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RELIGIOUS THOUGHT AND HERESY IN THE MIDDLE AGES

Pt. 2

BY THE REV.

F. W. BUSSELL, D.D. (Oxon.)

Perpetual Curate of Brushford, Devon
Rector of Northolt, Middlesex
Fellow and sometime Vice-Principal of Brasenose College, Oxford
Bampton Lecturer, 1905

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CHAPTER B. BUDDHISM AND HERESY: FROM QUAKER TO ANARCHIST

SECTION I. EARLY BUDDHIST IDEALS; WITNESS OF ASOKA AND THE HELLENES

Buddhism as known in the West : its wide evangelism.—That the Further East played an important part in forming the later syncretism of which we write cannot be doubted. Two extreme schools have hitherto confronted each other with axioms which cannot be reconciled : the one deriving all religious creeds from hindustan and ascribing an impossible antiquity to the aryan immigration, the other disparaging indian influence altogether. We have the names of aryan gods in the records of the Amarna period (*c. 1500–1420* B.C.) but there is no proof of later intercourse, so that Max Muller may be justified in believing hindu culture and religion to be primitive and indigenous. After Alexander the case is very different : not only have we the valuable witness of Pyrrho and Megasthenes (*300* B.C.) two generations before Asoka, but we know that the greco-bactrian kingdom in the next two centuries created a link between east and west and enabled each to know and borrow from the other. King Menander (Milinda) is a buddhist convert and the most notably lasting art-form in religious history is the quite hellenic figure of the seated Buddha, universal to-day in China and Japan. Again, apart from these facts, there is the mission-spirit of the new church which may justly be thought to have directed its influence westwards into the new regions opened up by the greek invasion. There is the tradition of a train of hellenist ' monks ' from Alexandria taking part in a great buddhist assembly (*c. 170* B.C.) which it is unwise wholly to ignore. There is reason to believe that the very ancient trade-route between Ceylon and Egypt was kept open in the period *300–1* B.C. ; and also that both by sea and land Persia and India were kept united by traders who (like the *colporteurs* of a later day) were sometimes

pilgrims and missioners. Some stoutly maintain that the Essenes are a buddhist community; thus both in Egypt and in Palestine these ascetic and quaker-like bodies are held to be connected with the earlier movement in Hindustan.[1] Clement of Alexandria speaks of the buddhist legend; Hippolytus, a little later, classes together Pyrrho, the hindu brahmans, the 'celtic' druids and Hesiod.[2] The story of 'Barlaam and Josaphat' was certainly current much earlier than the days of John Damascen (its supposed editor); and neither the sassanid religious revival (*c. 226* A.D.) nor the almost simultaneous movement of Mani were free from indebtedness to Hindustan; indeed with the latter we stand on firm ground. We can now say with certainty that the *quietist* yet in some phases antinomian movement which roused alarm in the west before and during the crusades has a direct descent from the indifferentism of indian ascetics. It seems likely that in the 'muslim philosophy' (after *820* A.D.) and in the rise of the adiaphorist sects direct indian influence was not wanting: the peculiar development of shiite tendencies is most certainly not wholly due to parsism, and the doctrine of Divine Right. Meantime from the days of Nestorius, zealous missioners or expelled priests traversed Central Asia and disputed with manichees and buddhists. During the first four or five centuries of our era—we cannot doubt—there was a constant

[1] Arthur Lillie, in a curious and uncritical book, has repeated the old statement that the Essenes are buddhists and that our Saviour was an Essene: a recent french book bears witness to the knowledge of Christ in Tibet—to both we shall have occasion to make further reference (*La Vie Inconnue de J. Ch.* by Nicolas Notovitch, Paris (Ollendorff) 1894).

[2] He also gives countenance (*Refut.* i 13)to the persistent legend that Democritus conversed with gymnosophists in India, priests in Egypt, astrologers and magi in Babylon; his chief reference (i 24) makes it clear that the jains (*svetambaras* and *digambaras*) were familiar figures to the western mind and that at home they were by no means distinctly marked off from the brahmans; they are ascetic vegetarians, naked celibates who despise and even court death—though the brahmans coming from the further side of River Tagabena marry and are given in marriage, admitting women into their community: here we have clearly that division between the *novice* and the *hermit* or recluse which is found everywhere in buddhist countries and was a constant mark of all medieval heresy. But it is needless to enlarge on the knowledge which the Greeks had of brahman ideals after Alexander (Calanus, Dandamis and their voluntary *Sati*): what is important to notice is that these figures are much more akin to *jain* and *buddhist* standards than *brahman*.

interchange of ideas between religious communities which followed the rule of ascetic and vegetarian celibacy. Even if the direct influence be denied there is proof enough of an unconscious intercourse between like tempers and theories in this age ; and the result of this was projected westwards in the several movements which roused the alarm of Church and State in our period. In any case a study of medieval heresies would be incomplete without some reference to so striking a parallel, even if we have to grant the developments to be wholly independent.

The Real Nature of Buddhist Teaching.—Certain facts have but recently been established by students of buddhist origins. The jain movement—we know to-day—was both independent and perhaps slightly earlier ; the *sankhya* school had already set out most of the tenets which we identify as buddhic. The reaction against brahman influence has received too an undue emphasis and it is clear that the jain and buddhic brotherhoods excited at first very little hostile attention. The latter very soon became an imperial and established church under Asoka without any direct attempt on the part of the State to suppress nonconformity, or supersede brahman rites and influence. Both these ' heresies ' were concerned solely with the individual's deliverance, and in this matter the older creed allowed the greatest latitude. Each was a ' way of life ' and a practical guide for conduct, first for novices and next for an inner circle of professed monks.[1] Both were *protestant* movements in favour of self-dependence and ethical purity against ritual and ' indulgences ' of supposed magical efficacy from without. The motive was happiness here and hereafter and nothing more or less.[2] The

[1] The *memoria technica* in psychology, list of mental and mystical states and the like, can be neglected without loss by a student of the practical influence of these teachers :—these solemn numbered lists and rarefied distinctions are due merely to the logical refinement of the Hindus and their love of analysis ; also to the need of helps to memory in an instruction largely, if not wholly, oral.

[2] No sober critic reading Asoka's inscriptions can doubt that *amrti* is immortality in paradise, promised instead of reincarnations in this hopeless earthly cycle : or that to the common people this preaching was a chief inducement : or that *parinibbana* was held out as a goal of striving, whatever its true sense—if it ever did have a single meaning—to a very few even among the *bhikkus :* or that the main attraction was the wholly optimistic promise (at least so it seemed to the eastern mind) that *in this life* it was possible to attain ultimate bliss by personal effort, and that

appeal was issued directly to those lovers of oriental calm for which the brahman system (with its ritual, its compromise and concessions to dravidian devil-cult) had made little provision. Jains and buddhists alike held up for admiration heroes who had overcome. If either system can be called a religion, it was really a hero-worship : careless of the gods (though by no means denying their existence) they placed them, as did the stoics, beneath the level of the Wise Man. Kindness to others and considerateness to all sentient life followed their self-love as a natural corollary ; there was no sort of meddlesome altruism or pretence at self-sacrifice in the highest stages of the spiritual life. The higher ideal was always found in the man who did not even know that other people existed ; and, even for the proficient, the chief virtue was a negative tolerance and a supine benevolence. Yet on the other hand no church was ever more active in the mission field or in the service of mankind by spreading abroad the glad tidings. Other individualist systems began and ended with the Self and its salvation ; but buddhism was at once individualist and evangelical, and achieved the remarkable success in the Further East which need not here receive further attention.

Quakers or Vegetarian Celibates : affinity with Western Types.—While we do not admit the direct affiliation of the judaic essenes to any buddhist prototype, their great resemblance shows the persistence of a universal ideal common, it would seem, to all mankind. The highest aim of man was to be a water-drinking, vegetarian celibate, offering a cult of pious memories to dead saints in simple rites and by solemn processions round a cairn covering sacred relics.[1] This worship displaced the gory and perhaps cannibal rites of primitive peoples as well as the costly system of hieratic animal sacrifice. It appealed to the low caste and the poorer yellow races [2] to whom it opened out hopes of peace, honesty and public order. It relieved such people from the terrors of devil-dancing and sorcery, revealing a spiritual

even the less competent could get nearer to it by his own endeavour and thus avoid odious rebirth in the present cycle.

[1] The *tope* and the tree were the two symbols of the saintly departed ; cf. *Tree* and Pillar-cult in Crete and Mycenæ. In the *sanchi* and *amoravati* topes men are represented worshipping *trees* and *cairns*.

[2] One modern theory even traces it, in spite of its emphasis on the 'noble aryan path' and the thraco-scythian name *Sakya*, to an indo-chinese movement *against* aryan supremacy.

life within the reach of every man who would take pains with himself. From such hopes the haughty Aryans had expressly excluded them.[1] Whether in technical axioms the Soul was denied or not, the inner calm of the self was the sole object aimed at. The *ego*—as a feverish and restless entity, striving vainly after objects it could not control, desires it could not satisfy —was to give place to the *non-ego*. The antithesis is no less strong than in our contrast of *matter* (world or flesh) and *spirit*. The two orders of things were set in opposition ; this world and the next, or the false and illusory world and true being,—just as philosophy had done from the very beginning. In the end this mystical calm places the saint on the highest pinnacle of development ; he is exalted not only above the *samsara*, the wheel of birth[2] but above the gods themselves. This philosophy is the 'wisdom of the other bank' *prajna paramita*—a phrase reminiscent of Virgil's *tendebantque manus ripæ ulterioris amore*.[3] There were the worlds of *appetite* (kama-loka) and of *spirit* brahma-loka) set over against one another[4] : only he who lives in the latter is secure against shocks and disappointment and the illusions of *mara* who spreads her net to catch souls. As with the gnostics only knowledge saves (*bodhi*,—of self not of external facts). It is likely that Gautama himself taught that a man could, as it were, slough off his gross body and make himself by force of will a thin aerial envelope or magical body, so as to pass through material obstacles, influence things at a distance and read thoughts : and it is also clear that he did not value these privileges as much as serenity of soul. Yet modern writers are not justified in suppressing these details and representing him as a mere godless positivist who came to mankind with a message that there need be no hereafter. He reproved current brahman notions on union with Brahma as gross and material—not because he disbelieved in it : he simply denied that unspiritual men could

[1] Severe laws were made and enforced in the Southern States (U.S.A.) within living memory against the instruction of slaves.

[2] Already in Buddha's time familiar in the orphic west as κύκλος γενέσεως, no doubt in complete independence : yet it has been suggested that the name Pythagoras = Buddha Guru !

[3] And in its completely opposite sense showing the difference of eastern and western ideals.

[4] As in the doctrine of Two Realms common to all hindu creeds, Parmenides, Parsism, the Gospel, Islam.

know spirit. The true method of approach was only within reach of the celibate monk, not to the greedy householder—to Mary not to Martha: only the homeless pilgrim and mendicant can find the way. No doubt moderate fasting and concentration of mind granted visions and dreams to which Gautama was far from denying value. Immortality then was open to all by self-help and personal effort, by surrender of outward things, by quietism: it was not the privilege of a caste, or to be won by painful devotion to priestly rules. The evangelists are only preachers, not celebrants or officiants in a magical rite. 'The Tathagata 'can only teach; it is the hearer who must make the effort.' In the famous 'Last Words', 'O Ananda, be to yourselves your 'own beaconlight, your own refuge; seek no other! Let '*dharma* be your light, and asylum! Whosoever is a light unto 'himself, the same is my true disciple.' Again 'not by tonsure, 'vows, discipline, continence—not by holy inspiration, alms-beg-'ging, rule of silence or outward acts—is a man a true *shaman*[1]; 'not by these can a man earn the release which no worldling can 'ever know; the real *shaman* is he who has quieted all evil 'in his soul'. There are but few among men who can attain this and their chief duty is to show the example and convince mankind that ideal happiness can be won and is not denied to us by any jealous deity. Nevertheless 'few can reach the opposite 'shore; many run up and down our bank always preparing 'to cross the current'.[2] Compassion, long-suffering and love form an integral part of this peace of mind and where a wise man emerges into full buddhic knowledge and self-consciousness there is even hope for the age in general. 'Wherever a super-'natural person is found that race will prosper; but he is by no means found everywhere.' He is not conceived as an innovator but as a restorer of the old pure religion,—not as an antisocial influence but as a healer of strife and a saviour of society. Thus in an earthly State, as well as in the private soul, everything *matters*, as effect must always follow cause, and idle acts or words

[1] Or *sraman*, the Σαμαναῖοι, Γαρμᾶνες of Strabo.

[2] It is more than possible that this simile is connected with the thought (or fact) in Hippol. *Rel.* i 24 οἱ δὲ ὁμοίου βίου ὀρεχθέντες ἐκ τῆς ἀντιπέραν χώρας τοῦ ποταμοῦ διαπεράσαντες; the *Peratæ* too were thought to have got this name among gnostic sects from this 'passage across' (though the origin of the word is very likely quite different): *ib.* v. 16 περᾶσαι τὴν φθορὰν μόνοι δυνάμεθα. ἐστὶ δ' ἡ φθορὰ τὸ ὕδωρ.

must bear fruit. Hence the duty to cure oneself of illusion and sin, and to show other men how easy and blissful is the method. It will be noted that, in spite of this public service of the true *bhikku* and the historic fact of a great buddhist empire or confederacy under Asoka, there were never wanting accusers of their *antisocial* tendencies,—as in St. Paul 'forbidding to marry and 'commanding to abstain from meats' is typical of 'seducing 'spirits and doctrines of devils' (1 *Tim.* iv 3). The strenuous and practical aryan of Persia objected as strongly to the influence and example of hermits and homeless beggars as could any modern anti-clerical writer.

Asoka's Witness to Buddhist Doctrine : no Driving Force in Nihilism.—Asoka's inscriptions (little more than two centuries after Gautama's death *c. 480–477* B.C., and perhaps seventy years after Megasthenes) clearly show the chief features of the new faith. It is not atheist or thanatist, but appeals to man's sense of humanity, his longing for a better life hereafter, his desire to address a higher power which can help him. 'Believe in God '(*isana*) for He is worthy object of obedience . . . religion is 'where the name of God rests . . . give glory to God.' The prize of the holy is to be united with Sugato, the deity of happy advent.[1] The king's aim which he sets before his subjects is very clearly 'otherworldly': it is to obtain *svarga* (paradise). 'Salvation (that is, to be good) brings blessings for inhabitants 'of this world; and in the next endless moral merit accrues from 'charity well bestowed. All the heroism which I Piyadasi, 'beloved of heaven, have here exhibited is in view of another 'life hereafter.' (*Rock Edict*, x Burnouf) 'For all who differ 'from me in creed I pray that they with me may attain eternal 'repose! . . . Earthly glory can bring but little profit, but to 'toil for heaven is hard either for peasant or prince unless by a 'supreme effort he surrenders everything. . . . May my loving 'subjects—who so well know my affection for *Buddha*, *dharma*, '*sangha*—[2] attain bliss both in this world and the next. . . . 'Piyadasi, friend of the devas, values alone the harvest of the 'next world: for this cause has he chiselled these words that his 'sons and grandsons may make no fresh conquests; for this is but 'ruin, confusion, violence; only the *dharma* can bring true

[1] So Turnour transl.

[2] The *teacher*, the *law*, the monastic *Order*.

victories '. He will have order and mercy to reign throughout his realm ; no animals are to be sacrificed ; wells are to be dug for man and beast, roads, bridges and post-houses kept in repair ; the good tidings is to be published by eager envoys to an expectant world ; the holy mendicants are to give their time to the perusal of the Seven Treatises of the Canon and learn them by heart.[1] It seems certain then that, as conceived 200 years after his death, Buddha was the apostle of a glad and comforting ' way of life ' answering many doubts about death and disease and unmerited distress. This doctrine promised for converts a joyful hereafter in *svarga*, relieved from endless migration. The special cult is saint or hero-cult of a simple kind but the old worships were not abolished ; the holy saints and martyrs do not reside in nothingness but still continue their kindly interest in human affairs.[2] So too with the homeless mendicants ; like St. Francis of Assisi, their heart overflowed with goodwill to all living creatures, the more because their own peace of mind was so amply provided for. In their vigorous propaganda they bear as little resemblance to the monks of later times as the massive *viharas* to the primitive booths of the brethren. Active missioners (*edict* iv Senart) they were enjoined by Asoka (*edict* xii) to conciliate heretics and win over by gentle persuasion. Within these two centuries they were spreading their gospel over Cambodia, Gandhara, Surashtra, Petenica ; and the king directs them to travel to the furthest limits ' of barbarous countries for the welfare and pleasure of all mankind '. The driving force behind such strenuous preaching could not have been nihilism. It is this attitude to life which has been repeated in a hundred forms in the west ; whether (as is likely in certain cases) from actual contact and imitation, or as one of the limited number of possible world-theories which in every age and clime the uniform human mind must reproduce. It is a thoroughly *humanist* reaction against

[1] Clearly 7 quite short and simple tracts—two being only of the length of our *Epistle to Philemon* ; the enormous literature of buddhism had very modest beginnings.

[2] Schopenhauer and Buchner seem quite wide of the mark in laying a chief emphasis on *atheism*, *pessimism* and *acosmism* : Monier Williams' estimate is certainly wrong, Rhys Davids' rendering of *amrti* is quite unconvincing and makes the success of the religion a perfect mystery. Mrs. Rhys Davids most rightly calls attention to the element of joy and tranquil gladness which fills the poems of the early converts.

magic and creature-worship, an appeal to the sense of freedom within, an answer to the demand for personal happiness.

NOTE

PRIMITIVE TYPE AND NAME OF BHIKKU

As yet the ' monasteries ' or rather cœnobitic brotherhoods were neither permanent nor wealthy : Buddhaghosa represents as primitive a later development which (as in St. Francis' Order in the west) was in truth a perversion. In 300 B.C. Megasthenes (150 years and more after the alleged convocation on the founder's death) says nothing of stone structures, but depicts the *bhikkus* as celibate bark-clad pilgrims, bound to a wandering life and living on wild fruits and water ; in Strabo xv 711 Σαρμάναι *cod.* Γαρμᾶνες (who are quite distinct from the brahmans and less famous). They account their most important branch to be the *wood-dwellers* (ὑλοβίοι) eating leaves and wild fruit, dressing in bark, not marrying nor using wine : some are kings' counsellors, some physicians, some ascetics (καρτερία), some divines and charmers (ἐπῳδοὶ) skilled in knowledge of the condition of the deceased, begging from village to village : in their company are women who also maintain celibacy. Clement (*Str.* I 303–305) quotes or paraphrases this and compares with the Encratites : of professed disciples of Buddha οἱ τοῖς Βούττα πειθόμενοι παραγγέλμασι he seems to make a separate class. Bohlen was the first to maintain the *sramanas* (pali *sammana*) were buddhists ; Lassen held that the word referred more often to brahmans. Only Megasthenes uses form Σαρμαν-αι or -ες, Bardaisan the heretic, and Alexander Polyhistor prefer Σαμαναῖοι—one is *sanscrit*, the other *pali*. It is almost certain (Schwanbeck following Bohlen) that they are the same ; and Bardaisan evidently takes his knowledge from Megasthenes merely altering the word (Hieron. *ad Jovin*). It is worth notice that *suicide* is looked upon (by all hindu philosophers or gymnosophists) as νεανικὸν, and Calanus, a self-immolator, as ἀκόλαστος but Mandamis or Dandamis (*c. 320* B.C.) is a higher type :—he looked forward to a better life (μεταστὰς εἰς βελτίω κ. καθαρώτερον βίον (just as the sages generally held death as birth into the true life γένεσιν εἰς τὸν ὄντως βίον κ. τὸν εὐδαίμονα for all who have studied and practised wisdom). There is clearly no emphasis in either sect on annihilation nor is their pessimistic or rather dualist outlook one whit more marked than in any average greek thinker.

SECTION II. BLEND WITH LOWER CULTS: ANTINOMIAN NIHILISM IN INDIA AND CENTRAL ASIA

Humanism *versus* Naturism : cf. Epicurus.—If students are right in speaking of a primitive caveman's religion (not unconnected with bloodshed and cannibal feasts), it may well be that early Dravidians in Hindustan were then practising such a cult. Siva may be an aryan deity and the chosen patron of brahmans, but he covers the whole of a pre-aryan religion of fear. For the

appeasement of terrible gods by terrible means, the brahmans really offered no alternative and merely compromised with an existing usage which they could neither prevent nor remodel. Gautama (like Mahavira the jain) set up human excellence, effort and merit as superior to all these nature-powers. Though he laid no claim to divinity, it was inevitable that he should receive a homage by degrees becoming actual worship of a deity. Epicurus whose teachings were in many ways strikingly similar[1] taught a philosophy of hope rather than of despair and received a devout cult from his followers even in a most sceptical and secularist age. The shrine where the saint's relics lie is perambulated in solemn procession and simple offerings are made in gratitude to one who has solved the great secrets for mankind.

Contamination with Cthonic Worship: Sivaism.—But the fears of average men and their sense of dependence on higher powers thrust back this creed into *sivaism*, a mysterious worship of a supreme God (in the end rather destroyer than creator). It is supposed by some that this worship was marked by an ancient and secret ritual underground, in a succession of dark halls and deep grottoes, with terrifying alternations of gloom and light, and a final initiation in a dark chamber with no object of worship but the *lingam*. If buddhism claimed to be a return to the noble aryan path and the almost homeric or olympian worship in the open air of kindly celestials,—this emergence of a subterranean (or cthonian) and terrible element, must be due to dravidian revival. The brahmans are certainly not a pure aryan development; like the druids among celtic peoples, they derived much of their doctrine and practice from an earlier race. Gautama tried to restore a simple cheerful life of fearless self-reliance—a pelagian ideal for which India was certainly unprepared. Later history is the record of a long deterioration. The cult of Siva (representing a recurrent cycle of birth and decay) brought back the old virtue of fear, finding vent sometimes in orgy, sometimes in human sacrifice and cannibalism. In the innermost sanctuary was no figure of a man who had overcome and reached happiness, but a formless *herm* betokening that the same power

[1] See Hicks' admirable account *Stoics and Epicureans*, Scribner New York 1910, p. 166, 167. How true is Mme. de Stael's statement (*de l'Allemagne* Paris 1819) that Epicurus' system is really the only native greek contribution to philosophy!

which creates also destroys its handiwork. The Great Yogi Siva is also the great nihilist. The beatified human saint is pushed off the pedestal and a new deity installed who is *not being* as well as source of all life.

One possible source of Asiatic Antinomianism: Parsi Protest.—It is quite impossible not to associate this doctrine with the peculiar antinomian tendencies which recur once and again in the east and spread like a silent plague westwards. Let us compare two passages from asiatic writers separated by more than 1000 years, in which the distrust and abhorrence of nihilism is shown. In *Avesta* (Fargard iv) we read this injunction: 'Of a truth 'Spitama Zarathustra, the man who hath a wife is far above him 'who begetteth no sons; he who hath a house is better than the 'homeless wanderer and who hath riches and children than he 'who is poor and childless: of two men he who filleth himself 'with meat hath more of the Good Spirit than the man who ab-'staineth: he can strive against the onset of the fiend of death, 'against the winter-demon in thinnest garments, against the 'evil tyrant, and can smite him on the head, against the ungodly 'heretic (*ashemaogha*) who refuseth to eat.' This is of course the poor harmless ascetic of all time against whom (it would seem) the man whose religion implies worldly comfort and a 'hebraic' success is needlessly enraged. But a single turn will transform the blameless teetotaller and vegetarian into the magician acquiring black arts by his continence, about to become a real menace to the community. Hence a detestation and a fear which we shall find repeated in the west—a curiously double feeling of respect in the vulgar mind for the catharist *perfecti* and a fierce hatred of men of uncommon sanctity.[1]

Hatred and Fear of the Extremists in Islam.—We turn now to Moiz Mohammed Haidar's History of the Moguls.[2] 'The sectaries of Razi-ud-din used to put to death every one they 'met, deeming such murder a means of salvation bringing reward 'in the hereafter. . . . He was one of the accursed *Mulahida*

[1] This paradox is no greater than its complement, the union of mortification and licence, not merely in the same system (as that of Siva) but by turns in the same person.

[2] *Tarikh-i-Rashidi*, ed. Elias, Sampson Low 1895 p. 217 (part ii, ch. xvii): the author died in 1551–2.

' of Kohistan whose evil record is to be found in all histories. ' Most of the people of Badakshan are adherents of this sect ; ' they hold the world to be without beginning or end : [1] they do ' not believe in resurrection or a future state.[2] They say that ' while the Prophet was alive all the faithful were bound to abide ' by the statutes of the Holy Law ; but at the present day the ' whole duty of man is to speak fitting words and be faithful ' to their meaning.[3] All other ordinances are futile : sexual ' intercourse with kindred is lawful and its enjoyment need not ' depend on marriage-rites ; if one has a passion for some-one— ' be it daughter or son or mother—it is lawful to gratify it if it ' be practicable. It is also lawful for them to take one another's ' lives or property.[4] *In fact the sect of Mulahida*[5] *is the worst ' form of heathenism in the world.'* It seems that nearly three centuries after the mongol Hulagu's capture and destruction of Alamut (N.W. Persia) the sect still flourished in the hill country

[1] This was one of the chief articles of faith by which in cent. xiii the dangerous heretic of the west was to be recognized and convicted.

[2] ? of retribution ; clearly no more than the average buddhist did the Assassin face danger except for reward after death.

[3] Implies wholehearted loyalty to their chief and truthfulness with in dealing with other members of the sworn brotherhood : surely not with the rest of mankind.

[4] Trans. of Denison Ross ; must surely be wrong ; for ' honour among thieves ' is the necessary principle of all banditti whose hand is against the world ; it must be ' lives and property of other men '—not belonging to their confraternity. Or the reference may be to a harmless communism of goods within it.

[5] = impious, while *Chiragh-Kush* = extinguishers of the lamp—suggesting (as in the case of the early Christians) licentious orgies in the dark at the close of their meetings :—no doubt with equal injustice. These terms with the name Assassin, are purely opprobrious ; *fedawi* means ' devoted ' to the service of the Old Man of the Mountains. Marco Polo, ch. xxii also calls them *Mulehetites* and describes their overthrow (giving a wrong date 1262 instead of 1256). d'Herbelot says 'it is the plural of Melhed, *' impious, a man without religion* : Polo translates ' holders of heretic ' views ' as we apply the term Patharini to certain heretics among Chris- ' tians '. This easy transition from Assassins to Patarines is worth notice in a writer of cent. xiii : the one secret society seems to suggest the other. The capture of Alamut is described by Abul-faraj in his *Hist. Dyn.* of Jengiz ' descendants, and by Mirkhond (tr. Jourdain, Paris). The perhaps mythical story of the ' Garden of Paradise ' where the young emissaries were drugged, is fully recounted in Polo.

of Badakhshan and the region of the upper Oxus.[1] The Mullah Mohsin Fani explains thus in his *Dahistan* the title Ali-*Ilahiyah* by which they are sometimes called : 'This sect holds that 'spirits from heaven have appeared in palpable form, who 'otherwise could not be known. God Himself has taken human 'form,—especially in the person of Ali Murteza whose image (?), 'being that of Ali-ullah or Ali-God, they deem it lawful to worship. '. . . They say he returned to the sun when he left the earth, 'and the sun is his own proper nature and identical ; whence 'they call it also *Ali-Ullah*. They do not admit the Coran, as it is 'now extant, and believe that *God migrates into the person 'of their Imams*. In this age of the world they affirm that He 'was manifested in Ali-Ullah and his glorious posterity : Maho-'met was but a prophet sent by him ; for God, seeing that he was 'inadequate for his task, Himself took human form to assist him.'

Quaker Pietism evolves into a Social Menace.—We notice then in the above development, a simple quakerlike quietism, an epicurean 'way of life' with its due honour to the good men who first taught it—by degrees corrupted by blending with materialist doctrines of the hereafter, devil-worship and moral indifferentism. This evolution, beginning no doubt with the indo-scyths and Kaniska, took place in central Asia, and implied the permanent alliance with the very *shamanism* which Gautama detested. It seems also to have met and coalesced with the antinomian views which arose through a persian reaction against Islam—of which Ali was the convenient figure-head. The Incarnationist views wholly alien to Islam, gave rise to the peculiar loyalty to certain prophets or captains of banditti, whose commands override any known moral law. From hostility to the letter of the Coran arose a malignant enmity against all mankind who were outside the sworn brotherhood. Thus the harmless water-drinking and celibate mendicant became the type, for popular prejudice, of the dangerous antinomian, bent upon the overthrow of the true religion, all social order and all moral restraint.

[1] To-day they survive in Shignan and Roshan as *Ismaili*, and acknowledge the *Agha Khan* at Bombay (as noticed elsewhere), sometimes bearing his name (437).

DIVISION B

Islam : Its Sects and Philosophy

PART II

(ii) Final Form of Arabism

CHAPTER C. CULTURE UNDER THE LIBERAL CALIPHATE (TO AVICENNA)

Section I. Foreign Influences in Irak and Arabia

God as in Islam as Supreme Will : Transcendence and Agency.— Islam starts, like judaism but unlike hindu theosophy, from the concept of deity as a unique and almighty Being absolutely distinct from the world. Philo, under greek as well as eastern influences, had tried to modify the antithesis and bring the two into relation by means of the Word and the Powers. The problem before scholars and divines under the short-lived liberal caliphate was to safeguard the *transcendence* of God without denying His efficacy in our world : religion demanded that He should be conceived as near and powerful, if not with the *motakallemin* sole agent. But philosophy (which at least in the alexandrine age was never *pantheist* in the strict sense) insisted that His true essence and inmost nature should be kept from contact with the world and held to be unknowable. The Coran taught, entirely in accordance with biblical views, that God is great in *nature*, in *history*, and in *miracle* ; that He knows and watches over everything, the physical order being so directly the result of His unique agency that a too curious science was held to be sacrilege.[1] God created the several ranks of intelligent life, men, angels and djinns, that they might adore Him—' for His pleasure they are ' and were created.' The idea of revelation follows the lines of this conception of God as Absolute Potentate. It is external ; He commissions an angel to convey a message. There is no trace of the belief that spiritual beings in any sense emanate from the divine nature ; the highest archangel down to the meanest reptile, all are creatures of His will. Following a rough division

[1] An attitude in which augustan and later writers of Rome, like Seneca and Lucilius, shared, no less than Thomas à Kempis.

of faculties [1] we might say that while the hellenic deity represents pure *thought*, the God of Islam is pure *will*.

Problems of Human Freedom : the Libertarians of Basra.—Islam turned, sooner than the Church, to the human problem of *predestination* and *liberty*, because this arbitrary voluntarism in pure theology did not lend itself to analysis or discussion. It seems clear that the Coran by no means teaches a doctrine like calvinism (as it is commonly conceived), and inquiries on the extent of man's freedom were by no means ruled out as impious. Nevertheless God's absolute power over man as a creature had certainly been the accepted doctrine during the glorious period of the first triumphant advance : and very naturally. In *728* A.D. died Hassan of Basra, leaving two pupils who openly declared themselves partizans of human free-will and took the title *kadarites*.[2] Wazil the son of one of these pupils founded the sect of *Motazel*, acknowledged a *physical*, while he denied a *moral*, necessity, and, like the opponents of Gottschalk the reprobationist a little later in the west, held it impossible for God ' to wish or decree evil '. At the same time he strongly maintained the abstract unity of God and denied to Him qualities or attributes : ' he who affirms an eternal quality by the side ' of God is already a polytheist.' This strict monotheism was soon to be modified by the influence of the new greek learning. Indeed Hodeil of Basra [3] already rejected this very negative theology, and, without granting to the divine qualities [4] separate or hypostatic existence, regards them as modes under which the divine essence appears in a world of relations. God knows in virtue of a *knowledge* which is His very essence and His will is only a mode of His knowing :—' God wills that which He *knows* ' to be good.' Already we have the true mark of an intellectualism which will afterwards bear the name *thomist*. It is plain that he also tried to reconcile the novel greek theory of an *eternal* world with orthodox belief in a creation by will *in time*. In one respect

[1] Which can never be otherwise than artificially held apart or contrasted ; witness the disputes of thomists and franciscans or Kant's discussions on Reason.

[2] Or *qadarits :* a doubtful term which might imply the *power* or decree of God, or the *liberty* of man.

[3] Whose long life covers the first century of the Abbasids (752–850).

[4] Shahrastani is certainly hasty in comparing his views with the hypostases of the Christian Trinity.

he showed a liberal spirit which was not long to be tolerated in the east: *natural* law (he held) was anterior to all *positive* or revealed religion and was quite adequate as a guide. As in the later treatise of Ibn Tofail [1] a man can have knowledge of God, of moral distinctions and of duties, before any express revelation: by his own reason he can discern the beauty of holiness. Before the liberal if not sceptical caliph Mamun (*813–833*) disputed Nazzam, also a member of the Basra School, upholding *man's* will as the sole free activity in a world of necessity. God, Bichr believed, had not created the best of all possible worlds (as the Motazel held that He had); we may not however pass judgment upon the world since our standards of opinions on the good and just are not valid in connexion with Him. He is not bound to satisfy our demands; man is free, can by natural light discover and follow the wiser course; at God's fitting time, he can benefit by His positive revelation in Islam. It was clear however that Bichr thought that that world would have been a great improvement on the present, wherein all men were called to the true faith and were all found worthy of salvation.

Emphasis on Divine Transcendence: Negative Theology.—This tendency to lay stress on God's remoteness and on negative theology was increased by Mamar, who in a sense excluded God from the natural order, by denying that He directly produces *accidents*—but only *bodies*: in them resides an immanent force which of itself produces birth and change and the various forms and activities of being. God (quite in the greek manner) cannot know the particulars of our world—is there 'knowledge in the 'Most High?'—for if He is the object of His own thought there is division of *knowing* and *known* in a simple substance, and if His object be outside He is dependent upon it and no longer Absolute. Once again then, our concepts are irrelevant and cannot be applied to Him and He is in the last resort unknowable.[2] But

[1] Pococke's well known *Autodidactus*.

[2] When Baron Carra de Vaux terms this theology *pantheist* in his valuable work *Avicenne*, Felix Alcan 1900, p. 29, I cannot follow him: it is true that some aristotelians call the Philosopher by the same name because he places in nature a 'something divine' (θεῖόν τι) and makes Nature (somehow personified) the single really efficient cause in the world instead of God. But Mamar's tendency is surely clear: to remove a too absolute power from a universe (where otherwise everything that is or happens is equally divine as in spinozan positivism) and allow some inde-

Tomamah (+ *828*) expressed an opposite doctrine which shows greek influence : the world is a *natural* act of God and not an act of *will* ; it follows of necessity (as in spinozism) and is an eternal and necessary counterpart of His essence. About this time appears the first notice of the Active Intellect, from which issue forth the forms of beings ; the saved will not see God in person but only thus secondary being or First Intelligence.

The Word or Reason : Sifat Anthropomorphism : Predestination.—Already then under Habit and Hodabi (pupils of Nazzam) appeared the distinction so intolerable to islam, of God and His Reason or Word. Djajiz, page to Nazzam and a distinguished member of the basrene School (+ *868*), held (like Kant) that 'in knowledge there is no freedom' ; knowledge which we receive passively comes from natural necessity ; *willing* is only a mode of *knowledge* ; a voluntary act is merely one of which its author is conscious. Hachim, son of Djobbay (+ 915) found the negative theology then current very unsatisfying, and tried to justify the conception of divine attributes as modes having a subjective value for one who knows the divine being. His father blamed this attempt and returned to the teaching of Hodeil. It is not then surprising that an *anthropomorphic* protest arose in the sect of Sifat ; some even maintaining (like Kerram in Syria (+ *869*) that God has a body and form like His creatures, that we can speak of and explain His qualities as if they resembled our own.[1] Again, opposed to the libertarian sect of *Motazel* we find arrayed the sect of *Djabar*—as Austin against Pelagius. Man, says Djahm, (a teacher beyond the Oxus), has no power over his acts, no will, no freedom, God creating directly all his acts as He creates other beings and results in the natural world ; punishment and reward follow as necessary consequence of necessary acts :—that is, man's categories are vain and

dent life for the world and our freewill. He is therefore rather correcting Pantheistic tendencies than promoting them.

[1] The jewish sects of Karaites, no less than the Christian monks of Nitria, held these material notions, for fear of losing all conception of the divine in the absolute nothingness which we find taught by Bar Sudaili and the pseudo-Dionysius. But the theory has much deeper roots ; it went back to the gnostic Primal Man, met and satisfied the Incarnationist beliefs of the nearer east, and was already giving proof of vitality in the doctrine of the Divine Imamate and the apotheosis of Caliph Hakim of Egypt ; cf. de Sacy's work on the *Druzes*, Paris 1838 xix.

futile, he cannot apply any judgment to the world of men and of things; we can never say it ought to be, only it is so. Man in the scheme of the world is only a mechanical toy with an unhappy gift of consciousness.

Greek Wisdom as a Perfect and Final System: Activity of Translators.—When the greek wisdom was made known in translations during the short liberalism of the last prosperous Abbasids, Aristotle was without doubt held as the chief exponent of a unique, final and perfect system of thought. Philosophy appeared to muslim eyes as a real unity, not a series of tentative surmises but a body of doctrine, a living science which unbroken tradition had handed on. Masoudi tells us 'how the hearth of human 'cult was transferred from Athens to Alexandria, how Augustus 'set up another centre in Rome, how Theodosius closed the latter 'school (!) and brought all learning to Egypt, how under Caliph 'Omar the chief place of study was transferred to Antioch and 'later, under Motawakkil, to Harran:' a very suggestive if not wholly accurate record. The aramean world began about *150* A.D. to study with impartial coolness the writings and doctrines of Christian and gnostics alike; witness the peshito rendering from hebrew into syriac.

The 'Nestorian' Versions: Greek Influence Unbroken for 500 years.—Edessa was already a resort of the followers of Valentine and Marcion.[1] Bardaisan founded his school and his peculiar literature in this important borderland of east and west. As we know to-day, he was certainly a gnostic and only in a few eclectic doctrines a Christian at all: his sect lasted on into the Middle Age as a separate body, as both Masoudi and Shahrastani testify. His astrology is just for us his most interesting feature. Without a doubt he did much to spread interest in the *chaldean star-theories* which appear so clearly in the arab philosophy—though in a form tempered by a knowledge of Aristotle and a certain regard for human freedom.[2] About *200* A.D. the bishop of Edessa consented to receive orders from the patriarch of Antioch; the aramaic spirit united with hellenism. Zeno closed in *486* (as we saw) this vigorous and independent school of Edessa because it was in sympathy with nestorian beliefs

[1] Duval, *Hist. d'Edesse*, Journ. Asiat. 1891 ii 262.

[2] Cf. Brandt, *D. Mand. Relig.* and the chapter on 'chaldean philosophy' 182.

on which perhaps its influence had been of no little weight. The scholars met on the more tolerant soil of Persia at Nisibis, and the shah himself, Chosroes Nushirvan, founded in *530* an academy for their use at Gundisapora (Djandisabour) where medicine and philosophy were studied for more than 200 years. The exiled 'nestorian' bishop of Edessa, Ibas, gave the first impulse to translation. Against this heresy the monophysites fought and protested, Philoxenus, patriarch of Antioch, having urged Zeno to ruin the heterodox 'school of the Persians'.[1] Both rival schools were engaged in making versions of the greek authors, and already a regular scholastic method of commenting on the text was popular, e.g. with the brilliant Sergius of Rasain who died in *536*. In sum, we have for 500 years before the arab inroad an unbroken tradition of greek culture, maintained both in orthodox and heretical circles by syriac scholars acquainted with greek.

Arabs already under Christian and Jewish Influence : Axum, Hira.—Nor did the Arabs arrive from their desolate steppes entirely untouched by such influence. Islam is in its essence and impulse little more than a 'republication' of the primitive jewish creed, corrupted, as Mahomet supposes, by idol-worship and by a dogmatic subtlety which threatened God's unique dignity. Iconoclasm was in truth a sister-movement, and it was hardly religious differences that made Leo III (*717–741*) the champion against the arabs of an hellenic ecclesiasticism which he detested. In Mahomet's day there were Christian communities in the Yemen, and a Christian kingdom at Axum, which had dealings with New Rome. Between the two world-empires there had long been established semitic or saracen principalities in the borderland, some embracing the Christian faith and accepting the emperor's suzerainty.[2] In the kingdom of

[1] Roughly, the nestorians correspond to *pelagians* who desire to leave something to man's agency and to safeguard the human and progressive element in Christology—the monophysites to the *austinians* who set in the foreground God's absolute power and the immediate absorption of the lower finite element in the divine. In dealing with such terms as *nestorian, austinian, pelagian* we are using only convenient adjectives showing the general tendency and ultimate deductions of doctrines, which in their extreme and logical form, were never held by their reputed inventors.

[2] E.g. the families of Salikh and Tanoukh, the dynasty of Ghassan (which in Nicephorus I, the successor of Irene in 802, gave an emperor to Byzantium).

Hira the Christian element was important: though a vassal of Persia, Amrou (+ *568*) was son of a Christian captive and himself became a Christian. Nestorian settlers attained to riches and honour in this kingdom of Hira and took the name 'Ibadites', 'servants of God'.[1] Arabs then had long been in contact with eastern creeds and culture—before the fourth and greatest exodus of the semitic family. Islam at first not only borrowed wholesale from the Bible, and even from Christian belief, but was inclined to favour these 'peoples of the book', hoping to gain their help against its real enemies the idolaters. The Arabs were only a conquering caste, but neither intolerant nor destructive; they kept in office[2] the roman and persian clerks of bureaus. Jews and Christians (wearing their cross) were seen at court as advocates, administrators, physicians and men of science.

Liberalism of the Abbasids: Patronage of Unbelievers.—Under the first abbasid Mansur (*752–774*) the work of translation went on apace; besides greek books, pehlevi and parsi gave up the secrets of Bardaisan, Marcion and Mani.[3] In cent. x it will be seen that the gnostic element plays an important part in the syncretism which passed westwards under the scarcely deserved title of 'arab philosophy'. The Arabs knew *Mazdeism* both in its original form and in its peculiar restatement by the last named leader of heresy: of indian systems they knew much less, though the vogue in the west of *Barlaam* and *Josaphat* shows that buddhism, at least, was not unfamiliar at an early date; and though Kharismi, the astronomer under Caliph Mamun, compares indian with hellenic methods. This caliph founded an official bureau for translations within the palace; at its head was placed Honein, a nestorian ibadite from Hira who

[1] Sôme interpret the word *bogamil* in the same way, as 'servants or friends of God'.

[2] In Egypt, the coptic element, and in Persia, such civil servants as John Damascen and his father, were simply invaluable; the Arabs knew no organization save that of the clan and (as we know) when the 'vanquished land took its victor captive' the clans retired sullenly to the desert again, while the caliphate, now (like the roman empire) ecumenical and non-national, became a victim first of disintegrating *persian* thought and manners and next of *turkish* violence.

[3] Masoudi *Golden Meads* viii 293: Flügel, *Mani and his teaching* 1862, notices the acquaintance of Arabs with his *dualism*.

maintained his favour at court under the three successors to his patron.[1] His son Isaac (+*911*) and his nephew Hoblich continued the work ; the former rendered into syriac, besides the usual aristotelian writings, Plato's *Sophist* and various commentators as Porphyry, Themistius, Ammonius and Alexander. Other nestorians were Naimah from Emesa, translator of John Damascen's notes on the last four books of the *Physica*, and Matta of Deir Kana (+*939*) who, like Naimah, gave a version of the *Sophistic Elenchi*. Kosta the son of Luke[2] of Baalbec under Caliph Motasem studied in Greece itself and returned with books from the dead to the living hearth of hellenism. Tekrit, a jacobite Christian, studied under the great Farabi, flourished under Caliph Muti and died in *974*. With Abu Ali the son of Zaraah (+*1007*), also a learned jacobite Christian, we reach the times of Avicenna : besides versions from the greek he wrote original comments on Aristotle and Porphyry's *Isagoge*.

Planetary Cult from the Sabians : Their Negative Theology.— So far then for Christian activity in a work so much applauded and honoured at the caliph's court : but it would be unfair to omit mention of the labours of the Sabians (to whose peculiar and still doubtful religion we must so often refer). The influence exerted by these curious survivals of chaldean belief was far greater than muslim doctors are inclined to allow.[3] In the sacred books of the Mandeans the thesis so often stated in our survey is explicitly repeated as the cardinal tenet : *a messenger from the light-world visits the realm of darkness to conquer its king.*

[1] He is said to have been poisoned by orthodox christians for spitting on an image of Christ, 873 : it is curious that in legal proceedings against him Motawakkil allowed the Christians to judge him according to their law.

[2] A work on the *distinction of soul and spirit* attributed to Kosta has been published in a latin version in *Bibl. Phil. Med. Æt*, Innspruck 1878.

[3] Three other similar systems are the Yezidi, the Nosairi, and the better known Mandean—of which we have spoken elsewhere : Chwolson in his monumental work identifies the sabians *of the Coran* with the elkesaites as ' people of a book ', and compares the kindred but not identical sect of the Mandeans : he holds that these ' elxaites ' owe their title to a prophet of the name from N.W. Persia who attempted like Zoroaster a reform of *parsism* : common to Elkesaite and Mandean sects were the constant rites of baptism : here again we may name Brandt's *Mand. Writings* Göttingen 1893, preceded by his *Mand. Relig.* (Leipzig 1889).

From this 'gospel' Mani is said to have borrowed his battle of light and darkness: it describes the *descensus ad inferos* in epic form and with wealth of detail but the chaldean origin (whether in the myth of Ishtar or of *Tiamat*) is not to be concealed. Meantime (as we saw) another sect, but of star-worshippers, welcomed the protection offered by the name Sabian, and enjoyed peace under its disguise. In *830* Caliph Mamun bade the men of Harran choose one of the *religiones licitæ*: 'no one knows', suggested a friend at Court, 'what a Sabian is, except that Mahomet 'tolerated the sect; take their name and continue your own faith. 'no one will raise objection and you will be allowed to live in 'peace'. Now this second class of pseudo-sabians are of great importance: they adored the stellar-spirits and continued the primal priestly religion of Chaldea. It is likely that at this time there was both an exoteric and an esoteric cult—the former polytheist, the latter tending to a gnostic monotheism. *The planets are subordinate to a Supreme Deity*, as in other gnostic systems. In a prayer to Ursa Major, appeal is made to the force which the Creator placed in that constellation; Jupiter the planet is conjured in the name of the 'master of the lofty edifice, first 'among all beings, the only eternal'. Nedim in his *Fihrist* (*c. 987*) states that many notions and terms in their system had been derived from peripatism; e.g. on *matter* and *form*, *time* and *space*, the elements, movement. They held that weighty doctrine of the fifth body (πεμπτὸν σῶμα) which marked off the perfect stellar world from our own evil region: *beneath* the moon things were compounded of four elements, beyond, of the pure and eternal fifth element alone. The Supreme God (as in most gnostic systems) was beyond knowledge and possessed no attribute which the finite mind could understand. Man's higher soul, common to him with the angels and opposed to the animal soul, moves the body freely: in the angel it is *active*, in man only *potential*. Intellect is a function or form of this Soul which perceives the essences of things. In a word, their debt to Aristotle and his successors is quite evident. Like the Mandeans and Mani,[1] like Zoroaster long before, they are pure and explicit

[1] It is interesting to note that Kindi (+ 873) under Caliph Motamid combated expressly the *manichean* cosmogony together with their views on the constitution of heaven and the theory of light and gloom.

dualists and contrive to combine this theory with Aristotle :[1] 'Spiritual beings are the forms of light (Shahrastani) 'corporal 'beings are forms of darkness . . . the two realms are opposed 'to one another, perfection and excellence belong only on high 'and not to the gloomy depths'.

Influence of Erudite Harranians.—The learned and eclectic character of Harran is seen in its two prophets *Agathodæmon* and *Hermes*, names which plainly connect their faith with Egypt.[2] Tobit of Harran (*835–900*) was a friend of Caliph Motadid before his accession and continued afterwards in favour. He displays the wide and encyclopedic interests which marked this age ; he knew three tongues, greek, syriac, arabic ; wrote 150 works in the last language and sixteen in syriac. Among his disciples were Christians and jews : his skill in geometry and stellar science was remarkable and in his careful renderings he corrected many errors of earlier translators. In this 'Sabian' school we note the union of philosophy with the exact sciences and the observation of the stars, agreeably not merely to chaldean origins but to their neoplatonic kinship. It is then clear that a richer literature existed in Mesopotamia and Irak than anywhere else in the world at that time.

Rich Compound of Creeds and Ideas in Irak : The 'Theology' Neoplatonic.—Aristotle held the chief place but his doctrines were seen dimly through the mists of the pseudo-*Theologia* which consists of excerpts from Plotinus' *Enneads*. Plato was certainly less known and Plotinus almost wholly ignored, no doubt owing to the similarity of name : Porphyry his pupil was a much more familiar figure ; Galen, Marcion and Mani complete the curiously eclectic list of chief authors. The general features of the Philosophy were however those of Plotinus[3] and no other ; and when the pythagorean is named by Masoudi (*966*) as the

[1] No doubt by exaggerating the distinction of *heaven* and earth which he helped to make so popular.

[2] De Vaux thinks that this gave an impulse to the problem of *prophetism* in Islam, not strictly in harmony with the belief in Mahomet as the final revealer of God's will. A further revelation (as in montanism) was always possible : on one hand this might lead to private heresies of subjective hallucination, on the other to Messianic hopes, to *imamism*—with tendencies taking curious form in the shiite sects.

[3] Plotinus, when he *is* named, bears the title 'Sheikh of the Greeks' *al-iounani* in Shahrastani (the learned historian of eastern thought).

system most in vogue, he clearly means the alexandrine revival to which the later movement called neoplatonic was loosely affiliated. The Theology of Aristotle [1] a pseudonymous compilation—was turned into arabic by Naimah of Emesa in *840* and Kindi revised the translation for the son of Caliph Motasim. It is just an exposition of Plotin's triad, *One, Mind, Soul*—the latter hypostases being first and second emanation from the unmoved *One*. If *One* be compared to light, *mind* is fire, and *soul* is warmth; this soul is bond or link between the eternal thought-world and the perishing world of sense: she is believed to create the beings of the stellar universe and the sublunar sphere when she turns from the contemplation of mind in which lies her truest activity. In the universal *Mind* are all later beings, all together as one in the thought-world; in the *World-Soul* are all forms and forces of life: at the last verge of existence, in the last feeble stage of emanation from the *One*, is the singular, a living concrete individual with which our finite experience must make a start. *Love* (which is a form of *intelligence*) can however unite even these remote pilgrims or prodigal sons with their Parent: 'the upper world is altogether love.'

Kindi: Stages of Human Reason: the Active Intellect.—Kindi (*873* under Caliph Motamid) is the first genuinely arab name that meets us in this long period of Enlightenment. This pioneer steeped himself in all the current learning and showed a wonderful and versatile energy. He accepted Plato's axiom that no one can be a *philosopher* without being a *mathematician*, and shows by the absence of emphasis in his writings that the mystical side of thought had not yet evoked the attention it was to receive later. He is the first to distinguish *four* states of Intellect of which *three* are within the soul and *one* without: (1) In potency δυνάμει, (2) in act ἐνεργείᾳ=the scribe actually writing and using the art which lay dormant, (3) the νοῦς ἐπίκτητος, (4) the Active Intellect. Nothing moves or develops into the *actual* unless stirred to do so by something already *in act*—the well known canon of Aristotle against Speusippus and pythagorean evolution (from chaos or night or the world-egg). *Soul becomes intelligent by means of the Active Intellect* (νοῦς ποιητικός). When looking up to this it unites itself with intelligible form

[1] Dieterici, Leipzig 1882, 3.

(νοητὸν εἶδος) : this form and the Active Intellect are the same within the soul—but only there (and for the time being)—for Active Intellect is not identical with the intelligible. Here in terms not very clear or precise is stated the problem which will exercise so deep an impression on the western world—the problem of the origin of supersensible knowledge.

Abu Zeid of Balkh was a traveller and a critic (like John of Salisbury) of the thought and tendencies of his time : he refers in his *Book of Creation and History* [1] to the Carmathian sectaries, to Hindus, Manichees, Harranians, and Parsis : he mentions the distinguishing dogmas of *dualist, pantheist, anthropomorphite* schools. He states the problem of immortality as conceived by one sect : ' soul must either be destroyed by the death of its ' owner, *or* absorbed into the world-soul, *or* migrate into another ' body '.

Section II. Farabi and the Basrene Brethren

Farabi : the Problems of Universals.—Farabi, the most distinguished name before Avicenna, was a turk from the banks of Jaxartes, pupil of a Christian doctor who died at Bagdad under Caliph Moktadir (*907–932*). He betook himself to the Hamdanid court where he lived in the muslim habit of a sufi : he followed Seif Addawla to Damascus, dying there in *950*. Like other members of his school he was encyclopedic in attainment and interest ; but he was not a physician. At first sight he appears as a decided nominalist. He believed *individuals* were first substances ; *singulars* are prior in substantiality and have more right to the name of substance than the *species*. But he allows that from another point of view the *universals*, as being fixed and permanent, have more right to the name substance than these transient *singulars*. In this he recognizes the basal difference in outlook of the theoretic and the practical reason : the former is only concerned with the general and enduring, the latter wholly with the actual concrete being in which for the time the universal embodies itself. ' The *Universals* ' he says, ' do not exist *in act*, ἐνεργείᾳ ' except by means of ' *individuals* : only then do they exist and so their existence is by ' *accident* : not that they are themselves by *accident* ' for they

[1] Ed. Huart, Paris 1899.

are unchanging and eternal in essence but their existence *in* '*act* can only be by accident'.[1]

Problem of Knowledge : Mystical Union with Active Intellect.—He has the same quadruple division of intellect that we noticed in Kindi ; but there is a closer approach to what may be termed a mystical or purely idealist attitude. 'When the being who is 'intellect *in act* (*actu*) comprehends a thing, that which he 'comprehends is not a being external to his essence, but is *his* '*very essence* itself', *thought* and *being* are identical ; only when they are one is there true knowledge. When this second stage of intellect seizes the νοητὰ εἴδη it becomes at once the intellect ἐπίκτητος (*el mostafad*). These intelligibles are the *universals* and exist *objectively* in the world, but when *subjectively* appropriated by us (in the union of *thought* and *being*) have a different kind of existence and are set free from many of the predicates (which belong to actual being) *time, place, site, quantity, mode.* In this obscure doctrine he seems desirous of displaying a hierarchy of *forms,* rising up and out from matter and separating themselves by degrees from it. In the scale of *being, thought* and *value* (which is identical) there are lowest elements, then nature, the soul's inferior powers, then *virtual* intellect ; above this again νοῦς ἐπίκτητος (the third stage), then discarnate intelligences, lastly the *Active Intellect.* This is *pure form* and acts upon our slumbering reason as sun upon eye (which even in the dark is *virtual* or potential sight, only becoming *actual* seer when the light comes). At this point our intelligence mounting upwards[2] by induction from *particulars,* meets and coalesces with νοῦς descending on the reverse path from the most perfect and general downwards to *singulars.* This is precisely Plotinus' second hypostasis, in which all forms coexist at once and together (ἀολλῆ) ; divided out or planted here and there in our sense-world they are united above in the world of Forms (κόσμος νοητός).

The Two Worlds, *Creature* and Commandment.—In *Jewels of Wisdom* (Dieterici §§ 27, 39, 41 etc.) Farabi explains from an *ethical* and personal point of view what is certainly obscure

[1] *Letter of the Second Master in reply to questions submitted,* § 10 : Dieterici, Leyden 1890 : Prantl's *Hist. of Logic,* ii 301 seq.

[2] In *Jewels of Wisdom* § 41, he uses this very conception : 'the human mind is that which goes to meet the intelligible forms', and thus enters a world more truly divine than the world of *the creature* here below.

in a merely *logical* exposition : man is composed of two substances separated in essence ; he is a citizen of two worlds of *creation* or of strict sovereignty, and of the *commandment.* ' The ' spirit is like a mirror and the theoretic intellect is like its polish : ' the intelligible forms (νοητὰ εἴδη) are there portrayed and their ' reflexion cast on its surface by a divine effusion, like bodies ' upon a mirror already polished with care '. Here pure logic takes that *mystical* turn which it is so often apt to do ; the vacant glass reflecting nothing is made clean by man's own activity, but the final irradiation is a divine grace from without. Thus ' if a ' man's soul is pure and he turns to the world of the *commandment,* ' he joins the higher realm and attains supreme bliss '. In sum, spirit is the purified soul, fixed on its own proper object, and like an untarnished mirror reflecting every flash from the divine, until these detached rays settle into a fixed and steady radiance —which is life eternal. We may note that God knows and governs both these strongly contrasted words or orders : Farabi is not one of those who deny Him a knowledge of *singulars.* In the lower world of sovereignty the *One* (as form) explicates itself into the *manifold* of our experience. ' The skies revolve according ' to the First Principle and there begins the world of *creation :* ' whence the purified soul ' can return into the world of the *com-* ' *mandment* by which everything becomes once again one '(*sub specie æterni*).[1]

Farabi's Political Theories : Souls in the Hereafter.—Farabi takes this hierarchic form of *psychology* (as he believes) from the universe itself ; and he introduces it also into *politics.* Just as the soul's faculties rise up in orderly sequence until it touches the world of truth, the body is a corporate state with heart for president, the city is an organism or a graded system, the universe itself is a harmonious whole : stars and the sublunar realm follow one on the other and are linked together. We may not dwell on his *politics* : but their close resemblance to Dante's ideal must be noticed : he is convinced that the *most perfect state should include the whole of mankind*—a logical result of muslim propagandism by no means so strange or novel in the east as might be supposed ; a principle indeed which must be found in every

[1] It is difficult to see in Spinoza or modern absolutism aught but a restatement of this doctrine, at any rate in its essential features and promises.

proselytizing theocracy. As in Dante the supreme ruler or *imam* is not a coercive authority; the master of the habitable earth must have, not skill in arms, but intelligence, memory, eloquence, temperance, a taste for study, firmness without obstinacy, love of justice and loftiness of soul. No doubt like the greek publicists [1] he prefers monarchy, but if these virtues cannot be found combined in one man, let there be two (consuls) or three or even more: thus he arrives at something like a modern Cabinet. As in Dante the perfect State on earth looks beyond itself to an eternal end; its aim is to procure for the souls of its subjects happiness after death. In the life hereafter the souls are closely united to one another and each addition of a soul delivered from the flesh sensibly augments the happiness of the group; we may compare Plato's *συναγυρμὸς φρονήσεως*. 'Souls 'are joined together as one intelligible form is united to another'. In this heavenly kingdom ever receiving fresh supplies of knowledge and happiness 'there is increase like that of a scribe's talent 'in writing'; and this increase is indefinite. Two things must be noted; language is used which might be turned in a monopsychist channel; yet our author is clearly bent on safeguarding in the 'collectivism' of soul-substance hereafter both the sense of progress and development and the certainty of individual consciousness and bliss, experienced by the several centres or souls, unmerged in any impersonal unity beyond.

He Contrasts yet Conciliates Plato and Aristotle.—For the proper understanding of the too famous medieval dispute about Universals, Farabi gives us by his clearness and sobriety no little aid. Trying to conciliate the thought of Plato and his disciple he shows the different tempers in which they seem to approach the same problem. Plato (he thinks) held himself aloof from earthly affairs while Aristotle loved them and sought honour and fortune; the one spoke by myth and parable and demanded purity of heart for the understanding of wisdom, the other ordered and classified ideas and explained them for the use of all men alike; the one placed at the top *substances*, the most general notions removed from sense and particularity, the other taught that *individuals* were the primitive reals.[2] Thus he regards Plato as a

[1] *Pace* Professor Barker.

[2] Wherein, as we saw, Farabi shows that there is no real conflict, only different points of view.

mystic, Aristotle as a 'secularist'; the preacher demanding *moral* purity contrasted with the logician demanding *mental* clearness : the lover of *forms* opposed to the student of *particulars* : the believer in a *creative* fiat against the upholder of the world's *eternity*. Without sacrificing his thesis of their concordance, he can point out the empiric and sensualist element in Aristotle, who in his *Analytics* makes the senses sole avenue and source of knowledge ; *intellect* being thus in one sense merely *experience*. But he holds that this was the real meaning and import of Plato's reminiscence (*ἀνάμνησις*) ; for our first impressions are unconscious and 'he who reflects seeks to grasp that which experience 'has already placed within the soul, and it is then as if a man 'recollected himself'.[1]

The Brethren of Basra : their Lodges of Instruction and Definite Policy.—The sect of the *Brethren of Purity* at Basra must be once more briefly noticed—a subject on which F. Dieterici has spent for more than thirty years a patient labour of love (from 1858). They founded various centres, (the first 'masonic' lodges), confined to members and designed not merely to spread culture but to exert an influence on politics and society. 'In each region where our brethren find themselves let them 'have a private hall for meetings at fixed times, where no one 'else shall have right of entry, where they may study science and 'converse on their hidden doctrine'.[2] These conventicles were something between an orphic community and a later cœnobitic society : for there were ranks among the members according to capacity ; and if one taught, another less gifted could contribute money ; and from these unequal elements arising from mutual needs was formed a harmonious whole. Advancing beyond the letter and perhaps the dogma of Islam they seemed to have held the principle of *salvation by knowledge*—common it may be said to most medieval thinkers. Their religion was a syncretism which admitted the writings of Moses and the prophets, a popularized philosophy—in which many ancient elements met and were

[1] Cf. unconscious cerebration and the doctrine (perhaps now exploded) of the two sides of the brain, of which one works more rapidly : it must be confessed that he deals in a rationalizing vein which we hardly expect with a theory closely joined in Plato's mind to *transmigration*,—in which Plato (at least) was without doubt quite serious.

[2] Dieterici *Die Abhandl*, etc. Leipzig 1883.

fused. Their grades of initiation (at intervals of ten years) promised the disclosure of ever loftier secrets ; and the proficient who had adhered for fifty years was believed to acquire the *angelic intelligence* (that is, surely, permanent union with Active Intellect). We cannot but see in this a direct result of a theory which must have been long familiar : *at a certain stage our mind becomes of itself divine*, or (in a more popular and mythical phase) entered into full union, either with its guardian-angel or with the divine reason conceived as a single hypostasis as in Philo or Plotinus.

Philosophy and Faith against Literalism and Works.—It is plain that they denied that religious literalism and moral works could grant this privilege : for them the religious law of the Coran was imperfect [1] and contained errors which only the Philosophy could correct. True doctrinal perfection would arise only by a closer union of Islam with greek wisdom. Their *encyclopedia* aimed at providing this supplement and completion. The Brethren were warned ' not to reject any knowledge or scorn any ' religious belief, because their aim was to include and harmonize ' all creeds and all sciences '. Man's *differentia* is found to lie in his morality, which is quickly given an intellectualist turn : ' the qualities by which man won the day over the brute creation ' in the presence of the king of the Djinns, consist in the mainten- ' ance of those sciences which we, in a fashion as terse and direct ' as possible, have united in these fifty and one treatises '.[2]

Their Cosmology and Wide Syncretism.—The cosmology of the Brethren followed the unvarying lines of alexandrine Emanation. The first effusion from God's being is creative *reason*, in which are the forms of all later beings ; a second is universal *soul*, still a simple and primitive substance : from this as final stages issue first universal *matter*,—from it *body* itself with which soul now becoming multiple unites and gives order and beauty to the visible world. This creation God *wills* and *knows* but He is not Himself the creator. The syncretism

[1] So Tanhidi tells us († *c.* 1009) who was both a *Sufi* and an encyclopedist of the school of Basra.

[2] It is interesting to note their fondness for the pythagorizing syzygies or pairs (*matter* and *form*, *cause* and *effect*, *night* and *day*, *male* and *female*) which the syrian pseudo-clementine writings must have made familiar in the east after 250, no less than the obvious dualism of the parsis.

of the Brethren is clearly shown in an appeal to the disciple (Dieterici *Macrocosm* § 91) to embark with Noah on the vessel of salvation, enter the heavenly realm shown to Abraham 'our father', appear with Moses on the right side of Sinai, be delivered from the stains of the flesh like Jesus 'who is so near to God', come forth from Ahriman's darkness to behold Jezdan, secure admittance into the temple of Ad and Tamoud to view there the celestial spheres of which Plato makes mention, which are not spheres of stars but spiritual Intelligences. Here in solution are all the elements which, receiving clearer and more detailed exposition from Avicenna, will pass westwards, and, summarized (but not notably modified) by Averroes, will enter scholastic thought in the first years of cent. xiii.

Section III. Avicenna

His Anomalous Character : Doctrine of Illumination.—The life of Avicenna was spent under the titular sovereignty of Caliphs Tai (*973–991*) Qadir (*—1031*) and Qaim (*—1075*), when the unhappy Successors of Mahomet exchanged the perils of direct authority for security of life and tenure and three names occupy more than a century.[1] He wrote on every conceivable subject, but we are in the main concerned with his work on metaphysics and psychology—including those *mystical* treatises which are so great a puzzle to modern students acquainted with his dissolute habits.[2] On ethics proper he left like Hegel very scanty fragments, and indeed he was but little qualified to discourse on the subject. Ibn Tofail[3] says that he wrote his *Chifa* according to accepted peripatetic doctrine, but that his complete truth must be sought rather in his *Philosophy of Illumination* (or

[1] For his life see de Vaux' excellent recital, chap. v 127–157.

[2] Mehren has done for Avicenna in this respect what Dieterici did for the Brothers of Purity : at Louvain 1887, *The Bird* ; at Leyden several editions of the *Hay ben Yaksan*, mystical allegory (1886, 89). The *Icharat* (with *The Bird*) and comments on sufism 1891 ; treatises (1894) on *Love*, on the *nature of prayer*, on *deliverance from the fear of death*, on *influence produced by pilgrimage to holy places and prayers repeated there* : in 1899 a treatise on *destiny*. Besides these Avicenna wrote *Astrologers Refuted*, *Solomon* and *Absalom* (a mythical apologue on the soul's release) and a treatise on the *Soul's Return Home* ; a further treatise on the *Philosophy of Death* (written for his brother) exists in persian in the British Museum.

[3] In his *Self-taught Philosopher* tr. by Pococke, London, 1700.

Eastern). Averroes (*Tahafut*) remarks that Avicenna's disciples think that he only called it *Eastern* because it contains the beliefs of oriental people, *divinity being for them a study of the heavenly bodies*. It is likely that some of these wished to divert his theology into chaldean or hindu channels. There is no ground for attributing to this work any new doctrine not contained in his other mystical writings. This method of *Illumination* is obtained by the *ascetic practice* of the sufis 'if they are 'still faithful followers of Islam'.[1] Now this illuminative method is nothing but the mystic teaching of neoplatonism in which was embodied the later but cognate belief and practice of sufism.

The Two Worlds and Stages of Soul's Ascent : His Rejection of Pantheism and Metempsychosis.—Avicenna follows Farabi in referring *sense* to the world of the *creature*, *intelligence* to the world of the *commandment*. Above these is a third sphere which is veiled from both faculties. Our *practical* reason presides over the animal world which it is its duty to rule : our *theoretic* reason looks upward to the regulative principles above it. While Farabi was content with three stages of the mind above and outside which as a fourth is placed Active Intellect, Avicenna gives four ; the new grade being that in which mind apprehends universal and necessary truths.[2] Above the fourth or *acquired intellect* is a fifth, which he calls Holy Spirit and attributes only to a very few men ; at this stage mind knows and grasps truth directly and without a medium. The potential phase he compares (*Icharat*) to a niche for holding a lamp ; the two next to the glass and oil of a lamp ; next the wick ; last the fire from without which is Active Intellect. 'It is clear' he says, 'that virtual 'intelligence does not issue into actuality except by cause 'of an Intelligence which is always actual' : that is, the great axiom of Aristotle against the evolutionists, that perfection cannot be a *result*, only a prior *cause*. Therefore, for his loyal

[1] Says Hadji Khalfa in his *Biogr. Lexic.* ed. Flügel iii 87 : this is to be contrasted with the way of *argument and speculation* which if united with faith in revealed religion is the method of *motakallemin* (or orthodox divines); of *falasifah*, if the inquirer does not believe or believing keeps the two separate and distinct. 'There are thus 2 ways' says Khalfa 'of attaining knowledge of the Author of all things'. This reference to the Double Truth (of science and religion, of reason and faith) is of interest.

[2] E.g. whole greater than part, if two things equal same they are also equal to one another.

disciples even in man the true completeness of the mind cannot be altogether a growth from within but a new force added from without by that which is always perfect. *Mind* says our author expressly, *does not understand anything except by its junction with Active Intellect* (*Ich.* 179) in which reside the eternal, intelligible forms (νοητὰ εἴδη), *but it does not itself become it.* This doctrine in Farabi and his successor is an adroit reconciliation of *empiric* and *idealist* views. He recoils from any pantheizing tendency to which his theory might seem to lend support : he has a strong belief in personality : ' is there any state in which one doubts ' one's own existence, is not sure of oneself ? Whether drunk, ' asleep, or in meditation, one always grasps the self . . . not ' what you see or touch, a limb or heart or brain, or even a ' collection of all these members ' : the self is something more than an aggregate of parts or a complimentary title given to the sum of psychic and bodily faculties. Immortality follows from this distinction : a reasonable *Soul* is an independent spiritual substance which knows and grasps truth without mediating organs : *body* is merely its implement or utensil. His proofs of Survival are curiously free from any *mystical* or even *moral* implication ; they depend, as in Plato's coldest manner of dealing with such evidence, on pure *metaphysics.* Each soul is created separately [1] and cannot exist before the body is formed to receive it. Every being perceives within itself a single force which acts and freely governs the body ; another soul suddenly introduced would be powerless, there would be no harmony or correspondence between spirit and the material which it has to employ. Hence he decides against *transmigration*—no doubt then a popular belief in some circles—with the same arguments which Aristotle might use.

Astralism in his Neoplatonic Theory of Procession.—The Procession of Being from the One he has treated in a New Year's gift to Emir Abubekr.[2] It is quite needless to repeat that from the One issues the world of *Ideas*, from this the world of *souls* ; the

[1] *Nadjat* 51, an abridgment of the *Chifa* or ' Healing '.

[2] Where he explains mystically the letters of the alphabet prefixed to certain *suras* in the Coran : if he supposes that these letters represent or symbolize different degrees of being, he resembles those gnostics who attached magical value to the greek *vowels* and held that each one was related to the several planets and had power over them.

Ideas are almost described as angels turning towards God, concerned in imitating Him as their higher duty and happiness and fulfilling His commandment upon earth in intervals of contemplation. There are in the *psychic* world a number of beings not separated from the world of matter : clothed in the most subtle and perfect envelope, the souls of the spheres administer their departments and achieve between themselves a sort of unity because of the fervent love which courses through the ideal world. Each has a special number peculiar to it which binds it to one of the Ideas. In the physical world are (not *angels* nor *souls* but) impersonal *forces* wholly infused in matter and controlled by magic. Contrary to usual doctrine, the visible *corporal* world, even extending to the ether, comes last, the higher natures having circular, the lower various—indeed disorderly—movements. The stars, then, do not in this theory seem to occupy so lofty a place as in the usual system.

The usual theory is not nearly so cognate to platonism and the plotinic ideal world : it is a blend of Aristotle and the ancient chaldean *astralism*. In the form which became later so familiar in the west, God stands at the top or apex : from Him [1] the First Caused, pure spirit or Mind (*primum mobile*) ; thence, the body and soul of the utmost sphere, and second mind ; from this mind issue soul and body of planet Saturn, and a *third* mind ; from this mind again, body and soul of planet Jupiter, and a *fourth* mind for the sphere which comes next to him in the order of planets ;—from the mind of the last planet or Moon issues a last intelligence, Active Intellect : and upon this depends our sublunar world. It is certain that we have here a compromise between two views : —the *gnostic* separated a hostile planet-world from a saving influence which descends through them even down into our sphere ; *platonism* (and in a certain degree *peripatism* also) saw no ultimate dualism between parts of the universe, only a gradual efflux from perfection and a failure of force at each successive stage. The *minds* of the spheres are somehow kept distinct from the bodies and souls ; which, however, they are said to produce : *and it is by conjunction with the last of these that man attains* to an uplifting past the material to the realm of pure ideas and true being. The Stars are then (as with

[1] Conceived in abstract terms as the One, the Necessary Being, the First Cause.

Plato and Aristotle) the first visible gods and the planets though less perfect are still composed of a tenuous and refined matter to which our earthly matter has no counterpart. This primitive astrolatry was revived in the very place of its chaldean origin by syncretists who united it with elements of every other known religion. The more enlightened thinkers were fully convinced of the unity of truth, of the identity of *natural and positive* religion, and found no difficulty in believing islam, recognizing the celestial influences, and adhering to the monistic theory of emanation :—in themselves three separate systems which cannot be reconciled. So too their encyclopedic knowledge led them to redact a *corpus* of all possible sciences to form a coherent and harmonious whole ; they were not beset like the modern mind with the irreducible antitheses of science in its various branches and of the conflict of religion in its turn with any and all of these.

Problem of Transcendence and Cosmic Agency : Gradual Descent of the Divine.—In the *Nadjat* Avicenna shows how the First Caused answers the recurrent problem, how did the One become the Many ? This second hypostasis is triple, because he knows the First Cause and knows himself, first as *necessary* in the light of the First Cause and as *possible* in himself. From the knowledge of the First Cause (the most perfect faculty in him) issues the *mind* of Saturn's sphere : from his knowledge of himself as *necessary* issues the *soul* of the utmost sphere ; and its body from his knowledge of himself as *possible*. So far as the Saturnian mind knows God he creates a Jupiter's intelligence ; the soul and body of his own sphere in the same fashion as described. Many readers will agree with Gazalith at this ' procession ' is simply incomprehensible. Yet it may be favourably compared with the refinements of Proclus on Plotinus and the complexity of the divine orders in the latter platonists. Its motive is clear : the *intransigeant* Unitarianism of Islam must be transcended to explain how the universe came into being at all. The philosophers learnt from the greeks to avoid this unreconciled dualism, by fusing the divine gradually with the world, not abruptly as in vulgar pantheism : a decent interval was set between the sovereign and the last and meanest of his subjects. Again, the Harranian influence was quite strong enough to provide a ladder, or means of harmonizing, in those ancient deities of the east, the stars and planets. The movement of the spheres

is not (as perhaps in the earlier chaldean phase) fatal, constrained, or malefic ; it is voluntary, an act of homage to ultimate perfection ; therefore it is *soul* that moves, in desire and adoration of the Good. It is not *mind* that sets in motion or directs, though it may be the remote cause ; for mind already has truth and the good and need not stir itself or anything outside to attain them (οὐθεν ἡ διάνοια κινεῖ). In a sense then, the motion of the spheres is a moral end : ' The principle of movement for the ' spheres is their passionate desire to resemble the Supreme ' Good ', that is, in the highest states of perfection allowed to them (*Icharat*). The first efficient motor is the soul of the utmost sphere ; and indirectly therefore the intelligence of this sphere is the First Caused who moves this sphere by way of *desire*.

Active Intellect, Last Intelligence of All : God Beyond Human Judgment.—The last mind of all, Active Intellect, governs our world and from it issue the forms which *matter* must receive there. The First Cause of all knows itself as *cause* ; and, though there is no end or motive of utility and purpose which impels Him to create, there is no necessitarian and unconscious efflux from His nature ; He is aware that ' virtue has gone out of Him ' and finds satisfaction in it. He seizes and grasps the world in a single instantaneous intuition : everything exists in so far as He understands it ; that is, has its cause in His comprehension of it. Thus *intelligence, cause, being*, are all one (*Nadjat* 67). But He does not know the changes of earthly things, else He would change too : ' He only comprehends the whole in a sort of univer- ' sal manner, yet ' (here he speaks from the religious side) ' spite ' of this no individual thing remains hidden from Him ; and ' herein is a marvel which only very subtle minds can conceive '. Evil has no substantive existence and is pure defect or vacancy. ' Providence (*Icharat* 185) ' is the enveloping of the whole by God's ' knowledge ; He knows what it should be to exist in the best ' order, and He knows besides that all this results of necessity ' from Him and from His embrace of the whole. This two-fold ' knowledge is Providence. He approves what He knows as the ' best order, and there is no need of quest or effort. The source ' whence the good flows down upon the world is in the knowledge ' that God has of the goodness applicable to the universal order '. Every cause of evil (if he allow its existence at all) is shut up in the sublunar sphere ; and having no hold upon ideas or intelligible

form ' attacks *individuals* only in limited periods of time whilst the *species* are exempt '. (*Nadjat* 78). A world wholly without evil could not have come into being : for us such an order would be inconceivable. Avicenna is quite ready (like other student optimists) to sacrifice victims of special disasters to the general good : ' God should not extinguish the irascible faculty in man ' or the element of fire in nature because both lead to untoward ' accidents in detail '. Treating of *Destiny* (*Risalet el Kadr*, tr. Mehren) he maintains that God and His own works are inscrutable and cannot be judged from our limited standpoint ; ' good and ' evil, ugly and fair, are not the same to man and God, or else He ' would not have created ravening beasts of prey . . . in creating ' He had not the same regard as you to feelings of compassion, ' did not follow the same principles of intelligence : in His ' wisdom, which our poor reason cannot penetrate, He has given ' His consent, you have not the right to exact from Him com- ' pensation for torn limbs or broken necks '. This strictly non-moral Being recalls the deity of Aurelius and will lead on to the First Cause of the philosophers and to Spinoza's God, who is wholly beyond good and bad, or indeed any human judgments (except possibly those of logic). But Avicenna's optimism reposes without doubt upon a firm belief in the soul's survival and future reward. Our soul's perfection here is to be wise and reasonable, knowing the world-order and modelling itself on the ideal world which the visible in part conceals and in part discloses ; when such a soul is set free from the body, it flies towards its end and goal and there enjoys rest. Only those who have lost the power to enjoy good will find no peace ; nevertheless, long divorce from matter will even purify the poor vicious soul. De Vaux adds an allegory or story ' mystically ' interpreted by Nasr ed din Tousi, much resembling the hidden sense extracted by Kingsley out of the farewell of Hector and Andromache. A king Hormanos stands for *Active Intellect* ; Solomon is *reasonable soul*, which issues from it without any mediation of *things corporal* ; Absal, his nurse, is the complex of animal faculties. The passion of Solomon for his nurse stands for *soul's* downward gaze and taste for physical pleasures—their flight to the western ocean shows the soul utterly submerged in the transient ; their suicide together in the sea is the end of body and (lower) soul in death. But Solomon is saved because the higher soul is immortal, and his

passion of desire is turned into aspiration after ideal beauty, when he has once seen the vision of Aphrodite Urania. The accession of Solomon to the throne of his father signifies his arrival at soul's essential perfection. All this is no doubt interesting and edifying ; but it is not in a very strict sense *mystical*. We are still without precise knowledge of Avicenna's concept of the operation of *Active Intellect* or of the union of souls in the hereafter with any divine substance.

Summary : A Harmony of Religion and Philosophy by means of Syncretism : almost at once rejected.—Such then is the final form in the east of the so-called ' arab philosophy '. It aimed at universality and a fixed dogmatic form : it believed every religion to be at heart the same, every science to be a department of a great and coherent whole. These students were assured that they had succeeded in adjusting the various parts to this ideal whole. For them ' Philosophy ' was a single system, in which they saw no conflict between the constituents which to us seem so far from blending. Harran, Plato, Aristotle, the latest School of hellenic thought, all contributed to this end and in Harran were collected all the most archaic elements of chaldean faith. They did not admit (or even conceive) that this syncretism could not be brought into line with Islam and its central doctrine of an arbitrary, personal, transcendent deity. But they did undoubtedly tend towards two presentations of the same truth, one *religious* and the other *philosophic* ; they contrasted *exoteric* dogma with an *esoteric* creed. Persecution arose not merely because the vulgar mind was terrified by any infringement of orthodoxy and convention, but because in practice esoteric teaching (such as that of the Pure Brethren) had often ended in nihilism and a denial of all religious truth and moral law. The East had not forgotten Mazdak, and the recent developments within practical Islam, though but slightly concerned with philosophy, were attributed to its influence. *Philosophy passed eastwards as a complete view of the universe and its truth, superior to the popular religious conception but not therefore contrary to it ;* just as it is conceived by Hegel and the hegelians. Hence we have already the concept of the twofold Truth. With Gazali and the more orthodox caliphate this system by which the wise could ' go on to perfection' was doomed, and almost at once became extinct ; yet not until it had passed on its theories to the western world.

CHAPTER D. DOCTRINE OF THE SPHERES AND ACTIVE INTELLECT: AVERROES

Section I. Theory of God and the World

Philosophy, a Recoil from Islam and Arabism: Alarm of Orthodoxy: Suspicions of Gazali.—Arab philosophy is not merely a passing episode foreign to the genius of the people among whom it appeared. It may be called more positively a reaction against arabism by those regions of the muslim world most remote from the peninsula—Samarcand, Bokhara, Cordova, Morocco.[1] Caliph Mamun (pupil of the Barmecide) represented a persian reaction partly mazdean, partly rationalist and eclectic, against the rigid system of Mahomet with its dogmatic voluntarism. This spirit was always esoteric and 'in opposition'. It was not, either in east or in west, a progressive movement; Averroes differs in no important point from Ibn-Tofail or Avempace, who did but continue in distant Spain the studies of Kindi, Farabi and Avicenna. Sufism met and blended with neoplatonic doctrines of ecstasy and union with the divine: peripatism supplied a logical framework and temperate formula for such unions with Active Intellect and indeed for a final absorption. It is clear that at the very outset Kindi held views on this subject beyond which the latest averroist did not advance in a serious degree. Farabi (according to some critics) held the hereafter to be fable; here and now man receives (as in buddhism) the recompense of his toil and the purified soul becomes *prophetic* as soon as the veil falls between it and Active Intellect;—in any case this greatest happiness is attainable in this life. Some held that the secret doctrine of Avicenna in spite of his exoteric defence of God's knowledge and the soul's life hereafter was pure pantheism of the type of Spinoza.[2] Against this whole hellenizing tendency

[1] Renan *Averroes* ed. 2, 1861, p. 90: in the same way all impulses in hellenic philosophy came from the fringe in contact with barbarism.

[2] Averroes, *Refut. of Refut.* x: Ibn-Tofail, *pref.* and Roger Bacon hold that this identifying of God and the world is in truth Avicenna's

Gazali protested. Without doubt, says Renan, he was the most original spirit of the arab school. In part akin to Hume, but still more like to Pascal, he tried to cure his doubt, which reasoning had aroused, by ascetic practice, by mystic dances of sufis which dull thought and bring to the mind the repose and contentment of bodily fatigue. In the interests of muslim orthodoxy he denied the laws of nature and the existence of *cause* ; God alone is unchanging and what we call law is only something we see habitually. His foes accused him of attacking philosophy and reason merely to divert the suspicion of the divines ; there exist treatises by him in which he gives the reconciliation of reason's antinomies ; and Tofail (*preface*) seems to quote from him an ambiguous counsel to a pupil, to leave behind what he has heard : ' when the Sun has risen there is no need to gaze at Saturn.'

A Complete Rationalism Attempted by Avempace and Tofail : Union with Divine only at the very summit.—Avempace took up the challenge on behalf of reason : it is only by gradual and patient advance in knowledge that man is able at last to identify himself with Active Intellect—not (that is) by *ascesis* or by any sudden irradiation by the divine. It would be possible (he believed) to form a social order wherein each man without painful effort should reach the goal, triumph over his animal nature, arrive at full possession of latent power by study and meditation, and so having reached perfection calmly await death ; which is the only experience that is now left untried and which has lost all its terrors. Tofail (or ' Abubacer ') is also a rationalist who believes that man can rise by training his own faculties to the highest perfection. But here the goal is mystical (though all the stages are human and pelagian) and the end is union with God. Of all this now forgotten literature this little treatise is the only one which has any real survival. *The self-taught philosopher* (Hay ibn-Jokdan) is adopted by Quakers for edifying reading. In both these spanish thinkers the *mystic* begins his work where the *rationalist* has ended.[1]

final word and genuine doctrine—all these build on the *Eastern Philosophy*, on which see last chapter : whether right or not, their opinion is worth notice.

[1] Before them ibn Gebirol ('avicebron), a Jew of Malaga, in the *Fons Vitæ* had set forth the same doctrine, but only began to exert influence at a much later date.

The Two Rival World-Theories : Creation and Evolution.— 'The entire spirit of arabian thought', says Renan in a remarkable passage (chap. ii § 3) 'and therefore of all Averroism, may be 'summed up in two doctrines intimately bound together and 'making up a complete and original interpretation of peripatism [1]; 'the *eternity of matter* and the *theory of Intellect.* Philosophy has 'never proposed more than these two hypotheses to explain 'the world :—on one hand, God free and personal, having attri- 'butes which determine Him ; providence ; causality in the 'universe transported into God [2] ; human soul, substantial and 'immortal : *on the other,* eternal matter, evolution of germ by 'latent force ; indeterminate deity [3], laws, nature, necessity, 'reason ; impersonality of Intellect, emergence and reabsorption 'of the individual :—the former view reposing upon a too exalted 'view of the *singular* or *part,* the latter upon a too exclusive 'regard for the *whole*'. In a word, acute realism confronted by nominalism in a form equally acute. It is not doubted that as Averroism reached scholastic ears it was wholly identified with this pantheizing theory ; but Renan is not justified in saying without reserve 'the arab philosophy *and above all that of ibn 'Roschd* must be decidedly classed in the second of these cate- 'gories'. It is now at length possible to do justice to a philosopher who never desired to be other than a faithful member of islam and is not wholly responsible for the doctrines which pass under his name. It is certain that unorthodox inferences were formed out of his expressions. Before him Gazali (himself accused of the vilest heresy) in attacking the *falasifa* had not called them unbelievers, but had rebuked them for bringing forward opinions not likely to subserve religious interests and offering material for mischievous constructions to other less enlightened men. It must in justice be said that Averroes, just like Farabi or Avicenna, was sincerely trying to establish a *philosophy* compatible with *muslim faith* : in this popular sense of the word, he is therefore a true 'scholastic'. The attacks of his orthodox

[1] He should have said *neoplatonism* with which (as de Vaux shows) he is somewhat apt to confuse genuine *aristotelian* teaching.

[2] As in cartesian or kindred theories.

[3] When we find ibn Sabin (under the early Fatimites in Egypt) defining God as the 'reality of beings' we see the chief text of medieval realism with all its latent dangers.

foes are more accessible to us than his original arabic texts or their crabbed and obscure latin versions, on which the Paduan School bestowed such tedious and inopportune labour. He is represented as a pure *evolutionist* and *determinist*; his world by some immanent force unfolds itself with inner necessity and no conscious providence presides over this explication—though it may vaguely be termed the 'unfolding of God' from an indeterminate to a determinate state.[1] Meantime this central Spirit—who is both *cause* and *product* and has no will or purpose as motive in self-revelation through the manifold and transient,—can be aware only of general laws and has no time to think about *singulars* or persons. All this is pure spinozism; and although Spinoza put out frankly and without reserve the logical deductions of jewish and arab thought, his system must not be fathered on those harmonists, mistaken though they may appear, who believed it possible *for a thinker to be at once a good philosopher and a good mussulman.*

His design to Reconcile Islam with Philosophy: Creation Eternal.—It would seem that Averroes was neither a *sceptic* nor a *peripatetic* nor a *pantheist* (in the strict sense). The 'philosophy' which he accepts and comments upon with an almost religious devotion is neoplatonism, not Aristotle's system.[2] He marks no advance upon the general position inherited and made welcome, never in substance altered, by the 'arabs'.[3] He is of a less mystical temperament than his forerunners, but he is hardly less neoplatonic. Some of his aryan and scholastic critics in the west were quite right in saying that at times this great semitic scholar misunderstood Aristotle's meaning.

His reputed dogma that the *world is eternal* by no means implied that it was self-sufficient or *causa sui*, developing by mere immanent law and necessity. Rather he upheld that the *act of creation* was *eternal*. God's agency is being renewed every moment, not as in deism relegated to a single act outside time: a continuous and incessant activity (he thought) is worthier of

[1] From Spencer's *homogeneity* to *heterogeneity*.

[2] Though we have pointed out how entirely the later elements were immanent in the stagirite.

[3] It is but in unessential detail that he modifies the accepted *corpus* of doctrine: at times indeed he seems even to welcome the corrections of Gazali.

the divine than an arbitrary fiat. The first creation did not take place in *time* ; to Averroes, as to other muslim speculators, time is the result of movement in the spheres. *The world is then eternal in that God is always creating :* it has an Agent and is not moved by its own inner impulse. In the same way, the heavenly bodies have a perfect and eternal life in that form of motion which befits their nature. But it is the Agent who imparts this movement, and enables them to maintain it for ever ; these spheres are ' ensouled ' and incorruptible, having spirits or angels presiding over each severally.[1] From God issues a single potency whence the whole universe is derived, a coherent and harmonious system, at unity with itself : this force, remaining one, penetrates into the *manifold* without becoming multiple. God knows the world but not as we reckon knowledge. He embraces all creatures in their truest and most exalted state of being.[2] *Particulars* God does not recognize in our fashion (as distinct individuals) but in a mode peculiar to Himself : '.My thoughts are not your thoughts neither are My ways your ways '. [3]

Intellect and Soul : Soul a Real Substance.—It seems quite unfair to accuse him of denying *immortality* to the soul, but he certainly held the *unity of Intellect* in the universe. Aristotle [4] has expressly sundered *νοῦς* and *ψυχή* : there was therefore for the muslim a profound difference between the faculty which

[1] Here also Averroes is no innovator ; he makes very few changes in the current views of *falasifa* on the sphere-souls and their procession (*πρόοδος*) down into our realm below the moon.

[2] This belief may well have been assisted by the peculiar jewish theory of *pre-existence of all things in God*—on which cf. Harnack's *Hist. Dogma* (*excursus* period I) : he well contrasts it with the hellenic view which exalts, not the *sovereignty and sole agency* of God, but the independent existence of *partial souls*.

[3] This is not of course meant to explain the exact method of God's knowledge *sub specie æterni*, only to combine the two notions, each important either for *philosopher* or *believer*, that God is not ignorant of the happenings of this world or of individuals' conduct and destiny, but that He apprehends these in a divine way which seizes the *part* only through the *whole*.

[4] And of course all the later hellenic development, in which (as Whittaker and others) *neoplatonism* is a far more authentic and legitimate offspring than the half-semitic brooding subjectivity of the Porch ; or even the ' philosophy of Epicurus ' which, though a thoroughly greek ' way 'of life ', is in effect the denial of all philosophy.

grasped universal truths valid for all reasonable beings, and the soul, variously regarded as the *creator*, *controller* or mere *resultant* of bodily desires and temperament. The Master's easy (and perhaps ironical) attitude toward *ethics* proper was seen again in these very faithful followers: *soul* was too closely interwoven with the material tissues and objects to exist apart (as a purely *speculative* question); the character, formed by the long experience of dwelling in a particular frame, had no value or meaning apart from it, whereas *intellect* is one, pure and unmixed.[1] It is wholly unconcerned with the slow and *serial* development or moral training of the person, at home only in the domain of abstract and general truths.[2] Yet, plainly with the utmost sincerity, Averroes remarks that the soul may very well remain *singular*, *personal*, *individual*, after death; but the arguments for this do not come to us from pure philosophy which in such a matter can supply no *coercive* proof: it can only show us that survival is possible and in the end we must leave it to revelation. It is certain that he did not (in the last resort) consider the soul as pure *resultant* or *harmony*, a convenient term for the assembly of bodily faculties and powers: with Plato he believed *soul* formed the *body* and therefore cannot be dependent upon it. He quotes with approval Galen's term, the informing faculty (*Tahafut al-Tahafut* 138 Cairo 1303 A.H.). It is something superadded to the innate celestial heat or vital principle in a creature. 'Each species has its soul, mediate between the souls of stellar 'bodies and souls in separate bodies here below'.[3] He also cites another author;—'when the *body* dies the *soul* returns to 'its spiritual condition and to those subtle bodies which are

[1] As in those famous texts wherein Aristotle is really commenting on Anaxagoras' dictum.

[2] There can be no doubt that the peculiar Christology of certain gnostic schools *either* helped in this sundering of our spiritual nature into two disparate elements, *or* was at the outset expressly derived from Aristotle's transient visitation of νοῦς in an alien world: the heavenly Saviour descends upon the man Jesus at baptism (καταφοίτησις) to deliver the message through him, and remains until the Passion when He somewhat cruelly deserts him.

[3] This is a true touch of that speculative *realism*, of which church dogma showed its counterpart in the *massa peccatrix* or Fallen Humanity (after Adam), as a single continuous and responsible entity.

'invisible'.[1] We cannot then deduce that *soul* is mortal because body is.[2]

Averroes believed himself a Pious Mussulman : Sage not to set himself above the Current Faith.—Averroes always claimed to be one of the faithful and never despised the needs of the average man. *Soul* may be individual and remain so : in *Intellect* there is nothing of the nature of individuality ; it exists only perfectly when freed from all conditions of individuality. 'But with 'soul it is quite otherwise'. Thus again he refused to deny *resurrection* ; 'Religious Law had always taught it before Philo-'sophy appeared and it was useful in leading average men to 'seek happiness beyond the grave'.[3] It is certainly clear however that he believed[4] *philosophy* to be a higher stage than *religion*, or (shall we rather say ?) to give a deeper insight into its truth. 'Religion has to teach the crowd ; philosophy can 'only be grasped by the few, the elect, and enlightened' (*Tahafut* 139). 'The sage' he continues in a noteworthy passage, 'must 'however not stand aloof : *he must accept the teaching that suits 'the people best'*, though he would not be debarred from private interpretation of dogma : '*for this class of philosopher only 'arrives at complete and perfect life and at happiness by associating 'with the multitude'*.[5] As to the kind of life in a future state he

[1] A very obvious analogue to Mani's tunics left behind in paradise by the angel-spirits driven forth into the world of matter ; and to the tenuous envelope accompanying soul in its migrations among the hindus.

[2] There is a very curious passage which must not be omitted or overcharged with meaning by the side of other statements : 'There is *one* 'soul and its *multiplication* to infinity in individuals is only a secondary 'matter'.

[3] It will be seen that the theatrical disinterestedness of paduan averroists like Pomponazzo (cent. xvi) falls wide of the mark : 'it was far better to follow virtue for its own sake rather than for its consequences or external rewards of which it is held by the vulgar to be the unpleasant condition'. Yet Pomponazzo himself would not have denied that to love virtue for its own sake and seek no other recompense because none was forthcoming, was scarcely a doctrine to be safely preached to the western mind after the fall of empire and papacy, after the examples of the Italian Renaissance, after Machiavelli's careful apology for the tyrant, and the ominous beginnings of the purely selfish and secular State.

[4] Like McTaggart and Hegel.

[5] This is just the attitude of Spinoza ; he warmly approved of churchgoing and would examine the younger inmates of the house on the text and teaching of the sermon. It may be contrasted with the cynical

entertained certain dim (but not less important) surmises: 'the future existence has a kind of generation loftier than that 'of our actual existence, constituting a more excellent order 'than our own cosmic order here' (140).

Doubtful Meaning of the Doctrine—Unity of the Intellect.—The Unity of the Intellect seems on inquiry to be nothing more than Plotinus' *νοῦς* as comprising the whole *κόσμος νοητός*. It only implies that there is a realm (of abstract truth) where all reasonable beings must think alike; that general ideas are universal. 'Intellect' he says 'starts from the *particular*'[1] 'but advances past it to lay hold on the *common* element (*τὸ* '*κοινὸν*) the *quiddity* of the species, which is not divided with the 'persons who are constituent members of it'. These *general* ideas (so held the *falasifa*) really existed together as units in Active Intellect (the counterpart of the neoplatonic noëtic world). We apprehend them only so far as we can enter into relation with it; when a man's reason does so it becomes perfect and completely developed; it is now in *actuality* (*ἐνεργείᾳ*) and has brought into full use its *potential* or dormant faculty. All the previous stages of reason's use form but a prelude; it is now awakened from its slumbers of bare possibility. It is this *intellectus acquisitus* which persists; for the primary intellect, as the merely virtual, does not persist in itself. At the summit then of spiritual development he puts a relation with Active Intellect which easily passes into mystical terms, can indeed with great difficulty avoid them. Now all mysticism implies, first, an almost exaggerated and exclusive emphasis on the subject or self; and secondly, an invariable desire to transcend it or fuse it permanently with the truth of which it is in quest. As to Aristotle at the end of his rational system—a long and prosaic pilgrimage from single and detached things to a coherent order of general truth—there takes place a kind of *illumination* of which naturally he cannot clearly explain the process.

mendacity of our own deist school who, for political and social reasons only, desired the mob to be kept immune from their own doctrines: religion to them (as to Critias) is a 'ruler's lie', to preserve property and make the poor respect their betters—just as Bagehot shamelessly justifies Monarchy only because it dupes the lower class into obedience to Whig oligarchy.

[1] There is always a sound commonsense *empiric* basis both in Aristotle and his arab disciples.

The old problem cannot be better expressed than in Dorner's language : 'The knowing subject' says he (*Pers. of Christ.* Period I. *ep.* i) 'which had 'by its own effort attained the dignity of absolute knowledge would soon 'fall under a doubt whether the Christ (viewed as objective) was not 'rather a *projection of the subjective consciousness* . . fully declared by this 'that the subject properly in itself is Christ'. So Doutté (*Magic* and *Rel. in N. Africa*, Paris 1909) 'The god is the collective desire *projected* or 'personified.' So to the impersonal brahmans, a personal supreme God was only a gradual creation, reached by reflection. The power of prayer and mental concentration or will-power was objectified and regarded as a real entity, outside the suppliant. (So Murray *Four Stages Gr. Rel.* New York 1912, p. 42). Zeus is called ἀφίκτωρ, that is the suppliant ; 'the 'assembled prayer, the united cry that rises from the oppressed, is grown 'to be a god and the greatest God'. So in the Diasia, the mysterious deity Μειλίχιος is but 'the personified Shadow generated by the emotion 'of the ritual—as Father Christmas is a *projection* of our Christmas cus-'toms' (29) . . . . 'magical ceremonies (32) produce a kind of strange personal emanation of themselves'. So Murray sees in the *Kouroi* the rise of a similar *projection*, 'the god is in part merely identified with the 'inspired chief dancer, in part the intangible *projected* incarnation of the 'emotion of the dance. . . . The worshipper of Bacchus became Bacchus '(142) simply enough, because in reality the god Bacchus was at first only 'the *projection* of the human bacchoi.'

Is Intuition the work of the Soul (Pelagian) or of God (Austinian)? This contact and interpenetration with objective truth may be called *intuition* by our own soul's eye at its clearest, but the objective element cannot be altogether ruled out. There is a sense in which (to use religious language) a divine grace is infused : 'In Thy light shall we see light'. 'Averroes' says Baron de Vaux 'seems in the end to identify the *Philosopher* and the *Prophet* ' : there must always be prophets on earth or great mystics.[1] So must there always be philosophers, a few great men must always partake in eternal truth. In a word, Averroes so far from delighting to upset the revealed faith of the people is very careful not to do so : again, his *rationalism finds its natural complement* (where it is helpless or transcended) *in an attitude which cannot be called other than mystical.*

Creation and Evolution : Criticism of God's Unique and Arbitrary Agency.—I have set forth in the first place the most modern and critical views on a man and on a philosophy which

[1] To keep up the relation unbroken between this earth and 'heaven', just as in Plato it is enough that wisdom exist in one man who shall be absolute ruler.

has been greatly misunderstood. But further inquiry into special doctrines ought to follow before the vindication is complete. Taking first *will-less and naturalistic evolution* : on the origin of things (he says *comment in Met.* xi or xii) *there are two conflicting views, some explaining the world by* development, *others by direct* creation. *For the former, generation is but the issuing forth, the doubling (as it were) of beings ; the agent only drawing forth beings the one from the other and distinguishing them, his functions being merely that of* motor. *The latter say that the Agent produces being and there is no need of pre-existing matter. In certain mediating views this is a common element, that generation is but a change of substance, that there is a* subject *for the process, that nothing is born except from its like. Avicenna calls the agent 'form-giver' and severs time entirely from matter ;* (like Plato's Demiurge) *he impresses the form on a matter already existing. Themistius and perhaps Farabi hold that the Agent is sometimes separated, sometimes not, from the material. Aristotle (the third view) says that the agent imparts movement to matter so that the virtual becomes the actual. Here Agent only brings to* act *that which was* potential, *and all creation is reduced to a movement of which heat is the principle.*[1] *Though Nature is devoid of Mind she produces with order and perfection, as if guided by mind. These proportions and productive energy that the movement of sun and stars imparts to our elements, are what Plato called* ideas. Here he follows such theories as e.g. the chaldean and hermetic (of Egypt) where the entire dependence of sublunar things on the heavenly movement is expressly taught. As we have seen it was because man desired release from this fatalism that gnostic and parsi beliefs came to the front, promising freedom to all who could rise above the planetary spheres to the 'First God'. As to Plato's *forms* it is well known that Aristotle's rejection of them was due to their helpless inefficiency as principles of *movement. Aristotle denies that Agent* creates *any form ; if so something would arise out of nothing. It is a false theory which represents forms as* created, *and some have been led to suppose that forms are something real and*

[1] This is much like the spontaneous generation from heat acting on mud, found in many savage cosmogonies and in earlier evolutionists like Empedocles to whom the *imperfect* and tentative was the *prius* : In Tofail a current arab view is seen—that in putrefaction and sun effects (as in Lucretius) we see a purely natural process of generation.

substantial, and that there is a form-giver *: so divines of the three existing faiths assert (in error) that* something *can come from* nothing. *Hence our muslim divines suppose a single Supreme Agent producing all beings without mediaries, exerting power at the same instant in an infinite number of conflicting acts. Everything in this theory of the* motakallemin *has need of a special and direct creation.*[1] *When a man throws a stone they hold that the action belongs not to the man but to the Universal Agent ; thus they destroy all human activity.* It seems clear that Averroes is here rebuking two doctrines : that at a certain moment of time God suddenly brings the universe out of nothingness into being, and that He remains ever afterwards the *only effective agent* of all changes, whether in nature or man. He belongs to what we might call the pelagian or arminian party against a determinism which reduced man to a puppet of some Power, not to be described by human attributes or judged by human standards. He is anxious to preserve human agency, *as long as he can*—just as the discipline and self-culture of the philosopher is a matter of patient endeavour until crowned by the divine irradiation at the summit.

God Remote from World : not Cause of every happening : Analogy of Eastern Sultan.—His single subject or substrate is formless matter, simple virtuality—which in cent. xiii David of Dinant will pronounce to be the only existence. It is not productive and it will not die. The world-order (which Avicenna had put in the category of the *possible*, like Leibnitz) could not have been otherwise ; God is not free to act arbitrarily. Both *cause* and *movement* of the world are necessary and eternal. ' An ' old will ', he says ' cannot start a new action '.[2] The world could not have been greater or smaller than we actually find it to be ; else, caprice would have determined its size, and it is sacrilege to attribute heavenly movements to hazard or chance (though it is admissible to refer sublunar events to accident). God then knows only the *general* laws of the universe ; He is concerned with *species* not with *particulars*[3] : for if He knew

[1] As in the cartesian system where God is the *sole agent* (and, in human actions, the obsequious valet, accomplice or executive of our desires).

[2] *On Phys.* viii, folio 150 *imposs. est quod actio fiat per voluntatem antiquam.*

[3] *Tahafut* Disput. xi, xiii ; *Comm. in Met.* xi or xii 37.

these directly, there would be constant changes in His being. If He ruled directly, as the muslim divines maintained, He would be author of evil. His providence is then the *general order* of things, and all the good in the world is His for He has willed it ; while evil is not His work but the fatal result of a material substrate which thwarts and baffles His plan. Like the edicts of an oriental sultan His will filters down through many mediating, and (it may be) thwarting or distorting, agencies : ' the universe ' is governed like a city, where everything starts from the same ' centre, but where all is *not the immediate work of the Sovereign* ' (*Tah.* Disp. iii). Aristotle's remote deity had left a standing problem both for the pure naturalists who succeeded him and for the more pietistic thinkers of the roman age :—How can movement start at all ? How does God as principle of motion have contact with the world ? With curious analogy to the system of absolute ministers or viziers [1] it was supposed that God made a plenary delegation of all effective power, by the single ' creation ' (or emanation) of Philo's λόγος or Plotinus' νοῦς. ' *From the One only one can arise* : the first thing created by God is the Intelligence ' says the Coran.[2] This First Mind is really the Aristotelian deity, first mover of the remote stars. To the belief that these were real divinities and spiritual forces, the Arabs gave ready welcome.[3] Ineradicable dualism had from the first

[1] The true type of eastern sovereign was the Mikado before 1867–8 ; such a one lived entirely secluded and limited his intervention in politics to the single instant when he appoints or cashiers an absolute ruler to act in his place : in a very true sense he knows only the most *general* laws and cannot be supposed to condescend to the *particular*.

[2] That intelligence (reason, λόγος) was first-begotten of all creatures was a common doctrine in the east for all faiths and schools of thought (e.g. Fatimites, Sabians and Batenite allegorists) except the *motakallemin* who, like the Cartesians, preferred a *direct* agency : this would be pantheistic, if it did not lay stress on the Divine *will* conceived after quite a human fashion. Whether the influence was hellenic from Alexandria or gnostic or parsi or (as is very likely) Christian, the theory was well-nigh universal and, as we saw, fitted in well with the normal conception of government in an eastern country.

[3] It is not surprising that modern rationalist interpreters should have denied that Aristotle could have meant anything so childish as to deify the stars (*Met.* xi or xii § 8). Reading their own mood and tendencies into the text, they have either held it to be (as it were) an ironical tribute to the ' old Divines ' or an interpolation ;—beginning from Vacherot

marked the greek mind ; we with our firmly attested belief in a *homogeneous* universe cannot enter into the feelings of those who divided the world into the *two realms*, one of *the four elements*, the other of *the fifth body*. To Averroes heaven is an eternal being, all *act* and moved by a soul (*de Subst. Orbis* v).[1]

Chain of Subordinate Causation.—Circular movement can only come from *soul :* if it halted but for a moment all else would turn to destruction. Hence it is not immortal *in its own right*, but only by virtue of the eternal action of the First Mover (vii) who is thus like the heart radiating life into the several members. Each orb has its intelligence, which like our rational soul, is its *form*. These compose an unbroken chain of motive agencies which propagate movement down to the sublunar sphere. Averroes is certain that they are moved by *desire* (*on Phys. viii de Cælo et Mundo—on Met. xi or xii* 337, 351). *They only move because they are unceasingly seeking the best ;* their intellect is always *in act*. They know both themselves and all that occurs in the lower sphere ; through them the First Intelligence (the Grand Vizier of the universe) has complete acquaintance with all that passes in the world.

Section II. Theory of Man and the Reason

Active Intellect—an objective reality : it is, and it is not, Human Reason.—Passing now from *cosmic* to *psychic* and ethical concerns, we find that Averroes' doctrine, like that of his forerunners, is founded on an aristotelian text : *de Anim.* iii, where the Active Intellect (superior to the *passive*), is separate, impassible and immortal.[2] *We cannot then look for the Active Intellect in the individual.* It is therefore a gift or grace coming to us *from without* (θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι *de Gen. An.* ii § 3) although sometimes it is

(*First Principles acc. to Ar.* Caen 1836), Ravaisson, Pierron and Zévort, Michelet (all on the *Met.*).

[1] This work, often found united with the *De Causis*, is one of the most popular and widely spread in latin and hebrew : it is made up of several essays written at different times.

[2] νοῦς παθητικὸς, ἐν δυνάμει opposed to ιητικὸς or ὢν ἐντελεχείᾳ : it is the latter only which (in Anaxagoras' language) is χωριστὸς κ. ἀπαθὴς κ. ἀμιγής. Aristotle had started with *a fact* and a *principle :* clearly man only has intelligence *in potency* or *virtual* and by slow degrees rises into his full inheritance ; yet, the axiom must be clearly held that the perfect is the *prius* and the hen earlier than the egg.

called a second kind or class of soul which alone has immortality.[1] But the *transcendent* and *occasional* notion is in the foreground not the *immanent*; *it is, and yet it is not, the human faculty of reason at its highest point.* Without a doubt peripatetic students like Aphrodisias, Themistius and Philoponus understand it in the semi-mystical sense; and this is the unvarying doctrine of the small but important line of arab philosophers. Now it is obvious that Aristotle never reconciled with the *understanding* (verstand), that which he held together in unity by the *reason* (vernunft); the double view that is, which makes νοῦς a man's truest personality, and yet a power intruding (as it were) from elsewhere.[2] Aphrodidias helps on the more mystical sense by comparing *passive intellect* or ὑλικὸς νοῦς to the barest potentiality:— it is not even a *tabula rasa* in which at least there is a surface ready to receive impressions; rather is it like the writing which may at some time be inscribed there.[3] Therefore this purely virtual mind becomes everything that it thinks or is conscious of[4]: it is merely chamæleon, or better, a transparent crystal, formless and colourless in itself and thus has aptness (ἐπιτηδιότης) to mirror what passes: it is *pure receptivity*.[5]

[1] ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι κ. τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδεχέται χωρίζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ ἀϊδίον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ, *de An.* ii § 2: in *Phys.* viii § 5: he says frankly that he has taken the idea and the terms from Anaxagoras (ἀπαθῆ κ. ἀμιγῆ), with which account Simplicius' extract (from the fragments of the earlier philosopher) quite agrees νόος ἐστιν ἄπειρον κ. αὐτοκρατὲς κ. μέμικται οὐδένι χρήματι ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ ἐστι.

[2] Professor Case thinks that Aristotle somehow never acutely felt the dilemma in which he was landed; in a sense everything is *passive* in acquiring knowledge, but in the last resort he could not make Intellect dependent on sense. So he introduced, as if from another sphere, an alien element or a *deus ex machinâ*: the end is pure mystery or mystification and the rationalizing and harmonizing commentators have to acknowledge it or else deny one very important point in his system.

[3] ἐοικὼς πινακίδι ἀγράφῳ, μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς πιν. ἀγράφῳ ἀλλ' οὐ τῇ πιν. αὐτῇ αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ γραμματεῖον ἤδη τι τῶν ὄντων ἐστι.

[4] Δυνάμει πως Aristotle had said (*An* iii 4) ἐστι τὰ νοητὰ ὁ νοῦς ἀλλ' ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδὲν πρὶν ἂν νοῇ. So too to Simplicius, 'mind becomes what it thinks', πᾶς νοῦς ὅταν ἐνεργῇ ὁ αὐτός ἐ. τοῖς νοουμένοις κ. ἔστιν ἅπερ τὰ νοούμενα: therefore we may add if it *thinks* God it must already *be* God: this is certainly a step in advance of the *ontologic* argument, by which if we can think God it is proof enough that He exists. Of this union or coalition of *subject* with *object* Philoponus uses terms like ἐξομοιοῦσθαι and even ἐνυπάρχειν.

[5] Averroes seems so far to agree: *Omne recipiens aliquid necesse est ut*

The act of knowledge is due to God's intervention ; He uses our faculty as an instrument : *Active Intellect is then God Himself who for a short space enters into relation with our soul : it is but a transient theophany* and the mortal element soon relapses into its nothingness. This notion of employing man as a tool and then allowing him to fall back into his own petty life, is a common feature *both* of the gnostics (to whom Christ's union with Jesus was of this sort) and of the whole creed of Islam.

Views of Hellenic Commentators on Aristotle's Text—Mystical.—Themistius followed the same mystical view : intellect *one* in its source (God) is *manifold* in those who partake of it, as infinite rays come from a central sun. Our dormant intellect conceived by him more substantively than in some other peripatetics) *desires* to perfect itself and aspires (in the mystical doctrine of every age) to complete union with that Being, in which it both achieves its final development and as the price ceases to be itself. This intellect is for Simplicius *mortal*, like everything which lives a *serial* life in time. Philoponus brings in a *realistic* [1] element by speaking of mankind as a *collective thinker* who is always thinking. Units of the human family may be asleep or abstain from thought in any true sense, but there are always some who keep the sacred fire burning, and maintain the electric current between heaven and earth.[2]

Averroes' Emphasis on the Human Side as against Grace.—Now Averroes was highly displeased with this undervaluing of the *subject*, this identifying of man's highest faculty with a pure empty receptivity. ' What is this, Alexander ? ' so he apostrophizes Aphrodisias (*de An.* iii f. 169), ' you pretend that Aristotle ' wished to speak only of a *disposition* and not of a subject *dis-* ' *posed* ? A disposition is neither a substance nor its quality. ' If Aristotle gave us intellect as mere *aptitude to receive forms* [3] ' he would have made an *aptitude* without a *subject* '. He pleads

sit denudatum *à naturâ recepti* (*de An.* 160). So once again *On Connexion of Act. Int. with Man* 358 *Oculus si esset habens colorem, non esset possib. . . . recipere colores.*

[1] Of course in the *medieval* not the *modern* meaning.

[2] οὐ γὰρ τὸν ἕνα τῷ ἀριθμῷ νοῦν λέγομεν ἀεὶ νοεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κόσμῳ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοὺς ἀεὶ νοεῖ.

[3] It will be noted that this is the very same definition that matter received from the time of Plato : therefore (as with the stoics, David of Dinant and Spinoza) every distinction vanished in the confusion (not

thus for a substantive existence in man as well as in God. Yet it must be confessed that the Arabs never completely freed themselves from the oppressive sense of the divine agency which Islam taught them. Personality or consciousness was never clearly expressed by them ; they were more struck by the unity of objective reason, than by the manifoldness of subjective thinking.[1] With naïve realism that always marks awakening intelligence they conceived of Human Thought as a real substantive entity, a 'general phenomenon of the universe' (Renan).[2] Averroes compares soul to light just as do Plato or Themistius (above) : *sicut lumen dividitur ad divisionem corporum*, and therefore in 'one sense 'the souls of Plato and Socrates are the same and in another 'different' (*Tahafut*). But this unity was not a mergence or fusion of individuals : unity of intellect is nought but the universality of the principles of Pure Reason—that domain in which all individuals lay aside their special features and idiosyncrasies. As in mathematics all alike bring out one single accurate answer to a sum and all approach the problem by exactly the same methods : in the whole race, that is, the psychic constitution is one and unvarying.[3] If some part of humanity did not always think, the tie between earth and heaven would be broken and something new introduced into the universe—or rather lost from it.

How Intellect works upon us : Stress on Rational Development in Man.—In one sense therefore this dogma of the Unity of Intellect means little more than a conviction that reflection and culture will never wholly be stamped out, because *human* reason is necessary as an organ of the *divine* expression. So for Averroes the 'sciences are eternal, not generated nor liable to 'death, except by accident' as when they are for a term united to Socrates or Plato,—*quoniam intellectui nihil est individuitatis*

reconciliation) of extremes, and of the monistic amalgam left you can say nothing but that *it is so*.

[1] *Necesse est . . . ut sit etiam quid unum in Socrate et Platone*, from *Tahafut*).'

[2] There is no doubt a certain tendency to this in Plato's latest phase ; cf. the συναγυρμὸς φρονήσεως and the remarks of recent commentators since Lutoslavsky.

[3] *On ne peut douter*, says Renan, 137, *que telle ne fût sa pensée ;* and he believes the whole question becomes just a statement that 'mankind 'will always live and think in some part at least of its members '.

(from Tahafut). In *Ep. de Int.* in *two* latin versions of cent. xiv, from Italy,[1] there is an interesting but obscure passage: *quia intellectus noster in actu nihil aliud est quam comprehensio ordinis et rectitudinis existentis in hoc mundo, sequitur ex necessitate quod quidditas Intellectus Agentis hunc nostrum intellectum moventis nihil aliud est quam comprehensio harum rerum.* That is, the true essence of the λόγος of the world is (as to Philo) the power to 'embrace and hold fast' the 'order and justice of the universe'. It is here spoken of as 'driving' or acting upon our mind so as to allow us to be partakers in the eternal laws of God, by which He rules the realms of *thought* and *things*, the two worlds of *commandment* and of *creature*.

At this point I certainly cannot follow Renan in calling Active Intellect identical with the knowledge that we have of the universe; no doubt it is when we have made it our own or been infused by it, but it exists objectively as well, as a separate and eternal being, into which we have only rare inlets—as into Emerson's 'Oversoul'. The existence of some philosophers (one at least) in human shape (*de An. Beatit.* and *de An.* 349) is not needed to keep this objective Intellect alive, because it would exist without any thinker; but it *is* needed because the bond between heaven and earth would otherwise be dissolved—which would be very bad for earth but would leave heaven the same as before. To reduce all the hypostases of ancient philosophy to mythical figments within the brain is to show little appreciation of its temper and introduce purely modern views. 'This union of Intellect 'with the particular soul (*de An.* 163), takes place neither by 'multiplying intellect nor by unifying individuals':—it is the eternal participation of all mankind through its chosen representatives in a certain number of principles as everlasting as itself. As *form* acts upon matter, so *Intellect* upon sensible images (?). These principles, in their transient union with the mortal, contract nothing of its mortality or singularity; they are independent of individuals and are valid in the most desolate regions where man has never trod. They are really the Platonic Ideas (or forms) in their true and proper sense, as *universals*.[2]

This Union is Reward of Patient Toil: Man's Supreme Blessedness.—Averroes is not slow in giving a devout turn to this

[1] Steinschneider maintains that he had also seen it in hebrew.

[2] Not as causes of movement in the physical world.

very logical and abstract discussion: 'in each being (*de An.* '*Beatit.* 356) there is a divine intent [1] to arrive at the attainment 'of such measure of that noble End as its nature can realize . . . '*even for brute animals*[2] *is it possible to have such virtues as will* '*enable them to mount aloft in the end to such perfection, as belongs* '*simply to the First Being*'. Renan adds very rightly, not here underrating the mystical note: 'Acquired intellect (νοῦς ἐπίκτητος) 'only conducts man to the door of the sanctuary': it does not usher us into the presence chamber. 'As sense prepares for 'imagination and vanishes when the imaginative act is too 'intense, so it disappears as soon as the end is attained'; it is παιδάγωγος εἰς λόγον. Then Active Intellect, like Beatrice or heavenly wisdom, completes the task, unites with the forms (νοητὰ) and makes man in a sense God; inasmuch as he *is*, because he *knows*, all things. This happy and perfect state stands not at the beginning but at the term of development, when man's spiritual nature is wholly *in act* and in no part *virtual* only. It is the crowning of a slow process not the direct intuitive union of the impatient mystic. Averroes hymns its blessedness in words which, like Buddha's eulogy of *nirvana*, leave no doubt of its very positive and satisfying qualities, though like any mystical goal it cannot possibly be defined.[3] 'How wonderful it is! '*and blessed be God who has given to each several thing its rights*!' Man (he says) whose special right is this complement [4] is himself more noble than all other things found in this world: for he is the *bond* and link of continuity between things of sense and those more noble and pure essences—in which no *virtuality* is mingled with their act.[5] Therefore it is only right that everything in the

[1] Or straining forward, *intentio*.

[2] This is very curious and reminds us of several phases of hindu thought: is every soul (the number being of course limited) straining up through every form of life to a perfection which each one will one day, sooner or later, certainly reach? This is the extreme of 'universalist optimism' and cannot be ruled out of the (so-called) pessimistic creeds of jains and buddhists.

[3] Cf. *de An.* 180: *de An. Beatit.* §§ iii, iv: *Ep. de connexione* Activi Intellectus *cum homine*:—in this it is called *quaestio magna et fortunium sublime* . . . whether A. I. can be joined with our material intellect *while in the body*, the point on which several philosophers felt uncertain: it is *secretum divinum, subtilitas venerabilis*.

[4] Of a spiritual addition to his natural faculties.

[5] *Complementum* . . . *ipse est ligamentum et continuatio.*

world should but subserve man's purpose (*creatum propter hominem et totum ei deservit*). It is proved then that he acts very unfairly who would hinder man from the attainment of knowledge, since plainly he contradicts the invention or intention of the Creator (*inventione vel intentione*). ' Just as he is happy indeed who ' devotes his time to this service and study and the Blessed God ' draws nigh to him, so too is the man fortunate who by slow ' degrees draws nigh to Him by knowledge.[1] . . . Blessed be God ' and may He bring us to that which is His will and lead us into ' that for which we have been formed at first and hereafter, ' that is, in life and in death ! ' ' I nourish well ', says Mencius, the chinese sage and confucianist, ' my vast-flowing vigour . . . ' it is not easy to explain ; it is supremely great and in the highest ' degree unbending : nourish it correctly and do it no injury and ' it will fill up the vacancy between heaven and earth '.

Communion with God obtained through perfecting our faculties. —This ' Union ' is no doubt expressed in less mystical terms by Averroes than by earlier writers. Avempace had insisted on the need of ascetic practice to attain it (*ittisal, ittihad* or *djam*). Tofail (the favourite author of our Quakers) recommends violent dervish dances, or sitting alone in the dark in a cavern and resolutely quenching any conscious thought.[2] Gazali (as is well known) became a sufi and hoped to win certainty by *emotion* and fatigue, which his sceptical mind could not attain by *reflection* or argument. Thus a curious physical externalism is made the means of conquering the last heights of the Spirit. Averroes dislikes this half-corybantic and sometimes wholly sensuous method : union can come about only by knowledge, when consciousness is raised to its highest pitch. *God is reached when our faculties are at their best and highest state of perfection.* This blessedness is only attained in old age when our spirit has won final triumph over the flesh ; by constant study, and by renouncing needless luxury without falling into the opposite error

[1] This is very obscure : *Quemadmodum fortunatus est qui consumit tempus suum servitio seu studio et appropinquat ei laudatus, sic ille in approximatione.* It may however mean that both he who draws close is ' praiseworthy ' and also he who is only coming a little nearer to an unattainable ideal. (I suggest *appropinquans ei laudatur ?*)

[2] The vagaries of the mystical mind may be seen in James *Var. Rel. Exper.* Longmans 1902, espec. 387 sq : ' Revelation through Alcohol and Anæsthetic '.

of unwise rigour. He believes that many only taste this felicity at the moment of death itself ; a sentence in the *Connex.* A. I. etc. reminds one of Gautama's insistence that bliss is attainable in this life (*jivanmukti*). 'Avenazar (= Farabi) believed that he 'might reach this perfection in the end of his days, and when 'he failed to, set it down as a vain and impossible goal and the 'tales of old women'.[1] This intellectualism holds that life is justified if reason, triumphing over sense, is able to contemplate, were it but for an instant, the unveiled truth : 'one day in thy courts'—in this vision duration plays no part ; for in a sense he who sees the Eternal must be already himself eternal. These brief flashes of intuition are glimpses of the same bliss that God enjoys for ever—as Aristotle asserts.[2]

Active Intellect is Last Planetary Intelligence : always present in some group or individual.—The Active Intellect is not a mere sum of rational humanity when it thinks ; it is not, like the gods of pantheism, a resultant. Averroes insists on its real objective existence ; it is the last of those spiritual powers which bind the earth with a golden chain to the throne of deity.[3] In his *Abridgement of Metaphysic* he identifies it with the last of the planetary intelligences (397, ed. 1560) and calls it the *Holy Spirit* (*de An. Beatit.*) or in the Mosaic Law, the *Angel* (*Tahafut*). It was most

[1] *Posuit imposs. hoc et vanum et dixit esse fabulas vetularum* (Plato's γράων ὕθλοι).

[2] Such a life (*Nic. Eth.* 3. 1177 fin) is more than mortal ; it is not as *man* that we can attain it but inasmuch as we have in us something divine (θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει) 1178 fin. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιάντης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει. Therefore εὐδαιμονία and θεωρία are interchangeable terms, and he who is not qualified for *speculative* study cannot be in the truest sense *happy*. It is easy to see how one slight additional turn of this eulogy of *human* faculties will annul them altogether, and place *man's goal not in becoming his best self but in transforming his nature into something wholly different* —the old problem of νοῦς ἕκαστος yet νοῦς θύραθεν.

[3] Cicero *Acad.* Poster. 1, after stating Aristotle's view of the wholly dissimilar nature of our world and heaven, speaks of the *vis* or *qualitas* or *anima mundi*, or *mens et sapientia perfecta*, or *Deus* which *first* is concerned with the care of heavenly things but also next with that which affects men (*procurantem cælestia maxime deinde in terris ea quæ pertinent ad homines*). Although Cicero is syncretizing Aristotle with stoic immanence, yet he clearly preserves quite enough of the former to show that this Force is (1) transcendent and (2) more interested in the higher and perfect world than in our own.

emphatically not God Himself—he vigorously combats this error of Aphrodisias ; nor is it in any sense the stoic *world-soul* or general principle of life. In his ' hierarchy of eternal and auto-' nomous beings ', ' vaguely attached to a supreme Unity ' (Renan), *thought has a special place to itself and an objective existence of its own*,—always manifested or rather manifesting itself at some point in the universe, in some group of rational men. It is motionless and unchanging and in it the individual shares in various degrees of fulness.

Ambiguous Views on Personal Survival ; or rather, Current Conceptions.—*Solicitudo divina* (he says in *de Anima* 133) *quum non potuerit facere ipsum* (*humanum genus*) *permanere* sec. individuum, *miserta est ejus, dando ei virtutem permanere* in specie. Renan well points out that, like Aristotle (*immortalist* in *Eudemus* dial. *thanatist* (?) in other more profound treatises), Averroes vacillates on the subject of individual *survival*. In *Tahafut* he has almost opposite views on successive pages ; after showing that *soul* is quite independent of *body* : ' if the old man ' had a youth's eyes he would see as well. . . . So the sage comes ' to partake in vulgar beliefs on the subject of survival, intellect ' being attached to no special organ.' Shortly afterwards he says ' soul is one in Socrates and Plato and intellect has no indi-' viduality which comes only from sense '. He is angry with Plato for his story of *Er*, because it induces men to practise virtue for the sake of external rewards and not for its intrinsic beauty : so ordinary tales of the nether world fill him with disgust. At other times he speaks with a certain respect of the great religions [1] whose teachers established the dogma of *resurrection* ' to moralize men and excite them to virtue by consideration ' for their own proper interest. . . . I do not reproach Gazali ' and our school of orthodox divines for saying that the soul ' is immortal, but for pretending that soul is but an accident and ' that man can resume at the Judgment the same body which has ' fallen to decay. No, he will take one *like* the former but not ' identical ; that which has once dissolved cannot be recalled to ' life ! '

Lack of interest in normal Ethical Life or Problems : his Politics.—The fact remains that like Gautama, Aurelius, Spinoza,

[1] Including the Sabian, whose creed, as ibn Hazim tell us, ' is the ' oldest in the world '.

Hegel, Emerson, Averroes was somewhat indifferent to the thought of a *personal hereafter*; but he certainly did not expressly deny it, although he tried to clear it of unworthy accretions or corollaries. Again, like many intellectualists, he was not in the least interested in the *ethical* life or in social reform or in giving moral advice as a preacher. His ethics are *objective*, part of the visible State-system with which he deals in his *Paraphrase on Plat. Rep.* Government should be placed in the hands of the old—a maxim in which both Plato and his great pupil concurred. Poetry (above all, the arabic Muse) is pernicious; to inspire *virtue* we must train our citizens in the rhetoric, topics and the true poetic art. The army should only watch over the public order and the ideal State is realized when men need neither judge nor physician. He believes military fiefs to be the curse of mankind. Women (as certain african tribes have attested to Plato's wisdom) are capable of taking part in war and differ from men in degree but not in nature. It is on this score that he stands most aloof from orthodox muslim dogma. 'Our social State 'does not allow scope for the resources of female nature; it 'seems they are destined only to give birth to children and their 'state of slavery has destroyed in them the faculty for great 'things. We see then with us no women dowered with moral 'virtues. Their vegetative life passes like that of plants and 'they are a burden to their husbands: hence the distress that 'devours cities, for women, in number double the men, cannot 'procure their own livelihood by work'. The first declension of the State of Islam (he thought) took place when Moawia the ommiad founded a syrian autocracy and opened the epoch of revolution, 'from which our own isle of Andalusia is by no 'means yet delivered'.

A devout and 'practising' Mussulman: testimony.—In spite then of the pursuit of envious foes and suspicious bigots it would appear that Averroes lived as an orthodox muslim and to the end believed himself to be one of the faithful. The devout Abd-el-Kebir assured men that the charges of impiety and doubt were wholly unfounded: that the philosopher practised regular prayer and ablution. 'It is certain' says another witness[1] 'that jealous intrigues led to his condemnation; for his own

[1] Also cited by el-Ansari of Morocco, Averroes' most authentic biographer.

' part he thought only to write comments upon Aristotle and to ' *reestablish harmony between religion and philosophy* '.[1] He had very strong views on the poisonous influence of Gazali's ' infidel ' book on the Destruction of Philosophers,—which (like Pascal or Mansel) founded orthodoxy on wholesale doubt. He wished himself to vindicate the rights of reason and of human freedom —against the *motakallemin* whose universe consisted of an infinity of atoms shuffled about by a single arbitrary Will. In the *Physics* he is scornful of the purely *customary* belief of the crowd, ' believing that which is repeated often enough '; the result being that such faith, unfounded and without ballast, if once shaken, utterly dissolves : ' we see in our own day men who ' entering of a sudden into the study of speculative science, lose ' the religious faith which they held only of long habit, and ' become *zendiks* '.[2]

Dislike of Shallow Conventional Belief—but no less of a Vulgar Scepticism.—Al-Makkari says of the andalusian arabs : ' if any one remarked of another that he takes lessons in philo- ' sophy or works at astronomy the people at once applied to him ' the term *zendik* or impious unbeliever, and this epithet was ' sure to adhere to him for the rest of his life '. Averroes saw the danger[3] of a narrow and illiberal policy of formality and legalism ; ' of all tyrannies the worst is a regimen of priests ' (*Paraphr. Plat. Rep.* 513). But in religion he was genuinely interested and wished to save it from its friends. *Philosophy* (he maintains)[4] *is the highest ideal of human life*,—he meant by it the appropriation by the personal reason of truths imparted to the vulgar by *prophets* under the guise of revelation. This lofty condition is only for the few. What we call to-day Free Thought

[1] Of this hostile attitude of the *legales* or *loquentes* A. had no doubt ; in prologue to *Tahafut, inimici reperiuntur philosophorum . . . livor persecutorum nostræ matris carissimæ Philosophiæ.*

[2] A general term for a motley group of sects (manichees, mazdakites, babekites, the free-thinkers or ' evidence folk ') which to the horrified orthodox mind in east and in west were united only on the one antinomian motto : *believe nothing and admit no law.*

[3] Like Clemens Alexandrinus in the case of the ψοφοδεεῖς or ultra-orthodox, who are horrified at the slightest ' contamination ' of the gospel with serious pagan thought.

[4] In the treatise *Harm. Rel. and Phil.* published together with *Ways of Proof for Rel. Dogma*, by M. J. Muller, Munich 1860.

and open discussion of the *credenda*, he feared and abhorred. 'Disputes are not made for the people; they end only in weaken-'ing faith: they are quite rightly forbidden, for it is enough 'for the happiness of the simple soul that they should understand 'what they *can* understand' (so *Tahafut Disp.* iii and vi).

The Sage must be allowed to study God's Works: but the Heretic must be Executed.—But God in the Coran has clearly bidden those who are qualified, to seek the truth by means of Science: '*The peculiar religion of the sage is to study that which is*; 'the worthiest worship we can give to God is the knowledge of His 'works which leads us on to know Him in His full reality. This 'in His eyes is the noblest activity': just as the vilest is to tax with 'error and presumption' the votary of this highest of all creeds (*in Metaph.*). Popular beliefs on deity, angels, prophets, prayers, outward worship, sacrifices, have for their object the inciting of (ordinary) men to virtue; and positive religions are an excellent and indispensable instrument of public morality. Before a man begins to live his own proper and personal life, he must submit to the guide of general convention and the canon of custom; even when he has reached a more individual method of thought, *instead of scorning the doctrines in which he has been brought up, he should give his mind to interpret them in a noble sense.* He who inspires in the people doubts on its religion and draws attention to the contradictions of the prophets [1] is a heretic and should suffer the penalties which religious law enacts against such. The sage does not permit himself a single word against the established faith; the epicurean who tries to overthrow at once religion and virtue must 'die the death' and he deserves his fate.[2]

Misrepresentation of this Philosophic Attitude by the Orthodox: Grace not excluded.—Religions are not composed exclusively either of *reason* or of *prophecy* (as we should say, of revelation)—but of one and the other in varying proportions. The figurative

[1] It is quite likely he may have heard of Abelard's *Sic et Non* where conflicting views of the Fathers are juxtaposed without any attempt to reconcile them and the average man is certainly encouraged to distrust them all—though this was certainly not the writer's intent.

[2] From the closing paragraphs of 'Tahafut,' *oportet omnem hominem recipere principia legis et procul dubio ut exaltet eum qui posuit ea* (i.e. Mahomet): *nam negatio eorum et dubitatio in eis destruit esse hominis* quare oportet interficere hæreticos, 335 of ed. 1560.

and material part of their doctrine (*vorstellung*) must be explained in a spiritual sense (*begriff*). Speaking to the same effect Gazali had introduced a typical ' philosopher ' whom he holds up to execration : ' What I do, I do not on any man's authority ; ' after a study of *philosophy* I understand very well what *prophecy* ' is—wisdom and moral perfection—that is all. Its commands ' aim at restraining the women-folk and preventing them from ' quarrelling and killing each other, or following their own evil ' passions. But as for me who have nothing in common with this ' ignorant mob, I am not obliged to put myself out, being of the ' number of the wise : armed with wisdom which is my own, I can ' well dispense with the *authority* of other men '. Nearly all agree in believing *prophetism* to be the highest point of a trained natural faculty, rather than a *magical* gift suddenly infused : all desire to save the freedom of man and urge the need of careful training and steady progress in the spiritual life. Renan notes that Tofail, Avicenna, Averroes express themselves to this effect ; as also the jewish thinkers Saadia, Moses Maimonides, and Levi son of Gerson. Yet it would be a great mistake to exclude the notion of divine *grace* in the last resort, just because they felt obliged (like Pelagius and Nestorius) to lay stress on the *human* and the gradual elements in the scheme of redemption. They only displayed the same pardonable inconsistency as Aristotle himself in his νοῦς ἕκαστος. For the moment no doubt they isolated and strongly defended one side of truth (and utility), which they saw unduly threatened by the doctrines of an arbitrary God, of a passive and impersonal humanity. The orthodox, both in east and west (during cent. xiii), saw in this claim nothing but blasphemy and revolution. Though no doubt unduly enhanced by popular report, there was ground enough for panic in the suspicions and scandals of *antinomian sectaries*. Theology (they would maintain) must be all or nothing ; pretend to do without it for explaining God, the world, and man, and in effect you declare it superfluous : he who makes this claim, whether he will it or not, is its enemy. ' The unfailing result of these ' (independent) sciences [1] is to believe in fate and the eternity of ' the world, to deny the resurrection and the last judgment, *to* ' *live without rein and surrender oneself to appetite*'. After all there

[1] Said Gazali in his *Release from Error*.

was the witness of the Assassins and the life of Avicenna, at once mystic and voluptuary.

APPENDIX M

Averroism: Modern Analogies

Reconciler like Hegel of Faith and Reason: Hegel's Irenicon.—In spite of the attack of the orthodox it is not to be doubted that Averroes sincerely aimed at a reconciliation of *faith* and *reason*—was in fact a typical scholastic. Passing by the analogy of Spinoza we come in our own time to that of Hegel. If we wish to understand the real aim of Averroes and the panic he caused in the west we cannot afford to neglect this parallel. The development of the Extreme Hegelian Left was an *antinomian individualism* which, carried into practice, would subvert all society, like the esoteric teaching of the Assassins: it has not been without influence upon the lamentable retrogression of teutonic morality[1]. To these subjective hegelians 'each man is his own god, which as his own ideal he projects 'on vacancy: having no hereafter he has a right to everything here 'which he is strong enough to grasp and hold'. So Spinoza had taught, with all his own personal unselfishness and quietism: and Nietzsche's theory is only a wild paraphrase on doctrines logically elicited from Strauss, Feuerbach, Bauer and Stirner. But it can scarcely be denied that Hegel's own private aim was exactly that of Averroes. '*In philosophy*' he says,[2] 'which is *theology*, the whole object is to point out the *reason* in religion. 'In it, religion finds itself justified from the standpoint of thinking con-'sciousness: unsophisticated piety does not need or perceive this *apologia*'. He does not ridicule the 'charcoal burner's faith', but like Averroes he does not believe it to be the last word. 'Rationalism, that vain conceit 'of the Understanding, is true philosophy's most deadly foe and is offended 'when the presence of reason in our religion is demonstrated'.[3] 'Every act of mind' (*Logic*) 'contains implicitly the principle which, purified and developed, rises to religion'. Philosophy only comes to analyse and prove once again the truths already possessed by religion. In the third part of his great work[4] he identifies his own peculiar and triadic system with

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[1] Though it is unfair to exaggerate this (largely) academic influence.

[2] *Phil. Relig.* ii 353 a work justly styled by its posthumous editor Marheineke as 'the most perfect bloom of Hegelian Philosophy'.

[3] Sterrett (*Stud. Heg. Ph. Rel.* Sonnensch. 1891, p. 85) 'the speculative 'comprehension of the religious relation never comes to many men and 'comes to others only late in life. It is never tired of asserting that *religion* 'and *philosophy* have the same content, only differing in form of knowing 'it . . . the *phil.* content of religion is comprehension in a living system 'of the abbreviated knowledge of faith. As such, it is the highest form of 'theology; but this can only be the religion of the few'. It would not be 'easy to find a better parallel to the views of Ibn Roschd.

[4] *Philosophy of Religion.*

Christianity. He seeks to rehabilitate genuine and catholic dogma after the iconoclasm of a shallow 'enlightenment'. It is said that he died with the calm assurance that he had succeeded in making eternal peace between theology and the wisdom of the world. In the need for positive dogmatic teaching he firmly believed : quite sincerely he blamed Tholuck for his lukewarmness in defending the dogma of the Trinity. He was warmly attached to the Nicene creed and upheld compulsory religious instruction on definite and doctrinal lines.

Reverence for the Objective as the true vehicle of Theophany.—Like the spanish arab, he had little real interest in *morals*. On its *subjective* side he never wrote a word ; he was content to examine it in its *objective* form in human society. The *Philosophie des Rechts* is his sole work on *ethical* questions, and here he is examining the State and its public usage and opinion rather than the private conscience. He belonged to the party of natural reaction against Kant's claim for finality in ethics.[1] He was a little impatient of the negative stoical temper of the Good Will, and did not believe that therein lay a clue to the highest truth. But his intellectualism is tempered by his distrust of the vain and captious knight-errant who resists the *zeitgeist*, or common reason of his time, and thinks to be wiser than his teachers and better than his age. With Green then, he is tempted to exaggerate the sanctity of the *objective* forms in which God reveals Himself to the world, in which the Absolute Spirit clothes itself. The State[2], the church, mankind, the universe,—these are he believes the only means by which the divine nature makes its theophany. His whole work is a long protest against the self-satisfied *aufklärung*, the selfish subjectivity of 'free thought'. His catholic mind loves the objective and the institutional, is afraid of the vanity of the slothful individual who has not taken the trouble to make himself a *person*.[3] So he would see the work of the divine spirit operative in the development of catholic dogmatism. Hence the Church is justified in taking action against heresy, maintaining its completeness in the face of any one-sided or egoistic apprehension of its content.

Dislike of both for the Mysticism of Ignorance.—But the most remarkable

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[1] Of which Bradley, MacTaggart and Taylor are the best-known exponents to-day.

[2] With the best intentions hegelians have helped on that mischievous deification of the modern State (without defining it or explicitly identifying it with a 'Christian' society) to which much of our present distress can be traced. From many latter-day protests I quote F. W. Hirst (editor of *Economist*) : 'We were told that *the State was a higher thing than the sum of individuals who composed it* : that idea was not an english idea ; it was not a humane idea ; it was not a right idea. It was a continental growth fostered by a small group of rulers and bureaucrats who wished the people to fall down and worship them.'

[3] By merging his idiosyncrasy in the current of Reason, by communing (we might say) with Active Intellect : he has all Averroes' conviction of the objectivity of Thought.

agreement of the two is to be found in the relation of the human mind to truth and its kinship with the divine. Neither philosopher is in any strict sense a mystic: nothing was more abhorrent to them than the common claim of the zealot to represent God in his own unkempt person and untutored intelligence: divinity is won by effort; it is not already there, or imparted magically in a moment. 'When man' (says Hegel *Ph. Rel.* i 211) 'is said to be *divine*, or the mere finite spirit as *natural* spirit is identified with God—this is sheer pantheism: the church declares plainly 'that only through death of the *natural* man can he be united with God'. For Hegel fully accepts the Fall: as related to *God* man is bad and must be born anew, as related to *nature* he is unhappy. Before the atonement can be mediated by the incarnation, he must become fully conscious both of *sin* and of *misery*. He must feel himself unable to regain his lost estate: mere morality and 'culture' cannot heal the breach. Here is the 'deepest depth' (*die tiefste Tiefe*). In the section on *The Absol. Rel.* ii, 3 'the 'essential Nature of Man', he speaks of the stoic or sceptical view in which soul is 'undeveloped naked monad, empty soul devoid of content '. . . : conceiving itself as extreme of abstract being-for-self, of abstract 'freedom, it plunges into its depths, into its absolute abyss'. This is sheer empty *individualism* and is the lowest and most worthless point in human development; except where it becomes of need the spring or starting point for a new upward movement. It must be transformed into *personality*,—the steepest and loftiest summit towards which we move, *die hōchste zugeschärfste spitze*—the very antipodes of the sorry and futile individual[1]. This steepest summit, he says, 'is the Pure Personality 'which alone (through the absolute Dialectic forming its nature) includes 'and holds all in itself, because it elevates itself to freedom'.

On the way upwards to true Personality, man meets God: Synergism.—On this upward path through knowledge the endeavouring spirit of man is met by a higher power. As in certain phases of orthodox Christology, man in knowing is exalted to God, while on another side (not less important) it is God who is manifesting Himself to man. In this *synergism* God and man (if I may so put it) each keep their proper place; in God *all finite* things *discover* and do not *lose* their selfhood and reality. Into the Spinozan lions' den, the Absolute, all particulars vanished, and left no trace nor made the one Substance any the richer; but for Hegel all finite beings emerge from God and still exist in Him but clothed *sub specie æterni*. Man is but *abstractly* rational, made in God's image; only by mediation, culture, discipline does he become *concretely* such in the divine kingdom. In a sense this is all God's work, in another all man's; there is the constant paradox of the Pauline 'work out your own salvation, for it is God that worketh in you'. That which is man's goal or 'the Eternal Consciousness' (Green's *Proleg.* to *Eth.*) is a being 'with whom our human spirit is identical in this 'sense:—He *is* all which the human spirit *can become*'. It is only in this relation that soul feels itself *at home*, either with God, or nature, or itself. 'Religion is the knowledge which, through the mediation of finite spirit,

[1] Though confounded so often with it.

'the *divine* spirit has of itself. So in the Absolute Idea, religion *is not* '*the work of a man*, but is in essence the highest determination of the 'Absolute Idea itself' (*Ph. Rel.* i 200). Worship then is a two-fold activity; 'a religious act of sacrifice on my part and also the means of 'the divine act of grace . . . God's act may seem to overpower my free-'dom, but my true freedom consists in His knowledge and will. . . . In 'this divine activity man seems but a passive material like a stone's. . . . 'His grace is to pass into me and through me. My self-surrender, my 'receiving divine grace, are my own acts, but at the same time God's' (quoting *Galat.* ii, 20). 'I have to open myself to the influx of the Spirit 'that I may become spiritual; *this act of worship is at one and the same time* '*my act, and the act of God*' (*Ph. Rel.* ii, 222). He very frankly contrasts this 'paradoxic truth of the religious experience with the merely moral 'standpoint of self-realization as held by Kant and Fichte'. With the 'impervious self' he has no sympathy. He still plainly declares himself a countryman of the early german mystics; it is the inflowing of God into man that, so far from abolishing the person, lifts him into wider freedom and fuller life[1].

The Absolute Self-Consciousness: how the Individual becomes the Person.—The presupposition of all knowledge is not my subjective consciousness, but a thought or self-consciousness *beyond* all individual thought, which thinks *in* and *through* individuals—this is true both in Averroes and in Hegel.[2] The self-centred individual is an empty concept, like the freedom claimed by the *aufklärung*; he must, in order to become a person, die to live, put off his creatureliness and self-hood,—like the grain of seed-corn perishing in the darkness of the earth that it may enjoy a richer life above it. The guarantee that man can attain completeness of *personality* is the (already) complete personality of the Absolute Reason or God; thus Hegel's First Principle is 'adequate to originate, to explain and 'to fulfil the personality of finite spirits' (Sterrett, *l.c.* 177). Thus for

[1] The sturdy independence and nominalism of the english and scottish mind shows itself in Pringle-Pattison (*Mind.* I and liii); his libertarian, pelagian, arminian views display the native dislike of regimentation, whether divine or secular: an acute american writer says of this attitud broadly 'God is warned not to tread on the holy ground of the individual will, unless first He put off his shoes' . . . 'He betrays a jealousy *of* God rather than *for* God; he is jealous of his own individuality, not for human personality as *personalized by God* which is really Hegel's conception'—and, if so, that of Aristotle and Averroes.

[2] Sterrett *l.c.* 196 'The real presupposition of all knowledge is not my 'own consciousness of myself as an individual but thought or self-conscious-'ness beyond all individual selves, which is *the unity of all thinkers and all* '*objects of thought.*' So Morris *Phil. and Christianity*—56, 'the finite self-'consciousness involves, and reveals its dependence on an Absolute Self-'consciousness which provisionally we can only call (in agreement with 'philosophy and religion) the self-consciousness of an Absolute and Divine 'Spirit'.

Hegel, 'religion is not merely the spirit putting itself into relation with 'the Absolute Spirit, but He Himself relates Himself to Himself.' 'Perfect 'personality' says Lotze, 'is found only in God; in finite spirits but a weak 'imitation.' 'The self-communication says Green (*Prol. Eth.*) of the 'Infinite Spirit to man's soul is such that man is conscious of his relation to 'a Conscious Being, who is in eternal perfection all that man has it in him 'to be. . . . He is a Being in whom we exist, with whom we are in principle 'one. . . . God is the Eternal Spirit or self-conscious subject, which com-'municates itself (in measure and under conditions) to beings who through 'that communication become spiritual'. In each act of conscious thought, thought finds itself mirrored or rather realized; it is a dialogue or colloquy of spirit with spirit. The knowing agent finds himself *at home* in an intelligible world of which he forms a part as a free member. The forms of his intelligence (as Kant showed) are not his own, in a narrow protestant sense; they are the necessary forms of the world's existence.[1] When our reason discovers a truth it is not a sudden flash out of darkness into darkness; it is the union of a feeble light within with the original Light.[2] Reason is not only that of the individual man, but of mankind; nay more it exists in its own right independently of all knowing men. It exists first in God: *before ever man or the world was, there was Absolute Intelligence.*[3] Only as the empty and formal *individual* attains concrete fulness and *personality*—by merging himself first in the social life and at last in the divine thought—can he be said to *be* really or *think* truly: *Deus nos personat*, as the self-abasing medieval realism took for its text.

Averroes' Influence on the German Mystics: True Personality is Divine.—It has been shown by critics how closely Eckhart follows in cent. xiv the lines drawn by the arabian thinker. Karl Pearson (*Mind* 1886) says that Eckhart's mysticism owes its leading ideas to Averroes. The Active Intellect (νοῦς ποιητικός) can be traced through the muslim from Aristotle to the great german pioneer of mystic theology. Lasson shows a close resemblance between Eckhart's *Seelengrund* and Averroes' principle of reason in all men. Quite in Hegel's spirit he makes the notion of *person* the central point in his system; the (empty) individual must try to become a *person*—just as Christ the Son of God is in the truest sense a person (Monogr. on *Eckh.* 348, 9). He writes: 'In the act of knowing, God 'and I are one and the eye whereby I see God is the same whereby He 'seeth me: God has become man that man may become God'—Athanasius' ἵνα θεοποιηθῶμεν. In this blissful union our *personality is not blotted out but achieved and made perfect, by becoming active in and with a personal*

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[1] Hegel, the modern gnostic, has been much laughed at for making logic = *metaphysics*, for spinning the whole world of reality out of his head; but his meaning is clear and, I think, his principle incontrovertible.

[2] Which is not merely *transcendent*, but like Anaxagoras' νοῦς, takes the trouble to visit our world: this is the right sense of John i 9 τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινὸν ὃ φωτίζει . . . ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον.

[3] This objective existence was very strongly held both by Aristotle and by Averroes: the perfect must be the *prius*.

God. That Hegel (once again) held no absorption or extinction of the unit in the universal seems clear : he even justifies the pietism that is without any proper object [1] because with all its faults of slothful agnosticism it recognizes the individual : ' this cognition of the absolute worth of the ' individual [2] may be said to be the great attainment of our day. Indivi- ' dual subjectivity is a very essential determinant of religion. . . . The ' unity of God and man is in the first place but implicit or potential, but ' it is also eternally being realized. This progressive free reconcilement ' only takes place because of the inherent *potential unity* of the *human* ' and the *divine* ' (*Ph. Rel.* part iii). ' Whoever says that God cannot ' be known, says that God is jealous ' with the ancient Greeks ; ' and he ' is not in earnest in *believing* in God, no matter how much he talks about ' Him '.

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[1] Such as Schleiermacher professed no less than Count Zinzendorf ; also Spencer in his almost devout attitude to the Unknowable and Infinite Energy. How completely ' averroist ' he was (in the popular sense) is clear from his last work *Facts and Comments* 1902*:* ' What becomes of ' consciousness when it ends ? We can only infer that it is a specialized ' and individualized form of that Infinite and Eternal Energy which ' transcends both our knowledge and our imagination, and that at death ' its elements lapse into the Infinite and Eternal Energy whence they were ' derived '. So Emerson (*History*) : ' There is one mind common to all indi- ' vidual men ; every man is an inlet to the same and to all of the same '. The numberless poetical analogies in his writings cannot now be quoted ; it may suffice to direct to the *Over Soul, Montaigne the Sceptic* (e.g. ' Let a ' man learn that he is here, not *to work but to be worked upon* '). *Experience* (' the subject is the receiver of Godhead and at every comparison must ' feel his being enhanced by that cryptic might ') *Intellect* (' we do not ' determine what we will think ; we only open our senses, clear away as we ' can all obstructions from the fact and suffer the Intellect to see ') *Nature* (' if, instead of identifying ourselves with the work, we feel that the soul ' of the workman streams through us, we shall find the peace of the morn- ' ing dwelling in our hearts '.)

[2] Cf. Gierke's *Pol. Theory in M. Age,* where he makes this primitive teutonic claim, reinforced by the Gospel (' for whom Christ died ') the main feature of medieval political theory,—in opposition to the modern secular State. This is apt to deny all worth and rights which itself has not arbitrarily allowed, and as at the present time demands a wholesale sacrifice of units to the objective which on its own principles it cannot possibly justify.

Moral Side of Early Religion in Asia

Evidence seems to be gathering in favour of a highly ethical and personal religion in W. and Central and E. Asia in very early times, from which both branches of the indo-persian family afterwards declined—the former owing to *dravidian* demonolatry, the second owing to *magian* Shamanism. I will here only state the several points of late raised or accepted by students: (1) the Chinese official and imperial cult, historically recorded since Emperor Shun (c. 2300 B.C.) is an *ethical monotheism*, to which the cult of the Six Worthies or (under Chows) Four Lords is distinctly subordinate: (2) the prehistoric word-form *Assara Mazas* (with his court of seven *Igigi* and seven *Anunaki* or sky- and earth-spirits) must date back to 1500 B.C.: (3) About this time *Assur* appears as the most personal and paramount figure reached in the *Sumero-semitic* pantheon: (4) Zoroaster (whose dialect cannot be far removed from vedic times) made of this (? joint) concept an exclusive deity and propounded the familiar outlines of moral religion for all later time: (5) the aryan invaders of India called this deity *Varuna* and for some reason, perhaps the jealous enmity of near kinsmen at feud, degraded the name *Asura*—which is still, curiously enough, the name of a non-aryan tribe in Chota Nagpur, who believe in a benevolent Creator and Preserver of the world and (in the strict sense) are not demonolaters (Ferdinand Hahn): (6) About 1500 or somewhat later the aryan *Harru* (with king and nobles forming a small dominant caste the *marya* or 'men') were in contact in N. Asia Minor with Hittites to whose semitic deities they equated their trinity of gods—*Varuna, Mitra, Indra*: (7) This chief god of *rta* and *asa* (law and order) was at first (as elsewhere) a *lunar* deity and Mitra the special sun-god is his lieutenant: (8) As moral judge he is surrounded by spiritual abstractions or virtues, which are refinements on the notion that '*planets* ' are spirits subservient to Sin the moon-god's will' (Carnoy *Enc. Rel. Eth.* ix 569, 1917) and there are traces that the same theory prevailed in India, even the names of these ethical hypostases corresponding.—The conclusion would seem to be that from the fatalistic Chaldean conception of *world-order* connected in the Bab. Period (after 2000 A.D.) with star-cult, the Aryans borrowed a nearly monotheistic religion, which they humanized and moralized—until both in Persia and Hindustan the 'weeds 'sprang up and choked it'. In China the cult of Heaven may be a lineal descendant and this retained its purity until the recent downfall of monarchy.

DIVISION C

Greek Thought and Chaldeism : the Nearer East and Christian Heresy

A. Science and Mysticism in Greece

PART I. ARISTOTLE

Aristotle or the Final Form of Greek Philosophy : His Important Influence.—On leaving Hindustan the next area for study has been the Nearer East—Irak, seat of the earliest culture and religion and scene of the great muslim development within our period. We have to some extent inquired into Syria and Palestine—it will not be needful for our present purpose to examine Egypt. In this region of Irak exists from very early times a welter and medley of religions—a general knowledge of which must form a prelude to any study of the strange blends arising after our Christian era. But one chief factor has not yet received full notice, an influence moulding all the more prominent forms of belief. This is *greek philosophy* in its classical and later stages,—not only because of the direct impression left by it upon the arabs, but because all sects of syncretic *gnosis* (pagan and semi-Christian) borrowed something from the greek ; and the later heresies, however eastern in origin, take on a semi-hellenic form. The name of Aristotle is therefore as important for our purpose in the general survey as that of St. Austin in the narrower inquiry into purely Christian dogma or politics. Whether in arabian or later medieval development he is the chief figure ; for further formulation of dogma or for heresy there are few other sources than his works, whether rightly understood or wrongly interpreted by his devout students. Whether we think of Authority or of free thought he is the principal source and constituent. We cannot advance to any lucid conception of philosophy unless we have examined this final form of the hellenic intellect. If this is done it is surprising to see how many of the

logical problems or strange positions in later thought become clear.

After *Material*, the Problem of *Motion and Motive* : Ionia, Elea etc. : the Visit of *Mind*.—After the earlier thinkers of Ionia had laid stress on the world-material, taking its regular movement and evolution for granted (hylozoism), it became more and more apparent that the real problem was that of *motion*, or that of motion combined somehow with order, change within unity. Some schools unable to explain or justify *movement*, denied it altogether (*Elea*) and held that *movement* and the *multiple* in our world were but a mirage : as we saw in the east the realm of *samsara* was *maya* or illusion. Empedocles first introduced *motives* ; he spoke of *love* and *will* (ἔρως, φιλία) which brought all things together, and of *discord* (νεῖκος, ἔρις) which severed them into the individuals of our present distressful experience. Hitherto when *motion* was postulated the greeks were content to refer it to some immanent force or inner impulse of the world-mass. But now there appeared with Anaxagoras another solution, upon which later greek philosophy was little more than one long commentary.—His hypothesis of νοῦς has deeply coloured all later phases of west-aryan thought, and on the whole placed it in a certain contrast with the east-aryan thought of Hindustan. 'An extraneous power once visited our world ' and imparted a *motion* which could never otherwise have arisen '. When this was called *mind* it is clear that we are beginning the long period of *dualism* ; between object and subject, present and future world, earth and heaven, the true function and the secondary duties of our soul. We are also at the first stage in that mystical interpretation of man as a ' pilgrim and sojourner ' with no ' abiding city ', the exile of eternity who cannot be content with time or any temporal series.

To Awaken Matter to a Pursuit of the Good.—But if the visit of Mind (ἐλθὼν διεκόσμησεν) imparted a stir and impulse to dead matter, *how* and *why* did it do so ? The former—or scientific—problem was left for Aristotle ; as to the latter—or ethical—there was from the first some general agreement. *Mind* aroused slumbering *matter* to a search for a better state, for its own good. The good must be the end of *birth* and of *movement*. When Aristotle discarded what he took to be Plato's Theory of Forms, he did so because they seemed to offer no help in this problem.

Ideas,—whether as thoughts in a mind, class-concepts, general collective terms, a republic of eternal paradigms—did not explain motion towards an end—the *good*. As the moving and really efficient principle, then, he replaces *thought* by *will*. If we use cumbrous terms, we shall say he is a *voluntarist* and a scotist instead of an *intellectualist* and a thomist. Like the so-called pessimist school of modern date, he sees in the ferment of our world a ceaseless exercise of will; motion being but a means to an end and not in itself the highest state of being; 'we make war that we may be at peace' (πολεμοῦμεν ἵν' εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν). In a pedantic vocabulary this might be called 'actualizing the possible'; that is, drawing out latent virtue or capacity to its perfect state in which it would find its highest happiness. No greek doubted that the two—*work* and *satisfaction*—went hand in hand (at least in theory). The pursuit of the *good* was universal and must in the end always win its way to achievement. Aristotle being a nominalist and an individualist, thought that each being (or class) had its own special *good* or that form of *The Good* which it could compass: he objected strongly to Plato's sacrifice (as it might appear to some) of the individual to a transcendental *good*, in which he could share or find joy only by a very misleading metaphor.

So then, the will or life-principle in everything seeks satisfaction in the *good*, and *movement* (κίνησις) is a transition from *possible* or virtual to *actual*, from seed to perfect tree. It will be seen later how at this point Philosophy *sub specie æterni* comes into conflict with religion, that is, with ethical individualism. Philosophers profess that they cannot understand why, having attained its perfect state, a thing should wish to go on maintaining it: 'one day in Thy courts is better than a thousand' is taken to mean that a man who has for one precious moment realized eternal truth has laid hold of eternity, has reached his allotted goal of perfection: he has become in a sense divine and perfect: he need not trouble himself further with time-series or his own continued being as a mere individual. This belief, against which the normal and selfish consciousness breaks into vigorous protest, is really at the basis of buddhism—a gospel of attainment which in most essentials is quite analogous to later greek thought.

The good must be *prius* not *product*: Evolution and Theism.—Now with Plato's nephew Speusippus there had

appeared a very modern doctrine ; rather perhaps he revived the normal doctrine of world-origins and evolution in the savage mind—a spontaneous development from the vague and imperfect toward the perfect and definite. This analogue to the old nebular hypothesis or modern evolution or even bergsonism, is almost ubiquitous : God to primitive or savage thought is nearly always a late product of a process at first blind and chaotic, as in Schopenhauer and Hartmann. Aristotle's importance for theism and religious development is due to his unfaltering assertion that perfection stands at the beginning of things and is not a product. Except with theists, this *ontology* is by no means in favour to-day : for every other school the world is yet ' in the making ', and so is the divine principle which is its moving force and final form. Aristotle denied this with emphasis : there could be no regular *motion* unless there was an end in view : motion always implied a purpose, an aim quite well understood, or else followed by an instinctive impulse that was learning to be rational.[1] If perfection did not already exist, as achieved and complete, it could not stir anything to move towards it. Therefore perfection is a *necessary prius* to the world of our experience, and this is really the basis of all arguments to prove the existence of God.[2]

Providence : Plato Believed, Aristotle Denied.—But to this perfect Being, Intelligence, Aristotle did not even allow the single visit to our world which the pregnant phrase of Anaxagoras seems to suggest.[3] Plato had been in great doubt as to the creative function of the Good (*Republic*) or the Demiurge (*Timæus*), or more simply Mind or God (*Statesman*).[4] He plainly shows that he cannot believe God's action upon the world to be either *direct* or

[1] God moves the world by exciting *desire* and *will* : desire, aiming at particular objects, will, at a universal *good*, at a design in which all particulars are subordinate as means to end. Now the *will* of reasonable beings (λογικὰ ζῶα) is only determined by the objects of their thought ; therefore, there must already exist actual good towards which they aim and in them too (as we shall see) there must be something divine.

[2] That is, all logical arguments which appeal to the reason ; it need not be said to-day that these are not the chief evidence.

[3] It need not here be said how very obscure the ionian thinker was on this point ;—he threw out a sentence (which the world has never forgotten) without, it would seem, being fully conscious of its value or meaning.

[4] This does not exhaust the various forms under which he conceives the Perfect Being or His relation to the world : the above will here suffice.

unintermittent. Like an eastern sovereign, God entrusts the real work to secondary powers; and in the course of the world, there are periods of violent reaction from the divine guidance, when God 'hideth away His face', or in Plato's phrase, 'retires to His own watchtower' (εἰς τὴν περιωπὴν) and holds commune only with Himself. Still, in Plato there is a doctrine of Providence: God knows His world and at times of trouble condescends to become the Helmsman in person. He has an interest in the creature and it is His ethical law which is vindicated in the rewards and penalties awaiting us hereafter.

God, not Self-Revealing: Magnetic Influence.—This Aristotle could not for one moment admit. God was not an *active* and *formative,* but a *magnetic principle.* His perfection and self-sufficingness exclude the notion of interest in anything beyond Himself. He is pure Thought; without that further belief of Plato's that he was *good* and did not begrudge a share in Himself to other beings. He is not then a God who reveals or discloses Himself; the very notion of revelation is put out of court.[1] But since He is perfect, all things in their measure and according to their several capacities yearn after Him, desiring to become like Him as far as possible.[2] He is then not (as in Evolution) a *final term* in a development, but an *eternal prius* of a process which goes on for ever: we cannot conceive the *attraction* of the divine nature losing its force. The complex world of things striving to become like God always has been and always will be.[3] These complex movements of separate life-centres (struggling to be perfect even as their Father in heaven) constitute our world and are summed up in a single pardonable personification: Nature who 'does nothing in vain'.[4]

[1] Except for one point upon which almost the whole development of our period will turn.

[2] Plato's φυγὴ ἐντεῦθεν and ὁμοίωσις θεῷ: to regain the divine likeness lost by the Fall is the epitome of the later greek church theology: τέλωσις is with it (as with the post-aristotelian greeks) the real and sole aim of man: how it is attained by us is a problem which exercises them greatly.

[3] On this single point later orthodox schoolmen could not follow him: the *eternity of the world* was the doctrine which finally marked off the philosopher and heretic from the communion of the orthodox.

[4] It is not unlikely that this shifting of interest to a Mother Goddess (as in Lucretius' very kindred sentiments about *Venus Genetrix*) is a revival of the ancient Ægean Religion: the real source of life is the 'yearning

Nature the Real Agent : her Remoteness from God.—But Nature is not after all a conscious artist and is often baulked of her ' aim ' through the imperfection of *matter*.[1] In our world she is besides handicapped by her remoteness from God. For it is with Aristotle that that curious *localism* begins, from which few of us are free to-day after three centuries of copernicanism. The degree of perfectness attainable by the creature varies according to the spatial distance from God who is rather the enfolding circumference than the centre and heart of the universe.

God Attracts Her only Through Mediation of the Spheres.—His beauty acts directly upon the outermost circle of the visible, namely, the sphere of the Fixed Stars—in which there is a uniform and circular movement. It cannot rest because it is roused to ceaseless activity by the propinquity of God, but it does not move outside a perfect orbit and always returns upon itself. Next come the inner spheres, one within the other, each with its moving soul or spirit—there are fifty-five of these.[2] These are the visible gods to whom honour is due :—a common religious feeling among Plato's disciples, no doubt derived in part from Pythagoras who may well have learnt so much from the east before he set up the italiot school. God then moves the world from the periphery, and the outermost motion is therefore the most perfect, while disorder only enters by degrees as we descend the spheres to the planet-orbits. The most irregular and least perfect motions are those of earth—that ' sublunar sphere ' where chance and accident [3] bear rule and matter thwarts the purposive designs of Nature. So then the *first heaven* (πρῶτος οὐρανὸς) is the solid vault or firmament of Fixed Stars revolving in perfect orbit ; the first Moved and second Mover.[4]

of the creature ' not the goodness of God ; from this point of view Aristotle began to pantheize and his ' immanent teleology ' often puts his theism in some jeopardy.

[1] The greeks never decided on the nature of matter, and the question of its *positive* and *negative* existence does not concern the broad doctrines stated above.

[2] Others give 56 or 47 ; in any case Aristotle is not here a strict chaldean.

[3] Otherwise conceived as fate and ἀνάγκη ; the two opposite terms being merely different aspects of the same incalculable force.

[4] The old expression *primum mobile* is not complete without the addition *movens*, as the really important point is its influence on the succeeding spheres, who are only magnetized through it by the divine.

Gradual Intrusion of Evil through Freedom of Movement.—The inner spheres are solid but transparent, and revolve round earth, the common centre ; their complex movements prove that they have special spirit-guides [1] or motors who have free-will (in a disparaging sense) and are not tied by their very nature to perfection. For the regular movement of the remotest sphere is a sign of true freedom and divinity, not of ' bounden duty and service '.[2] The bright Fixed Stars, removed from all contact of our lower sphere and in direct communion with God, enjoy happiness unalloyed and are immortal. The Planets, inferior in dignity as in perfectness of motion, are nevertheless also immortal and uncreate—spirits endowed with life and rational activity. With them (as we saw) begins the realm of Free-will ; their planet-angels or *animæ motrices* display movements opposed to the divine circuit of the Fixed Stars and (as it were) declare their independence [3] of God and hostility to the universal order. Here there is but a very slight beginning of *free-will* (in the sense of arbitrary and subjective choice) and its attendant *evil*, but it is enough for his system. Down below, the seven planet-spheres (Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Sun, Moon) begin to exert an influence already malign ; which centres on our earth—lees of the universe, and scene of birth, failure, and death. The only true abode of perfection and bliss is above (*Met.* xi 6, 12).

[1] ὅσας εἶναι τὰς σφαίρας, τοσούτους κ. τοὺς κινοῦντας θεούς. So too Plato LL. 898. The question was always rising between *naturalist* and *humanist*—was the heavenly body itself divine ? had it a soul *within* or an angel *detached* from its substance to guide it (like naiad from her physical province) ? or was the archaic animism a pure fallacy and was motion due to nothing but the weights and measures of Strato of Lampsacus, or the atomic collisions of Democritus ?

[2] It is odd and unsatisfactory that the modern world always expresses virtuous action in terms of *constraint*, unpleasant obedience to a law or standard set from outside (Kant in vain insisting that it is really our true self alone that dictates the law). The greeks really maintained that such a service was ' perfect freedom ' : the slave (Aristotle saw with an acuteness unfamiliar to-day) is really the person who can ' do as he likes ', whereas his master by his very dignity is tied (in politics or in the world of thought) to the dictates of pure reason, *noblesse oblige*.

[3] I do not say that Aristotle carries his *personifying* and *voluntarism* so far as this ; but the doctrine of rebel spirits is latent in his theory and will be found to fit in with the oriental creeds, chaldean and other, which are seen at a later date in alliance or confusion with peripatism.

Aristotle, Admitting Both Principles of *Rest* and *Movement*: places them in Two Different Worlds.—We may now notice the deeper aspects of this somewhat naïve cosmic system. Aristotle is the union of Elea and Heraclitus, of the principles of *rest* and *movement*. Being or substance is not dead and inert but in ceaseless motion; it realizes itself by passing over from the *virtual* (or dormant) to the *actual*. It is not a globe of crystal [1] but is stirred in its inmost core by a restless and purposive process. Life is not the meeting-ground and arena of conflict for two independent powers which have already existed apart as among the parsis or in some platonic developments.[2] Not that Aristotle altogether escapes the platonic dualism of *Form* and *Matter*; sometimes he represents them as separate realities and (as will be seen) falls in the end into a far more complete dualism than his master.[3] But at least he started from the old ionic idea of a single substance unfolding itself in a continuous and unbroken development—a monistic theory which perforce is always the conscious aim of the philosopher. Yet this self-developing and automatic process must (as with the stoics) be presented to discursive reason as the play of a *moving* force and a *moved* stuff (*Phys.* iii. 2). Even if our whole object is to say with Spinoza that there is after all but one thing in the world, we cannot help

[1] σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιος ὄγκῳ in Parmenides' poem, of which the σφαῖρος of Empedocles is another form: but the latter has a cyclic evolution from (Spencer's) *homogeneity* to *heterogeneity* and back again; in the former, all movement whatever is expressly denied.

[2] In the Zoroastrian *Avesta* the real problem is, why did the realm of *light* and *gloom* intermingle? So to Plato's successors, what was the relation of the *Forms* to *Matter*? two 'idly confronting realms' (Schwegler), of which surely one was otiose and superfluous.

[3] It is one of the chief merits of Caird's *Evolut. Gr. Theol.* (Gifford Lect.) Glasgow 1904, to have clearly shown this, against the almost ineradicable prejudice that the greek nature was blithe and buoyant, supremely contented with the world; that their theology was always *pantheistic* (if they had any at all) and that they were as a race quite careless about the soul's destiny hereafter, being so well satisfied with the present life. Goethe has consecrated this curious illusion and we even find Professor Pringle-Pattison and Deussen repeating it with assurance. Another and related illusion is the dividing of world-history into 3 great periods corresponding to the fichtean and hegelian *thesis, antithesis, synthesis; hellenic,* wherein man's spirit and nature are in complete harmony; *medieval,* in which owing to the ascetic ideal they are violently discerpted and set in contrast; *modern,* in which the early harmony is said to be completely restored!

allotting to it its concave and convex sides, *thought* and *extension*. Aristotle felt himself charged with the duty of reconciling the new *mechanism* of Democritus with the socratic and platonic *teleology* and humanism ; ἀνάγκη with the Form of Good.

God and Matter : Aristotle's Cosmogony Retrograde.—Matter is conceived in two ways : as that which longs (ὄρεξις) to realize the form ; on the other hand, as that which ever prevents the form from becoming actual : *it is at the same time both the* cause and the hindrance *of such perfection as there is*. At the other end in the scale of being God, since He is self-sufficing and without want or defect, cannot be *active* or *good* as creator ; and although this postulate may satisfy the intellect, it will not be found to satisfy the religious sense. The divine being is really a self-conscious person, embracing the whole of Plato's *ideal world* ; in Him centre as absolute sovereign all the attributes which Plato at one time gave to the republic of Forms. In the end neither *commonwealth* nor *monarch* are active, except as a magnetic paradigm by which matter is attracted. Yet it must not be forgotten that this deity is no bare postulate to round off a system, no constitutional sovereign ' to dot the I's ' or put an apex on the pyramid, but is the corner-stone of Aristotle's entire system of cosmology. It must be noticed that his theories by no means marked an advance in science : his *weltanschauung* is rather a retrograde and all ' too human ' system which sat heavily on the western mind for a thousand years. His concentric spheres in a strictly limited and circular world, encompassed on its outermost verge by Godhead, pushed aside the schemes of Pythagoras and Plato—which, with the ' infinite worlds in infinite time ' of Democritus and the ionians, stand far nearer to the truth of things.

Again, his Spirit-guardians of the spheres helped along the later current of demonology, and subjected the earth-life to those *astrologic* influences which were familiar enough in the east. For the eternal and (in a sense) regrettable vicissitudes of birth and decay were due to the restless movement of sun, moon and planets [1] whose self-will (as we saw) first introduced a strain of discord into the music of the spheres. The fundamental distinction of heaven and earth led readily to the blending of peripatetic science with gnostic and parsi dualism ; and helped to create that peculiar ' Philosophy ' amongst the Arabs and latin

[1] *Gen. et Corr.* ii 10 (336).

scholastics, against which, in the end, the religious conscience was obliged to protest.

Man Epitomizes and Explains the Macrocosm : Immanence or the Divine in Nature.—The physical universe he thus represents as an unbroken series upwards, from the first vague impulses and early strivings in matter to Man. We have at last reached the nature for which all this development was preliminary. Nature in every part is but a herald for man and in every abortive effort to produce life after the ' heavenly pattern ' she is really striving to produce a man-child. But even now we cannot quite understand this strangely persistent character of *purposiveness* : why does Nature strive to produce the best possible ? We have reached a permanent and insoluble problem in interpreting Aristotle ; for in Nature there is for him ' something divine ' (*θεῖόν τι*) which seeks itself or its kindred and its true happiness in the transcendent God beyond the spheres. *This activity carries every nature not only to its own perfection but beyond itself :* it dies just on the verge of achieving something better than its own completeness. This activity is in the world of our experience and not in God ; and it is so conspicuous that Nature can be justly personified as pursuing a conscious end, like the purposive and rational animal, Man. Thus the divine is as well *immanent* in the world as *transcendent,* just as there is order in an army, or law in a State, apart from, yet somehow linked to, the general or statesman who is its author. Aristotle cannot (as we saw) account for this by the self-revealing *goodness* which in the eyes of Plato formed God's chief attribute. This he can say, that God *thinks* the ideal order of the world of change *sub specie æterni,* though He cannot condescend to take notice of particular things or happenings.[1] But how far removed from this sphere, wherein God gazes eternally on a complete and ideal whole, is the world of our striving, the painful and discordant process of the finite ! The real tendency of this theology comes out clearly in the stoic school ; for which the ideal was a subjective brooding and concentration on self-consciousness,—after the pattern of God wrapt up in His own perfection. Just as God is indifferent to the cosmic process, indeed not even aware ' that virtue has

Deity says Caird in effect (Lect. xiv and xv), is not an empty blank as in later apophatic and nihilistic theology, but a transparent and flawless unity in which all differences are taken up and resolved.

gone out of Him ', so is the wise man wholly indifferent to outward events over which he has no control. He does not seek to objectify, in an unmeaning world and by a series of detached moral acts, the timeless perfection that he feels within his soul.

Nature attains the Divine in Man : Influx of Grace.—God who sees only the ideal order may be compared to some modern sovereigns for whom the papers are carefully edited that no untoward news may spoil their complacence. We do not see why the final world of repetition and process should exist at all and develop (as it does) in time and space ; there is no ground for it in the divine Being. Of Nature herself, the imperfect creature, one can only say in a half poetic strain that there exists somehow a love which yearns towards God, not merely as its *object* but as its *source*,—though how this can be, Aristotle does not explain until he reaches Man. It is a very one-sided affection, which is never reciprocated : as in Spinoza ' man must never expect God ' to love him in return '. Our world, in endless revolution, conflict, change is always pointing beyond itself, is ever seeking and failing to find. But its aim can only be to unite itself with the centre (or goal ?) of its being. The ' somewhat divine ' can (so Aristotle tells us) at its highest earthly stage rise to the same consciousness that God has, and in the end becomes ' partaker of the divine ' nature ' and of the eternal blessedness itself.

Man's Reason, and Divine Inspiration.—Man is thus, as the microcosm, the only key to the universe so far as it is a process towards an ideal unattained, not the enjoyment of an unbroken and fully realized satisfaction as in the Stars. Man is at the end or the apex of earthly development ; he recapitulates creation. His soul embraces and brings to complete perfection all the faculties shown in plant and animal life. Just as in Empedocles, the nature of the soul can be treated as a natural product by *physiology* : man is just the most complex result of a long evolution and no break can be observed in the gradual ascent. But at this point there is a sudden irruption, a new element. There is something more in man's soul than can be supplied by nature : *reason*. This is at once man's *differentia*, marking him off from the animals, and his veriest self.[1] All other psychic faculties are so tied up with the senses of body that they cannot be supposed

[1] νοῦς ἕκαστος=the mind is the [true] personality : cf. previous section on Averroes.

to survive its decay and dissolution. But *mind* or *intellect* exists in its own right ; it does not need to lean on the suggestions or impressions of sense and the outer world. It is therefore in the truest sense immortal *suo jure*. Alone, this *reason* is not a function of the body [1] : it is not a *dependent* but an *absolute* principle, ' something divine '. Aristotle here leaves *physiology* and becomes a *mystic*. There is that in man which cannot be explained by natural causes and enters his nature from another sphere.[2] Man's mind, bound to the senses as the sole vehicles or avenues through which knowledge can reach him, is at first a *tabula rasa*.[3] His intellect may be divine but it cannot manifest itself in this lower world without the stimulants of sense-impressions (*φαντάσματα*). But this dormant or *virtual* faculty becomes *active* by a gradual union with a divine power, also regarded as entering from without. *This power to appreciate abstract truth is then transcendental both in source and destiny.*[4] It is like the creative *νοῦς* of Anaxagoras an ' occasional visitor ' to our world, a special ' grace ' or dower which comes from heaven.[5] It can be argued that his philosophy falls (like most others) into two disparate halves which cannot be reconciled.

His double Attitude : *Orphic* and Physiological.—The *transcendentalism* was soon sloughed off by his successors (e.g. Strato) as a needless accretion, but it is probable that for Aristotle himself it formed the most important part. Like Empedocles he can look at soul both as a *naturalist* and a *mystic*, and in the latter respect he only gives a slightly different turn to the orphic and pythagorist doctrine or superstition, which existed side by side with pure impersonal science in almost every greek thinker. We must distinguish then between the *physical* and the *mystic-intellectual* theory of soul (*de An.* i 403, *part. anim.* i. 641) : just as other thinkers abruptly alter their standpoint when they regard man from the *objective* or the *subjective* side. To earlier in-

[1] *τὰ λοιπὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς οὔκ ἐστι χωριστά de Anima* ii 9.

[2] The famous passage is found in *Gen. Anim.* ii 3 : *λείπεται τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι κ. θεῖον εἶναι μόνον.*

[3] *de An.* iii 4 *νοῦς = γραμματεῖον ἐν ᾧ μηθὲν ὑπάρχει ἐνεργείᾳ γεγραμμένον.*

[4] *de An.* iii 5, almost in the language of Anaxagoras.

[5] It will be objected that I read an unwarrantable *mysticism* into the most matter-of-fact author : even if the charge is justified, I am only trying to enter into the mental atmosphere of his interpreters who for at least 1500 years were convinced that this was his meaning.

quirers, man's Soul was at one and the same time a fallen demon, a mere resultant, coefficient or harmony of a particular natural body, and an entity which passes through successive bodies by transmigration : man is both a mere animal, a vagrant spirit on its travels, and a god. The more important passages in this context are *de An.* ii 412, *εἰ δή τι κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς δεῖ λέγειν εἴη ἂν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ* —that is, soul from the scientific point of view : 413, *ἔοικεν ὁ νοῦς ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι . . . τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεται χωρίζεσθαι.* Also in 413, he says ; it is quite conceivable that there may be some parts of *soul* separable from *body*, because they are not the expression of any particular body ; it is further a matter of debate whether soul as perfect realization of body may not stand to it in the same separable relation as a sailor to his boat :—just as Plato's Grand Pilot of the Universe is by no means tied to his vessel but sometimes leaves the helm and enjoys his own true nature apart and alone. While he starts from a desire to show orderly and continuous development from the lowest stage, he ends in this peculiar and abrupt *dualism.* In a sense the whole motive of his system is to avoid Plato's antithesis of the *real* and *ideal* worlds. He seems to strive against the common orphic tendency to sunder body and soul, against the pythagorist scorn of the physical vesture (*σῶμα = σῆμα*) which is the ' tomb of the spirit '. Yet he is in the end inevitably drawn back to Plato's position ; ' the soul is not at home here ' and is not doing its proper work '. Spirit is dragged down into a lower region, where like a philosopher who is forced to become a backwoodsman or a Crusoe on a desert island, it is reduced to low and imperfect activities.[1] If the Christian believes in a *threefold* nature—body, soul, spirit—he is only following in the steps of Aristotle and the gnostics who restated him.[2]

Immortality—conditional and non-ethical : the End is Dualism.—Man leads a complex existence because he has a mortal body and an *immortal* spirit—not (be it noticed) of right

[1] In which of course the purely *ethical* must be included.

[2] His *νοῦς* is only the *πνεῦμα* of the valentinians and others, who divided mankind into the *pneumatic*, *psychic*, and *hylic* : —the first were sure of salvation or redemption, the third were *ipso facto* excluded from all hope, and the intermediate group might or might not be saved : only for them was there any freedom of choice.

or without effort. Aristotle, for whom continued existence hereafter is not an *ethical* postulate, upholds *conditional* immortality, which is the privilege of the elect few only. The highest part of his soul (when purged of passion and devoted to the attainment of truth) is a unity lifted above all change, serene and untroubled, unaffected by the desires and passions which torment all other men. Hence as *faith* (and grace from another point of view) is the only really important thing, *works* do not matter (as in the hindu systems already examined) ; and *reason*—perplexed, discursive and dialectic in the lower function, asking and solving questions by argument and syllogism—is in the highest region silent, and gives way to direct intuition *θιγγάνων κ. νοῶν*. The constant ' nagging ' dialectic of *discursive* reason ceases, and something arises analogous to the immediacy of sense-perception. In *intuitive* reason we perceive the highest truth directly : it is beyond judgment and is infallible. Between the uses of the *understanding* which analyses and judges and the enjoyment of *reason* there is drawn a deep line. Aristotle has forsaken at the most critical moment his avowed design of preserving at all costs an orderly development and organic union. In the end *matter* and *form* (in the truest sense) are irreconcilable opposites and can never be joined.

Is this Pure Intellect Man's true Self ? Atman.—What is this peculiar faculty which completes and perfects, yet in a sense, annihilates, the nature of man ? Is it his true self ? In a sense yes, since *νοῦς ἕκαστος*, and herein is his *differentia*. But in another sense it is not his *self* at all, but *God*. Plain logic demands that we identify man at his best and highest with God ; for the state of mind, the calm fruition, the ideal objects of thought exactly correspond in the divine and human. It is conceived in this double sense as the highest apex of the individual soul's development and as the sudden infusion of a divine grace ; man, at his last and most perfect stage, or man when he has passed beyond himself and become something better, even God Himself.

The Gift of the Elect Few : to become God.—The definition of *νοῦς* in man agrees with that of *νοῦς* the Supreme which is God—both are unmoved movers, both are in the words of Anaxagoras *ἀπαθὴς, ἀμιγὴς, καθαρὸς, χωριστός*. This being must be *unique* ; there cannot be a *manifold*, for a plural is mate-

rial and this must be regarded as wholly spiritual.[1] Our personality is then in the last resort *divine*, God Himself :— is He then the *being* of all things ? (a perilous belief which we shall find at the back of medieval Realism and other tendencies more heretical still). No, the grace of union with the Active Intellect comes only to a few, for whose sake (it may be said) this cosmic development exists. Divinity is not an immediate gift, but slowly and painfully achieved or purchased at a great price (like Festus' franchise).[2] In the end it is perhaps best to refer the ' divine something ' only to man ; and not generally to Nature. It is because man can be the vehicle of the divine spirit that she subserves his purpose and strains, like Penia in Plato's *Banquet* in her want and emptiness, towards the good : in man her aim is satisfied and she rests content.[3]

No Loss of Self in Thought, either for God or Man.—Aristotle's doctrine is not *nihilistic* ; God does not indeed think of *particulars* nor has He providence for special cases or for anything outside His own perfect nature. But He contemplates the world of Forms as a whole (*νοητὰ εἴδη* forming the *κόσμος νοητὸς*, which is both God Himself and yet the object of His eternal thought). So in the supreme stage the soul is not rapt, as in other mystics, into an emotional nothingness (if the term be allowed) ; and just in so far as there is no fusion of subject and object (either in God

[1] *Met.* xii 3, 10 : Aristotle is so far *pantheist* at times that it might almost be said that *νοῦς* is a sort of *immanent* world-soul of which our partial souls are transient modes—as in Spinoza and all hindu systems and their kin. But the transcendental side must never be forgotten as the complement and correlate : in Aristotle it is at least as important. At any rate throughout our period he is justly regarded as the champion of transcendental theism.

[2] *Immediate* and premature pantheism of all things, willings, and happenings, is obviously a doctrine liable to have inconvenient results as we saw in Hindustan ; but ' to *become* divine ', to be in St. Peter's language ' partakers of the divine nature ', is the avowed object of man and the goal set before him in the eastern church.

[3] The question arises ' are there few that shall be saved ? ' both in this system, and in a very kindred one, buddhism. The aim of this long misunderstood school is to secure the fullest happiness attainable *in this life* (no doubt by methods which a western mind cannot readily appreciate) : the buddhas are the ' fine flower ', the last bloom, of the world-process, and this is even justified so far as the group of the elect attain felicity and reappear from time to time to exhort others to the quest of the same happiness.

or in man) Aristotle is not a mystic. But history plainly shows that from him the later mystics of east and west have borrowed the whole of their doctrine; though they may carry it into heights (or depths) of self-loss and nihilism where he certainly could not have followed them.

Morals, only Episodic and Provisional.—It is not hard to see what place *morals* will occupy in such a system, or again political life and society. At the two ends of his scale of mankind Aristotle places the 'beast' and the 'god' (*θηρίον*, *θεός*). Intermediate is the average man, the citizen who must lean on convention, established laws and current examples around him, who is not strong enough to stand alone; even as the 'great-souled hero' of the *Ethics* stands in need of popular approval, and lives a somewhat artificial, indeed precarious, life as Triton among minnows. The *materies virtutis* of the *μεγαλόψυχος* (as of Mr. Dorrit in the Marshalsea Prison) is an admiring community, willing to acknowledge his superiority and allow him to patronize and benefit them. The peripatetic school was always haunted with this dependence on *externals*; and the next age is occupied with the old problem of the happy slave or martyr on the rack, to whose bliss outward circumstances and the goodwill of his fellows contribute absolutely nothing, as they can take nothing away. Aristotle's morals are then provisional and propædeutic: social life is all very well for the average greek citizen and the philosopher will never kick down the ladder on which he has mounted to serenity: he is never an antinomian. *Moral* virtue is a prerequisite and a permanent condition of intellectual freedom, but it is hardly an end-in-itself: it is not the sum or series of detached good acts but a habit (*ἕξις*) which renders possible the use and enjoyment of man's peculiar activity, on which pleasure follows in the very highest and most divine form. It is in the *dianoētic* virtues that man rises into communion with Active Intellect, to view things not as finite and struggling particulars but as a coherent and organic whole. When reason (like Martha) is fussily active over the business or rather businesses of life, it is engrossed in that which is not its proper sphere and is diverted from its real end. At rare moments of infinite satisfaction the soul is admitted to share the same bliss that God enjoys for ever. In passages which describe the divine felicity and man's infrequent glimpses of it, Aristotle, creator of intellectualism, be-

comes almost a mystic of the emotions and creates for all later time, the aim and the phrases which express it. This ultimate interest in the subjective feeling of the single soul saves Aristotle from platonic Realism : whereby the individual seems to be swallowed and absorbed in the collective state-life. When he calls such social life man's highest good (*τἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν par excellence*) he is hardly sincere : though it is never wholly displaced or forgotten, this stage must be transcended by any one who wishes to be perfect as God is perfect.

Proper Goal of Man Guaranteed by the Cosmos : Union with God.—This perfection is really within the reach of one who gives pains and takes trouble about the task.[1] The test of proper[1] adjustment to one's cosmic surroundings is *pleasure* (*ἡδονή*). He does not shrink from using this word, although as implying to most ears a flitting satisfaction of a single moment, it is not the best possible term : *happiness* he prefers (*εὐδαιμονία*), a word which implies a uniform and continuously blissful state of mind. This state is not merely a subjective feeling (which might be hallucination or an opium-trance) but a lasting condition judged to be *good* as well as pleasant by competent experts, and well nigh inalienable. Man's proper work is also his proper happiness (*Eth.* i 6, x 7) ; the greek mind, not yet impenitently pessimist and ironical, still believes that Nature provides for man's perfection and happiness and respects it when won. The deeper and sadder problems of life it had not as yet confronted, and in Aristotle there is little of Job. As the life of *theory* is the highest, so he cannot allow that the state's paramount duty is to train its citizens for war. War, like the lower athletic training of morality, is only a means to an end ;—just as the motion of the spheres and the restless process of earth-life is only a means toward repose in the good, in contemplation,—in that which men will later call the Beatific Vision. Therefore we find constant reference (both in Nature by metaphor, and in man) to *will* and *desire*, to the life-impulse which has not yet quite become unhealthy and morbid and turned in upon itself in introspective pessimism, or penitence. The perfection of God stirred appetites which in the end could be satisfied ; the universe as a system

[1] With the pretensions of the slothful and ignorant mystic who believes himself at once and without effort *en rapport* with Central Being, he had as little sympathy as Hegel himself. Cf. Divis. B 503, 4.

corresponds with man's hopes and aspirations.[1] Aristotle tried to preserve the creature and the sovereign distinct and separate even in the supreme moment of 'union'. He admits no neoplatonic theory of *emanation*, no *creation*, no progressive *deterioration*, no 'overflow from a full cup' (as in Plotinus); only the magnetism which the perfect must exert over an inferior world, conscious of its dearth and longing to fill up its emptiness.

Aristotle seeks to Overcome Hellenic Dualism and Reconcile the Unit with Objectives.—From one point of view then, Aristotle desired to cure the ungrateful aloofness (ἀδημονία) which orphism had introduced into Greece; which Plato, in very much of his writing, had sanctioned both by argument and appeal to emotion. His pupil takes up the sophistic problem. Man is to restate the world *in his own terms*, and accept it *on his own terms*: he need not travel far abroad for this; there was a good deal of 'homework' to be done in examining his concepts and making acquaintance with the obvious facts of the rich life around him.[2] The sophistic movement showed that reflecting man, the *subject*, felt dominated or overshadowed by *objectives*. These he could neither understand nor accept without reserve. He believed them (like Rousseau or the anarchists) to be not wholly *rational* from the 'private member's point of view'. Socrates had put forward a very protestant and individualist solution, while Plato had tried to reconcile man once again with the State and the Universe. Aristotle undertook to show how far and by what method, the *unit* could (as it were) appropriate the *whole*, and 'win out' to freedom. He did not approve of Plato's half-militant, half monastic State, with its truly catholic and realist implication, that the member must be submissive and dutiful to the society. Though he concedes that the State is prior to the individual, he does not allow this titular dignity and precedence to interfere with the latter's rights and franchise. This liberty or deliverance was the basal problem for his greek successors; it was the

[1] *Pol.* i 2, 9, he uses βούλεσθαι of φύσις, *Phys.* i 10, 7, *matter* ὕλη ὀρέγεται (yearns after) *form*, *Met.* xii 6, 15: 7, 3 matter desires God: not to be merged in the same nature but rather to enjoy the same delight, the contemplation of an ideal world, which is intermittent with us but for Him eternal, xii, 7, 11.

[2] In so far Aristotle is the 'absolute empiric' as he is the father of all later inductive science: but equally, he is nothing of the kind, as no single designation can ever exhaust the thought and work of a true philosopher.

sole aim of the subjective schools, as it had been of some notable socratic pupils. Antisthenes had sought to set the unit, the single life, free from the limits which culture or society (even convention, etiquette and common decency) could impose. The hedonist of Cyrene also showed his profound dislike of the State (for which he substituted the voluntary bond of friendship), his profound distrust in the Universe : his actual pursuit of particular pleasures quickly subsided into the settled temper of mind which expects nothing from the world ; it cannot understand it and it entrenches itself behind an innermost citadel. His aim was not a series of pleasures but a negative absence of wants, and the goal, just as in the sternest ascetic, is only won by renouncing and suppressing : in the uncertain journey of life one's baggage should be reduced to a *minimum* by every prudent traveller. In an age which had not forgotten the victory of a few freemen over the million slaves of persian autocracy, the demand of thought was that man be not sacrificed for a purpose which he cannot make his own.

He Rationalizes Universe from Humanist Standpoint : Felicity within our Reach.—Aristotle tried to *rationalize* the whole universe from the humanist standpoint : to prove to man that the highest attainable pleasure, the highest intelligent substance, was within his reach. He found, in his half-mystical and religious conclusion, that these two are one. God Himself is the aim and goal of man. The unfolding of Active Intellect allows us to behold and even to touch the truth. We gain by it an inlet into the pure thought which forms the inmost essence of the divine. Here (like God Himself) without further willing or end in view, we enjoy the chief good for its own sake and timelessly ; and 'will-less absorption in the perception of truth' which, both for God and mortals is the most blessed life of all.[1] But the final *salto mortale* Aristotle never takes : he leaves to others to deduce the obvious conclusion, that *man only attains the completeness of his nature when he ceases to be man and has already passed into the divine.*

[1] Erdmann *Gesch. Phil.* § 87 can say with truth 'the Deity is both 'object and *subject* of the philosopher's contemplation : so in Plato, the 'good is not only the highest being and object of knowledge but that, 'in which partaking, our mind can alone perceive it, and in its light every-'thing else in the world'.

APPENDIX A

Greek Demonology and King-Worship

'Demon'—our own Character or a Divine Grace?—Empedocles is the standing instance of a man claiming to have been a deity. Hesiod (*Op.* 122, 251) certainly believed that the demons were the souls of those who lived in the Age of Gold, who might well be the Titans or subjects of Cronus before Zeus usurped the throne; to Æschylus, Darius is a demon after death, to Euripides, Alcestis.[1] The philosophers used the term often; for Thales everything was full of demons; Pythagoras held them to be souls of the dead who sent dreams to men; Heraclitus and Epicharmus say almost in the same words, that character (ἦθος) is each man's real demon or guardian spirit; Democritus says that happiness dwells not in things without, but the soul is the abode of a blessed being οἰκητηρίον δαίμονος. To Plato the souls of the dead were δαίμονες that is, δαήμονες, because when released from the body they became wise in that lore which our flesh hides from us; every man has his guardian demon *Phædo* 107; *Rep.* 617; so also in *Tim.* 90 where God allotted to each man as guiding genius a supreme form of soul[2], within the rational faculty which dwells in the summit of our body and lifts us to the higher region of thought—an important passage noticed elsewhere. Aristotle (*fragment* 193 Rose) held also that each man had a spirit-guardian (φύλαξ) and Xenocrates, a successor of Plato, only repeats his master's teaching in the *Timæus* 89, 90. So Aristotle reports (*Topics* ii 112). Hence Menander in the well-known lines popularizes a philosophic belief, which was something more than a superstition: he calls the attendant demon, 'one who conducts us or initiates us into life's mysteries' (μυστάγωγος τοῦ βίου), like the attendant and guide at a freemasonic initiation. Now in all this usage (popular, mythical or symbolic) it is hard to decide if a separate angelic being is meant or merely the highest point in our own nature, our own personal character: it is certainly unsafe to rule out the former sense altogether and we should introduce a wholly irrelevant scepticism. For the great materialists and monists of the stoic school (at least in the Middle Period)[3] were among the warmest adherents of *demonology*. Posidonius held that our disembodied souls congregated with other spirits in the sublunar region; for soul-stuff is not dissipated but has an element of permanence and an allotted habitation beneath the moon. Our indwelling soul may strictly be called 'the demon born with us'.

The Belief Coalesced with the Notion of Mana—or temporary Divine Possession.—This view, common it would seem to the vulgar and to philosophers alike, met and coalesced with another, and perhaps earlier, belief

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[1] Nero styled himself *Corp. Ins. Gr.* iii 4699 ἀγαθοδαίμων of the whole world!

[2] Here the true derivation δαίομαι is clear.

[3] Cf. Schmekel, *Phil. of the Middle Stoa*, Berlin 1892.

which lies at the root of kingship and priesthood,—the incarnation of a deity in a mortal body, during which time (for the union is often not for the duration of life) he is identified with the God whose name he bears and whose form and power he assumes. Thus Bacchus became actually incarnate in his initiates; there is no doubt that Aphrodite was something conceived as a force which acts like demoniac possession (as conceived in the New Testament). It is also said that Hermes was held to become embodied in the Cave of Trophonius near Lebadea. Pausanias ix. 39 certainly says that the two boy-attendants who acted as guides to the consultant of the oracle were called by the god's name (οὓς Ἑρμεῖς ἐπονομάζουσι). We have seen in Hinduism that Sitala, the goddess of cholera, is supposed to be actually *incarnate* in the sufferer. These two beliefs—(1) that soul-substance comes from the heavens, (2) that a deity is a *mana* or electric force entering a human (or animal) body, or again merely a *fetich*-object—have certainly united.

APPENDIX B

Platonic Soul-Theory (as *Demon*)

There cannot be a doubt that *Aristotle's soul-theory* is in great measure taken from a passage in Plato (*Tim.* 90) which deserves close attention. Plato begins as a dualist who finds his disparate substances somehow working together to form a συνθετὸν or κοινὸν ζῶον. Man being formed of soul and body united, his guide is the former, and to its welfare he must diligently take heed. Of the three parts that which is most fully exercised will be the strongest; therefore let him give freest play to the part which is most divine, his guiding genius which lifts him up towards his birthplace and true home in heaven—the κυριώτατον παρ' ἡμῖν ψυχῆς εἶδος . . δαίμονα θεὸς ἑκάστῳ δέδωκεν . . οἰκεῖν ἐπ' ἄκρῳ τῷ σώματι πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐν οὐρανῷ συγγένειαν ἀπὸ γῆς ἡμᾶς αἴρειν, ὡς ὄντας φυτὸν οὐκ ἔγγειον ἀλλ' οὐράνιον.

The later interpreters, when the self-help of the subjective school seemed to fail, placed this entirely *outside* man as a real spirit sent to guide him; οἱ πολλοὶ says Plutarch in his tract on the *Socratic Demon*, νοῦν καλοῦντες ἐντὸς εἶναι νομίζουσι . . οἱ δ' ὀρθῶς ὑπονοοῦντες ὡς ἐκτὸς ὄντα δαίμονα. On the *Tim.* passage Archer Hind says (not without truth but with some little over-emphasis) 'in Plato νοῦς is simply ψυχὴ exercising her own 'unimpeded functions . . . the true δαίμων is our own mind; we are 'to look for guidance not to any *external* source but to ourselves, to the 'divinest part of our nature'. But a somewhat mystical doctrine of grace and illumination is latent even in the most convinced preachers of self-sufficiency in pelagian antiquity: and we cannot in fairness exclude one marked side of human thought.

Now he who so exerts his highest faculties must have thoughts which are immortal and divine (φρονεῖν ἀθάνατα κ. θεῖα) that is, if he grasp or lay hold of truth (τῆς ἀληθείας ἐφάπτηται); and so far as our nature can share in immortality (μετασχεῖν ἀθανασίας), no portion of this privilege is lacking to him. He must needs be blessed beyond all others (διαφερόντως

εὐδαίμων) since he ever cherishes the divine in him and keeps duly attended and adorned the demon which abides with him (ἔχειν εὖ κεκοσμημένον τὸν δαίμονα σύνοικον ἐν αὑτῷ).

This, like much of Plato's mystical language, may be merely suggestive and intended to explain the greek word for *happiness* as opposed to mere *enjoyment*; the εὐδαίμων is he to whom his deity within, his ideal standard that is, is propitious and well content with his pupil:—but it is easy to see how a single turn of phrase or meaning, a single forced accent on the metaphor, will set in motion the long series of gnostical solutions for the problem of our being. This sentiment Aristotle echoes in Eth. x 1177 where the divine life for man is *mental* life (κατὰ τοῦν βίος) because this is the more divine portion; therefore duty is clear, not to listen to those who restrain us from high thoughts (παραινοῦντες ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν) but aim, so far as we are able, at things immortal (ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν) and do all we can to live according to the most noble faculty within us.

PART II. ORPHISM AND CHALDEISM, OR ASTRAL THEORY

SECTION I. MYSTIC AND EMPIRIC PSYCHOLOGY AMONG THE GREEKS

Empiric and Mystic Elements in Solution or Antagonism.—It is now quite clear that in Aristotle, the chief influence on thinkers in east and west alike during our period, there coexisted two tendencies; the *empiric* or materialist which advances by way of tested science, and the *mystic* which supplements the former method when at a certain point it becomes powerless. In his system at the most critical moment there is a sudden break and a new force is admitted from another world. At least that is one way of interpreting his language; his direct successors took the other view and put the emphasis on the purely empirical element. The neo-platonists, and Christian Commentators,[1] neglected the former and *inductive* part and saw in him chiefly a *mystical* and religious writer who could be reconciled to his master Plato in every detail. As there was a fissure in the socratics, so there was in the peripatetic school; neither party from its schismatic basis presented the master in the entirety of his teaching. It is just possible that Aristotle may have intended Active Intellect in the complete philosopher to be only a *natural* faculty raised to its highest power by untiring personal effort; but he did not always say this and at times most distinctly contradicts pure pelagianism.

Orphic Teaching: Man as a Fallen Angel.—We must now inquire if there was any counterpart in previous greek thought to this curious doctrine of grace or Divine Illumination which in Aristotle's text cannot be wholly explained away. None of the Ionians had ever denied the existence of demons even in their most scientific moments; and the atomic school (like their later exponent Epicurus) acknowledged them. From the year *600* B.C. onwards there arose, from origins which are to-day

[1] To some extent the arabians also.

absolutely unknown, a peculiar personal religion called *Orphism*. Time must not here be spent in a survey of proofs or problems. We do not know if the new doctrine was the uprising of an earlier racial element ; or the invasion of savage thraco-phrygian orgies and myths, so tempered and modified as to suit a civilized society and meet the demands of the heart ; or an indigenous product of that hybrid race we call the Greeks ; or lastly, an introduction from the Far East. Much good work has been done recently in making this ' revivalist ' movement a little clearer, but we are by no means as yet fully acquainted with its true origins and import. About the same time that the saco-thracian Gautama founded the school of godless personalist ethics (since strangely transformed into a religion of comfort for one-fourth of our race), anonymous teachers were spreading a new soul-theory among the Hellenes. The soul was a demon exiled from a better world by its own fault ; in order that it may expiate in the living death of bodily life those sins for which it was expelled from ' paradise '. It was not the ghostly breath of our physical being—hovering around the theatre of death or near its sepulchre, acquiring a fitful life and even a certain agency among survivors, by means of food and drink placed by the grave or by occasional draughts of blood. It was an independent being from another world with a history stretching far back into the past ;—of which its present lot and conduct was the lawful issue as it would be the condition of its future state. This demon was immortal and brought with him into a mortal frame memories and visions of a better world. It might be said rather to exist side by side with our soul-proper,[1] the sum of the faculties which rise out of the use of our bodily organs and the needs of intercourse with a tangible world. The ancients, savages as well as sages in Egypt, had faced the problem of a *dual* or a *multiple* personality : the *ka* was not the *ba*. It must be noted that the *ka* as demon or guardian-angel is *semitic* in origin and is not an indigenous belief of Egypt. The well-known hyksos sovereign Khyan begins the practice of inscribing his cartouche with the words ' *beloved by his ka* '. Later this singular being was expressly deified ; at Panahemisis we read on a tomb ' Thy *ka* is thy god, he parted ' not from thee and so thy soul liveth eternally ' (Bissing *Versuch*

[1] This is curiously like the hindu *Soul non-agent* which we found in Sankhya and the Vedantists.

etc. 1911)—a curious parallel to the doctrine of our period on the divinity of a certain part of the soul, and the independent (*χωριστὸν*) existence of the *Active Intellect*. Here, says Flinders Petrie with great truth, *ka* has become a divine principle, indwelling, and saving the soul.[1] The Spirit which could leave the body and wander far afield, as in Herodotus' story of marvel, was, and yet again was not, the chief factor, the real person. It was from one point of view the *very man himself*, again a mere *passing guest* from the divine world who took up his abode in a human body, *deus*, says Seneca, *hospitans in corpore humano*. There was always a tendency to regard it as a stranger who was not our real self.[2] It is clear that such a doctrine would become at once popular with a *crowd* swayed by emotion or sense of mystery. What is surprising is that it was held besides by inductive philosophers who at least started out with the aim of rationalizing the world and man.[3] Until the last dire necessity, they admitted nothing but what senses could attest and reason ratify.[4]

[1] It must be remembered that, as mostly elsewhere, religion in Egypt began, not strictly with a formal theology or even a fixed worship of gods, but with a firm hold on immortality, rather a burning desire to secure it—which may very well exist in a community as yet (to our notions) godless.

[2] See my *Marcus Aurelius and Later Stoicism* Edin. 1910, pp. 202–211; he represents our true spiritual worship or 'reasonable service' as a cult of a deity in the innermost shrine of the soul—certainly at times an entity distinct from our own individuality (ii 17 *τὸν ἐνδὸν δ.* iii 3, 4, 5, 16) with repeated refer. to *ἐνδὸν ἱδρυμένος: νοῦν κ. δαίμονα* often v 27 with evident refer. to *Timæus προστάτην κ. ἡγέμονα Ζεὺς ἔδωκεν . . . ἀπόσπασμα ἑαυτοῦ*: the aim of life is xii 3 *ἵλεως τῷ σαυτοῦ δαιμόνι διαβιῶναι*; xii 26 is clearest statement of *ὁ ἑκάστου νοῦς θεὸς κ. ἐκεῖθεν ἐῤῥύηκεν* (cf. xii 2).

[3] Democritus also called soul a dwelling-place of deity (*οἰκητήριον δαίμονος*): after the Stars man's soul was by the chief thinkers held to be the most divine object: sometimes the two were united, soul was an efflux (*ἀπόῤῥοια τῶν ἄστρων*) and in Diels' *Doxographi* (651) we have *τινὲς τὴν ψυχὴν δύναμιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄστρων ῥέουσαν* (*οἴονται*), which may refer explicitly to a semi-christian gnostic sect but also fairly represents much earlier conviction as to the source of rational life.

[4] This is not wholly true: as a fact every greek school was *rationalist* and not in any strict sense *empiric*: the evidence of sense was distrusted by all the most divergent thinkers, and even Democritus is fabled (but the fable is highly significant) to have blinded himself, that he might muse undisturbed by sense-impressions and discover truth by intercourse with the 'deity within'.

Possibly a revolt against Olympianism : The Two Worlds, Real and Unreal.—The belief might be said to betoken, even among philosophers, a titanic revolt against the new aryan dynasty of Zeus and Olympus, against the upstart families of intruding deities which Homer and Hesiod had arrayed with a very artificial symmetry and coherence. The new doctors were assuredly followers of Prometheus who was one day destined to overthrow the hated aryan gods. Orphic mysteries taught the esoteric faith that men were of the seed of the Titans, tormented by the gods and kept from the bliss that was their right. Or again, even if the titanic strain in our blood was evil, that which gave promise of redemption was a certain kinship with Dionysus : but Dionysus is no homeric deity [1] but a god who comes very much closer to man (for good or ill) than any denizen of Olympus. Wise men (above all in Italy) helped on the notion of the strangeness of this life, the foreignness to our better nature of this earth which is not our true home—by a formal system of ' two worlds ', one visible and sensible, the other descried only by the eye of pure *reason*.[2] The natural trend of the *hellenic* mind to dualism was much more noticeable than in the *medieval*—while the most ascetic and saintly monk tried to trace a consistent harmony or correlation between *outward* and *inward* by a luxuriance of allegory and symbolism [3] the greek desired release from a region where he could not feel at home. Pythagoras had, I believe, started that curious *local* division of the world which Aristotle adopted and handed on to our own times. The two worlds were those of heaven and earth ; the distinction was not between a *sensible* and a *rational* system, but between a higher and a lower in space.[4] We should find it hard to exaggerate the importance of this *spatial* dualism, both in the strictly medieval period and in the later age down to Kepler and Copernicus. Parmenides

[1] In true orphism the introduction of Zeus is obviously an afterthought of syncretism.

[2] Which in this context takes the place of *faith* in the Christian system, of the immediate intuition of Spinoza, Hegel, and the Vedantists.

[3] Founded it must be confessed on very slender knowledge of our beautiful and complex world ; cf. Taylor's entertaining study of *The Medieval Mind* 2 vols. Macmillan 1911.

[4] Hence in great part our modern ideas of heaven as a region somewhere aloft, from which notion, as from the use of terms like sunset, sunrise, we find it impossible to get free.

tells of two absolutely distinct worlds, of *one* and *many*, which have nothing in common; the laws of the one realm exactly contradict the system prevailing in the other. Democritus too sets in complete antithesis the world as revealed by the senses and as disclosed to the reflecting mind by thought.

Socrates Reinforces with Strong Ethical Vein.—This scientific manicheism (as it might be termed) met in Socrates a very strong ethical and emotional interest. He was a convinced member of the orphic brotherhood or community, as Plato's myths prove.[1] He had passed through a stage of genuine scientific inquiry. Aristophanes' burlesque in the *Clouds* is by no means pure caricature; there was an academy at Athens, with students, a laboratory and apparatus for experiments. But he found the scientific view of the world quite unsatisfying, because it only regarded man as a late, meaningless, and perhaps unhappy, product of a necessitarian system. He therefore, as we may say, was converted and took to religion. Like Joan of Arc he believed in divine voices, and (what must have seemed a singular dogma at that date) thought that each individual had somehow a sacred mission to perform, a sentinel's post to fill, and that God had time to attend to every unit and to take a personal interest in him. With this was of course united a firm belief in the hereafter [2] and in the rewards and penalties which were part of the new teaching [3] and found a prominent place in the Platonic Myth. Plato's philosophy [4], whatever else it taught or did not teach, at least set the world of Forms in abrupt antithesis to our own. He urged the 'flight hence' as the supreme

[1] See the very able vindication of Plato's *mystical* side as due to the genuine historic Socrates, Burnet *Gr. Phil.* Part i. *Thales to Plato* Macmillan 1914.

[2] Burnet is justified in blaming those who doubt the convictions of Socrates (and Plato) on this matter: their whole philosophy seems to issue from belief in a continuous soul-life, the only doctrine which could reconcile man to the trivial interests and happenings of our world: it will be noted that Plato's sense of the 'paltriness' and futility of human concerns deepened as he grew older and his hold on a personal hereafter weaker.

[3] And as we see were liable to much abuse and exploitation by charlatans after the likeness of Tetzel and his indulgences (Plato *Republic*).

[4] Which has been almost re-interpreted *de novo* and set in a completely different light in recent years.

duty of man, in at least one group of dialogues whose teaching he never expressly repudiated. We have seen how Aristotle did justice to both worlds and tried to bring them into closer union: in the end without effect.

Mystical Psychology confronted by Facts of Science and Savage Beliefs.—As far as the new theory of Soul went—that man was in his inmost essence a *demon* or (as we should say) a '*fallen angel*'—it was of course confronted and challenged by the teaching of empiric science that even if man was 'a little lower than the angels' he was in nearly every salient feature only little more than a brute. The primitive world fixed no impassable gulf between man and the animals: the æsopic fable and ubiquitous folk-story of every savage race, exhibit him as on friendly and equal terms with his kindred, who indeed at times are both more virtuous and more powerful.[1] Belief in *transmigration* is very constant and primitive: children born to-day are either ancestors reëmbodied (the number of souls being limited), or else animal spirits who have won their way upwards. Pythagoras (we know) took over this belief from archaic sources, as his aryan cousins may have done in India. Neither in Italy nor the East was it the result of profound thought; rather an ineradicable instinctive concept, which must somehow be fitted into a *rational* cosmology and was in the end found to give it moral sanction. Both these theories, that soul is a demon, that it is a spirit in turn animating *different* bodies, were crossed by yet another—that man's psychic side is merely the resultant of his own *particular* body.[2] Many philosophers were also men of religious emotion, and the same person might very well without being insincere hold two divergent views about the same thing, when a

[1] Celsus in *True Discourse* (*apud* Origen *c. C.*) (*c.* 150 A.D.) seriously believes that birds are θεοφιλέστερον γένο. I do not suppose that even Tacitus found the german respect for horses, as *confidantes* of the gods, altogether strange (*Germania* § 10).

[2] A belief which as we know from Plato's *Phædo* was familiar enough to the pythagorists and (like later averroisms) seems to have been held by otherwise orthodox members of the school—at least for purposes of argument and discussion. No doubt, so far as it was seriously held, *survival*, or further discipline of anything personal, was strictly out of the question; yet, as in buddhism, this want of logic did not trouble the professors in their moralizing moments.

purely *speculative* interest came into conflict with a *practical* and *personal* one. Empedocles is a good instance.[1]

Psychology in Plato's later stage and in his Successors: negative.—Plato found it hard to establish the survival of *character*, as the resultant of moral discipline and life's experience, which for the strictly religious consciousness is the chief practical interest. While he never denied or rewrote his retributive eschatology, he seems in *Timæus* to make only the *reason* of a man immortal; that is, that side of his nature in which he is least *personal* and *idiosyncratic*. Therefore morality in itself has no value and little meaning except as making peace in the soul for meditation on truth: there is no continuous subject left, for discipline and development. As in Lessing's *Education of the Human Race*, or in Gautama's teaching, the whole moral aspect is an elaborate (if necessary) fraud—at least fiction. These problems were never cleared up. After Aristotle, philosophy (as such) took no further interest in personal immortality. Ethics (whether in sceptic, stoic [2] or epicurean schools) were regarded simply and solely as a means to obtain such satisfaction as this present span of life could guarantee to man. Needless to say

[1] R. D. Hicks in Hastings' *Encycl. Rel. and Eth.* seems to doubt that the same man could write the *Purifications* and also the works on evolutionary science; or he inclines to think that the adept and mystical works are earlier and youthful productions superseded by the common-sense view of a more mature thought. Yet the phenomenon of the 'Double Truth' must be familiar enough to any student of human thought; antithesis of the spheres of *reason* or philosophy and of *revelation* was clearly a doctrine widely held by men who knew that cosmic experience cannot be covered by a single set of axioms or formulæ. It was neither irony nor fear of the State nor craven hypocrisy that made men from Simon of Tournai down to Pomponatius hold two irreconcilable views at the same time; simply the needs of our complex nature. Such dualism which mightily offends the pure logician is very common in English thinkers, of whom Locke, *impressionalist* and *pietist*, may be taken as a typical example of the national temper, which never pushes logic to extremes.

[2] This is strictly true: the preachers of the Porch are not moralists in any sense intelligible to-day; they are *eudæmonists* who ask, by what process of quieting the will-to-live can a man be happy? That which in one sage is a state of holiness and absorbed contemplation becomes in his caricature, the cynic or gnostical libertine, a rejection of all law and decency. But (as has often been observed) all the rudiments of complete ethical adiaphory are to be found in the earliest and the most serious doctors of the school.

this was conceived under purely negative terms and the golden visions of another and better world were revived in the east as a reaction against a similar nihilism. It is not too much to say that post-aristotelian thought has had no influence on later developments. The revival of stoic views or even epicurean (with Gassendi) was something of a pose or a challenge; and although we read to-day Epictetus and Aurelius as we read Thomas à Kempis, we do so for the sake of the eternal religious truths, or rather hopes, underlying and at every turn contradicting a pessimistic positivism which forms the dogmatic basis.

Section II. Babylon and Star-worship

East and West : Early Religion in Chaldea.—It is idle to seek to relate the thought of east and west or to form a table of comparative influences—as well might one refuse to believe japanese history because ' it could not have been written except by men who knew and studied constitutions and limited monarchy in the west '. The human mind is everywhere akin and in the same circumstances will produce the same thoughts and ideals.[1] It is enough to say that very similar views on the origin and destiny of soul prevailed in the east, and that at whatever precise date teachers of both regions met, their views were found to agree in the main points.

There is no subject so obscure as the *theology* of Babylon; apart from the obvious worship of *local* gods, who assumed imperial proportions with their city's growth like Marduk, we have the strange contrast of deep personal piety, sense of sin, divine wrath or forgiveness, with a sheer astrologic fatalism. It is with this latter that I am now mainly concerned; because it is clear that this coalesced with Aristotle's views on the starry spheres and in blending formed that peculiar product—the so-called arabian philosophy. Here once again we are forced to return to origins.[2]

[1] My friend Mr. J. E. C. Bodley reminds me (very justly I think) that the mechanical age has now profoundly altered this; that we can never again depend on the validity of lessons from the past, that history can never recur with the same order and uniformity again, and that the mind of man is really changing and losing every trace of idealism.

[2] The labour is however not lost or superfluous since nearly all later thought is but a comment upon ancient doctrines or a rearrangement of old material.

Star-Worship : not a Primitive Cult.—The two chief religions of the nearer east are, *first*, the amalgam of sumerian and semitic creeds which we may call *chaldean*; *next*, the doctrine of Zoroaster, which may be termed *parsism*.[1] In the ultimate form of the *chaldean* faith the important element is the 'astral strain'; yet it is clear that this is but late and secondary, though it is more than likely that it represents the emergence of a primitive sumerian belief. That the star-connexion of the various gods was *secondary* is the view of Winckler and Zimmern of Leipzig; no doubt Sin (Moon) and Shamash (Sun) were in origin heavenly powers, but the greater number of deities preside over vegetation and are certainly at first earth-spirits of fertility.[2] This primitive people also handed down a conception, not common in old time, of the cosmic unity; all phenomena being interdependent, laced and interwoven the one part with the other, mutually corresponding; it is from this conviction that the babylonian pseudo-science of astrology arose, the art of the *mathematici* or casters of horoscopes.

Priestly Ingenuity at Work in Relating the Gods to Each Other and Heaven to Earth.—Out of the medley of tribal gods or city-tutelars attempts were made at an early age to co-ordinate and to relate the mythical figures, even to establish family connexions between them. An early trinity is formed by *Anu*, *Enlil*, *Ea*, gods of *heaven*, *earth* and *water*; whilst, like Osiris, Marduk of the new metropolis at Babel comes by degrees into prominence with its political supremacy, supplanting, like Zeus, an older dynasty or divine cycle. In the end he succeeds in

[1] I use these two terms chiefly for convenience and brevity; attaching to the first—the dogmas and practices called as a rule *babylonian* (a title somewhat too exclusive), and to the latter—the aryan religion of militant effort which began with Zarathustra (a historic character with date varying from 1000 to 600 B.C.) and is known by the name Mazdeism, or the worship of Ahura Mazda or Ormuzd: if the two qualifying adjectives suggest that in the main the former is *sumero-semitic*, the latter chiefly *aryan*, they will have served their purpose.

[2] *Sin* is a specially beneficent and kindly god, and *Shamash* is his son; as in Tacitus, *nox ducere diem videtur*. (*Germ* 11); in Norse myth sun is *feminine*, as in south Arabia in early times, but in Chaldea is *male*. Already under Hammurabi (*c.* 2200 to 2000 B.C.) there is a kind of *solar monotheism* making for morality; Sun is supreme judge, legislator, and patron of oracles.

absorbing the others just as *Ishtar* becomes a general designation for a goddess and she herself remains, as Great Mother of Nature, the one distinct female figure in the pantheon. *Marduk* is allied with, or represents, the temperate sun in spring time who brings with him a new life-impulse; but he is before that, a god of vegetation. *Nabu* (the Nebo of scripture) is also a god of fertility; so too was *Nergal*, god of fields and the chase but also of deadly plague and fever; so too was *Ninib*. Now while the last-named was raised to heaven to be the mild sun in spring or early morning, Nergal became the dread and over-potent force of noon and midsummer, also taking over the infernal kingdom of the dead in his fierce and relentless character. Both these again were connected with the planets Saturn or Mars, and Ninib is also the constellation Orion (an artificial grouping of stars which dates from very early times). In all this we can plainly trace (as in Egypt) the somewhat misleading syncretism of a reflective priesthood. The sacerdotal gilds at Babel composed at their leisure a highly sophisticated *astral mythology*, which as the result of a purely imaginative ingenuity would have little interest for the philosopher were it not for the serious results that ensued. It was priestly speculation that united these primary gods of earth with some heavenly body and made out that our earthly happenings were but the pale copy of celestial patterns, controlled in every detail by the influence of the stars and planets.

Development of Myth of Ishtar and her Descent: the Hereafter.—An important place in development must be assigned to Ishtar, first a goddess of fertility on earth, closely tied with visible nature and human needs, next the Queen of Heaven, who dared also to invade Hell. This *descensus ad inferos* forms the starting-point for a long mythical evolution. At the gates of the Inferno she asks the janitor for admission and at each of the Seven Portals has to take off one of her garments, arriving naked in the courts of the Mistress of Hell who puts her in a dungeon. As in the story of Demeter's sorrow for lost Persephone, our Earth, losing the goddess of fertility, decays and perishes, until Ea sends an envoy commanding her release. Sprinkled with life-water she is let go and at each portal recovers one of her forfeited garments. With her is associated Tammuz: like Dionysus he is never numbered among the great or heavenly gods but is a youthful favourite of Ishtar, and god of the shortlived spring-

vegetation, doomed to shrivel under the parching drought of summer ;—at whose death men weep and at whose resurrection, expressed in rite and symbol, they rejoice because the life-impulse again returns to our world. Chaldean notions of this nether-world and of soul-life hereafter were gloomy and distressing,—though perhaps the story of the release of Ishtar and of Tammuz may (as in the nature-mysteries of Eleusis) have encouraged some men to hope for a better fate. Dust and darkness were the chief features of this abode of the dead, as hopeless as the homeric *hades* or hebrew *sheol*. So far as we can trace, there was no sign of a general resurrection or recall of mankind, no doctrine of transmigration.[1] There was however in this purely secular religion a genuine strain of *piety* and deep feeling of penitence and submission,—found side by side with a frigid astral *fatalism* and a gloomy *demonology*. That the chaldean religion was a blend of several divergent elements is clear : that the most primitive or sumerian form was a *nature-cult* seems likely, while (we may rest assured) the semites brought in a more personal and *humanistic* concept of the divine.[2]

[1] As in Egypt kings were deified in this life and raised to heaven, but we do not find that the king's privileges hereafter were extended to the common man ; who, as democracy advanced in Mizraim, was made to personate Osiris and attained through this identification immortality.

[2] We cannot wholly dismiss the theory which connects China with the Land of Sumer and Accad as a colony : China has, it is true, never developed a complex astrology, but 'heaven' (*tien*) is the highest figure in their conception of the world and the *active* agent upon the lower or *passive* region.

DIVISION C

Greek Thought and Chaldeism : the Nearer East and Christian Heresy

B. Zoroaster's Creed and its Development

PART III. PARSI RELIGION AND ITS KINDRED ; THE GNOSTICS AND MANI

SECTION I. ZOROASTER'S DUALISM

Zoroaster's Militant and Theistic Creed : no 'Drowsy Croon' of Monism.—Whatever may be the truth about the religious schism of the aryan people in Asia, it is certain that Zoroaster's reform, the *ethical monotheism* which we call *parsism*, was aimed in part against the *astral fatalism* of Chaldea. We know that names of deities (good and bad) common to both persian and indian branches of the family, have been found in Asia Minor about the middle of cent. XV B.C. Certainly before the reformer arose the creeds of aryan and semite were in contact, if not in conflict. Now the later religion of Mid River Land which spread westwards was a blend of the two—a *moral* and *personal* deity being placed above an *evil* principle and the world he called into being. It is impossible to maintain that parsism is not dualistic : it is so in the strictest sense, for the origin and present condition of the world [1] ; though like judaism and our own faith it bids us look forward to a triumph of righteousness and the extinction of evil. This hypothesis in no way resembles such systems as the stoic which starts in a professed monism to become only more acutely conscious of an irreconcilable divorce between thought and things. The Avesta recognizes frankly the presence

[1] Amongst recent writers Casartelli justly points out to *parsis* (who wish to be thought 'philosophers' by renouncing the inherent dualism of their creed) that the Avesta is far more *dualistic* than the Christian faith or than any system where *soul* and *body*, spirit and matter, are contrasted as ultimate *antitheta*. Ahriman is not a rebel servant or a fallen angel ; he is an independent potentate, who creates (and does not merely mar) a world. He is the essence of unmitigated evil, and malignant will or rebel personality ; he is not an unconscious world-principle (like Plato's ἀνάγκη) which thwarts God's designs.

of active evil in the world but tells us that this influence will not last for ever. Man can and must help in its overthrow. This is the inspiriting and militant factor, in all religions which have a world-history or cosmic theory of an advance through conflict and failure to a promised goal. It is the mark of contrast between an *ethical* creed of action and a *naturalistic* surrender to world-powers which never alter their character or their policy, and have nothing in common with man's aspirations. They proclaim a Holy War against an evil principle which can be overcome in time: time is real and not an illusion: neither for ourselves nor for God Himself is there an everlasting *now*; the world of particular happenings and personal experience is not a mirage (*maya*). Ahriman in this system arose from the abyss of darkness, being independent of Ormazd and perhaps even coeval: but he is not coeternal since in the restitution of all things he will one day be destroyed. When he comes to know that a good God exists he challenges Him and creates a countless host of demons (*devas*) and attempts to build a world on the borderland of the realm of light and darkness: in some not very clearly defined fashion man is in part his creature, in part God's. Though this is his world in great measure, he is the author of all pain, evil, and disease within it and of all bad and destructive life-forms. He does not take the wisest course to allure his subjects into allegiance. Man, whom he hopes in ignorance to make his slave and tool, is destined in the divine purpose to become the chief instrument of his defeat; *God asks for, and in a sense needs, our help in the fight.* At the Resurrection, Ahriman will be found impotent and helpless and will be caught and at last annihilated in the earth he tried in vain to make his own.

A Dualistic Creed of Conflict and Hope: Optimism.—The ultimate triumph of the good is as well assured in parsism as in our own creed; but meantime no attempt is made to gloze over the fact of the dangerous competition of evil in the present æon. There is no lulling repetition of 'God's in his heaven, All's well with the world',—if such complacent monism is intended to release man from the need of strenuous battle against the wrong. Hence, like the norse religion,[1] it appeals to the generous and the combative instinct in men of spirit, to Plato's θυμοειδες. Unlike

[1] With which it has much in common, being no doubt akin.

it, it gives promise in the end of a complete victory and to each soldier a personal share in the triumph: whereas the odinic reign is only an interlude between two infinite periods of disorder,[1] and in the end the gods succumb to Surtur and Loki in the Ragnarok; the new heavens and new earth under the risen Saviour Balder being a pure Christian accretion and having no place in the original gloomy yet strenuous creed. Yet, whatever may be the result at the end of the world-order, for both cognate religions the immediate outlook is *optimistic*: 'it is better (says the norse *Havamsal*) 'to be alive than dead, to be blind than burnt on funeral pyre': a saying to be contrasted with the typical eastern axiom, 'Better to sit than to stand, to lie than to sit, to be dead than alive'.—A similar temper of bluff and unreflecting optimism was brought in by the norse Achæans of Homer's poems, into a culture already decadent and lethargic.[2]

APPENDIX C

Dr. Mills' Estimate of the Avesta

This eminent scholar has published, in his many works upon this subject, certain views which deserve attention and are not likely to be welcomed in all quarters (cf. *Our Own Religion in Persia*, Brockhaus Leipzig 1913). To the *Gathas*, most primitive element, he gives *900–700* B.C. for the date, although from their silence as to Mitra and Haoma, sun and moon, he believes they might be placed even earlier: indeed (*Study of Gathas*, Leipzig 1900, 1913) he gives *1200–700* B.C. as limit dates. He considers them unlike the rest of the Avesta and wholly dissimilar to 'apocryphal zoroastrianism'. The rest of the zend scripture he refers, in its origins at least, to the period of aryan supremacy *600–300* B.C., but admits many interpolations of much later date.—The original creed was purely *unitarian*, that is, in the realm of good; for the 'universe is divided into 2 immense 'departments'; Dualism is primitive and in later development this 'vital element' was extinguished; the belief that good in the end would overpower evil 'not being part of the original concept': (to decide this point every student must read Yasna 30 carefully for himself). He asks if we may not trace a certain dualism even amongst the Jews?—As to *immortality*, he says with great justice: 'The future existence of souls 'after death was as dim in the pre-exilic bible as in the older greek classics; 'in fact this latter view of immortality seems to show rather the more of

[1] Cf W.P. Ker's *Dark Ages*, Blackwood 1904, 'the human world is an 'enclosure defended against Chaos . . . through all his daily life the 'Northman hears the boom of the surges of chaos against the dykes of 'the world'.

[2] But this brief temper of a fighting noble caste has most strangely been accepted as the normal 'greek' mood.

' animation '. In the matter of *freewill*, the Avesta makes man the master of his fate by free moral choice: ' rewards and punishments are self-induced '. As to the ' Amshaspands ', he compares the notion with sabellian views of the Trinity—they are *attributes* or *aspects* of godhead which while unified are yet separate, and this separateness tends in turn to become more distinct. *Vohomana*, God's good mind, also alive within his saints, later becomes an archangel—something like Metatron among the jews. *Asha* is, like sanscrit *rta*, divine order, symmetry in the Law and the Ritual; but this too becomes an angel. *Khsathra* is the (personified) kingdom of righteousness upon earth. *Aramaiti* (from *aratrum* root) is active mind, God's ' inspiring energy ', which calls man to honest toil in contrast to the turkish raids. *Haurvatat* is God's perfection, in man ' wholesomeness ' or health. *Ameretatat* is God's eternity and man's ' deathlessness ' through His bounty. In sum, they are thoughts of God objectified in His people. These *seven spirits* (for Ormazd himself forms one of the number) were heard of in Greece at the time of Daniel as well as in jewry (cf. witness of Theopomp *c. 350* B.C. *apud* Plutarchum). Tobit xii 15 alludes to them at Rai the zoroastrian centre (Oesterley *Apocrypha* 366 dates this work *185–175* B.C.). So in Zechariah iv 10, the seven eyes of the Lord (on which the official court and ministers of the persian king were modelled). So down to Revel. v 6.—To these ' potencies ' of good hypostatized are opposed in the rival kingdom of Ahriman *Druj* or Lie, *Akem* or evil mind, *Dush-khshathra* or evil sovereigns, *Taromaiti* or insolence, the greek ὕβρις, *Avetat* or dejection, *Merethyu* or death.—In the religious attitude of the believer, he points to the ' astonishing subjectivity ' of the system. Here again we have the hypostasis created out of an abstract idea; a man's *conscience* meets him after death at the *Chinvat* or Judge's Bridge, as a female accompanied by dogs. ' The gathic Avesta has its peculiar claims ' as the first document of interior religion ' (117); yet it is not (121) therefore ' purely academic and of the cloister ' but its moral idea ' butts full ' upon real life at every turn '. It was never anchoritic, always national—God's order embodied in a *holy people*. A nation was not (*Yasna* 28) a horde of robbers but a vast religious brotherhood of industrious husbandmen. When the Ox-Soul complains (*Y.* 29) of the Spirit of Rapine, the prophet urges the people to energetic resistance. The community of believers are called ' adherents of Maga ' the good caus (whence, for some, the term *magian*). Like Plato, Zoroaster tried to see the virtues visibly embodied in certain castes of his half-warrior, half-agricultural, State. No mere ritual or magic was the end in view but ' good food-raising ' (134): membership was never otiose or relieved of positive duties.—Immortality was no physical continuance of the bodily frame as in Tao (China) or Egypt: it implied the identity of the interior life (137). There is therefore no belittling of the present: ' The converted soul breathes no contempt for ' this life, lost in long-distance dreams . . . it was sacred, every hour of it, ' even with all its evil contacts.' Here and now are the rewards of heaven constructed, by our least acts in our passing moments. This life is an integral part of the hereafter. ' We are builders not for time but for eternity—' nay, of eternity ' (138). So the earthly kingdom is prototype and rudi-

ment of the heavenly which shall be one day realized ; and princes and good rulers are copies of the heavenly sovereign : hence the later persian veneration for legitimate kingship. It was recognized that the (Turan) Raid had its political and religious organization complete : it had a propaganda (*Y.* 31) : did this instinctive hatred of a brigand-State rouse the later persians against Islam ? Compare the thoroughly Tory maxims of *Y.* 32, directed against Raid, communism, disrespect to nobles, and all the tendencies later concentrated in Mazdak and the Zendiks. The ideal king (*Y.* 33) is no pacifist or quaker ; but a bold protector of the husbandmen who are the nucleus of the State. Care of the poor is his chief duty (*Y.* 34, 53).—As to the indebtedness of the Jews, he firmly believes in an independent development, but maintains the strong influence of the Captivity in modifying or reinforcing jewish ideas : e.g. the Hebrews had found the temporal rewards of virtue quite illusory and in the overthrow of their visible kingdom turned to subjective consolation and hopes hereafter. The name *Pharisee* recalls this close connexion = *Farsees* or Persians (?). ' The ' long prior religion of the Mazda-worshippers was supremely useful in ' giving point and body to many loose conceptions among jewish teachers ' (p. 37).—As to the relations between Veda and Avesta he holds (79) the somewhat unusual theory that ' the influence of Avesta upon Veda is the ' more likely ' ; since the vedic people entered India from the N.W. where, no doubt, the vedic indians were once pre-avestic iranians.' He goes so far as to assert that iranian texts are three-parts Veda, so far at least as the ' tales they tell may tally '. Yet Ahura (Asura) is dethroned and made an evil being by the indians ! Indra is to smite and overthrow him. He believes the cause of this great estrangement and inversion of names to have been petty jealousy between shrine and shrine. The hated *Dasyus* of the Veda are (he thinks) iranians not dravidians.

Section II. Amalgam of Astrology and Mazdeism in the Greek World

Introduction of Astrology into Hellenic World.—Now in this created world, where two rival demiurges play a part, the planets are the creatures of the evil spirit, while God creates the more remote stars and constellations.[1] If Kant believed that the

[1] It cannot fairly be denied that the Jews attributed more influence to Satan after the lessons they had learnt from a mixed religion in Babel,—*Tiamat* had been connected with *Ahriman*, as spirit of evil who has to be overcome by a heavenly champion, in a world where all is not plain sailing. Later, the Rabbis, disliking this seeming challenge to pure monotheism and to the doctrine (also islamic) of God's sole agency, fulminated against the *Minim* who believed in *two* powers in the godhead,—perhaps a survival of Philo's subordinate dualism of the kingly or punitive, and the creative or kindly Powers in God. (Cf. Friedländer, *D. Relig. Beweg.* Berlin 1905, and Bergmann *Jud. Apol*, Berlin 1908.) Once again the Cabbala and mystics

most venerable things were the visible heaven and the human conscience, Aristotle held that from them came our chief intimations or imaginings about the divine (*fr.* 12). We have seen how both Plato and his pupils seek to unite the two,—the *apex mentis* is a spark of light from the stars, and man is a 'heavenly plant' and not of earthly origin. Still, the old question was debated whether his highest faculty was his own or an influx of divinity from above,—whether, that is, there is something after all higher and more infallible than *reason* in the ordinary sense. Meantime into the now wider and hellenistic world, in the days of Alexander himself, came chaldean Star-worship. Berosus started a school of astrology in Cos and brought into a world of thought which esteemed itself *free* [1] the doctrine of astral *fatalism*. Always held in honour and respected for their aloofness, their brilliance and regular motion,[2] the heavenly bodies now become stern taskmasters and gaolers. The chaldean pseudo-science taught that 'chief among the Seven Planets is Saturn, and all are interpreters '(ἑρμηνεῖς) of the divine mind and purpose'. Their changes, in colour or in movement, enable us to foretell great happenings in the natural world (storms, drought, earthquakes) and the destiny of regions, rulers and even private persons. Beneath are thirty stars called Gods of Counsel (*βουλαίους θεοὺς*), overseers, fifteen of regions below and fifteen of regions above our earth. Once in ten days a messenger-star (*καθάπερ ἄγγελον*) passes aloft from below and another descends from above. Amongst the gods the twelve Masters (*κύριοι*) are the zodiac signs and each planet passes through all the Houses of these twelve. Such is the report of Diodorus Siculus.[3]

Welcome given to Astralism in the Stoic School: *Monism* somewhat Modified.—While the ultra-enlightened scoffed, the

of the Middle Ages assimilated Satan to Ahriman—but always of course in a more dependent attitude.

[1] Or at least tried to become so by wholesale jettison.

[2] The epicurean god is really that type which secured the truest homage from the greek mind: a being, perfect by nature, not *made* perfect by suffering (like Hercules or our Saviour) and wholly careless of any existence outside his own—in no real sense a Providence.

[3] Writing under Julius and Augustus Cæsar two centuries later than Berosus (ii 30) he lays stress on their belief in the *world's eternity*: *τὴν τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν ἀΐδιον . . μήτε ἐξ ἀρχῆς γένεσιν ἐσχηκέναι μήθ' ὕστερον φθορᾶν ἐπιδέξεσθαι.*

stoics gave an eager welcome to a doctrine which united the world in such a manner that each part rang responsive to every other and the most trivial event affected the whole,—a doctrine which, though it denied freedom, enabled men to know their future destiny by divining and thus supported a vague theory of Providence.[1] Chrysippus (*fr. 1076* ed. Arnim) giving a list of deities puts first 'Sun, Moon, Stars and Law (clearly the divine λόγος of Heraclitus), last men who have been converted into 'gods'. It is curious to note the anger of Cleanthes when Aristarch the Samian (about *250* B.C.) tried to correct the geocentric hypothesis, a premature Copernicus. He accused him (as the orthodox athenian might accuse Anaxagoras) of sacrilege, of disturbing the central hearth of the 'world-order'. Cleanthes also held the universal order to be a sacred dance, in which the stars were the performers, the sun the ritual torch-bearer (δᾳ̈δουχος). The first school did not perhaps hold the divinity of man's soul; but in the middle and later periods (especially in the platonizing syncretism of Seneca and Aurelius) the soul is part of the divine life (*divinæ particula auræ*) and comes no doubt from that purer element (πεμπτὸν σῶμα); which is the most rarefied and refined nature admitted in a system that never got beyond body. The more 'religious' ages of stoic materialism held besides (as Plato so often suggested, perhaps half playfully) that there was a faculty in man above reason, by virtue of which man transcends himself and becomes suffused (like the priestess at the oracle) with the divine spirit (ἔνθεος). The stoics already believed in Fate (εἱμαρμένη) and in certain recognized channels by which destiny might be disclosed, interpreted, and even adjusted to practical needs. It is worth notice that at this time, in spite of great professions of love towards the Universal or Absolute, of willing surrender to an undefined common good, no religion had any chance that was not avowedly *individualist.* 'Private persons who consult the chaldeans' says Diodorus, 'deem their wisdom 'truly wonderful and above normal human capacity'; so Theophrastus speaks of them foretelling not merely 'public events 'but even the life and death of individuals'. The doctrine of the stars was not then presented as an iron band of fate but, to the unit, rather as a token of a gracious interest in him as a person;

[1] Which, as Maimonides and Spinoza rightly remind us, cannot legitimately find a place in any *monistic* system.

by which, though he was predestinate, God gave him timely warning and perhaps 'made a way of escape'.

Fear of the Planets : Gnostics Promise Redemption in World Above.—In spite of this, the general feeling was one of distrust and terror of these serene and for the most part inscrutable tyrants. First, magical formulæ are invented, whereby their potencies can be eluded or diverted. The seven greek vowels [1] sometimes represent the planets, 'immortal Lords of the World', and are used as charms. The gnostic sects were much concerned, like the divines of ancient Egypt, in devising incantations for the soul to utter in each successive planet-sphere so that, like Ishtar herself, it may emerge whole and unscathed into the realm above.[2] Hippolytus writing under the syro-african emperors *c. 220* A.D. speaks of the Naassene (v 7) belief in stellar influences, 'Nature 'has seven garments (φύσις ἑπτάστολος) of ethereal texture', that is the planet-spheres, hence 'the just man shall fall seven 'times and rise again' (ἑπτάκις πεσεῖται κ. ἀναστήσεται) :[3] these 'falls' are the changes of the stars, but clearly also the spheres down which souls descend from the blessed 'Primal Man Adam as above, into the muddy vesture of decay' (πλάσμα τὸ πήλινον) that they may be slaves to the creator of this world. Ialdabaoth the fiery god is in number fourth (θεῷ πυρίνῳ ἀριθμὸν τετάρτῳ), the planet Saturn.

Section III. Soul-Ascent and Doctrine of Deliverance (Gnostics)

Salvation to be found Above the Realm of Planets.—It seems likely *that every gnostic sect professed the creed which we saw created by syncretizing the tenets of Babylon and of Zoroaster.* The planetary realm must be transcended and we can only find freedom beyond it : this freedom can be procured by those who are the

[1] στοιχεῖα obtains the meaning Demons ; it was also the term used for the seven vowels, each of which was connected with one of the seven planets,—over which they have control.

[2] The later egyptian *Book of the Dead* shows to what a length this theory of the after-world terrors may lead.

[3] We may notice the imitation of St. Peter's question, how many times shall a brother's fault be forgiven ? Is the Apostle, perhaps, reproducing a current esoteric theory ?

children of the true god who dwells in 'unapproachable light'. Plato in his old age had been afraid that human life was but a trivial thing in the eyes of God, and that we were playthings of higher powers: it needed but a slight turn towards pessimism to show that all our striving is futile and that we are automata in the hands of malignant beings. Saturn the planet becomes the leader of this tyrannical choir, Ialdabaoth; even identified with Jehovah of the Old Testament by that section of anti-semitic gnostics who show an unconquerable loathing for the Jews. Zoroaster had fought against the numbing fatalism of astral theology, and the movement towards liberty revived strongly in the Christian period. The sublunar sphere was well known to be the lees and dregs of the universe, the abode of the lower intelligences, of demons and of crass matter. Above the Seven Planets was the Pleroma or Ogdoad where God dwelt: there alone could man recover his proper nature and his birthright of freedom. Here man's soul may be again united with the Supreme God who gave it; its highest faculty or true self disengaged from the 'appendages' or foreign natures with which it has been 'clothed upon' in its descent through the hostile planetary realm.[1] Meantime the final good of man—the vision of God—can be anticipated and enjoyed even in this life; this is the *new birth*. Man's work is after all mainly negative or cathartic; he can cleanse himself so as to become fit to receive the divine influx, to see the divine vision; always there is the notion of the entrance at a certain stage of a fresh power from without (Aristotle's θύραθεν). When we find the Therapeuts speaking of the 'end or supreme 'good' being the 'vision of the true Being'[2] we are reminded of the ancient mysteries. 'It is certain' says a learned and competent judge 'that among the Jews of Alexandria there 'existed a system of mysteries imitating perhaps those of Demeter 'at Eleusis . . . lesser and greater', wherein are learnt the secret doctrines of the soul's mystical union with the heavenly bridegroom.

[1] Here (as in the later greek church) the frank aim was *deification* (θέωσις) in the fullest sense; 'I am your fellow-wanderer-star' (σύμπλανος ἀστὴρ) says the initiate of Mitra; the orphist carried to the sepulchre an amulet bearing the words, 'I am offspring of earth and of the starry 'Heaven . . . I too have become god'.

[2] Conybeare's *Philo*, 303, Clarendon Press 1895.

Common Doctrine of All Gnostic Sects : Soul's Ascent through Seven Spheres.—It is not my purpose to review in detail the doctrine of those gnostic sects which, already existing before Christ, borrowed something from His teaching and became the ancestors of the medieval heresies. But certain general statements may be made as to their main tendencies. The *gnosis* which was their aim was not an intellectual form of Christian theology,—a transmutation of faith into reason. It was (in Theodotus' words) 'the knowledge, who we were, what we have 'become, where we were and into what place we have been 'thrown, whither we are hastening and whence we are redeemed ; 'what is birth, what is rebirth'. The chief tenet had changed it would seem very little from the days of Empedocles ; man in his true form is a demon or angel exiled for some pre-natal offence into the lower world. This *gnosis* (Irenaeus i 23, 5) gives us power to overcome the very angels or Archontes who made the world.[1] When we have thus escaped from the realm of Fate, we enter into union with the highest God and understand His innermost nature : as Valentine said,[2] 'He who has a heart sanctified 'and shining with light is blest with the Vision of God'. A Naassene hymn (Hippolytus v 5) represents the Saviour asking to be sent down to earth to help man who 'seeks to escape the 'bitter chaos but knows not how to flee. With the seal of power 'I will descend, travel through all the Æons and impart the 'sacred mysteries of the Holy Path'. In all its essential features gnostic doctrine was already fixed some time before our era, in the same syncretizing movement which followed Alexander's establishment of a world-empire, and threw open the east to western thinkers in search of redemption. The central idea, common to the most widely divergent sections, was the Soul's Ascent through stages of being until it found rest in the true God.[3] This came to them direct from Chaldea, with its astral cult of spheres ruled by distinct gods,—'magical pass-words' take the place of the symbolic vestures given up or resumed by Ishtar in the myth of her Descent. The most important knowledge was

[1] As in Hindustan, it is *knowledge*, not *work*, that liberates.

[2] Clem. Alex. *Str.* ii § 114 when the Only Good Father looks at him ἡγίασται κ. φωτὶ διαλάμπει κ. οὕτω μακαρίζεται ὁ ἔχων τοιαύτην καρδίαν ὅτι [ὥστε] ὄψεται τὸν θεόν.

[3] Cf. Anz *Ursprung d. Gn.* Leipzig 1897.

the name of the demons and the formula which would rout them (cf. Origen *c. Cels.* vi 25). Sometimes the whole complex science of names was reduced to a single term, e.g., the *Caulacau* of Basilides ; by knowing this the fortunate soul could rise through all the hostile spheres (so Irenaeus i 29, 5). We may compare the *Sabda-Marga* of the hindus and the hybrid term *an-had*. But the planets are regarded (as we saw) under their mazdean aspect,—as evil tyrants, and malign influences : *parsism* is therefore the channel by which the astral theory was made popular and above the planet-spheres was the home of the god of light. Mitra-worship has also this Soul-ascent, won through complex rite, sacrament and formulæ.[1] While 'redemption' was the sole aim (as *moksha* in Hindustan) deliverance comes by purging of *intellect* not by discipline of *will*,—as in Aristotle and later medieval intellectualism. It is spiritual enlightenment (by magical means) which relieves from bondage to the World-rulers ; the ethical aspect falls completely into the background. In certain antinomian branches *gnosis* was brought into conflict with the Catholic Church, both in the east and during our later period in the west. The present universe owes its origin to a mixture of two kingdoms which ought never to have taken place.[2] This forbidden mixture must be retrieved by the careful separation of the incompatible elements. A spiritual essence was held (like Simon's Helen) in bondage, in a sphere radically alien to it, by the Archons (whose collective power is εἱμαρμένη or Destiny : Iamblich's *Myst. Eg.* v 18).[3] The captive imprisoned in this world must

[1] Cf. Anz *Ursprung d. Gn.* Leipzig 1897. I do not exclude an influence from Egypt which may perhaps be detected (1) in the theory of the Pleroma ; (2) the emanation of Æons from a single source ; (3) their syzygies or couples (male and female) at Hermopolis, where cosmogonic pairs of elemental gods were recognized, *male* with froghead, *female* with snake-head ; the names are highly suggestive of gnostic *Abyss*, *Depth*, and *Silence* ; *Heh* is eternity, *Kaku* darkness, *Nu* ocean above the firmament, *Nenu* the flood :—it is clear that these ideas enter the Hermetic books e.g. *World's Eyeball* which, though not redacted in present form till our iii cent. represents an early phase of alexandrine syncretism.

[2] Though in some schools the lower world is only an empty space, a defect and not an evil and rival power—this ambiguity is truly platonic : e.g. Satornil, Menander's pupil, taught that the Supreme Deity created the world of angels—*seven* of whom (= the planet-spheres), no doubt in self-will or open rebellion, framed our world, their chief being identified with the Jehovah of the Hebrews.

[3] This very significant passage shows clearly the gnostic blend with

ascend and win his freedom through each successive sphere—the initiate was provided with mystic names and words of power (in Josephus ' titles of the angels ') as passports or talismans by which the evil powers could be reduced to impotence. The ritual of Mitra was highly complex and symbolized this ascent of the soul, as Dieterich has shown in *Mithrasliturgie*, Leipzig 1903.

Emanation : Imprisonment of the Great Mother.—Whilst the general theory was a *dualism* of two hostile principles and the entanglement of spirit in earthly coils,—*gnosis* often presented the theory, so familiar in later times, of orderly emanation (πρόοδος) from an unqualified ground : this passes out of itself, by an immanent law, in a series of beings which as in Plotinus bridge over the gulf between God and the visible world. Once again, a very common feature (suggested no doubt also in Genesis ii) attaches the Fall to a *feminine* principle—Helen is Σελήνη the moon-goddess in whose realm begin the troubles of our ' sublunar sphere '. Other mythical female figures are Barbelo, or (with Valentine and others) Sophia or Achamoth. This is no doubt a memory of the ancient female Earth-and-Mother-goddess of the primitive east and the ægean area, which was ousted by the male deity of the aryan family : she is Ishtar, Atergatis, Isis, Cybele, Demeter. She becomes through her imprudent curiosity a fallen deity, immersing her light in a world of gloom ; she also acts as a medium by which her children (likewise held captive) can regain freedom ; often the Creator is represented as her son, e.g. Ialdabaoth.[2] Her correlate is the Saviour who (as we saw) descends to rescue the spiritual element and gather the scattered

Plotinus' system : ' Most men are subordinate to Nature and look down-' wards to her works and fulfil the ordering of Fate (εἱμαρμένης διοίκησιν) ' and represent *Practical Reason* (πρακτικὸν λογισμὸν) being concerned ' solely about natural things. But some few alone using a supernatural ' power (ὑπερφυεῖ in its strict sense) stand aloof from Nature and are led ' round (περιάγονται because circular movement is the holiest ?) to the ' Absolute Mind (χωριστὸν κ. ἀμιγῆ νοῦν), who at the same time become ' superior to the powers of Nature ' (φυσικῶν δυνάμεων κρείττονες). This last idea may either represent a mahatma's authority over natural laws, or a magician's command and control of spirits (or *djinns*), or (as with gnostics) the power to defeat and rise superior to the World-powers or Archons, or lastly (in the too obvious and ethical sense which was so little in favour then) the mastery over our own lower nature.

[1] A name which Hilgenfeld *Ketzergesch.* believes =' offspring of Chaos '.

seeds of divine light.[1] He is always regarded as distinct from the man Jesus, upon whom he descended only for a 'transient theophany', not for any permanent union of person or ethical penetration of will. Like *νοῦς*, which at death flits away to rejoin the reservoir of Active Intellect, the Æon leaves before the Passion the man whom he has used only as a prophetic medium or vehicle for his message of deliverance. Transmigration often plays a part in the purifying process by which the light-seeds are separated and winnowed from evil matter; and, though contact with the Further East is quite possible at a very early stage, there is no reason to infer a direct affiliation of a doctrine so natural in any scheme of theodicy.

Fall of Deity—Doctrine Common to All Schools: As Primal Man.—Thus we may say with assurance that one chief tenet of the *gnosis* is the Fall of Deity,—a doctrine which Schelling following the lead of Böhme revived in our own time. But this godhead is very closely akin to man—Primal Man in *Pistis Sophia*, or in the perhaps earlier *Poimandres*[2] or in Hippolytus v 7. This is the archetypal man who in the *Clementines*[3] passes through the ages in various human forms until he is finally revealed in Christ. The *Pistis* calls Primal Man *Ieu*, and gives him the significant title King of the *Luminaries*. In the kindred mandean system the figure *γνῶσις τῆς ζωής* or *manda d'hayye* seems to correspond. In the manichean system, says Bousset, 'the Primal Man again assumes the predominant place' (Baur, *Man. Rel.* 49 sq.). This masculine figure, like Sophia or Achamoth, may be differently presented, as a fallen captive or a saviour hero, who descending to do battle with Darkness (or serpent *Tiamat*), is in part vanquished and held to ransom. Now he has succeeded in freeing himself, and his members, becoming like him, can rise into the light-world again (*Poim.*): now he is saved by the compassion of the higher powers from his dungeon and thus too all his race will in the end be saved (*manichee*); sometimes the lower Wisdom or *Sophia* is purged by suffering and finds her consort Soter, the Saviour, and is married to him—all gnostic souls in like manner becoming brides for His

[1] Conceived as we shall see in Mani's system in a very material way.

[2] Cf. Reitzenstein *Poim.* Leipzig 1904 who suggests a link with the mysteries of Attis and Cybele.

[3] *Homilies* iii 17, xviii 14; *Recognitions* i 16, 32, 45 sq., 52: ii 47, also cf. Epiphanius' account of the Ebionites (*Hær.* xxx 3–16 liii 1).

angels. At any rate amid all variations we find the same doctrine ; *degradation of a divine particle in an alien world from whence it must seek deliverance ; for here it can never feel itself at home nor find fitting employment or interests.* Once again, this supernal spirit is at present under the tyranny of the Seven Spheres ;— whose angels are sometimes apostate ministers of God, sometimes purely devilish powers. In Mani's system these evil archons are fastened like nails to the firmament by Primal Man ; *Pistis Sophia* contains the stirring myth of their capture and punishment. There is no doubt of these figures ; they are the five planets who together with sun and moon form the true rulers of the lower region of Fate and Coercion. The Mandeans refer the seven to the union of the female-devil *Ruha* (or Namrus) and *Ur*, homonym of the ancient chaldean town ; when the light-god captures them, he forgives their sins, sets them in chariots of fire, and makes them world-rulers.

When greek met persian dualism (which had already incorporated the star-gods of Babylon as evil spirits) it was easy for gnosis to maintain that these seven demonic powers are the creators or rulers of the nether world ; either on sufferance or in direct rebellion against a sublime god of light from whose realm they are separated by an ineffable distance. In the *Bundahish* (iii 25, v i) when Satan strove against the world of light, seven hostile powers were captured and set as lights in the firmament of heaven,—where good star-potencies keep them from doing mischief ; the *parsi* of course exempting the beneficent Sun and moon and making a list of five malign influences only. Man, in sum, is a part of *God which has fallen into matter* ; by the use of his highest faculty, a capacity to receive enlightenment, he must reconquer his freedom and win his return to the heaven he has lost.

Section IV. Gnostic Sects leading to Manicheism

Marcion's Peculiar Form of Dualism—a Reaction.—As opposed to this *intellectualist* system of salvation by knowledge, Marcion and Mani appeared to revive emphasis on *faith* and the *moral* will. The former was far nearer to the Christian faith than any gnostic, and though he may have borrowed from the pagan esoteric sects he appealed to the world of Christian believers and did not despair of converting the whole church to his

view. Man is wholly a creature of the inferior god,—here he differs profoundly from the current view which referred his *spirit* at least to the Supreme God. The Superior (hitherto unknown) in compassion sent His son to earth, perhaps conceived as a sabellian phase of Himself; clothed in a docetic body He suddenly appeared in Tiberius' fifteenth year. The demiurge, to make amends for the crime of securing His death, has to deliver up the souls of those who were to be redeemed: they are 'purchased by the blood of Christ'. When He preached in Hell the patriarchs and prophets would not believe: only Paul understood the real meaning of the gospel. As in buddhism the true believer must lead a life of quietism and aloofness, not of strenuous ascetic practice: he must abstain from marriage: celibacy is the most precious offering to the God who comes to end this wicked world. The ambiguous position of the devil led to a correction of doctrine by Apelles Marcion's pupil: he was a fallen and rebellious angel—who in the end was made to subserve the purposes of the Most High by punishing unbelievers in hell. Marcion ranged his community under the authority of bishops and presbyters, though he avoided any highly organized system as *legality* and externalism. The sect lasted long, their palmy period was from *150–200*; 'wasps build combs and Marcionites 'build churches'. It is clear that a real danger to a catholic society lay in this heresy which split asunder the two revelations of God, as in the case of the Cathars afterwards in the west. It was significant that large numbers went over to the side of Mani—a system almost entirely independent of Christian belief. Yet the sect can be traced into cent. vii, when it must have met and fraternized with the Paulians; and thus through them Marcion is lineally connected with the great movement directed against the western church.[1]

Astrology in the Sect of Elkesai and Mughtasila, forerunners of Mani.—The Elkesaites (already mentioned in an earlier section) was in origin *jewish* and intended to be a reform in Judaism by the revival of the rite of baptism. The founder Elkesai in Trajan's third year (*100* A.D.) appeared with a message beyond Jordan and was accepted by *essene* and *ebionite* sectaries. He sanctioned marriage, bade his converts turn to Jerusalem (*not* the east) in prayer and to observe the law of Moses. He shared the current

[1] Cf. Foakes-Jackson's *Christ. Diffic. of cent. ii and xx.*

belief in various classes of angels or spiritual beings and identified the bad angels with the stars of the northern region—' in the ' days of their dominion no task should be begun '. He believed himself a complete astrologer and foretold a war among these ungodly angels of the north which would shake to their overthrow the kingdoms of the world. Certainly akin to this sect were the *Mughtasila* or ' baptists ', identified with the Sabians, residing in the swampy region of lower Euphrates ; to whom the Coran allowed free exercise of faith together with Jews and Christians. Their cosmology was now more certainly dualistic, the principle of *male* and *female* syzygies (so familiar in the Pseudo-Clementines) having been adopted. Al-nadim, who gives us this report, says that the father of Mani joined the sect and brought up his son in its tenets and practice : he in turn began to preach his own special form of *parsi* syncretism at the age of twenty-four. The manichee sect is therefore affiliated at least on one side to the Elkesaites of a century and a half earlier. If they pretend to worship one God in order to avoid muslim indignation, it is certain that in secret they had amongst them worshippers of the stars and must have derived their dualism from Parsis. It seems likely (to follow Brandt, that most patient inquirer into the chaldean sects) that their rite of immersion was not in any sense *jewish* but in fact originated in this region of the most archaic human culture : it certainly spread eastwards into Hindustan and formed a strong link with the cognate sect of Mandeans.[1]

APPENDIX D

The Fravashi (as guardian-angels, archetypes, and sphere-spirits)

The Fravashi and the Ego.—There cannot be any doubt that this doctrine or soul-theory as finally fixed was assisted by the avestan *fravashi*—a spiritual being conceived like the hellenic demon as part of a man's personality, yet preëxisting and independent of him,—something analogous to the *ka* of Egypt. Their prominence in certain later *Gathas* points clearly to a revival of the old nature-cult and belief in many gods, which Zoroaster had sought to replace by a pure monotheism. They had at first no definitely ethical character, which they seem to acquire only under the sassa-

[1] Besides the monumental and still authoritative work of Chwolsohn *Die Ssabier* Petrograd 1856, cf. Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis* Göttingen 1907 and Brandt *Elchasai* Leipzig 1912.

nids (after *226* A.D.) in the epoch of Mani's heretical restatement of mazdean orthodoxy. Zoroaster had made spirits *attributes* of the one God, not independent beings but parts of His single hypostasis; and in his stress on moral responsibility and endeavour he makes much of the *daena*, the *ego*, which really determines a man's lot by choice which is genuinely free. It was quite distinct from the *fravashi*, which was divine and, in the far greater mass of opinion, confined to believers only [1].

As Tribal Patrons and Ancestral Spirits.—In the plural they are the same as the good ancestral spirits, to whom homage is due and regularly paid at annual festivals, e.g. the *farvardigan* correspond to *sraddha* of the hindus. Though they have certain 'guardian' functions, no single spirit of the group is seen quite in the same close and personal relation as the guardian-angel in Christian belief. They had rather *tribal* and cosmic functions, brought rain and gave fruitful crops, promoted conception and birth—and, as nature-deities of growth and increase, replaced Anaitis (a form of Great Mother) who belongs to a pre-aryan age. They are also, like Castor and Pollux, powerful tribal allies in war; here again, like the hindu *pitri*, they act in concert for public ends. Such a belief may certainly be connected with the common primitive theory that a new birth is but the return of an ancestor, reincarnating for the welfare of the tribe. It is however to be noted that in the case of certain departed saints (*Yast* 13) their *fravashi* in each instance, is separately adored and for specific reasons. This leads on to a belief analogous to that of the roman *genius*—a spirit promoting birth and growth not merely in *collective* groups but in *individuals*.[2]

As part of a Man's Personality: as Guardian.—*Fravashi* is the highest of the 5 parts of the human soul (vitality, personality (*daenan*), sense, soul (*urwan*), and *fravashi*). It was conceived as divine and immortal, pre-existing the human concrete being, dwelling with God during his life and at death uniting with his *soul*, saving it from extinction. 'The *fravashi*' says *Yast* 13, 17 'of the living faithful are mightier than those of the dead:' does this only imply that their interest in the nether world is keener and more direct? In the case of (as yet) sinless and innocent children 'their 'angels do always behold the face of the Father', Matth. xviii 10. When Rhoda says of St. Peter, 'it is his angel', she clearly believes that his double or *doppelganger* has for a time taken his place.

As Animae Motrices in Stars.—*Fravashis* controlled the orbits of sun, moon, and stars; just as the sphere-spirits in hellenic and arabian thought. God gave them choice of remaining serenely aloof in the spiritual world or becoming incarnate in order to combat the evil power: is their first embodiment (as with the Arabs) in certain of the good stars? This association with stars in *parsism* is always a compromise and an accom-

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[1] Only at a late period do we find 'the *fravashi* of an unbeliever goes 'to hell with his soul and senses', *Sad-dar Bundahis*, ed. Spiegel, Vienna 1860.

[2] Here as Professor Moulton reminds us, there is connexion with the ancient belief in the External Soul of folklore, *Enc. Rel. Eth.* vi 117.

modation. It is probably due to early magian and ' chaldean ' theology. The *fravashi* are said (*Yast* 13) to *guard* the heavenly bodies, as the *yazatas* do ; but they are not *identified* with stars, till a much later date. This magian star-lore is conspicuously absent from the Avesta ; but clearly must supply the motive of the Magi's visit to our Lord :—a great soul just then born into our world would find a counterpart in a new stellar arrival. By the time that persian theories had blended with hellenic ideas so as to form ' arab philosophy ', it seems likely that these spirits were regarded (1) as a heavenly counterpart, type or exemplar, of the soul here, uniting at death and saving the personality ; (2) as in some way connected with the sphere-moving spirits or angels about whom all refined thought was then agreed. On earth all the concentric groups of Iran (house, family, clan, district) had their counterpart in heaven,—as in *Daniel*, nations, regarded as ' realistic ' corporations not atomic groups, have their *princes*, and churches in the Revelation have their angels.

Their Source in Primitive Ancestor Worship.—In sum ; it is clear that these spirits belong to one very primitive cult, *ancestor-worship*, with which Avesta monotheism was obliged to come to terms. It admits them in some of the later *Yasts* to share honours and even prayers with the one God. But they vary in character, and the group includes very different beings ; good kings and heroes, patrons and protectors of tribes and districts, guardians (sometimes) of individuals, lastly celestial powers or angels. Through them, as elemental forces of nature, Ormazd makes plants and herbs to spring and brings children to the birth : functions which *in pre-theistic days, the ancestors would have performed in their own right*; which, when reduced under a ' monarchy ', they only accomplish as lieutenants. To this earlier stage belongs the curious picture of these tribal tutelars quarrelling over the supply of water in the heavenly lake, which each is eager to monopolize for his ' family or village or tribe or country ' (*Yast* 13). They were certainly invoked (*Y.* 26) as souls of the dead kinsmen ; to these pious oblations ' they come flying like well-winged ' bird ' (*Y.* 13, 70). Those who fulfil this duty of gratitude to the returning ' Manes ' will have a house well stocked with blessings for the coming year. They are represented as returning to their old haunts in the middle decade of March, to ask for human friendliness and gifts ; ' who will bless ' us and accept us amongst his own ? will any one praise us or pay homage ? ' or receive us with a handful of meal and a garment and with sacred ' reverence ? ' (*Y.* 13, 49 sq). Elevation to the exalted post of stellar *genii* is certainly later, though we meet with it in *Yast* 13, the *locus classicus* of this perplexing cult (cf. *Mainog-i-khrat* xlix, 22).

Modern Analogies : Armenia, Chile.—Still in Armenia to-day is there a pious belief that at certain seasons the departed return and sojourn 3 days near their old home, flying back to heaven and leaving a blessing behind them if dutifully made welcome ; and the Armenian, no less than the Persian, believes that the soul of man is connected with the stars, It is not a little curious to find the same doctrines among the Araucans of Chile—a lesson to those who find in the normal development of theories all over the world irrefutable proof of direct contact or loan : they are *dualists*, the

benign *Menlen*, protector of our race, works with the help of the *gen* who have charge of things created, against the evil and malicious Guecebu, author of all evils ; creation is the work of a lower divine hypostasy : female spirits of great holiness are men's familiars or guardians ; a successful Araucan will express it (as an egyptian king kept or worshipped his *ka*), 'I still keep my guardian spirit' (*amchi-malghen*). Meantime it is certain that at one period they believed the Milky Way to be composed of the souls of departed heroes, before whose calm and beneficent radiance they were ashamed to do evil : but most souls follow the sun's flight to the twilight land of the west (as in the archaic eschatology of many diverse regions).

I add here a few words on Moulton's *Early Zoroastrianism* (London 1913) to sum up the points in his brilliantly argued (and still disputed) hypothesis : (1) Z. lived in E. Bactria and had little influence in the W., Darius I (500 B.C.) being his first kingly disciple ; he elevated a clan-god (who *may* be connected with *Assur* and appears somewhere between 1700–1200) into a monotheistic Jehovah—a creed far beyond his time and soon forgotten. (2) The aboriginal *shamans* (magi) attempted a revolt against the small aryan dominant caste in 522 and, failing in this, managed to usurp the whole priestly functions—thus creating a peculiar nature- and devil-worship (based on primitive animism) which became wrongly known to the west as the religion of 'Zoroaster the Magian'. (3) The *Gathas* are authentic and represent Z.'s real opinions ; the *Yashts* were composed in the period of indigenous (*non*-aryan, *non*-semitic) reaction, before the fall of the monarchy (c. 350 B.C.) ; of this anti-aryan movement Artaxerxes II was, perhaps against his will, the patron, and it is under him that *Anaitis* the Mother Goddess and *Mitra* come prominently forward. (4) The *Yashts* represent not only the *magian*, but also the *proto-iranian*, nature-worship (against which Z. had protested, in favour of an ethical cult of a deity who encouraged and rewarded effort). (5) An immense interval separates the *Gathas* from the *Yashts*, and the Magi are real *dualists*, while Zoroaster's system is optimistic and challenges the powers of evil to a last contest before the Recompensing and the Judgment (in true chiliastic spirit). (6) the Magi show affinities to the peculiar cultural stages of the Bantu, Uganda, Baganda, Unyoro peoples in E. Central Africa and make the same use of *gomez* or cow's urine (=avertan *gaomaesa*) which may *possibly* prove connexion.

The worship of *Assara Mazas* (cf. 566) with 7 good and 7 evil spirits, may then date from c. 1500 B.C. : adopted and purified into monotheism by Z. it was debased and overlaid by magianism and only emerges into a late prominence under the archaizing Sassanids (225–650 A.D.) when the monistic zervanites and Mani represent opposite views. (A further note is added on p. 508 on early monotheism in Asia, connected with the names Assara, Asura, Assur and the primitive cult of China.)

PART IV. MITRAISM AS A POSSIBLE WORLD-RELIGION

Early Ethical Character of Mitra.—It seems that Mitra acquired very early, both in indian Veda and iranian Avesta, an *ethical* as well as a *natural*, function. In the one he is invoked together with Varuna, the Sky-god, as a light-deity, but also as guardian of truth and enemy of falsehood. In the iranian development which raised Ormazd to a unique eminence, Mitra is a lesser and intermediate god between the realms of Light and Darkness; indeed he is the *protoctist* or first created being, greatest of *yazatas*, and his chief duty is still the overthrow of evil (conceived physically as gloom) and his task is world-governance. Thus in both is he *god of truth and good faith.* Again, as light-bringer, he is a god of vegetation and of armies; he helped the hero and drove away evil spirits: above all (one chief source of his later influence) he is the protector of souls (like Hermes ψυχόπομπος) in their perilous journey to paradise: thus quite early he appears as a Redeemer. His votaries purified themselves by washing and whipping, like the later Flagellants.

Cult made Welcome in Babylon: by the Roman Empire.—Babylon gave to his worship a warm welcome, and the overthrow of the persian hegemony did not lessen the popular favour. When hellenism arrived, Mitra's chief features were clearly defined and his faith started on an adventurous career into the further west. By the Chaldeans he was identified with sungod *Shamash*, by the Greeks with *Helios:* but his worship never became popular in greek centres and was despised as barbarous by fastidious Hellenes. Its functions seemed already filled by the now spreading cults of Egypt for which (as the supposed cradle and hearth of human culture) Greece expressed a boundless respect. Even on roman soil the mitraic creed was little known before Augustus and our own era, and, however independent it showed itself later, seems to have arrived first in the retinue (or rather under the patronage) of the Great Mother. It became popular towards the end of cent. i (under Domitian) and in the

next spread rapidly amongst the mercantile class, the slaves, and the (increasingly) foreign soldiers of the legions. The german military frontier shows continuous traces of its thought and ritual; it flourished chiefly along military roads and trade-routes. Under the eclectic afro-syrian dynasty of Severus (*193–235* A.D.) it received distinct marks of imperial favour; but it had before been brought into notice by the patronage of Commodus (*180–192*) who was himself an initiate. Rome is full of its monuments.

Solar-Cult—a Soldier's Creed.—As in every *natural* worship the tendency was to absorb all the duties and prerogatives of natural deities in the sun, the *sol invictus*: with this Mitra was identified. As god of the divine right of kings (for which belief Persia was famous), as the god of loyalty and truth, he was popular in camps and among soldiers,—men who then formed whatever was left of the 'roman' type of character. From the chief home of Mitraism came the long line of Pannonian (or Danubian) Emperors, to whom for over three centuries is owed the preservation of the roman tradition *249–568* A.D. When Dacia under Aurelianus (*270–5*), himself a zealous devotee of the sun, ceased to be a roman province, the northern frontier lost this distinctive worship and its temples were overthrown. Constantine decided in favour of a rival creed and Julian's brief revival did not help to reinstate Mitraism. Though it lingered on in cent. v in certain Alpine cantons, its day of success in the west was over. In the east its scattered followers may be said to have taken service under the manichean banner.

Cultus of Mitraism in Caves: Symbolic Sculptures.—The temples of Mitra were artificial grottoes like the Mithræum hewn out of the capitoline tufa at Rome. It was a square or oblong building with apse and star-spangled roof in the fashion of a modern Masonic Temple. Along the sides were continuous benches of stone: altars to sun and moon stood before the choir-apse. None of the discovered temples are large; as if built for poor men and scanty congregations, they hold only from fifty to a hundred worshippers. The carving, or relief, of Mitra originated with artists from Pergamum in cent. ii B.C. and kept its features throughout: the God is seen as a youth in a conical cap slaying the Bull (of early ægean worship), while a scorpion attacks the side of the animal, a snake drinks its gore, and a dog springs towards the wound in the side.

Their Suggested Mythic Interpretation : Mitra as Creator.—In other sculpture there is (*a*) a theology or theogony, (*b*) further detail as to Mitra's own life (Cumont). To the latter belong pictures of his birth ; he is represented as cutting leaves from a fig-tree, discharging an arrow against a rock whence water flows ; —again, the bull is portrayed in a boat, or pursued by Mitra, or carried on his shoulders ; again, scenes are given representing Helios and Mitra clasping hands over an altar, banqueting together, or together mounting the chariot of the Sun and journeying across the ocean.

From this the myth must be reconstructed, since it is lost so far as literary evidence is concerned : the god is born naked on a rock and clothes himself with fig leaves, makes a treaty with the sun and sets up his kingdom upon earth : he seizes by the horns and subdues the sacred Bull of Ormazd, which he drags to a grotto and kills in sacrifice at Ormazd's own decree. The life of the world sprang from its dead body ; the Bull's spirit fled into heaven. Mitra is thus the creator of earth-life, in spite of Ahriman who tries to prevent it and, angry and baffled, sends a drought ; this Mitra dispels by drawing water from the rock. Then follows a *deluge*, from which one man only is able to escape : lastly, a *fire*, from which only Ormazd's creatures are saved. The work of Mitra, in creating, cleansing and saving the earth, is now over : the sun-chariot takes him to the abode of the immortal. All this is obscure and to a great extent hypothetical. The Bull-episode is certainly found in the early cretan religion ; but its relation to later Mitraism is quite uncertain. *All that appears clearly is the mediating position of Mitra between the worlds of light and darkness ; this present fabric he builds up in spite of Ahriman's repeated attacks.*

Divine Dynasties or Lieutenants (Cumont).—Cumont has also essayed to describe from mitraic reliefs a definite *theology*. Mitra, the most popular and active god, is, like Zeus, only a newcomer, a late arrival who makes men forget the older deities. First was *Zervan*, Boundless Time (Cronus and Saturn in the west) : *heaven* and *earth*, his offspring, correspond to Jupiter and Juno, who in turn produce *sea* (Neptune) : a third son of Time is *Ahriman* (Pluto). But Infinite Time is represented as handing to Ormazd (Jupiter ?) the symbol of plenary power, the thunderbolt ; and Mitra himself in turn became the lieutenant

of Ormazd, mediator between sinful and suffering mankind and a distant god of the ether.

Rites of Initiation : Chaldean.—The stages or degrees of the neophyte certainly betray the influence of Babylon. The soul in its upward progress always travels through *seven planetary* spheres and there are the same number of grades, the *Raven*, the *Veiled*, the *Soldier*, the *Lion*, the *Persian*, the *Sun-courier*, the *Father*. In the Lion degree, the proficient left the rank of *servitors* (ὑπηρετοῦντες) and became one of the *participants* (μετέχοντες). At this stage a eucharist (wine, water, and bread) was administered, no doubt representing Mitra's last banquet with the Sun before his ascension : the worshipper acquired thereby strength and wisdom and a share of his god's immortality. In the rite of initiation eyes were bandaged, lights suddenly shown, a running stream was leaped, a murder was simulated, strange oaths administered and a state of ecstasy induced ; thus in many points resembling the ceremonies of Freemasonry to-day.

Priests and Worship : Democratic and Corporate Character of the Lodges.—There were priests of the rank of *pater* ; the *pater patrum* (*Summus Pontifex* in Tertullian's *Præscr. Hær.* § 40) controlled all the initiates in one town and (like the Christian bishop) was not permitted to remarry. Others were vowed from the first to a celibate life. Fire was kept always burning on the altars, prayers were said to the sun at dawn, midday and twilight. There were numberless sacrifices, foals and sheep, oxen and goats, even swine, were offered. On each day of the week a certain planet was venerated ; and fixed festivals took place on the sixteenth day in each month—(of which custom the Parsis have a vestige to-day). The community formed a corporation, recognized by law and holding common property ; with its council, magistrates, treasurers, presidents and patrons (chosen from the wealthy class) ; all associates subscribed according to their means. A sense of brotherhood united the members ; distinctions of class were swept away by a common hope and a common rule of life. For its offices all brethren were eligible, even down to the slave : all partook of the same sacraments and awaited the same ' joyful resurrection '.

Its Optimistic Character and Personal Appeal.—The appeal made by the mitraic faith and cult was addressed to man's sense of sin, frailty and dependence, to his unquenchable desire

for personal happiness hereafter. Both the society and its teaching were aids to a moral and self-respecting life in an age of racial and religious disintegration: Mitra always helped his followers, if they waged a manful fight against evil. Hence no doubt his wide influence among the sober-minded, clean-living, pannonian soldiers. He it was who conducted (in his old function as escort of departed souls) the spirit of man through the *seven* realms of heaven, corresponding to the seven degrees of the proficient; while the unworthy went below to dwell with Ahriman. In *eschatology* the same optimism is to be seen as in Zoroaster's early faith: one day the struggle between good and bad would cease, the divine Bull (half god and half victim, like the *purusa* in Hindustan) descend again to earth: all men would then be summoned from the tomb in their own proper bodies and the Great Assize would separate the good from the bad. The unhappy Bull[1] was again to be sacrificed to Mitra; its fat was to be given to render the just immortal. Ahriman and his followers were to be reduced to ashes by Ormazd, while the regenerate world was to enjoy abiding happiness.[2] Here we have a private and democratic *cultus*, based on a personal hope in this life and the next, open like the greek Mysteries to all men, even to slaves. It was a mere restatement of the ideas and assurances of these Mysteries, whose practices and methods were only repeated under a new patron-god. Its appeal is based on the acute interest which individuals, in certain ages of finality or repletion, take in their private destiny—epochs which recur when the aims of society are met by governmental action of a mechanical and bureaucratic character. This was then one result of the imperial tutelage, to relieve men of immediate wants and of the old political anxieties, to allow them to cultivate their spiritual needs—or fancies. When the Church triumphed over this rival, the remnants passed over into manicheism.

[1] See Crooke's learned article "Bull-baiting," *Folk-Lore*, June, 1917.

[2] As to obvious points of sympathy and contact with Christian doctrine, Showerman very well says: 'At their root lay a common eastern origin rather than any borrowing' *Encyc. Brit.* s.v. The victory lay with the more concrete and uncompromising belief: the eminence of the defeated cult was largely based 'on dalliance with roman society: its weakness 'lay in having only a mythical character instead of a *personality* (as object 'of adoration), and in excluding women from its privileges'.

APPENDIX E: FURTHER DETAILS ON MITRA

Stuart Jones' article in *Enc. Rel. Eth.* only just accessible (April 1916), suggests a few additions to the foregoing. The conception of Mitra seems from the first to be *ethical*: both in sanscrit and avestan the word implies *compact* or *friendship*; and good faith or loyalty is always the underlying thought. If Varuna was the all-encompassing vault of heaven, Mitra is the light that issues from it; the god is guarantor of good faith between men as a witness who gazes on all. In Persia Ormazd succeeded to the place of Varuna; we find the name *mazdaku* as early as cent. viii B.C. and an assyrian list of gods gives *Assara Mazash, c. 650* B.C. (so Hommell *Soc. Bibl. Archæ.* 1899). Here the worship of Mitra attained an importance never reached in India. We find him as sponsor to a treaty of (aryan) chiefs among the Mitani (*c. 1400* B.C.). Under 'Sardanapalus' or Assurbanipal (*c. 660–620*) syncretism was already busy and Mitra was identified with sun-god Shamash. The names of persian nobles in classical time show clearly his prominent place in the aryo-iranian pantheon;—Mitradates, Mitrobates and the like. He is not named however in royal inscr. until the time of Artaxerxes II (*403–358*), who gives Ormazd and Mitra as his chief protectors, together with the goddess Anaitis.—It seems impossible to fix the date of Zoroaster; but, whenever he lived, he ignored Mitra—perhaps even regarded him as a *dæva* or demon. The very curious phrase put in the mouth of a false teacher, 'Ox and Sun are the worst things for 'mortal eyes to behold' may refer to the nighttime sacrifice of a bull to this deity (*Ys.* xxxii 10). The cult in later times certainly included elements abhorrent to the spirit of Zoroaster's reform and due no doubt to the *magian* revival, by which (as in India) much of the aboriginal superstition and shamanism was quietly brought back. In the *Mihir Yasht*, he is represented as a *yazata* and on a lower level than Ormazd's six Amshaspands. He is not the Sun himself nor a person or individual object,—rather the light of heaven in general, 'lord of wide pastures . . . driver of 'swift horses'. But the *ethical* and social side is also prominent: he is the 'truthspeaking one, eloquent in assemblies'. He is invoked against the wicked and faithless nomad of the steppes, 'the violator of promises' (*mithradruj*). He guards the poor and distressed, as well as good faith and truth. Unlike some gods whose power only lasts for this life, Mitra is invoked 'in either world, that of body and that of spirit'. For he is guider of souls in the hereafter (ψυχόπομπος), who 'bears them for atone-'ment and lays them down in the House of Praise'. No less is he a god of battle against the wrong; with his two vassals *Sraosha* (obedience) and *Rasnu* (justice) he strikes terror into the powers of darkness. For his use Ormazd fashions a beautiful abode on Mt. Elburz 'where is neither light 'nor darkness, chill wind nor feverblast, death-dealing sickness nor mists, 'neither defilement wrought by demons'. To him milk and *haoma* are offered; and 'beasts small and great with birds that fly' are sacrificed after due penitence and ritual ablutions.

Such is the conception as conveyed in the *Mihir Yasht*. But Babylon and chaldeism soon brought in novel features quite incompatible with

aryan views. The later Mitra, both in mythical person and prescribed cultus, is a composite figure. Astrolatry was never an iranian worship, whereas in chaldean or sumerian fatalism, a belief in their influence guided the whole of religious theory and practice. Iranian mazdeism had furnished by its dualism a solution to the cosmic problem and an answer to the soul's aspiration. The later magian development (under chaldee influence) had set Ormazd's realm far away from that of Ahriman, prince of darkness, 'as far beyond sun as sun is from earth': between the two kingdoms Mitra occupies the place and function of *mediator*. Soul too is a spark of light from the higher plane (as in the kindred doctrine of orphism), clothed as it passes downwards to earth with a material vesture and living here in perpetual conflict with evil both within and without. Mitra is the captain under whom the war is actually waged and the general who in the end rewards the loyal soldier: he is, as we saw elsewhere, (manichee fragment from Turfan) *boxtar ud xvabar* 'redeemer and bene-'factor'. The return of the released spirit to its true home was complicated by chaldee astrology and the doctrine of the spheres, which exert a baneful influence on the soul both in its downward and upward course. From Babylon came too that sense of an inflexible world-order and law, expressed in the steadfast movements of the heavenly bodies—a fatalism which, with happy want of logic, had no effect on Mitra's inspiriting gospel of endeavour. It was therefore well fitted to become the practical creed of loyal soldiers and it even possessed a distinct consecration of this attitude of personal loyalty. The 'glory or halo' (*hvareno*), aureole of the heavenly light was forfeited by sin; but it was supposed to survive in certain legitimist dynasties: when *Yast* xix deals with series of fortunate possessors, it starts with Ormazd and ends with Saoshyant, the future deliverer of mankind; but the interval is filled up with a brief history of the iranian monarchy. (The word becomes *phern* in hellenic transliteration; e.g. the familiar names of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus: Wilhelm has written on the conception (Bombay 1914) in Jamsetji Jejeebhoy's Jubilee Volume). It is a token of kingship and a talisman of success; it is the necessary *mana* which mystical royalty must possess to ensure the confidence and obedience of its subjects; it is 'divine right' in visible form. The Seleucid Diadochi after Alexander, anxious to secure this mark of heavenly favour, approved the mitraic worship and on their coinage styled it 'the king's fortune' (τυχὴ βασίλεως). Just before our era in Commagenè, Antiochus (*69–38* B.C.) left an inscription showing the completion of the syncretizing process; Zeus is also *Ormazd*, Apollo-Helios-Hermes [1] (a composite figure) is also

[1] At Stockstadt an inscr. of the imperial age gives the title: 'Deo 'invicto Mithræ Mercurio' (cf. Drexel's monograph, Heidelberg 1910): under Commodus (180–192) we have in Dacia 'Sol invictus Mithras' (*Corp. Inscr. Lat.* iii 1122): in the Antoninian Baths at Rome was discovered (1912) the legend 'Zeus-Helios-Sarapis-Mithras', an identification due no doubt to the syncretism of that strange figure in the imperial line, Antoninus V., son of Severus (211–217), miscalled 'Caracalla'.

Mithras, Heracles-Ares is *Artagnes* (or victory) : two other statues represent the land of the ruling king of Commagenè. But Mitraism never became popular in hellenic lands, properly so called ; it is not found in Delos which gave a welcome to so many foreign cults ; it has left few vestiges in Syria or Egypt ; and Lucian writes of the god (just as Homer might have written of Dionysus) that he was a barbarian and could not speak good greek. Nor did mitraic monuments become common on roman soil until the time of the Antonines (*138–180* A.D.). Its diffusion (as we have seen) was largely the work of the imperial armies, recruited in great part (not merely then but in the later byzantine age) from the borderland of east and west—Pontus, Cappadocia, Commagenè, Armenia. This fact may be borne in mind not only when we consider the figure and policy of Leo the syrian or isaurian, the earliest iconoclast (*717–741* A.D.) but when we attempt to trace the lineage of the armenian paulicians and their half-military, half-quaker ideals. During the parthian wars of Claudius and Nero (*41–68* A.D.) the oriental element was much increased. The XV Legion brought the cultus to Carnuntum on the Danube in the early years of Vespasian (*71* A.D.). The Flavian House raised auxiliary troops in the east which gave it its sceptre and placed them all along the riparian frontiers (Rhine and Danube) and on the *vallum* in N. Britain. Nearly every trace of mitraic worship is found in legionary camps, both in Britain and in Germany, or in the forts along the *limes germanicus*. On the Danube nearly every important post is so signalized and in Africa, III Legion and other military settlements have furnished specimens ; in Spain the veteran colonies clearly kept up their old regimental worship (Merida). While 'roman society' (if the term can still be applied) had no religion or convictions of its own, the importance of slaves (public and private alike) is well marked in the dissemination of foreign cults. Many corresponded to the lower official ranks of a modern bureaucracy, or the employees in custom houses or state-owned mines : e.g. in Noricum. The growing tendencies to equalize rank and status under an autocracy—probably the only possible means—is seen in the list of mitraists at Sentinum, where the municipal slaves and freedmen are inscribed alongside of the freeborn. Along the great trade-routes both slaves and free merchants seem to have played an important part in spreading the cult (cf. maps in Cumont's *Textes et Monuments* etc., Brussels 1896–9 and *Les Mystères de M.* Paris 1913, also Toutain's section on M. in *Cultes païens dans l'empire romain*, Paris 1908–11).

The meaning of the obscure emblems, pictures and ritual is thus given by Stuart Jones : the Bull is Ormazd's first creature and although slain by his enemy Ahriman it gave life through its death to 55 kinds of grain and 12 of healing herbs. Part of the body, borne upwards to the moon produced the manifold classes of animals, and from its blood sprang the grapevine. In mitraism (as in ægean religion) the bull's death is the source of life : it takes the place of Giant Ymir in norse myth and other vast primitive beings who are hewn into pieces to form an entire world. But in the later worship, the slayer is not Ahriman but Mitra acting as deputy to Ormazd. While he is spreading life the evil animals made by Ahriman

try to prevent the dispersion of the vital fluids—scorpion, snake and perhaps dog, try to absorb it into the kingdom of evil. Here is a clear survival of an archaic fertility-rite of the usual sort. Certain emblems bear out the notion that Mitra is a vegetation-spirit, as when he is seen issuing, like a dryad, from a tree or stripping it of leaves ; or, like the earth-goddess on greek vases, is represented as emerging from the rock 'petra genetrix' as πετρογενὴς of which word *cautes* and *cautopates* are translations into somewhat peculiar latin.—It is also certain that the chaldean astral strain is to be traced in the *seven* series of initiation-rites and grades of proficiency ; to this Origen refers (*c. Cels.* vi 22), citing from Celsus the ' ladder of seven ' portals ' made of the various metals allotted to the planets. Porphyry (*Grotto of the Nymphs* § 6) represents Zoroaster as teaching that the Cave is a symbol of the universe, ' emblems according to regular intervals ' of the cosmic elements and climes '.[1]

It may here be mentioned that the *taurobolium* belongs properly not to Mitra at all but to the cult of the Mother-goddess, with which it was closely linked in the great age of roman orientalism (*c. 100–400* A.D.) as many inscriptions attest. But even this connexion was the result of a reflective syncretism and the rite first belonged to the (semitic) worship of Anaitis, which somewhat reluctantly the persian sovereign admitted into his male and aryan pantheon. The greeks no doubt identified her with Ἄρτεμις Ταυρόπολος or the Tauric Artemis of the classical drama : possibly the whole rite may arise from a mistaken etymology. In the individualist days of the cultus the blood, shed from the animal, poured over the votary through orifices in the floor and gave him ' new birth '. It is perhaps needless to say that Anahita was identified in Asia Minor with the well-known anatolian figure of Cybele-Rhea, and that Mitra was in the same way identified with Attis : he is also held to be the same as the pontic *Mēn*. Cumont is certainly correct in believing that Mitraism borrowed the rite of *tauroboly* from the mysteries of the Great Mother.

APPENDIX F

Successive Modifications in Parsi Religion : Manicheism as Final Product

The Compromises of Monotheism : Angels, Guardians, Demons.—The Parsi Religion of Zoroaster before it entered as a potent factor into later development had been profoundly modified. Neither aryan creed, in Persia or in Hindustan, was proof against popular influences ; and as in Islam an austere simplicity was very soon overlaid by foreign accretions. Once more the old deities (demons in Zoroaster's eyes) came back into favour or were at least placated in fear : the vulgar faith demanded a sensuous and a concrete object of worship. The Angels (*yazata*), forming a new feature as the mediaries between man and Ahuramazda, begin to

[1] κλιμάτων : one wonders whether Celsus before him misinterpreted the word as κλιμάκων, but the ladder is a familiar symbol in freemasonry.

divert the reverence due to him only. The most primitive *Gathas* knew little of ' guardian angels ' (*fravashi*), the heavenly guide and companion which is reproduced in the *doppelganger* of the Cabbala : it is (according to one view) the ' confession of faith ' hypostatized and treated as a person.[1] More curious than this innocent belief in a guardian was the invasion of a comus-rout of old deities,—not only Mitra, but Verethragna, Anahita (Anaitis), Tishrya (Sirius) and others. Hence too arose a much more complex notion of the priesthood and its duties, with the minute system of ritual embodied in the *Vendidad*. While the Prophet preached (like Mani at Sapor's Court *241* A.D.) a swift judgment of the world, the ' continuance ' of things as they were led to a very much modified credence in a doom so long deferred. 3000 years after Zoroaster (it was then held) when a new *Saoshyant* is to be born of the Prophet's own family, the dead are to rise to a new and indestructible world.

Progress and Zenith of the Cult.—The wide expansion of this supra-national faith did not tell in favour of purity : Armenia and Cappadocia gave welcome to the persian creed and it spread over all the nearer east (Strabo xi 8, 4, 14, 76, xv 3, 14. After the Achæmenid dynasty, Arsacids and Indo-Scyths accepted the monotheism of Mazda (not without prejudice to the conception). The Parthians were but careless conformers to an official creed and ritual. Under the Sassanids the priesthood became a great State-influence, able to control the sovereign and enforce compliance with its law-book on the daily life of society. At Rai in Media lived the Pope (*zarashushtrotema*), next in rank to the king. The formation of sects at this time was not uncommon ; and of such is Manicheism.

Chaldean Rivalry : Syncretism under Achæmenids : Anaitis—But to return to the earlier stages. It is not easy to determine the relations of Babylon and Iran. There is no question that, in a later age, conscious antithesis between the two creeds lay behind much religious ferment and evolution of thought. When old gods and mythical figures reappeared as historic persons fighting on earth, Azhi Dahaka (*ashdahak*) or the evil serpent (or *Vrtra* killed by Verethragna or hindu Indra) was thought to have his abode in Babylon (*Bawri* of the Avesta) : a king in human form but with a dragon's head on each shoulder which devoured men's brains. In the popular faith (as we have just said) the old gods were never wholly thrust out by an uncompromising monotheism : was not Mahomet himself in later time willing to compromise by the admission of female deities side by side with Allah ? In Iran the goddess of fertility and vegetation, a river-goddess (the Oxus), Anaitis or *Ardvisura* : so Mitra[2], Haoma, and

[1] Just as ἦθος δαίμων ἑκάστῳ or Maimonides *Guide* ii 6 ' man's dis-' position is here called an angel ', quoting R. Jochanan's ' God caused the ' Angel of Lust to present himself to him ' (to Judah on seeing Tamar) *Berishit Rabba* lxxxv.

[2] Even to-day the unitarian parsis hold a festival (*sixteenth* day of *seventh* month) to *Mitra*, deity presiding over and directing the course of the sun. They name each day, not after a saint but after an angel of bliss who protects it. Farvardin, a god holding the place of the aged

(as we have seen) the dragon-slayer Verethragna. The earlier Achæmenids passed over these satellites with lofty disdain: Darius I only once names 'the gods of the clans': once 'the other gods that are'. Only under Artaxerxes II were Mitra and Anaitis received into the official worship. At a king's accession (Plutarch *Artax.* § 3) he is consecrated in the temple of the warrior-goddess at Pasargadae. The kings and upper circles were ardent professors of pure Mazdaic faith. There was even a strong tendency to proselytize, and persian settlers spread the creed as far as Lydia and the Lycian coasts. They might recognize the native gods as mere ministers and servants of Ormazd, but the foreign beliefs also reacted on the unitarian creed. In Cappadocia we find the local Bel recognizing the Mazda religion (*din-mazdayasnish*) as his sister and wife (Lidzbarski, *Eph. Semit. Epigr.* i 59, 1900). Anaitis (*Ardvisura*)[1] is identified with Ishtar of Babylon the strong bountiful mother with golden raiment and a diadem of stars. She is worshipped as the giver of life and the sustainer of men, even with the peculiar sacrifice of that which females hold most precious (Strabo xi 532 at Acilisene in Armenia, xii 559, at Zela in Cappadocia). At her side (corresponding with Attis in the legend further westwards) stands Mitra as a youth 'herald and propagator of the service of Light and mediator' between man and Ormazd—who, like all primitive 'high gods', tends to vanish before a younger and more strenuous generation.

It would appear then that Artaxerxes II (*404–359*) was the first king to accept a compromise with 'matriarchal' pagans: to Anaitis he set up statues in all the capitals, Susa, Ecbatana, Babylon, Persepolis, Bactra, Damascus, Sardis. In his inscriptions from the two first cities he invokes not Ormazd alone, but Ormazd with this his consort and their son: Clement of Alexandria preserves the notice from Berosus (*Protrept.* i 5, 65). This was a most important step: a unitarian theism, unable to struggle against primitive traditions, accepts in effect defeat and admits a trinity of a very human kind. Just as Anaitis demands some sacrifice (of decency), so Mitra too expects that the king himself will drink to excess on his festival and dance the sacred measure, like King David of old to Michal's disgust, Ctesias *fr.* 55). The abstraction *good thought* (Vohumano ὠμανὸς) also

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Yima in the primitive faith, also receives honour (*eighth* month, *tenth* day). In another curious respect the present community (at Bombay) differs from earlier use: there can be no proselytism or admission of foreign converts, even in the case of a frankish wife of a parsi, willing to join the husband's creed. E. Meyer reminds us that parsism always bears a *syncretic* character; the supreme God, in theory unique, yields place in practice to his own servants, the attendant deities, who both control the processes of nature and lead the initiated believer to salvation.

[1] Anahite's festival in Armenia, was dedicated anew to the Blessed Virgin Mary, whom for some time the more ignorant identified with the Mother Church. Near Antioch was a temple of Anait, whom the Greeks called the 'persian Artemis' (who afterwards appears as Anaitis Bendis, a thracian goddess of war and hunting whose cult strangers brought from Thrace into Attica *c.* 450 B.C. (cf. Plato's *Rep.* I i.).

receives worship; and from Babylon the Sacæan feast is adopted (Beros. *fr.* 3 and Ctes. *fr.* 16).

Buddhism and Kaniska: Sassanids Arrest Decay and Persecute Heretics.—Under the greek dominion this now composite religion was never attacked. Indeed, this was its era of greatest expansion (*300–1* B.C.) not only into Cappadocia, Armenia[1] and Pontus, but even into remote Hindustan. The indo-scythic dynasty of the Kushana overcame Bactria about the date of our era and pressed southwards into Hindustan, being already found by the time of Vespasian in the Indus valley: it embraced Buddhism under Kaniska, held by many to be coeval with Emperor Hadrian. But on his currency the names of iranian deities are most prevalent: *Mihro* (cf. Mani's form Mihr), *Mah* (moon), *Athro* (whence 'athravan') 'fire', *Orthragno* (Indra or Verethragna), *Tiro* (= Sirius the Archer, Tistrya). It seems clear that buddhism was here officially blended with the archaic persian creed: perhaps it awoke in some aryan survivors memories of earlier centuries when their forefathers brought down the common names and beliefs of the indo-iranian stock. In Persia itself, after the Sassanid restoration and revival a much stricter theism came into vogue; one sovereign rules in heaven as on earth. Each district had a lord or president of the magian caste. At their head a supreme Mobed at Rai or Rhagæ was (as we saw) the pope and successor of Zoroaster: the hierarchy enjoyed a great measure of political power, like the priests of theban Egypt or of catholic Christendom. The Magi translated the sacred books into pahlavi for the use of the laity; and maintained the stern dualism which lay at the root of the zoroastrian faith and encouraged moral endeavour in persian manhood. They allowed a certain respect to the lesser gods but only as servitors of the Most High. But a monistic heresy now began to arise which represented both the conflicting parties God and the Devil as children of a common parent Zervan; and the contest of right and wrong to be merely a harmless play of divine forces (as in the peculiar system of the interpolator of Lactantius). Not till the reign of Chosroes I. was this (perhaps hindu) view laid under anathema, having long enjoyed the favour of the court and the learned world. Meantime, as in later Egypt, ritual prescription became still more formal and minute, with a parallel increase in sacerdotal power. The founder of the dynasty Ardashir I. (*226–241*) resumed the task of collating and canonizing the scriptures. The restored orthodox doctrines must be subscribed by all. Heretics were imprisoned for a year and, if still obstinate, put to death. In Armenia all idols and statues were thrown down—even those of the lesser gods of Iran—in a zeal for purity of worship: their shrines were converted into altars for the Sacred Fire. Meantime in the (now aramaic) valleys of Tigris and Euphrates a rival creed had appeared: Christian

[1] In Armenia the native religion was almost ousted by the various persian cults, Gelzer *Zür Armen. Gotterlehre* in Sächs. Gesch. d. Wissensch. 1895. The strange pagan survival of the *Kizil Bash* is found to-day in these untrodden districts of Asia Minor and merits more notice than it has yet received from the ethnologist and student of religion (cf. p. 365).

missioners, spread over the whole of Iran but found here a choicer field and acquired a firmer hold.

Mani's Eclectic System : from Mazdeism and Gnosis.—Side by side with an attitude of uncompromising exclusiveness and hostility, went a belief that all faiths contained a portion of the truth. *Hence Mani's syncretizing attempt to create a new world-religion from an amalgam* of gnostic and zoroastrian tenets.[1] But yet another source has to be searched before the position of Mani can be fully understood. It is now agreed that *gnosis* is an earlier phenomenon than the gospel. Gnostical theories were widely prevalent before Christianity. The two faiths exerted a ' magnetic attraction ' for each other (Harnack). Both were animated by the desire for *personal salvation*.[2] Round the historic figure of Christ were grouped strange gnostic ideas of redemption. As in the great thraco-hellenic movement (600 B.C.), ' the attainment of everlasting salvation ' by the soul was the supreme end. It was natural to see in a Redeemer-deity, who has trodden the path of deliverance before us, a central object of worship or a symbol pregnant with mystic meaning. Not *knowledge* or study, not any (fancied) reconcilement of *faith* and *reason*, ancient philosophy with the new gospel, but (as earlier in Hindustan) a practical means of avoiding evil. Hence the emphasis on magical rites, formulæ, initiation, sacraments, knowledge of the ' names of the Angels '. It is often repeated that the released soul finds its path stopped by malignant spirits and can only pursue its way unmolested, if it is armed with full name and titles together with the proper formula of address. The Redeemer Himself was supposed to have used these incantations against the demons, that He might descend and ascend again in safety.[3] It is certain that these secret talismans constituted the chief appeal of these curious systems. The later religious development in Egypt had immensely increased the terrors of the world beyond and the need of finding the ' words ' of power ' which would put to flight ' the armies of the aliens ' and act as

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[1] Extirpated in Iran after his ' martyrdom ' Manicheism spread west and east, far into the roman empire and beyond Khorasan into central Asia : in eastern Turkestan fragments of Mani's works are found in *pahlavi* and in *sogdianese*—an east iranian dialect (K. Muller on the discoveries at Turfan *Abh. d. Berl. Akad.* 1904, and *Ber der Berl.* 1907). In certain versions of New Testament texts, God the Father is identified with *Zervan*, and the devil with *Ahriman*. It may be suggested that a certain section of Zervanites followed Mani's teaching.

[2] The motive of Gnosticism was not *knowledge* (as we saw above) : their ' knowledge ' was an esoteric doctrine or mystical illumination or magic formula : that is, *salvation*, escape from an evil world into happiness beyond, through a region beset with perils ; the soul's pilgrimage from the lower spheres into heaven was as terrible an ordeal as the hereafter of the *Book of the Dead*. Theosophy really played a secondary part and was a mere arbitrary or poetic mythology in its details.

[3] Anz, *Ursprung der Gnosticismus*, Texte etc. xv 4, sees in this the central doctrine of *gnosis*.

passport or safe conduct to heaven. In any case the desire for this posthumous aid was a genuine and widespread sentiment: and every analysis of a popular dogma must take account of the psychologic motive for its acceptance. In this respect *gnosis* and the gospel occupy exactly the same level of the heart.[1]

Factors in Gnosticism: A. Chaldean Star Cult.—Now the evil spirits, passage through whose sphere forms the perilous pilgrimage and ordeal of the soul, are the old planet-gods of Babylon. Seven world-creating powers (sun, moon and five planets) are the rulers of this earth and our tyrants and taskmasters. These powers are always of secondary rank. Sometimes malignant rebels, sometimes renegade deputies, they are the remotest emanations of inaccessible godhead, if not a wholly independent and inimical band. In Mandean belief, *Ruha* and her son and consort *Ur* produced the planets later fixed as captives[2] in the vault of heaven, and allowed as world-rulers in the present cycle to bear sway over man and nature. So in Mani's system the Spirit of Life, coming to aid Primal Man, captures these Archons and nails them to the heaven, in one account flays them to make the firmament from their skin! (We may compare the threats of the ancient Pharaoh to devour the stars.) In the gnostic treatise *Pistis Sophia* the tale is told of the capture of the 5 rebel Archons (cf. Origen *c. Celsum* vi 22). The Sabians of Mesopotamia worshipped the seven[3] planets, like the Babylonish ancestors. This planet-worship was then the sum and substance of the (later) native religion in Babylon and was handed on, not as the chief cult but as the appeasement of demons. Over it was the Mazdean light-religion, which found in them its own foil and antithesis. The gods of Babylon were thus degraded into demons who, either from pride or weakness or active rebellion, create our visible world at an almost infinite distance from Ormazd's light-world. The ascent of the soul then lies through this region of peril and ambush, through the seven spheres to the kingdom of light: knowledge of names (as we saw) played the chief part but the whole life of the Gnostic must be an ascetic denial of these realms and their rulers: he must have 'no fellowship with the unfruitful works 'of darkness'.

B. Mother Goddess: Distinctive Feature of Religion in Syria, Babylon, Persia.—Another, perhaps still more important, factor was the *Mother-Goddess* of Chaldea, Syria and West Asia. Whether this worship was a relic of gynæcocracy is uncertain, but it was without doubt the sign of an almost universal *naturalism* of which we found clear traces in Hindustan. Anaitis (once a local goddess of the Oxus stream) had enlarged her dominion and become identified with Ishtar or Beltis and the other kindred forms.

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[1] As we have traced in another section.

[2] When there was 'war in heaven' and Satan fought against the world of light, seven of his captains were seized and placed as constellations in the sky (*Bundahish* iii 25, v i): cf. p. 555.

[3] Sometimes the God of the Jews and of the Old Testament is represented as highest of the Seven, and then the dogma of the Seven Archons is given an anti-semitic complexion.

Among the Ophites, Archontics, Sethites and (in a less degree) the Naassenes, the Mother is a prominent figure in the world of light: she is the parent of the faithful and elect, raised above the Seven. Sometimes she appears as Sophia, the mother of the *hebdomad*, that is, the goddess of heaven is the parent of the planets. The chief figure in the Barbelo gnostic heaven, Barbelo (= παρθενος), is a virgin prototype—just as the unmated Artemis is also goddess of fertility. This mother-goddess descends [1] into the lower region and becomes the fallen Sophia so common in their systems: the most familiar figure being Valentine's Achamoth. As in the myth of Demeter and Cybele or Ishtar's *descensus*, the mother or light-goddess goes to the underworld and is there taken and kept a prisoner against her will: this story had already inspired the greek Mysteries. By her side and in a special relation stands Soter the Saviour, just as Mitra in the later persian phase, who is no other than the youthful deity of the spring, who yearly rises only to perish again while the Mother's life persists unchanged: he is Tammuz, Adonis, Attis. This element in gnostic theory is unmistakable: *Syria worships simply the natural forces immanent in the lower world, Babylon, more refined but more fatalistic, the planets of heaven, Persia a supreme God still more distant.* In the first there is no moral element at all, in the second very little; only in the anthropism of the Semites is it really found, except in Zoroaster's strictly *ethical* theology. These three religions met and confronted each other, though not exactly in conflict; still less was there a ready means of reconciling such very contrary attitudes to life. Neither was likely to give way and a syncretizing tendency (which saw some truth in every creed) was inclined to account for all. Hence *3 layers or strata, or at least 3 worlds, which can be traced in almost* every gnostical system: the perfect *light-world* (Persia), the *planet-world* sometimes quite evil, always dangerous (Babylon), and lastly the *nature-world* of our visible sphere where was confined the Mother. For all three there were suitable deities, and gnostics tried (like the priestly harmonists of Egypt or Chaldea) to make a working theory out of the entangled skeins.

C. Archetypal Man—a Gnostic Loan.—Another symbolic figure (as already noticed) is that of *Primal* or Archetypal *Man*; which lasts on through the jewish Cabbala down to the doctrine of the microcosm.

[1] So Simon's Helen was said to have been rescued by him from an evil house at Tyre (Epiphan. *Ancor.* § 104): the syrian Astarte was said to have lived in a like servitude for ten years; —by a grotesque elaboration of the idea, she did so to rob her lovers of the light-germs which they had stolen from the higher sphere: but having thus played Judith to their Holofernes she finds she cannot return and is kept in a degraded position by the wicked Archon. So for the 'gnostics' (properly so called) in Epiphanius; so with the Light-Maiden in Mani's own system (F. C. Baur, 219, 315, 321,—1831). The same figure appears in *Pistis Sophia*. Sometimes instead of turning below, she is seized with presumptuous love and longing for the Supreme God Himself Bythus, and so brings the fall into the once happy world of Æons—the realm of pure forms which should never know desire or appetency.

According to an ancient persian myth, world-evolution begins with the slaying of Primal Man, Gayomart, by Ahriman : an episode like the hindu comparison of creation to a sacrifice, the norse dissection of giant Ymir, the chinese cutting up (or possibly self-immolation) of Panchu. The Barbelo-gnostics spoke of Primal Man as *Adamas*, ' the true and perfect man ', who with *gnosis* formed one pair of æons : as in the Valentinians, *anthropos* is coupled with *ecclesia*. The *Pœmandres* and the Hermetic writings make man the most striking figure in the theory ; so also do the gnostics whom Plotinus refutes in *Enn.* ii 9. In the Attis-cult, then, a man was a god who died and rose again. The Manichees restored Primal Man to his commanding place in their system, as will presently appear. Now this figure is without doubt a masculine counterpart of the mother-goddess or light-maiden who descends, whether by a culpable fall or a praiseworthy attempt to rescue her captive children. He is a hero who makes war on the lower powers and (like sun and harvest) is partly vanquished by them ; descending into the darkness he begins the world's development, a long drama of deliverance for the shafts of light, entangled and held prisoner here. Just as the Primal Man has raised himself out of the nether world so shall his members also be set free by following him : as in Egypt the dead man at once assumes the name and character of a god. The method of redemption for this Archetypal Man varies in different sects : in *Pœmandres* he sank into matter, freed himself and, rising again triumphant, summons his members and followers to do the like ; sometimes he has been overcome and held captive by Darkness but the light-powers send and deliver him ; at another time it is the Mother-goddess who is the object of the rescue-party, like Andromeda or Ariadne in greek legend or Persephone in the Mysteries. The true ætiology of rite or myth refined and distorted by reflective analysis, is a difficult and dangerous task. The complexities of *gnosis* ought not however to blind one to certain general features which seem to-day beyond question : there are 3 tiers of being, and man who deserves the highest occupies the lowest ; the world in which he and his Mother are held prisoners is the evil creation of the midway stellar powers, who try to hinder the ascent of the Mother and her children, the light-particles, to their true home. These are the only constant elements : all else is changed according to the vagaries of the imaginative myth. But this knowledge is all that is requisite to understand the position of Mani who merely simplifies the doctrine and clears it of excrescences.

APPENDIX G

The Magi: Dualism and Origin of Evil

Ys. xliv 5 seems to attribute to God the creation of both worlds ' well ' working, making both light and gloom ', just as Isaiah xlv 7 ' I the Lord ' form light and created the darkness ' : but there seems to be no doubt

that the two phrases are independent (cf. Stave, *Einfluss des Parsismus auf das Judentum*, Haarlem 1898). The *Gathas* only mention ' darkness' once again (xxxi 20), where it is the blackness of hell. Although I fully believe dualism to have been fundamental in the earliest teaching, it is the younger Avesta that states it with greatest emphasis. I cannot for a moment allow that the monism (expressing itself in polar opposites, in xliv 5) is Zoroaster's protest against magian dualism, and that ' there is nothing ' really dualistic in Zoroaster's *Gathas* '. But Moulton is perfectly right in this sense that the magians, like their remnants the *yezidis* to-day, offered sacrifice to devil and God alike, and that Zoroaster (whatever his date) resisted this practice most strenuously in the interest of an undistracted monotheism. Certainly, it may be admitted (with Moulton) that *in this sense* ' one whose perpetual counsel was Resist the Devil and he will flee ' from you ' can never be called a dualist. I fully accept the hypothesis of Moulton and Prasek (*Hist. Medes and Pers.*, Gotha 1906–10) that the Medes are not *aryan* or *semitic*, and that the magians were the ' shamans ' or priests of this aboriginal people. Even if we allow the argument of aryo-iranian names in the district of the *Mada* (e.g. Mazdaku in Sargon's inscript. of *714* B.C. not to mention Indra, Aruna and Mitrā of the Boghaz Keui inscr. some 600 years earlier), this will not interfere with a well-founded belief that the magi were a pre-aryan hieratic caste of the usual shamanistic type, who by compromise and disguise managed to continue their ascendancy under the persian monotheists and so onwards into the latest days of the sasanian empire. This remarkable tenacity is displayed by them after the complete failure of their attempt to recover *political* power under Gomata or ' Smerdis '. The triumph of Darius (as Behistun clearly proves) was a final victory for a personal monotheism—although even he attributes his success to the aid of the ' other gods, all that there ' are '. But this cautious inclusion (analogous to roman usage) does not blind one to the fact that he is Aura-mazda's servant alone.—If (as by Jackson, *Zoroaster*, N. York 1899, and Sayce) the date of the Prophet be placed as late as cent. vi B.C., the ' Hystaspes ' of the sacred writings may well be Darius' father ; or Darius, whose lineage is perhaps a little artificial and urged with excessive warmth, may have adopted for his parent the name of the typical sovereign. This however is by no means certain and I prefer a much earlier time for the appearance of Zoroaster.

The magi then were *Dualists* in the strict sense, that they offered worship both to good and bad spirits, as shamans always do. They sought to appease or divert to their own use and profit the undifferentiated *mana* which is mere power or force apart from any moral connotation. The Rab Mag of Jeremiah xxxix (according to Winckler and Zimmern) is the head of a clan of professional exorcists, who still kept their place at court even under a purely monotheistic establishment. They might be called ' devil-worshippers ' and the name of their chief Nergal Sharezer (O Nergal, protect the king !) shows that they appealed to Nergal (a babylonian planet god) and identified him with evil Ahriman. It appears certain that this median or *mada* hierarchy gladly welcomed and appropriated the star-lore of Babylon—the astrology from which the Avesta is singularly free. The

magi were never able to determine with precision whether the planets were a bad or a good influence. Official parsism, which subordinated them as demons to the light-god, recognized them as malefic—the compromise of two separate creeds which, as we see throughout this volume, created so many syncretistic forms of religion. Sometimes the magi placed them in the creature-world of Ahriman because of their irregular motion, just as (in their eschatology) they smoothed away the mountains, as blots and excrescences, in the ' new heavens and new earth '. To Ahriman, we are assured by Plutarch, the magi offered sacrifice (*Isis* § 46) ' things of ' darkness to avert evil ' : from them the later mitraists borrowed the practice, *Deo Arimanio*.

Shahrastani, with his usual acuteness, says that ' all problems of the ' magians turn on two chief points—why Light mingled with Darkness ' and why it then cleansed itself from this contact : the blending they ' posit as the beginning, the cleansing as the aim or goal ' (i 275). Light (according to the Gayomarts) is uncreate, darkness created—they could not say whence or how, except by the ' lame solution ' (Louis Gray) that Ormazd unwisely wondered ' if I had an adversary, how would he be ' formed ? ' The Light gave men's souls the choice, before ever they were embodied, of going to hell with Ahriman or fighting him. These preëxisting spirits chose a bodily and earthly life of conflict, on condition that they shared in the ultimate triumph. The Zervanites held that from (impersonal) light there issued a multitude of shining beings, among whom Zervan (Time) prayed for a son for a myriad years save one and at last in his despondency thought (with the *mahayana* buddhists and the earlier hindu theologies) ' perchance the world is nothing after all '. From this evil thought sprang Ahriman, the spirit that denies. Some of this sect held the jewish-christian dogma that he was first an angel of light but meditating treachery he fell from heaven. The Mashites believed that a portion of light had (? voluntarily) changed itself into darkness ; Dion Chrysostom (*Oratio Borysithen.* xxxvi) seems to imply that Ormazd had to surrender much of his light in order to create at all (Dindorf ii 65). Meantime the true Zoroastrians rejected this imputation of evil to the foolishness of a divine thought and held firmly to two original and independent beings. God in His wisdom had allowed a mingling of light and darkness for a time, but evil powers must in the end be overcome.

The iranian mind was irresistibly attracted by the idea of *polarity*, the system of pairs of opposites (syzygies or systœchies) such as we find in Pythagoras. The worlds of *spirit* and *matter* were constantly distinguished ; also the two lives, present and hereafter. It is certain that we can here detect a transition from a savage and primitive religion, quite un-moral and utilitarian, to a form of personal worship which is strongly ethical. Both aborigines and perso-aryans held firmly to the existence of good and evil powers ; and are both dualist. But they differ profoundly in their treatment of the two. The shamanistic magi continued to appease, supplicate or exorcize the evil spirits, as occasion offered. The true iranian offered worship to God alone ; and in this sense Zoroaster is a strong monotheist, while his devotion to God is based on dualism, on his

hatred of evil which cannot be defeated without the strenuous aid of man. With Casartelli, we cannot help applying this term *dualism* to a system from the first recognizing two coeval and independent powers. Satan is not indeed coeternal with God, for in the end he will be annihilated ; but he is not a creature, a fallen angel, as in Christian belief. The world of the creature is equally divided between his work and the divine ; exact pairs of antitheta confront each other in every part of nature. There is a deliberate ' counter-creation ' (*fra-keret*). It is this true dualism of primitive mazdeism which passed into the less strenuous gospel of Mani—who certainly believed himself a restorer of the old paths. The comments of modern parsis, who attempt to explain away the dualistic basis of their creed, leave us quite unmoved. The tendency of all leisurely reflexion is towards monism, towards ' subordinate dualism ' (cf. my essay *Studia Biblica* vol. iv). The personalist asserts the perversion of an angel created good by the deity : the impersonalist (or ' philosopher ') speaks of an undifferentiated ground whence, by an immanent law of polarity as in Hegel's *Logic*, there issue the antithetic pairs of good and evil and the like. The Zervanite sect was undeniably a philosophic refinement upon the uncompromising attitude of the early creed : *Zrvan Akarana*, unlimited time, begat both Ormazd and Ahriman. Therefore evil was not so very evil after all, being a necessary phase or complement of God (as in modern Absolutism) ; and the unpleasant heat of the ethical struggle was really needless. Nor was the final triumph of the good anything more than a metaphor for the ignorant and exoteric : perfection was no question of time or slow achievement and the universe could never be different from its present state. As in India the apparent conflict of opposite forces was only God's play (*lila*) and the wise see through the illusion. There is no need for moral effort because there is really no goal in view—either for unit or race. In the Gayomart heresy Ahriman seems to be the product of an evil thought, somehow admitted into the mind of Good Spirit. The modern parsis say that in the *Gathas* Ahriman is never opposed to God Himself but only to His spirit ; and thus Ormazd is without peer or rival as ' sole creator and primordial spirit '. But He has two faculties—beneficent and destructive or corrective—just as in Philo's division of the divine powers ' creative and kingly ', or as in the hindu triad, Brahma Visnu Siva. Indeed, hindu influence cannot possibly be excluded. The parsi dislikes the term *dualistic* as applied to his creed and refuses to admit *personality* to Ahriman, who is for them but a force—or even a (platonic) negation or defect. Professor Jackson (Columbia Univ., New York) notes that in the *Gathas* the antithesis is between Spenta Mainyu and Ahriman, while the Younger Avesta boldly represents the latter as independent rival of God Himself. But in any case we may be certain that, from the very earliest times of mazdeism and in all its later picturesque mythology, Ahriman is a vividly personified potentate of separate origin, leader of the demon crew, author of all evils and doomed in the end of time to utter overthrow. Loki in norse legend is less powerful but not more personal. We may note once again that the persian outlook is optimistic for all its dualism ; the norse regards the reign of Odin and the Asa as a short and

doomed interlude between two infinite periods of chaos. The affectation of an impersonal monism (in modern parsi 'rationalism') is but the attempt of an ancient and strenuous creed of action to bring itself into line with a modern thought-current of quietism—which again can be traced back to the earliest hindu speculation. It need not be said that, if this craven compromise is successful, parsism must lose its character, its nobility and its appeal. Nor are there wanting signs to-day that this jettison is proceeding apace. The proselytizing spirit is decaying; and to-day conversions are purely nominal. Leakage to western agnosticism is common: the parsi is not likely to become mussulman or Christian nor is he attracted by the formal hinduism whose theology has so radically modified his own. The age of marriage is rising, the birthrate is falling. 'The radical wing' of the reforming party' says Louis Gray in an admirable article ('Missions' *Enc. Rel. Eth.* April 1916) 'rationalize the religion until it becomes a 'travesty of its real content.' (Cf. Dhalla *Zoro. Theol.* New York 1914 and Edulji's letter to Gray of July 1915 and his *Zarathustra*, Leipzig 1906).

To return for a moment to the magians, in whom we have seen the recognized priestly leaders of the aboriginal element subdued by the aryans. One difficulty for this view lies in the name; which seems aryan and cognate with gothic *magus* (servant), old irish *mug* (so Moulton; Carnoy suggests connexion with *μηχανὴ*, *μαχάων* and the notion of *healing* or *devising means* of escape from evil). That they were utterly opposed to the new ruler (however cleverly they adapted themselves after Gomata's failure) is quite certain from the following facts: (1) they exposed their dead to carrion birds and dogs whereas the persians buried the corpse encased in wax: (2) they extolled the merits of next-of-kin marriage, even between mother and son—a practice abhorrent to the iranian peoples, as indeed to nearly all savage stocks: (3) their magic and omens through dreams was utterly discountenanced by orthodox parsism throughout its history: (4) their star-lore, learnt in Babel, had no counterpart in the orthodox faith which accepted, only to degrade, the planet-gods of the conquered people: (5) they hated the mountains, which the persians venerated, offering on their summit their most solemn sacrifices: (6) the festival of the *μαγοφονία* kept in mind the failure of their bold bid for political power, making the survivors (like other wizards and soothsayers) resemble that class of men *quod semper vetabitur, semper retinebitur.*

Sayce is inclined to believe that Herodotus describes the real religion of the Mede, or *Mada* (? = Scythian *manda*) amongst whom the magi formed, as it were, a levitical priesthood. Against this arose the aryan religion of the persian nobility who found a champion in Darius (rather than in the very ambiguous Cyrus and Cambyses who were perhaps elamitic polytheists). The median beliefs, introduced when Cyrus conquered Istuvegu Astyages, received a severe check on Gomata's defeat, but soon regained their vogue, owing to their claim to appease evil spirits. Meantime (he opines) Zoroaster appeared in Media, built on existing notions and practices and attracted the magi to his side. But all these theories, however suggestive, are extremely doubtful and the late date of Zoroaster is unconvincing. The *Auestre* and earlier *Vedas* cannot be far apart.

APPENDIX H

Some Ambiguous Sects

(i) Essenes and Therapeuts

The worldliness and luxury with which ommiads and abbasids alike may fairly be taxed disgusted the simple and austere, and led to a lasting divorce (as in India) between the canon-law regulating private and social life and the mere arbitrary law of government. Islam had lost its veneration for its priest- (or rather prophet-) king and a new value was placed on a rigorous and ascetic seclusion which Mahomet himself had never intended. The same tendency was marked under the jewish Maccabees where the once spiritual power had become almost wholly secularized. The reaction took the form of *Essenism* ; and though issuing on jewish soil borrowed much from other creeds. The Pharisees called the Essenes fools who ' destroyed the world '. The sect was certainly not (as Kohler, *Jewish Encyc.*) simply the ' rigorists among the Pharisees ' ; their eclectic and syncretizing system is clear proof of another origin and of a defiant attitude to formal orthodoxy. At every point the difference of habit and temper becomes apparent. On the sabbath, the Pharisees abstained even from good works, the Essenes even from natural needs. The one ascribed *some* things, the latter *all*, to Fate ; the one washed before meat, the other bathed. So far we have only a tendency to exaggerate : but we can trace a definite opposition in their *denial of marriage*, which the Pharisees, of course, held in high honour ; in their *refusal to offer animals in sacrifice* ; in their view of oil (much used among Pharisees) as a defilement ; above all, in their strange sun-worship and peculiar dualistic hopes. Ritschl seems to overlook every characteristic feature of the sect when he says that Essenism was just an organized attempt to realize the ideal of a holy nation, a kingdom of priests. In so far, it would be a counterpart to Montanism (of which extreme nonconformity, calvinists, anabaptists, quakers, is always a reissue). But Montanism was not a gnostic heresy and the gnostical element in the Essenes is too obvious to be concealed.

The Essenes appear then as a *community of cœnobites* under the Maccabees (Jonathan *161–144*). Their name may mean *silent*, or *physicians*, or *devout* ; or again, may be derived from Essa, a place. The three authors who first mention them lived in or just before cent. i A.D. Philo (+*c. 42*), Plinius the Elder (+*68*) and Josephus ; but in Pliny's account (*N. H.* v. 17) he is certainly quoting from Alexander Polyhistor who flourished between *100* and *75* B.C. Whether the order were much older than the age of the Maccabees cannot be determined ; our authors certainly err in making them very ancient. They were a special school of which one became a member, not by birth or fate, but by free choice and after hard tests and lengthy apprenticeship (like the Dervishes in Islam). They had grades within the society and the most minute ritual program for everyday life. They were pure celibates like buddhist *bhiksus*, and pure *democrats* : first in the ancient world they wholly renounced slavery and

practised communism.[1] All offices were elective, priests and judges being chosen by and from the whole body. Philo says that they preferred the country to the corrupt town, but in his *Apology* for the Jews (Eusebius *Pr. Ev.* viii 11, 12) he represents them as forming separate communities in cities and prosperous towns. So Josephus: 'they had no single city' but dwelt apart in all'. Both jewish writers agree in estimating the number of these primitive Quakers at about 4000. In Pliny they seem to form a permanent settlement on the western coast of the Dead Sea. They adopted children to secure a succession. Riches and pleasure they despised. At initiation the neophyte handed over his property to be merged in the common stock; in cities the wage-earner did the same with his weekly earnings: indeed, without the consent of their elected presidents, they could give no help even to a needy kinsman. They were distinctly averse from cleanliness, as they wore white (?) garments until they fell away or were torn in pieces. Before sunrise they spoke of nothing profane (*βεβηλὸν*) and offered to the rising orb certain ancient forms of prayers as if beseeching it to emerge from darkness. They then went about their business or trade till the 5th hour; when after washing and girding themselves with a white garment, they partook of a meal in the common refectory after a solemn grace and benediction. Before and after meat they gave thanks to God the giver (*χορηγόν*). They returned to their employment till sunset and the evening meal at which strangers were admitted. They had their own law-courts of 100 jurors whose verdict could not be set aside. Oaths were strictly forbidden; except at the rite of admitting a neophyte after 3 years' probation, when he swore an awful oath (*φρικώδεις ὅρκους*) to revere God, harm no man, do justice and be faithful to all, chiefly to rulers, seeing that all power is of God. As regards the society, the newly-admitted member took oaths to cherish the truth, make modest use of power when entrusted with it, keep himself pure from unfair gain, conceal nothing from the brethren nor divulge their secrets to the outside world, even at the cost of death; to transmit the doctrines unchanged, keep secret the books of the Order and the *names of the angels*. Within the Order were found grades, curiously like the hindu caste in one respect; one of a higher grade touching an inferior must cleanse himself by bathing: here again, the *mughtasilah* or Baptists (mandeans) are recalled to our mind. Practical virtue was their aim; logic they repudiated (Philo) and to speculate on divine mysteries they believed to be a flight beyond

[1] Communism always excited and will always excite the gravest suspicions in normal men: the hermetic *sermon on the Mount* opposes *κοινωνία* to personal greed and may well represent a survival of therapeut influence in Egypt (*c. 300* A.D.). The Mormons are said to put their daily wage into the common stock, like the Essenes. The Nicolaitans carried the brotherly practice of the primitive church into family life, and like the cynics recommended community of wives. The bold antinomian discourse of Appion in *Clem. Hom.* will remind one how genuine was the danger of a one-sided interpretation of a good rule (cf. Ménard *Trismegistus*, lxvi Paris, Didier 1866).

human reason. No less faithfully than the outcast Samaritans, they adhered to the Mosaic Law and held its author in high respect; they kept the Sabbath and read scripture, but (to Philo's lasting admiration) explained it by symbol and allegory. They held body to be *mortal*, soul *immortal*: this latter coming from the most subtle ether is *cajoled* and *lured* by some *potent charm of Nature into the prison-house of clay*: at death, released from its bonds as from serfdom, it soars gladly aloft to its own true home. Beyond the ocean there is a happy Elysian Field for the good, where there is neither snow nor heat (cf. *Odyssey* iv 566); but for the wicked a place of torment in wintry gloom. The sect is, then, a *syncretizing order within Judaism*, adopting something from the pythagorist brotherhoods (themselves largely under eastern influence) and starting that community of goods and rooted objection to oath or military service which have since been marked features in our own extreme sectaries down to Tolstoy.

Soul enmeshed in Matter: Released flies Aloft or to Western Paradise: undoubted Parsi Influence: they herald Manicheism: Therapeuts—the Contemplative Side: Solar Cult and Allegory of Old Testament: 'Syssitia' Pentecostal Dancing.—As with the Cabbala much later, it is hopeless to apportion the obligation of the Essenes to other creeds with any precision. Lipsius believes that the original syrian religion might account for their peculiar tenets: Zeller (certainly, but not exclusively, right) makes them an offshoot of the neo-pythagorist school; just as Philo, the devout Jew, was at the same time a convinced platonist and stoic. Perhaps both 'Pythagoras' and the Essenes drew from the same source—the persian or zoroastrian religion (Lightfoot). Analogies with St. James' canonical epistle are brought forward by those who see in them merely the primitive Christians. But the early communism, entertainment of visitors from other branches, obedience to the State and avoidance of light oaths, need only imply that Christians shared in the ideas, as well as the best ideals, of their age. However disguised by their allowance of marriage for the world, only abstaining themselves (like catholic priests), their religion is a form of dualism which foreshadows the great development of cent. iii. 'Escape' from matter' says Keim 'was the grand problem of essenism.'

It is probable that they imbibed, without conscious indebtedness to any specific school, most of the floating doctrines of their time—the hellenistic age. Zeller, 'Essener und Orphiker' *Zeits. für wissens. Theol.* 1899, relates them with the new pythagorists who once more revived the old orphic beliefs: but the Essenes were not vegetarians and held no elaborate theories of the Soul's pilgrimage after death. It is impossible (with Moffatt *Enc. Rel. Eth.* v 401) to exclude the *parsi* element to which rightly Lightfoot and Cheyne refer; nor can we safely belittle the witness to their sun-worship at dawn (cf. E. A. Abbott *Notes N.T. Criticism* 1907). Most certainly denial of marriage and ascetic practice did not belong to the original creed; but these features came from the universal prejudice of that world-renouncing yet cosmopolitan enlightenment after Alexander, and certainly reappear in Mani and his kindred. Of hellenistic theories there is ample proof: Hertzfeld (1847. 57), Friedländer (1894), Pfleiderer (transl. 1900), Conybeare

(1898), Hönnicke (1908). Buddhist influence, (a hypothesis once held and then abandoned by Hildgenfeld (1886 *sq.*)), is now believed to be probable by many students.—Among minor points may be noted that they did not send out missioners; there is no trace of propaganda in Asia Minor or Italy. Their dislike of women has been attributed by D. Plooij (in monographs on Essenes 1902 and 1905) to be an interpolation of Eusebius and not to be found in Philo's original text; but it is clear that some of the lower grades were permitted to marry, and of these Josephus (*B. J* viii § 13) makes a separate order. They were indifferent to chiliasm and messianic hopes. They were not a hereditary body like the Rechabites nor is their *ascesis* similar. They were a gild or corporation spiritually recruited, and concealing under a formal observance of Mosaism a world-renouncing theory which was in effect a complete repudiation. Moffatt is right in detecting in the sect 'elements which point to a palestinian 'syncretism, enriched from some foreign and possibly oriental sources'.

Philo is the sole author to whom we can appeal for the similar Order of *Therapeuts* in Egypt, without a doubt the precursors of later eremitism there. These to him represent the *contemplative* life as the Essenes the *practical*. Their headquarters were on the Mareotic Lake; he does not know if their name meant *physicians* or *servants*. Prayer and meditation seem to have been their whole business. They lived in a sort of village of mean huts, each having a chamber set apart for study and orison, into which nothing was brought but the Law, Prophets and Psalms. Like the Essenes, they prayed at sunrise and sunset; devoting the interval to an allegorizing study of Scripture, on which subject some of their leaders had written books. They only gave attention to the body and its needs during the hours of darkness; some ate every second day only, for others a weekly meal sufficed. The Sabbath they kept both as holy day and holiday: indulging then in rye bread flavoured with salt and hyssop, and meeting in common assembly to listen to the discourse of an elder. Their women, as in some Druze churches, were screened off from the men. Their great festival was Pentecost, when they met in white robes and, after raising eyes and hands to heaven in prayer, sat down in the order of their admission, men to the right, women to the left: they ate served by the youngest members of the Order,—for they held slavery in abhorrence—but before meat they listened to a devout discourse on the symbolic meaning and spiritual truth of the Law. This they applauded and then sang hymns both new and old, for they had amongst them skilled writers of hymnody. After the simple meal, there was kept an all-night 'watch-service' (or *pervigilium*) with antiphonal chanting and choral dancing, like that of Moses and Miriam at the Red Sea. At sunrise, turning to the east and praying that truth might enlighten them, they returned to their private studies.

Egyptian Influence: Parents of Modern Non-Gnostical Dissent.—Chæremon the stoic (in Porphyry, *de Abstin.* iv 6) seems to have seen the survival of this school or 'system' (σύστημα) for the resemblances in his account are worthy of note (as to gait, posture and eating hyssop with bread). Strabo's account (xi 29) of the large priestly college at On for astronomy and other

studies refers, of course, to a purely egyptian foundation. The new creed may well have gained adherents among the Order of Therapeuts and certainly borrowed from its semi-monastic and recluse tendencies. A *general* likeness to the Essenes will be noted, but the two branches, no doubt, arose separately and from quite different needs. If Persia exerted influence on the one sect, Egypt was assuredly the parent and guide of the other; so far as a common establishment was a feature, directed to the ends of study, mutual help and edifying discourse. The allegorism of mystics who defied usage and disparaged the letter is a feature common to the Sapiential Books down to Philo. Still more plainly than in the sister-sect we trace the well-known features of modern nonconformity; the Pentecostal Dancers are indeed lineal descendants.

(ii) Nazarenes and Ebionites: the Earlier Form of the 'Clementines'.

(A). Nazarenes (Ναζωραῖοι) are said by Epiphanius (*370* A.D.) to be a jewish-christian sect in Cœle-Syria and Decapolis, dating their settlement there (near Pella) from the flight of the community before the siege of Jerusalem: (it is not a little curious that Plinius the Elder, writing at this same time, should speak of the *Nazirenorum Tetrarchia*, which we now identify with the *Nosairi* or ansariyeh sect already mentioned). By Epiphanius' account we learn that they were simple Jews accepting our Saviour's divine sonship and resurrection; we cannot gather if they held cerinthian views. Jerome writing to St. Austin (*Ep.* 79) speaks of them as orthodox in regard to the Virgin-birth, the Passion and the resurrection; and seems to limit their nonconformity to a close adherence to jewish rite and tradition in respect of meats, Sabbath observance and circumcision; but they allowed the apostolate of St. Paul and the independent rites of heathen-Christians. It is now maintained by most scholars that the body thus described must be identified with the *Ebionites*, who had become more orthodox by lapse of time.

(B) *Irenæus* says clearly that the Ebionites held cerinthian views upon Christ's person and rejected Paul as an apostate (*adv. Hær.* i 26). *Origen* (*c. Cels.* v 61 and in Matt. xvi 12) divides them into two classes, saying that all alike reject St. Paul's apostolate, while some accept and some reject the Virgin-birth. Eusebius adds that even the former do not hold the preëxistence of our Lord as the λόγος and σοφία of God. Amongst them extreme chiliastic views were popular and Jerusalem was destined by the sect to be the capital of a new messianic kingdom. It seems likely that, while some may have fled to Syria in *70* A.D. another great exodus took place in *135* after Hadrian's final edict of expulsion. These represent the more conservative judaizing sect, who called themselves the *Poor Brethren* (compare *Beghards* and others in the west), and looked for a literal accomplishment of the promises made in the Sermon on the Mount. They were not speculative theologians but rather rejected dogma, holding fast instead to custom and pharisaic tradition

(C) About *200* A.D., at a time of much thought-ferment (in pagan as well as Christian world, cf. works of Philostratus and the solar cult of the

imperial syrian house at Rome), a blend of essene and Christian doctrine arose in the *Elkesaites* who accepted the *Book of Elkesai*, brought to Rome by Alcibiades of Syrian Apamea. 'Christ was an angel born of human 'parents and had appeared before, as Adam and Moses' (kinship with the *Clementines* is obvious); 'he was merely prophet and instructor: he 'could not annul the Mosaic Law, and Paul was mistaken. Baptism is to be 'repeated as a (magical) purging from sin and a prophylactic against 'disease: the sinner is immersed in water in the name of the most High 'God and invokes the seven witnesses, the holy spirits, the angels of 'prayer, together with sky water earth salt and oil.' They abstained from meat and borrowing perhaps from Babylon and the gnostics entertained many fancies from astrology interwoven with their tenets. Ebionites lingered east of the Jordan, along with traces of a frankly pagan rationalism, until the tide of Islam swept over the country in cent. vii. Whether absorbed by Islam or not, it is certain that the ebionite-nazarean tradition helped in no small degree the peculiar incarnationist theories of the muslim sects,—the Shiites, Ismailians, and Druzes.

(D) From this same centre too emanated the *Clementine Homilies* and *Recognitions*; the first edition of which may fairly be fixed at the reign of Valerian's son Gallienus (*c. 265* A.D.) about 45 years later than Alcibiades visit to Rome. The two extant works, clearly the product of a judaizing syncretism, are revisions of a lost original,—a pleasing romance by Clement of Rome, telling how he travelled with St. Peter and found his own family by whom he had been lost in childhood—a typical ἀναγνωρισμὸς of attic comedy. Epiphanius (*Hær.* xxx 15) says that the essene or ebionite Christians use the 'Circuits (περιόδοι) of Peter', written by Clement's hand but so falsified by them that only a few genuine parts are left. He shows how far their interpolations are from true clementine teaching, they favour marriage even in apostles and think lightly of the prophets between Moses and Christ, who is the 'true Prophet'. But Clement on the other hand praised and enjoined celibacy, holding in honour Samson, Elijah and David. St. Peter, he complains, was misrepresented in many ways, as being baptized every day (cf. the Sabians) and as carefully abstaining from all animal food. This book, the *Circuits of Peter*, contained then a record of Peter's journey and discussions from Cæsarea northward to Antioch along the syrian coast, wherein he met and refuted various typical phases of thought,—Simon Magus, Appion the Alexandrine philosopher, and Faustus the astrologer and fatalist (who turns out to be Clement's own father). Eusebius clearly believed it to be a recent and impudent forgery. Its standpoint is that of a judaizing Christian sect, still holding to essene practices; and the Essenes (as we saw) were Jews who showed traces of alien and exotic influence though claiming to be pure Mosaists. They held a doubtful place on the fringe or confines of Judaism and their descendants the gnostic Elkesaites, were in the same plight: syncretists, like Alcibiades and the teacher named by Origen as appearing about *245* in Cæsarea (Eusebius, *Chron.* vi 38). We are now aware how much in future development depended upon this revival of religious activity in Syria about this time. A local cult had enjoyed a short and inglorious

triumph in Rome itself under 'Elagabal' (*218–222*), but traces of its syncretism are found in later Islam and its influence is by no means confined to the eastern world. Now the *Circuits* do not represent a flat and defiant sectarian creed: Harnack even believes that the work was of Catholic origin: it knew no baptism distinct from the usual Christian rite; was it not then rather a later and modified Essenism approaching the orthodox standpoint? As to its date it would not be (with Hort) written about *200* but *after 250* (at which time the syrian *Didascalia* is quite silent about any romantic visit of Simon Magus to Cæsarea). The *Circuits* suggest as their place of origin one of the cities south of Antioch, perhaps Laodicea, where the story reaches its *dénouement*: it is no longer possible with Waitz and Harnack to believe it written in Rome or indeed in any region outside Syria. But even this is a composite document: it had an archetype in the *Preachings of Peter* (*c. 200* A.D.), containing no reference to Christ, but strong ebionitic features and a distinct hatred for St. Paul. We may feel some surprise that these were not modified in the later works: but the atmosphere was still similar, jewish-christian sentiment prevailing in eastern Syria. The *Preachings* betrayed one feature of profound significance: the dualism of the two kingdoms, the present world (as in Lactantius' interpolator) being wholly surrendered to the Devil and the millennium being given over to the Angel, Christ. The *Circuits* aimed to present the true faith of Christians in a broad and favourable light, as the final form of God's self-revealing process through His chief prophets Moses and Christ. It was written in a liberal and tolerant spirit to win over Jews and philosophers, the latter being mainly pagans of a high culture who in that neoplatonic age (under Emperors Valerian and Gallienus), desired a means of intercourse with God. The religious pagan world was restless and disquieted: a new 'apologetic' was prepared and such a book in the hands of catechumens might win favour by its pleasing element of romance, while deeper doctrines could be added later. The two profoundly heterodox abridgements of the earlier and longer volume are each written from a different standpoint; the *Homilies* are more dogmatic; the *Recognitions* pay most heed to a romantic and edifying narrative which will interest and attract. They arose independently in different semi-pagan circles widely separated in religious belief: but both are products of Syria.

(iii) Further Note on Ebionism

Beveridge (Ebionism: *Enc. Rel. Eth.*) has marshalled very clearly the discrepant accounts and judgements of this obscure movement. One or two points may here be brought out. Ebionism was an *impersonal* movement, as it were, on the part of those who wished to exalt the Law and depreciate Christ. For the sect, He derives His value and significance *only* as *republishing* the True Law. It is thus analogous to movements in buddhism (where the meaning of the historic prophet was overlooked); in *Islam* (where the Coran was regarded as external and uncreate); in english and foreign *deism* of a much later date wherein Christ is held in honour merely as teacher of a simple Law of Nature now forgotten by mankind. Within the body thus wishing to reinstate Law and disparage

the work of the Redeemer, there were of course grades of antipathy to Christian dogma: some acknowledging the Virgin-birth (like primitive socinians in a later age), others with Cerinth believing our Lord to be Joseph and Mary's son (φιλὸς ἄνθρωπος). If the former school be termed *Nazarene*, the latter are the *Ebionites*, distinctively so-called. They are termed by scholars *Pharisaic Ebionites* who accepted some gnostic ideas and held Christ in honour merely because He observed and punctually fulfilled the Law. In them we find the germs of later Adoptionism, and indeed of the peculiar tenets connected (perhaps unfairly) with the name of Nestorius: Christ became worthy by His holy life to receive the spirit at His baptism —His birthday as Messiah. The power, descending on Him from heaven, was a preëxisting hypostasis, akin to the *wisdom* or even the philonian λόγος at that time perfectly familiar to all. The office of this mediating being was merely *prophetic* and in no sense *redemptive*: before the Passion the spiritual power abandoned its victim or its instrument.

A *third* division is that in which, far more clearly than in pharisaic ebionism, a gnostic and essene heterodoxy is to be detected. From Epiph. xxx 2, 4 etc. we gather that while the Ebionites agreed with the former judaizing sect, they also held the peculiar Incarnationism that we must so often notice. Some believed Adam and Christ were one and the same: others, that the great second god, created before the angels, descended successively as the Recurrent Prophet, until at His last coming He suffered death, clothed in Adam's body, to rise again in glory. This Christ is only the 'Prophet of Truth', republisher of the Mosaic Law; and Jesus on account of his merits deserved to be united to him. They were ascetic vegetarians like the disciples of Buddha, but their once strict views in regard to marriage had been seemingly modified by the time of Epiphanius. For the further development in Ebionism, Beveridge is clear that *Essenism* must be held responsible. This 'gnostic Judaism' shows such an emphatic repudiation of the ideals and beliefs of the normal jew that outside influence must be invoked for its proper understanding—whether *pythagorist* (Zeller), *parsi* (Lightfoot), or both (Schürer).

The Recurrent Prophet in the Elkesaite sect is of course a further extension of the dogma; and the report of Hippolytus is fully borne out by Origen, his younger contemporary and by Epiphanius at a much later date. The *Clementines* presuppose the book and dogma of the Elkesaites and to this view all scholars (except perhaps Ritschl) seem to agree. The *latin* 'Recognitions' may be the earlier form and the version less utterly abhorrent to catholic orthodoxy. The doctrine is simply this; the Gospel offers a genuine and purified Mosaism, and Adam and Christ are one. He is the True Prophet—for it is *knowledge* not *redemption* that man wants in order to lead a happy life and attain the chief good (cf. besides passages quoted elsewhere from 'Homilies' the *greek* and most heretical version *Recogn.* i 16, 40, 41, 45). To accept Moses or Christ is the same thing. The Christology of this wider Judaism is purely Arian; Christ is not in any true sense divine (*Homil.* xvi 15). If Harnack can see in this treatise 'a '*catholic* revision of a *heterodox* original' we can only say *aliquando bonus dormitat Homerus.*

APPENDIX I

Further Notes on the Sources and Affinities of Gnosis

(i) The Systems of Valentine and Basilidês

A. Basilides *c. 125–150* A.D. : His Sources (*a*) Iranian.—The two principal names in *gnosis* are Basilides and Valentine, both coevals,[1] both gathering older tradition into a system : one, an advanced and consistent *dualist* (with scarcely any relation to the gospel) ; the other, the nearest to the Christian church in spirit and doctrine of all heathen gnostical thinkers. There is no doubt of the iranian affinities of *Basilides* ; before he came to Egypt he is said (*Acta Archelai et Manetis* § 55) to have preached among the Persians, and he appealed to Bar-kabbas and Bar-Koph as eastern prophets (Agrippa *apud* Eusebium *H. E.* iv 7). Indeed, upon the prophecy of the latter, his son Isidore wrote comments, and also referred to Cham, that is, Nimrod or Zoroaster (Clem. Alex. *Str.* vi 6 § 53)[2]. Basilides lays claim to the wisdom of the Barbarians and sets out a scheme of pure *iranian dualism*, which has lost the happy confidence and enterprise of the older mazdean faith. The name of the persian god Mitra, or Mithras, is represented by the numeral 365 ; hence Basilides' heavens are of the same number, ' daily aspects of the sky ' (Irenæ. i 24). The 5 (Irenæ. *l.c.*) or 7 (Clem. *Str.* iv 25 § 164) Hypostases round the throne of the Most High recall the Amshaspands (Ameshas-spentas) round Ormazd : an obvious counterpart to the 5 or 7 malignant sphere-spirits. Our physical world is no longer even in part the creation of a good God, but solely the work of evil powers who steal some straying light-fragments to give it life. Light and Darkness, long existing separate, ' at one moment suddenly 'perceived each other,—the one did but look and turn away, but the other

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[1] Euseb. *Chron.* dates Basilides' appearance in Alexandria at *133* A.D. under Hadrian, but Agrippa Castor (Eus. *H.E.* iv 7) wrote under the same emperor a work against the heresiarch ; he would then be slightly earlier than Valentine who lived in Rome under Popes Hyginus, Pius and Anicetus =*135–160* (Harnack *Chronol.* etc. i, 291). Justin Martyr (*c. 150*) says in his *Apology* that in the *Syntagma* he had already attacked Valentine, whose appearing may thus be placed *c. 140*. It has however been supposed by some (e.g. by Schwartz *über den Tod der Söhne Zebedæi* 1904) that the true date for Basilides (as for Satornil) must be placed *earlier*—in Trajan's reign (*98–117*) or possibly even before that. It is certain that Basilides claimed to possess a tradition from St. Matthew through a single mediant, Glaucias (Clem. *Str.* vii § 106).

[2] *Clem. Recogn.* iv 27, 28 says that, after Noah's marvellous escape from the Flood, Cham, one of his children, handed on to Mizraim, his son, the art of magic, and from him ' *Ægyptiorum et Babyloniorum et Persarum ducitur genus : hunc gentes quæ tum erant Zoroastrem appellaverunt.* Thus the secret doctrine was entrusted to Noah and through him passed in a long tradition to (1) the persian syncretists (2) the jewish cabbalists. Cf. also *Homilies* ix 3–5 (198, 9 ed. Dressel).

'seized upon the fleeting vision and from the reflection of the Light formed 'this world'.

(β) **Hellenic.**—This iranian view was now blended with the greek dualism of body and soul; hence the pure ascetism of his teaching and Isidore's emphasis on celibacy (Clem. *Str.* iii 1); again, the Saviour's mission (*Str.* ii 8 § 36) begins the process of separating the sexes, which when complete is the Restitution of all things. Salvation is found then in this; that a composite which never should have been united, *body* and *soul*, falls apart into discrete elements; *spirit* and *life* returning to its own transcendent sphere, *matter* falling once again into the nothingness from which it ought never to have been aroused. As in the Cabbala, *transmigration* of the spiritual essence was taught (Origen *Rom.* lib. v: Clem. *Exc. Theod.* 28, *Str.* iv, 12 § 85, v 11 § 75). Isidore also held a belief in *two* souls good and bad (*Str.* ii 20 § 113) which finds a parallel in Mani and the *Pistis Sophia*.

(γ) **Chaldean.**—To these iranian and hellenic elements, Babylon added her planetary gods or angels (the seven world-creators), once perhaps divine, but now demonic agencies of Fate (εἱμαρμένη), overcome by the Light-religion of Zoroaster. When this perso-babylonian syncretism comes into contact with Hebraism, the God of the Old Testament is seen in the highest angel amongst these seven Archons. In the same late, perfunctory and artificial way, the historic Christ is somehow adapted to his system. Basilides knows of Him but denies that His human nature was sinless (Clem. *Str.* iv 12 § 83): the real Saviour was a docetic phantasm which descended at His baptism. Basilides was among the first to connect the mythical figure of a divine Redeemer, Soter, with the *historic* Christ. 'The 'purely mythical figure of a god-saviour ἥρως was connected first by Basilides 'with Jesus of Nazareth' says Bousset. As with other gnostics, his real interest lay not so much in dogmatic theosophy as in the safe ascent of the soul hereafter to its true home; hence in the later school a profusion of charms, amulets, talismans and engraved gems.[1]

The *names* of the 7 world-rulers are a secret of potency, as Josephus tells us of the Essenes who on initiation swear not to disclose these titles συντηρήσειν τά τε βιβλία τῆς αἱρέσεως κ. τὰ τῶν ἀγγέλων ὀνόματα (*B.J.* ii 8 § 7). Armed with these, the soul ascends fearlessly through the several spheres of his enemies; the Æon Christ had used the potent name *Caulacau* as a passport down to earth and up to heaven again.

(δ) **Egypt.**—This *magical* tendency may be a later development of the school, just as the theurgy of Iamblich in Platonism. In any case it bears a

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[1] *Abraxas* or *Abrasax*: see L. W. King's valuable works on gnostic art: many critics however doubt the connexion of these gems with Basilidianism. Harnack (*Altchrist. Liter.* i 161): 'It is doubtful whether even a single 'Abraxas gem is Basilidian.' Peake (*Enc. Rel. Eth.* ii 429): 'It is now 'generally agreed that if any connexion existed it was of the slightest 'kind, most of the gems being of pagan origin'. Like the greek words for *Mitra* and *Nile* it was equivalent to the number 365—the number of heavens in the somewhat ambiguous Basilidian system, expounded by Irenæus (cf. Hieronymus *in Amos* 3, Vallarsi VI i, 157).

close resemblance to egyptian practice under the later Empire (*1500–1300* B.C.). One chapter of the Coffin Texts is 'On ascending to the sky where 'Re is' (Lacau vi *Rec.* 26, 225), 'On becoming one revered by the King' sungod (the chapter being a magical formula for ascending to the sky xv 27, 53). In the seventeenth chapter of the *Book of the Dead* the deceased man identifies himself with the sungod: 'I am Atum, I am Re . . . I was 'yesterday, I know to-morrow, *I know the name* of the great God'. This notion, that to know the *name* of a god acts as passport and safe-conduct through his realm, is at least as old as King Pepy of Dyn. vi in Egypt (*2500* B.C. at the latest, according to the modern Berlin computation): if the four curly-haired guards of the ferryboat delay at the king's summons he threatens them thus: 'This king Pepy will *publish* this your name to 'the people' (*Pyram. Utter.* § 1223). Pharaoh raising himself like 'an elemental colossus' (Breasted) confronts the gods fearlessly—even the Sungod himself: 'I know thy name; Limitless is thy name; of this 'name I am not ignorant . . . the birth of Limitless shall be prevented, 'if thou dost hinder King Pepy from coming where thou art' (§ 1434). The new emphasis on the hereafter as a place of ordeals and perils created the Coffin Texts and the Book of the Dead (which is merely an authorized collection of them); in them we find little beyond a series of charms against spiritual foes on the borderland, 'dwellers on the threshold'. The priests devised a chart for the soul's future journey; through the fire-gate at the outset and thence by two possible routes, by land or water, with a fiery lake between: the dead are to be careful not to enter the 'place of execution of the gods' lxiii. *Rec.* 31, 20, and there is a chapter of caution about 'not walking head downwards', xliv, *Rec.* 30, 193. There were many charms which enabled the happy possessor to reach the hereafter intact and whole: he is taught how to avoid losing his mouth, head, heart; how to remember his own name, to breathe, eat and drink; how to ward off demon-snakes and keep his drinking water from vanishing in flame. The efficacy of such magic in the world beyond was the chief solvent of a true religious spirit in Egypt and paved the way for an exceedingly secular theocracy in the next period.

Precursor of Manicheism.—Basilides, then, represents a pre-Christian development of iranian belief which is closely akin to Satornil's theories. It is marked by the absence of the Mother-Goddess Sophia, the fallen female round whom other gnostic systems collect their romantic legends. Nor is there any trace of a 'fall within the Absolute' and all movement takes place from below until the Saviour is sent. It is impossible not to see in this apostle an immediate precursor of Mani, whose creed merely carries on the Basilidian[1] tenets.

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[1] It is worthy of notice, in support of the *dualistic* interpretation of Basilides, that the keen critic Jerome states that there were followers of this sect in Spain in his days. Technically he is wrong; the school never seems to have passed beyond Egypt where Epiphanius (xxiv 1) believed it to be still existing in *c. 390–400* A.D. But there were Manichees in Spain then

It has been thought well to set forth the hypothesis of the persian origin of Basilides—such as Bousset prefers, following the *Acta Archelai et Manetis* and denying to the accounts or references of the Fathers (Irenæus, Hippolytus, Origen) any authentic value.[1] We have thus been able to show this heretic as a step onwards towards Mani, as gathering together the fragments of *parsi* dualism into a coherent system. But it need scarcely be said that no subject is more doubtful than the precise teaching of Basilides. A whole library of polemic has been composed as to the version to be followed, whether that of Irenæus or Hippolytus (*Philosoph.* ed. princ. 1851). To present clearness in a matter so obscure, we will consider in contrast to the *parsi* dualism just expounded the *buddhist* monism as we find it in this latter author. Here once again we must repeat the caution as to surmises on *oriental* influences ; and we use the term *buddhist* only to emphasize kindred doctrine not to dogmatize on loans and sources. Yet the positive indebtedness to the hindu philosophy is warmly maintained by Pfleiderer (*Urchristentum* 1902).[2] It is enough for us to point the coincidences as we find the system portrayed in Hippolytus. First, there is no abrupt *parsi* dualism, but a *monism* which posits an Absolute nothing, beyond all predicates, yet at the same time source of all being. In this deity arises *will* (as in the Vedas, *kama*), will to create a world. God deposits a non-existent seed containing all future potencies : the doctrine of Emanation is most explicitly rejected. In this fact some students see the ' fundamental difference ' between Basilides and other gnostics. His scheme (as will be seen) works upwards—the natural tendency of all being ; it is an evolution from Anaxagoras ' πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ or confusion to an orderly arrangement of ranks. This is the ' goal of history ' (Peake). It is suggested that his theory was ' consciously elaborated ' in antagonism to the emanatist views then prevailing at Alexandria—a theory of which Valentine may have been the coryphæus. The *triple sonship* contained in the cosmic seed corresponds to the 3 grades—*pneumatic, psychic, hylic*—of other systems and there is therefore the same *necessitarian* ethics : for our destiny is but the working out of an original nature. (Herein Basilides cannot be said to follow the spirit of *buddhism* with fidelity.) The Great Archon bursts from the seed to become world-ruler, believing himself the highest being and residing in the highest firmament : he, with his son fairer and wiser than himself in the Ogdoad, creates the upper world down to the moon ; below this a second Archon, emerging from the seed and residing in the Hebdomad, moulds the lowest creation, with the help and advice of his son, also fairer and wiser than himself. Meantime 2 orders

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(as we know by the later phenomenon of priscillianism) and in this doctrine were gnostic elements (Hieron. *Epist* 75 ; *ad Vigil.* 6).

[1] Krüger also (article Herzog-Hauck) dismisses Hippolytus' witness and bases his view on *Acta Arch.* and Clement's references—treating Irenæus as secondary.

[2] Cf. the discussion by Kennedy (*Journ. Roy. Asi. Soc. 1902* ' Buddhist Gnosticisms ') : Watson's *Philos. Basis of Rel.* 1907, also Clemen, *Religionsgesch. Erklärung* 1909.

of the *triple sonship* had already fled aloft to the god who is no-thing (*μὴ ὂν* quite frankly) : and the firmament, where First Archon was arrested in his flight and established his empire, is none other than Holy Spirit which having assisted Second Sonship to rise is yet unable to follow it into the abyss of deity. It will be noted that there is *no descent* either in compassion or through sin of a celestial being. ' Ascent, not descent, is the ' law of the Universe ' : the natural tendency of all things is upwards. The process is thus one of *evolution*, not, as in platonism and before it in other gnostic schools, of *degeneracy*. All this is but a *metaphysical* prelude to the *practical* problem—rescue of the sonship yet entangled in the lower world. The First Archon learnt the secret that he was not highest in the scale of being and reverently accepted the humiliating truth. It was revealed to him by his wiser son who had himself (as naptha) caught the irradiating flash from the pure Sonship aloft. The truth descended from the Ogdoad to the Hebdomad where all the 365 heavens hailed it with gladness ; so it passed to the Son of Mary who became its prophet in the lowest world. It was his part to sort out the various grades of being, lying tangled together in the world, and to range them in proper classes. All these kinds were combined in him,—so that he becomes (as for Irenæus) the ' recapitulator ' of all the creatures ; like the microcosm or Primal Man (with some reserve). Like Ishtar he ascends to the highest heaven, leaving at each stage in the journey the part fitted to abide there. The Third Sonship followed him, undergoing the same spiritual cleansing ; and *spiritual* men still left on earth must follow its example if they desire release. When all who can have passed to the non-existent god, the Great Ignorance will come and hide from the eyes of each rank the knowledge of its Superiors. For all pain comes from longing for that which is unattainable ; and to pass into a region for which a creature is unsuited is death for it. With ignorance comes contentment, the happiness of all orders and the Restitution of all things. This Third Sonship, which since Christ's ascension has passed into heaven, may stand for the spiritual or *noëric* principle still blended with matter. It is a ' pilgrim and sojourner ' in this world because in its very nature it belongs to the supramundane, like the *νοῦς* of Aristotle. ' That portion of mankind ' says Peake ' which is chosen [or predestinate] to rise ' to the highest sphere cannot properly belong to the world from which ' it is destined to escape '. The *ethics* of the founder (as revealed by Clement) are not difficult to adjust to this theory of ' deliverance '. Basilides seems to take seriously the old savage doctrine of the *multiple soul* : the reasonable soul has ' appendages ' or rather spirit companions in its passions—qualities of animals, of plants, even of things without life. These foreign elements adhere to the central soul—a leibnizian sovereign-monad—and allow it no rest. Isidore (the son) wrote a treatise on the *Parasitic Soul* (cf. a chapter in Drummond's once popular *Natural Law* etc.). In the interests of the moral will he urged that we must not throw the blame upon these appendages (*περιαρτήματα*) for our sins. Fully accepting the dogma, he insists that the rational soul must be master in its own house. From Origen (*in Ep. Roman.*) we may gather that this belief formed a basis for a theory of *metempsychosis* : the soul brings with it various inferior elements

from the several incarnations in which it has been associated with them Pfleiderer sees in this theory of the *parasitic* passions yet another proof of buddhist origin. The quintessence of hindu ethics seems to him to be comprised in the maxims: 'one should love all since all are related to the 'whole' and 'desire nothing, hate nothing' (Clem. *Str.* iv 12). We may note here that Pfl. in order to effect a certain compromise between the conflicting accounts, traces 2 distinct stages in development; a syrian period, represented by Iren. and Epiph.; an alexandrine, to which Hippolytus, Clement, and Origen bear testimony.

Students, anxious to examine further into the controversy as to Hippolytus' trustworthiness, must be referred to the great encyclopedias and more recent monographs—e.g. Hort in *Dict. Christ. Biogr.*; and Hilgenfeld's writings (since 1856), who sums up, in his latest work on the history of heresy, his almost vindictive attack on the 'uncritical bishop'. He is followed by Lipsius, Harnack and Bousset. Salmon started the idea (in 1885) that the difficult *monistic* version was a forgery: Zahn and Stähelin, Schmidt and Krüger, followed him. To-day, this belief seems losing ground: Harnack seems to doubt his former judgment, and Anz and Drummond, Bousset and Bardenhewer believe it to be an authentic document. Bousset believes Hipp. version to be a *monistic* transformation of an original system (under what influence he does not clearly say). It is clear that the determining factor in the mind of the student is largely his preconception of what a gnostic system *ought* to be: an *à priori* judgment which perhaps unconsciously colours his deliberate theory. Schmidt, who thinks that *emanation* is the core of *gnosis* rejects Hipp. *monism* because it has no trace of a divine explication; because evolution from below is a hypothesis wholly wanting from the schools (*Gnost. Schrift.* etc. 1892). On the other hand Bousset entirely denies the relevance of the doctrine: 'it is 'found only in a few systems and in none as in the basilidian': he has, since his *Hauptprobleme*, somewhat modified the latter view. 'Everywhere 'else the stress lies not on the thought of a gradual emanation and degener-'ation of the Æons but on the sudden Fall of one of them. The question 'as to the origin of the idea of emanation is *fairly irrelevant* for the proper 'understanding of *gnosis*' (H. 329).

I refrain from further details of the version of Irenæus: I wholly agree with Peake's judgment: 'the system as so presented goes on very 'conventional lines: it is quite a *commonplace presentation* of ordinary 'gnostic beliefs, and it is not easy to understand why Basilides gained his 'immense reputation, if he were capable of nothing better. . . . We are 'probably justified in treating Iren. as a *secondary authority*, who employed 'a source describing a degenerate development, far removed alike in 'speculative power and ethical elevation from the founder'.

B. Valentine: his Christian Affinities.—Valentine the Egyptian is perhaps the only gnostic—if we except the earnest commentator Basilides—who betrays a firsthand acquaintance and sympathy with the church, Tertullian (*adv. Val.* 4) even calls him a disappointed candidate for the see of Rome and in consequence the leader of a schismatic party; but this story is told of many other heresiarchs. He did not, like Marcion, break

with the Catholics at the outset, but endeavoured to maintain himself and his tenets within the pale. Of all the sectarians he effected the nearest approach to Christian dogma; and for a long time avoided any open breach. He modified the acute *dualism* of other (oriental) schools with a *monistic* tendency, adopted johannine names for the Æons, passed a favourable verdict on the Demiurge (the God of Old Testament Scripture) made his famous three-fold division of mankind in the interest of the catholic *psychics*, used Christian baptism, and had far more respect than is to be found in other systems for the historic personage of our Saviour in his *Christlehre*. His followers certainly used the Four Gospels and the Pauline Epistles; of these, both Ptolemy and Heracleon wrote comments or introductions to St. John's Gospel. They held also the Old Testament in veneration and did not subscribe to Marcion's abuse. Ptolemy in his *Letter to Flora* (Epiph. *Hær.* xxxiii 3) is shocked that the Old Testament should be attributed to the devil; and believes that he can detect a triple strain in its texture—laws directly given by God Himself, Moses' own additions, and the tradition (interpolated) of the elders. So much for this spirited attempt at a compromise with catholic doctrine.

Central Point: Doctrine of the Mother-Goddess.—As to the actual theory of the founder of the school, it is not easy to speak with any certainty, for the Valentinian disciples are at least as important as Valentine. Secundus, we know, was the author of the division of Sophia into mother and daughter; Colorbases was another and a teacher of Marcus (Irenæus ii 2; i 14); Ptolemy and Marcus both had a numerous train of pupils; Heracleon, with Ptolemy, represents the *italian* as opposed to the *anatolian* branch of this sect. We may perhaps recover Valentine's own authentic teaching from Iren. i 11 where it is explicitly connected with the *gnostics* 'falsely so-called', who made an exclusive claim to the title. These were worshippers of the Mother-goddess of Syria, sometimes the stern and austere dweller in heaven like Artemis, sometimes as a goddess of love. In her celestial form she dwells in the 8th or furthest heaven (*ogdoad*) next to the Unknown and Nameless Father; below are the Seven World Creators or planetary angels, each with his distinct sphere, of whom the chief is Ialdabaoth. The true gnostics claim to be children of this heavenly Mother, whose divine spark is somehow entrapped in the gross material of this world.[1] Their cult, sacraments and symbols were means to secure the return journey upwards after death. She was (at least in part of her divine nature) a fallen goddess immersed in the material world and set free by a Redeemer, as the gnostics, her children, must be. This is a strictly Osirian feature, for that somewhat impassive God falls into the underworld and is rescued by Horus his son; every pious worshipper becomes, not merely *like* Osiris, but an Osiris himself. Kindred myths are found in greek legend (Andromeda and Ariadne) and in world-wide folk-stories of the imprisoned Princess or the Sleeping Beauty who waits

[1] Joseph. *B.J.* ii 8, 11, Essenes believe ψυχὰς ἐκ τοῦ λεπτοτάτου φοιτώσας αἰθέρος συμπλέκεσθαι ὥσπερ εἱρκταῖς τοῖς σώμασιν, ἴυγγί τινι φυσικῇ καταπωμένας (cf. 583).

for her deliverer. Cognate too is the Jewish ' Spirit of God ' which ' moved ' upon the face of the waters '. In another form this heavenly Goddess *Sophia*, is considered as herself a demiurge or world-creating power and the highest Angel of the Spheres, Ialdabaoth being her son. Finally by her side stands a male redemptive deity, her heavenly consort, as Eros to Psyche, whose spiritual marriage with the fallen goddess is itself the climax of the deliverance. They are expressly called ' bride and bridegroom '. With this myth the descent of an Æon upon Jesus of Nazareth at His Baptism is very loosely and externally combined.

Other Mythic Figures : Achamoth, Anthropos, Horus, Ialdabaoth.—Such in general was the primitive *gnosis*, and Valentine follows it closely. The Mother-Goddess stands always at the centre. In the early form of the theosophy it was a *male* Æon who fell ' ruining down the illimitable inane ' from heaven and the Pleroma to begin the drama of world-development (Iren. i 11, *Exc. Theod.* § 31, and Hippol. *Syntagma*). But Secundus introduces a refined distinction : the higher Wisdom still remains in the upper world even after her presumptuous craving to know the Abyss of deity ? ; but her abortive offspring (ὥσπερ ἔκτρωμα) is a new and independent being Sophia Achamoth, whose sighs and tears beget the visible world. Meantime '*Anthropos*', a leading figure in primitive gnosticism but now half ' forgotten, moves back into the centre of the system and the direct vicinity ' of the fallen goddess ' (W. Bousset of Göttingen). This is the Primal Man, Osiris, who in the early mythology had sunk into matter and raised himself again ; the community of the faithful attach themselves closely to him and secure the very same deliverance. Another strongly egyptian trait, part of the founder's authentic doctrine, is *Horus*, the Limiter (as the Hellenists interpreted the name). His office is to keep the fallen Æons separate from the light-world ; in the later phases he is to be seen shaping the disorderly chaos which marked the passage of Achamoth into a visible world : he is also called *Stauros*—no doubt in the Platonic sense of a world-soul stretched like X across and again across the universe, not with any definite Christian meaning. Another point worthy of remark is the acquittal of the world-teacher Ialdabaoth. This *demiurge* (Iren. i 29 etc.) is at first an evil and malicious spirit of a fallen mother-goddess already deprived of light. In later Valentinian systems (and no doubt in his own teaching as well) he is rather the offspring of her praiseworthy tears of remorse and repentance. He loses his name of evil import and becomes the Platonic world-builder, the God of Old Testament, the First Person of the Christian Trinity. (His precise relation to Horus the world-orderer does not appear.)

The Sacred Wedlock.—The *redemption* comes about by means of the heavenly marriage ; for the Goddess, by becoming Soter's bride. This *Saviour* is the most ambiguous, if the most indispensable, figure in Valentine's soteriology : in Iren. i 30 he is the heavenly *Christus* who turns to help his fallen and penitent sister. In Valentine's own early system he is sometimes connected with the Æon *Christus*, sometimes with *Anthropos* (Primal Man), sometimes again with Horus (ὅρος). In Ptolemy's mythology, he is a curious joint product of the whole Pleroma, each of the Æons (like a fairy godmother in a folk-story) lavishing its best gift upon

him until (like the babylonian Marduk) he becomes the epitome of all divinities. Such is the bridegroom, whose coming in the guise of the fairy prince sets the captive free. The aim of their pious practice is to repeat mystically in themselves the experience of this spiritual union between Soter and Sophia. The heavenly escort of the groomsmen are the spouses of the believers' souls : every gnostic has his angel (*fravashi* of *later* zoroastrian belief) standing in God's presence. The final eschatology or completion of the great drama of deliverance is thus conceived : the Soter bears off his bride Sophia into the Pleroma [1] and the gnostics with their angelic spouses follow in their train ; the *demiurge* with his *psychic* believers ascends into the Ogdoad or Achamoth's heaven ; and the world of matter, as in the norse *ragnarok* or stoic ἐκπύρωσις, sinks into flames.

The Heavenly Bridegroom or Divine Comrade.—Their chief sacrament (as in greek nature-mysteries) was the rite of the Bridal-chamber : ' a ' few prepare (Iren. i 21) a *thalamon* and go through a form of consecration ' with certain set phrases, repeated over the candidate also, which state ' that a spiritual union is to be consummated on the model of the higher ' Syzygy '. A fragment of the former actually survives : ' I will confer ' my favour upon thee, for the Father of All beholds thine angel ever before ' His face . . . it is meet that we become as one . . . deck thyself as ' bride for *bridegroom* that thou mayest become as I am and I as thou art . . . ' receive the bridegroom and give place to him, open thine arms to embrace ' him '. Here once again we have a further witness to Valentine's egyptian origin : the *ka*, as we saw in an earlier section, is not really a factor in the personality but a genius or comrade allotted by the god, as in the well known greek verse μυστάγωγος τοῦ βίου, guiding the fortune of his *double* in the lower world but chiefly in the world beyond ; there he abode and there he awaited the coming of his companion. Certainly in *3000–2500* B.C. this phrase was familiar as a euphemism for death, ' he goeth to his *ka* ' ; and the dead are ' those who have gone to their kas ' : sometimes ' to the ' sky ' is added. ' Call on thy ka ' it is said, ' like Osiris, that he may protect ' thee from all wrath of the dead ' (*Pyramid Texts* § 63). ' How beautiful ' it is for thee in thy ka's company for ever ! ' § 2028. He speaks to God on behalf of the dead man, introduces him to *Re* and brings him food, he is the protective genius, a tutelar. At first an exclusive privilege of the king, this *fravashi* or ' guardian angel ' became the possession of all when the cult was democratized. This is at least one source of Valentine's eclectic theory (cf. p. 557 f.).

Rite of Baptism : The New Name.—The Sacrament of *Baptism* was also important because of the magical import attached to the *new name* : the giving of this was termed deliverance or redemption (ἀπολύτρωσις). The heavenly angels (*doubles* or *kas*) have to be baptized in the same mysterious name as Jesus was, that themselves and their earthly partners may find salvation (*exc. Theod.* § 22). The last words of the rite are a

[1] To this with a curiously frank materialism, their exegesis referred the Old Testament phrase πᾶν ἄρρεν διανοῖγον μήτραν. Pan(!) the universal Saviour is male element, etc.

benediction : ' peace be over all upon whom the (sacred) Name rests ' (Iren. *l.c.*). This name will protect the Soul as it mounts aloft through the hostile potencies to the lower heaven, where Horus will give it admittance, frightening back the pursuing demon by his *magic word* (*exc. Theod.* ibid.). Before this name is invoked over the neophyte, the demonic forces (of nature) have power over him, and are summarized as Destiny (εἱμαρμένη), from which baptism only can release him (ib. § 77). A baptismal confession of faith is found (*Iren.* l.c.). ' In the name of the Unknown Father of ' All, by Alethea the Mother of All, by the name which descended upon ' Jesus '. Another formula (aramæan) began : ' In the name of Acha- ' moth ', who is the *kyrios* (or lord and hero) to the faithful, while Jesus is Soter but not Lord.

Extreme Unction : Other Talismans for the Upward Journey.—A dying man had a form of Extreme Unction, being anointed with oil and water : the object being to render the soul invisible and intangible to the Powers of the Air (Iren. i 21). The soul, just as in the formulas of the *Book of the Dead*, is entrusted with magical sentences to pronounce on the perilous upward way : ' I am a son of the Father Who was before the whole world— ' I came down to see all things, that which is strange as well as that which ' is my own ; and deep down there is nothing strange but only that which ' belongeth to Achamoth, who is the female Æon and hath created all ' things '. After the invocation the mother-goddess is said to cast the ' mantle of invisibility ', (the helmet of Homer and the folk-tales), over the now redeemed soul. The mother-goddess is always at the centre of the cult and foremost in the worshipper's mind. She may be presented in various guises (as fallen Achamoth, as the higher Sophia, as Alethea, the Eternal Father's consort), but it is always upon the Mother that the fervent piety of the gnostic is fixed.

As in Egypt, A Magical Sacramentalism : Unethical Character.—It is clear then that Valentinian pietism became, for many converts, mere *magical sacramentalism* like the later Egyptian religion. The attitude is not merely selfish and utilitarian, but tends to become distinctly sensuous and unmoral. ' All kinds of attempts ' says Bousset, ' are made actually ' to assimilate to oneself the divine through external means '. To the more refined natures this externalism was abhorrent. Some gnostics, says Irenæus, admit the value of no outward rite or practice ; *deliverance* ' being ' attained through actual *knowledge* of God's majesty, for all faultiness ' and suffering arise from ignorance . . . knowledge therefore is the true ' perfecting of the inner man '. So *Exc. Theod.* § 78, already cited :— ' But it is not Baptism alone which sets us free but knowledge (γνῶσις), ' who we were, what we have become, whither we have sunk, whither ' we hasten, whence we are redeemed, what is birth and what is rebirth '. The truest piety is to contemplate the perfection of God : man's soul is like a tavern frequented by many brawlers and evil spirits (Clem. *Str.* ii 20, 114) ' but when the Father (Who alone is good) looks down, the Soul ' is hallowed and lies in full radiance, and he who has such a heart is to be ' called happy, for he shall see God '. Further light is thrown upon a practical faith which is by no means mere magic or pessimistic quietism :

Valentine (*Str.* iv 13, 91) thus addresses the elect souls : ' Ye are from the ' beginning immortal and children of everlasting life : ye desire to divide ' Death amongst you as a prey . . . that this Death may die in you and ' through you ; for if ye dissolve the world and are not yourselves dissolved ' then are ye lords over creation and over all that hasteth away '. It is easy to see that this spiritual victory may be transformed into a *superstitious* desire to work on matter for one's own profit (magic), or again, into a *scientific* interest in nature. In conclusion Valentine was a true son of Egypt, a mystic and pietist, who tried to bring his archaic system, already existing quite independently of Christian influence, into a very mechanical connexion with the Gospel.

(ii) Anti-Semitism and the Judaizers : Ophites, Cainites and Others

Snake-cult : the Old Testament Read Backwards.—On the other hand the Ophites or Naassenes (Iren. and Hippol. *Phil* v. Origen *c. C.* vi 25 and Epiph. *Hær.* xxvi) represent a purely hostile attitude to hebrew monotheism. The honour paid to the Snake (very offensive both to Jews and Christians) is a survival of primitive religion in Egypt and Babylon, and later in Hither Asia and Greece. Primal Man here appears as identical with the supreme God : his thought (ἔννοια) is *second man* : and third in this strange trinity, we find Holy Spirit (female), who gave birth to the *third man*, Christ. As son and mother flew upward to the abode of the Primal Man, a spark of light fell on the waters as Sophia, like Secundus' Achamoth. From this seed sprang Ialdabaoth (creator of the *seven* spheres of heaven) and six powers, who acting in concert made man. But the newly created being gave thanks for life not to these powers but to Primal Man : and Ialdabaoth in a rage sent Eve to destroy him. We may compare the hindu belief that the gods send female demons of great beauty to tempt man from ascetic practices which will make them equal to the gods, or even superior. Then Sophia in pity for man sends the Snake to persuade Adam and Eve to eat of the tree of knowledge ; this breaks their allegiance to Ialdabaoth and a long war (recounted by the hostile party in the Old Testament) ensues. At last Sophia sends Christ and His sister Prunikos to proclaim the gospel of redemption by means of Jesus, Who is deserted by them in the moment of crucifixion. But His body is raised again and for 18 months Christ expounds, to a small circle of the elect, the secret doctrine. Then (somewhat strangely) He ascends to Ialdabaoth's right hand, and deprives him of his power and glory and receives the souls that follow Him.

Problems of this Exegesis : the Cainites.—The myth bristles with inconsistency. Ialdabaoth is said himself to create a serpent (νοῦς) from whom come evil and death as well as spirit and soul : is this what the Ophites would call the carnal wisdom of the Old Testament ? Again, the serpent who brings knowledge is sometimes identified with Prunikos. The syncretism is of the familiar type : a hostile religion, the jewish, is accepted as true in its way, but as a low and evil creed—just as other gnostics superadded the purer Mazdeism to the planet-cult and magic of Babylon ; or as Valentine, remaining an archaic egyptian at heart, completed his system

by a thoroughly sincere, but erroneous, welcome of Christian dogma. As in Marcion's gospel, the protest of our Lord against jewish formalism and worldliness was accepted as a complete repudiation of the Old Testament and the Deity who inspired it. The *Cainites* of cent. ii followed the same practice of reading Scripture *à rebours*. Cain was the messenger endowed with power from the higher regions, Abel representing the lower powers; the sinners of Scripture (Esau, Korah, the men of Sodom, Judas Iscariot) become their saints. The *Cerdonians* (after the syrian *Cerdo* who came to Rome like most other heresiarchs of the time, in *138*), opposed a *docetic* Christology to the whole religious development of the Jews; the Saviour's birth and sufferings were mere appearance. They were sincere in their *dualism*, forbidding marriage and the use of wine or meat: they were an ascetic sect and from them sprang Marcionism.

The Judaizing Party: Cerinthus: Chiliasm.—A syncretism quite outside the line of development was the half-judaizing doctrine of Cerinthus the judaizer, said by Hippolytus (*Phil.* vii 33) to have been trained, like Valentine, in Egypt. Epiphanius (*Hær.* xxviii 4) tells a story, which cannot well be true, that he led the opposition to the new Pauline liberalism: that St. John refused to bathe under the same roof is probable so far as the date is concerned (Iren. iii 3 records it from Polycarp, and Eusebius mentions it twice). He strictly observed the Sabbath and laid stress on circumcision; but at the same time he believed that the world was created by inferior potencies or angels; one of which (the God of the Jews) had given us only an imperfect Law. On Jesus (a mere man) the Christ descended from above to impart the true religion of the Unknown Father, deserting him before the Passion. Cerinthus is said by Gaius of Rome (in the time of Diocletian) and Denys of Alexandria (in the Nicene period) to hold a crude and materialistic form of Chiliasm. Another variant of *Gnosis* is found in the alexandrine Jew, Carpocrates, who seized upon the communistic element in the early Christian church, but based his own theories mainly on Plato's *Republic*. Like Severus Alexander the Emperor, he was a pure eclectic pagan and not a Christian at all: he paid honour to Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle as well as to Christ. With all the others he held the present world-fabric to be the work of secondary and inferior angels, as in Plato's *Timæus*: salvation comes through knowledge of the Supreme Unity. If Souls (which existed before their bodies) can remember their former state, they can rise again (as in Plato and Empedocles) to a contemplation of Unity and Truth. Jesus, a mere man, had this wonderful and intuitive faculty. The things of this world are so absolutely indifferent (ἀδιάφορα) that no outward act is of the least importance. The orthodox held this to mean that the sect indulged in every kind of licence, and that Cerinthus' clever son, Epiphanes, died from the effects of his practical antinomianism. Here, as in Hindustan or Irak, we note the suspicions—no doubt sometimes justified—which were directed against creeds of over-refined intellectualism or of a strained repudiation of the present world.

APPENDIX J

Further Notes on the Mandeans, Sabians and the Star-worship of Harran

(i) The Mandean Survival in Chaldea

Surviving Sect in Chaldea : Its Sacred Books.—The *Mandeans* (followers after knowledge, γνῶσις) are a survival of the wreck of these speculative systems whose fortunes we have followed in the early Christian age. There is undoubted connexion with the early jewish-christian Nazarenes (ναζωραῖοι). The Arabs called this sect *Nasara* ; and in the present community the title *Nazoraye* is reserved as a term of honour for those who are most proficient in ' knowledge ' (Petermann, *Reisen in Orient* ii 447).[1] They live to-day in southern Chaldea, near Basra, and in Khusistan ; in 1882 some were seeking a new home on the Tigris. They speak arabic and zend (persian), but their sacred books are in an aramaic dialect most cognate to the babylonish Targum. This scripture seems to be made up of fragments of various ages, survivals of an older and more extensive literature.[2] Their chief treatise is *Sidra Rabba*, ' great book ', otherwise *Genza* ' treasure '.[3] This is obscure, diffuse and often inconsistent, being a congeries of disconnected sections by various authors in different ages : the oldest part (at the end of the Right-hand portion) may be dated between *700* and *900* A.D.

The Trinity : Succession of Gnostic Dynasties.—This is their theogony. *Pera* (or *Pera Rabba*, the ' great Abyss ', or possibly, from hebrew Peri, the great fruit) is the ground and origin of all things, but he forms a trinity with the primal æons *Ayar ziva* ' shining æther ' and *Mana d'ekara* ' Spirit of glory ' often called *Mana Rabba*. From this last member of

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[1] Their frequent washings and deference to John the Baptist led to the inaccurate name *Christians of St. John* : the name *Sabians* is assumed by the sect in their dealings with the muslim world because the Coran (*Sura* 2, 5, 22) includes the *sabiuna* (the baptizer) along with jewish and Christian creeds as a *religio licita* : see below (pp. 607, 8).

[2] Mandean MSS. are found in the Brit. Museum, at Oxford, Rome, Paris, Berlin, Weimar. Poynon (Paris 1898, 9) brought to light inscriptions bearing on belief and superstition : also Lidzbarski (*Ephemeris* Giessen 1900) : W. Brandt wrote on *Mand. Relig.* Leipzig 1889.

[3] First printed and translated under the false title *Liber Adami* by Norberg, 1815, 16 at Copenhagen ; next by Peterman 1867 at Berlin and Leipzig ; Brandt has produced about a quarter, Göttingen 1893. There is also the *Book of John* or ' Discourses of the Kings ', not yet printed as a whole. The *kolasta* or ' quintessence ', containing hymns and discourses on Baptism and the *Ascent*, deals with the *state of the soul after death* like the *Book of the Dead* in Egypt. The *Diwan* (unpublished) contains the ritual for the atonement ; *Asfar Malwaske*, ' book of the Zodiac ' treats of astrology, and many shorter pieces have a purely magical value as charms or amulets.

the triad, the king of light, all creation emanates. first in the great ethereal Jordan which (as soul of the higher world) permeates the air, Ayar's special domain. By Mana's side is D'mutha, a feminine principle such as we find in the Syzygies of pythagorizing gnostics. Mana called into being the highest æons (of subordinate rank) *Hayye Kadmeye* (cf. Adam *Kadmon*) 'Primitive life'. But after this, like Plato's demiurge, Mana withdrew into the most profound secrecy, yet manifesting himself to pious Mandeans after their soul leaves the body. This Trinity, then, only prepares for an active and efficient world-ruler; *Hayye* is surrounded by a paradise of light—as in earlier manichean beliefs: 'he sits in the far north in might 'and glory', unfolding himself by five branches 'light, wind, harmony, 'voice and beauty of the æons', all personified abstractions like the zend *amshaspands*. Out of them arise 360 æons, divided into classes and bearing proper names recalling the complex angelology of the persians: the number at once reminds us of the basilidian heavens. Hayye's first emanation is *Yoshemin*, 'Jehovah of the heavens', the jewish God of the Old Testament; who wishing to raise himself above his father was exiled from the pure æther to the lower realm.

Younger Son set over the Elder.—A second-born son is *Manda d'hayye*, 'knowledge of the Life', the mediator and redeemer, the λόγος of the system; he is always loyal, and stays with Hayye (and even *Mana Rabba*) as *beloved son*, *first born* (the elder being disinherited), *high priest*, *word of life*. Another power, *Abathur*, 'father of the *Uthre* or splendours, of uncertain parentage, also called the 'Ancient', *Atigua* or the 'deeply 'hidden and guarded', stands on the confines of the hereafter. Like Osiris, Abathur is a god of the dead, sitting on the furthest verge of light and weighing the acts of the departed souls in a balance.

Beginnings of Material Creation: the Impotent Demiurge.—Below him was once a black stream of murky water; in which his image being constantly reflected became *Ptahil* his son, who is partly material and therefore imperfect in nature. Only at this point after these endless celestial myths have we reached our own world. The *demiurge* and creator frames the world at the request of his father Abathur the Ancient. With the usual feebleness of gnostic creators, he cannot make Adam and Eve stand upright on their feet. Mana Rabba therefore, in compassion, sends *Hibel* (Abel), *Sithil* (Seth) and *Anosh* (Enoch) to infuse true life into these crawling 'Frankenstein' monsters: they are 'guardians of souls' (like the *fravashi*) from the higher world. *Hibil* teaches man about the æons and their world of light, and tells them that *Ptahil* is not their god or true creator but that the 'great king of light' stands immensely above him. This King however enjoins them to marry and to replenish the earth. The unfortunate *Ptahil* having forfeited his power over men is driven away by *Abathur*, angry at his son's failure, into a place of darkness; whence at the judgement he will be summoned to baptism and permitted to receive a kingdom among the Æons or 'splendours', with all the honours due to a god.

The Nether World: Descent of Man into Hell to Overcome Evil.—In the world below are 4 vestibules and 3 halls: in the former Zartay and

Zartenay, Hag and Mag, Gaf and Gafan, Anatan and Kin, bear sway; in the latter *Shdum* the warrior, *Giv* the great, and lastly *Krun* or *Karkum*, eldest and most terrible of all the demons. The rule in this Inferno is progressive drought and emptiness; for while there is foul water in the vestibules and scorching fire in the two upper hells, *Krun* has nothing to rule but dust and ashes. Hibil (or Abel) carries his propaganda and evangel of light down even into these gloomy abodes: as in Mani's system a Primal Man descends to fight the devil in his own palace. He lets himself be half-swallowed by the monster *Krun*; but forces him to recognize Mana Rabba and reveal the hidden and mystical *name* of darkness. *Armed with this talisman he passes upwards*, through these halls of Eblis laying bare the secret and ending the power of the several rulers. Over the 4 vestibules he set a female devil, daughter of Kin, 'mother of falsehood, poison and fornication',—a blasphemous parody of the *Ruha d'Qudsha* (Holy Spirit) in the syriac church.[1] Her son *Ur* ('fire of hell' conceived as a person), launches an attack, like the titans or men of Babel, against the world of light: but he is suppressed by Hibil and enchained in the 'black-water' by seven chains of iron and seven of gold. This attack seems to have occurred at an early stage during Ptahil's brief creative activity.

Demons placed as Planets in Heaven, Authors of Evil.—To her son and consort *Ruha* bore 3 broods whom Ptahil placed in the firmament, the first litter forming the planets and the next the zodiac. The names of the planets are clearly derived from Babylon, *Estera*, *Enba*, *Sin*, *Kewan*, *Bil* and *Nirig* = Venus, Mercury, Moon, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars.[2] To the sun is given the Old Testament name *Adonai*, or *Adunay*: he is lord of the spheres and planet-spirits. All evil and all temptation arise from the hellish brood, so strangely transported into heaven.[3] In the sky above, the stars and (evil) planets sail as upon a crystalline vault. The Pole Star is the central sun round which all heavenly bodies turn; he is the door-keeper with jewelled diadem, standing sentinel before Abathur's palace on the verge of the kingdom of light: all prayer is addressed to the north. Our earth is a circular disk with a lofty rampart of turquoise to the north where like the Hyperboreans are the blessed departed. Here in a blessed

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[1] Or rather the Mother-Goddess supplanted and degraded (like the Planets) in the new light-cult.

[2] Here again is another reading of this wholesale 'catasterism' which makes the planets less evil and hostile: with mother *Ruha* (or *Namrus*) and father *Ur* (N.B. the son, as in the Great-Mother worship, impregnating or violating his parent), the seven planets belong wholly to the dark world; they are made captives by Hibil for the god of light, who pardons them, sets them in celestial chariots (like the planet spirits in Averroism) and makes them world-rulers (the older κοσμοκράτορες): cf. the *Genza*, *Tract* 6 and 8: Brandt, *Mand. Schrift.* 125 and 137, *Mand. Relig.* 34.

[3] Can we read here a coalition of feminine *Naturalism* and an astral cult? The earth- or hell-powers are raised to the firmament and credited with all the evil that happens in the lower sphere.

region live the forefathers of the sect—the Egyptians, saved from drowning in the Red Sea, under their king Pharaoh (who was the first king and high priest of the Mandeans). Ever since this catastrophe they have kept the supreme pontifical rank, *rish amma*, in abeyance: only once since the Pharaoh of the Exodus has the office been filled.

Planetary World-Periods: Hatred of Jews and Christians.—As for the earth's history: its duration is 400,000 years, each (evil) planet bearing sway for 70,000: in this vast space of time our race has thrice been totally destroyed, in each case a single couple survives. All the Old Testament worthies are impostors, such as *Abraham*, *Misha* and *Shlimun* (who, as is usual in the east, figures as lord of all *djinns* and demons). The people of Egypt (!) followed the true religion; and in later times *Yahya* (John the son of Zachariah) was an *incarnation* of the all-conquering Hibil or Abel: he baptized Jesus by mistake, and after an illusory death at the hands of Herod went back to the world of light. Hibil now sent his younger brother Anosh to oppose the false magicians and prophet Yishu, that is our Lord; he wrought healing, raised the dead to life, caused the false Messiah to be crucified, and brought about the siege and overthrow of *Urashlam*, the devil's city, Jerusalem (built to the honour of the (evil) sungod *Adunay*). 240[1] years later 60,000 reincarnate saints from Pharaoh's paradise were sent to reinforce the almost extinct community of Mandeans who still kept the true faith. Mahomet was the last impostor and false prophet, but Anosh protected his own people and gave them a new home in Chaldea, near Wasil and latterly in Khusistan. At the end of all things, the devil Ur, like the norse Wolf Fenris, will devour the earth and higher visible worlds: but overtaxing his capacity he will burst asunder and fall into the dark abyss, where, together with all other powers of darkness, he will be annihilated. The world (after this futile and costly interlude of a material creation) will be once again transformed into a pure realm of light.

Hierarchy and Sacraments: Monastic Life Abhorred.—As with the Druze *Akils*, great honour is paid to the priesthood: it is divided into 3 grades, *Shkanda* 'deacon', chosen at the age of 19 after 12 years' training; *Tarmida* 'initiated', a priest ordained by bishop and two other priests, after painful and trying ordeals; *Ganzivra* 'treasurer' chosen from the whole body of *Tarmida* by democratic vote, after which he enjoys absolute power over them. As with the Druzes, women are also admitted to priestly rank. *Baptism* is the most important rite, repeated on many occasions by total immersion; also a parody of the Eucharist, bread and wine being received, as having unfailing efficacy:[2] it is forbidden to touch the 'Host' with the finger. The 'churches' are built only for the clergy, and are small and bare: the people remain in the forecourt: there is no altar. At a dedication of the small sanctuary a dove, Ishtar's sacred bird, is sacrificed.

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[1] If there is any value in this date, it is curious to remember that exactly at that time Emperor Aurelian (274 A.D.) conquered Palmyra, if we reckon from our Lord's death; did refugees pass eastwards?

[2] Hence the *magical* powers of sacramental bread among the western Cathars.

Besides certain festivals there are fast days in which no living thing may be killed and no flesh meat eaten; otherwise fasting (with celibacy) is strictly forbidden owing to the intense abhorrence felt for any vestige of jewish or Christian practice; chiefly do the mandeans hate the monastic and anchorite life of the latter. The *Sidra Rabba* lays emphasis on the duty of parentage, and marriage is a matter of obligation; yet in spite of this encouragement, the community has dwindled to 1200 persons from the flourishing state in which the earliest missioners found it.[1]

The Basis of the Mandean Religion.—This last surviving phase of dualism was reared and grew in its present home: Babylonia is its cradle and will be its grave. The sect did not come from Palestine, nor does it show any trace of jewish or Christian sympathies. It does not spring from the disciples of John the Baptist, who is only introduced adventitiously. In this again it is easy to recognize the ancient faith of Babylon. It holds a place apart from all the great creeds, and is clearly *gnostical*, of the *intransigeant* and anti-Christian type otherwise known as Ophite or Naassene. The ophite-babylonian nucleus is however overlaid by the clearest process of syncretizing from *talmudic* Judaism, *syriac* Christianity and *parsi* Dualism. They appropriate, to pour scorn upon, the whole drama and *personnel* of biblical history: *Abel* indeed is their chief hero. The *Peratæ* (whose name according to one account is derived from *πέραν* on further side) have the same oddly perverse views on Pharaoh and the Red Sea; as the Sethians gave all eminence to Seth, Cainites to Cain, so do the Mandeans to Abel. The old babylonian planet-gods (no less than jewish worthies and Christian saints) are degraded into demons. It is clear that Ophites, Perates, and Manichees as well, have their common origin in Mesopotamia. The old triad of Anu, Bel, Ea finds its counterpart in *Pira*, *Ayar*, and *Mana Rabba*,—the wife of the latter is Ea's female consort Damkina (or Δαύκη in Damascius the platonist). Hibil stands in place of Marduk, mediator and redeemer in the older religion, who descended to fight Tiamat as Hibil strove with Hell and Darkness; Tiamat also half swallows Marduk. Ishtar's descent supplies other features and a dove, as we saw, is the *kirk-grim* of a dedicated 'church' (Cf. Siouffi's *Études sur la Religion des Soubbas* Paris 1880). The basis of all this gnostic cosmosophy lay in a convinced oriental *dualism*: in sharp contrast and conflict are two worlds of good and evil, light and darkness. In many systems there is no pretence of deriving one from the other; Basilides (in one account at least), Satornil and Bardaisan were frank dualists. The system now considered stands, together with its later development manicheism, on a *dualistic* basis. In parsi or zoroastrian theory, the good and evil powers are at war within the material world and the region beneath the moon is by no means under the sole influence of evil.[2] It seems likely

[1] There were 20,000 households (it is said) in cent. xvii, when the mission began with Ignatius and Angelus: the former published his latin work at Rome in 1652: cf. Pietro della Valle (Geneva 1674), Thévenot (Paris, 1664).

[2] Greeks, like Hindus, saw in bodily existence the source of all evil,

that later babylonian worship centred upon the seven planetary deities (so in the *Pistis-Sophia*). But how are these once holy beings—regarded (in Mandean and other creeds) as evil and hostile ? Bousset of Göttingen (as we have seen) suggests the answer : another faith has entered the lists and overcome without extirpating its rival ; the earlier stellar powers are degraded into demons or servitors. This new faith is not the Gospel ; gnosticism is older than Christianity.

A System of Parsi Gnosticism.—Nor does hebrew monotheism account for this change ; nowhere is Judaism treated with even common courtesy. There is but one religion left, the zoroastrian or persian. Already under Alexander this was the chief religion in the great plain of Babylon (Cumont, *Textes* etc. *de Mithra* i, 5, 8, 14, 223, 233). Its chief tenet, as we know, is a belief in a deity of light, *Ahura-mazda*, either confronted and opposed, or else grudgingly obeyed, by the powers of darkness, but loyally served by his own angelic band. Now most ancient religions are syncretist, that is, do not expel other gods with hatred and violence but degrade those of a conquered race or lower culture into servitors or deputies. The visible gods are half demonic beings, infinitely far from the supreme God. When hellenic thought came into vogue with its scornful survey of this lower world, the seven demonic powers become world-creators of a universe, infinitely remote from the divine realm. Greek and persian dualism meet in gnostical theories ; and the iranian religion is the chief factor. In the *Bundahish* iii 25 we learn that (as in the Mandean creed) seven hostile powers were captured and set as lights in the firmament, where the *good* star-powers kept them from doing mischief. It is the one principal aim of every devout gnostic to find his way past the lower planetary spheres into the kingdom of his true sovereign. The female principle prominent in gnostic systems is not iranian, but belongs to ' great mother ' worship (Astarte, Atergatis, Beltis, Cybele, Aphrodite, Lucian's syrian goddess) : Sophia is represented as the *Mother* of the Hebdomad. Prostitution (as a means of rescuing the light-particles) becomes a sacred duty and a religious rite : before, it had been a piece of sympathetic magic, or a personal surrender of what is held most dear in honour of the goddess. Or again, the mother inflames the Archons so as to steal from them their share of light. The mother standing in close and intimate relation with her young boy-lover and son, Tammuz, Adonis, Attis (the spring) finds a parallel in Sophia's connexion with Soter in some systems, and in the Mandean marriage of Ur the devil with his mother Namrus, janitress of the vestibules of Hell.[1]

Gnostical Character of chief Mandean Concepts.—Another feature common to almost all gnostic sects is Primitive or Archetypal Man. In the Naassene system (with which our Mandeans are closely connected) the

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and therefore the true hellenizing gnostics are thorough-going pessimists and, where not *indifferent* in morals, tend to become convinced *ascetics* and *renunciants*.

[1] The magian ' sacred marriage ' (ἱερὸς γάμος) between mother and son has not yet been disproved.

dogma has a central place. Both in the *Clementines* (*Hom.* iii. 20 (Dressel) and xviii 14 ; *Recogn.* i, 16, 32, 45, 52 : ii 47) and in the *Ebionite* sect (Epiph. xxx 3–16 and liii, 1) we have the mysterious figure of the Man who was before the world, the Eternal Prophet who takes various forms as the ages roll on, and is at length fully revealed in Christ. Salvation for the gnostics (rarely a *historical* process) is figured as the Return of Primal Man to his first home : he sank into matter and can only be released by degrees, either by his own efforts or the compassion of the Light-World. This figure forms a male counterpart to the feminine principle Sophia or *Achamoth* who like Psyche is only permitted after long wandering and distress to rejoin her heavenly spouse. It cannot be denied that this notion has penetrated into the christian mind and given an impulse to an erotic religiosity sometimes discovered in orthodox mystics.[1] Bousset (following Reitzenstein on *Pœmandres*) suggests that the Naassenes drew on a purely pagan source, the cult of Attis, the power which dies and rises again in the year and courses through all physical nature. In our Mandean system *Manda d'hayye* (' knowledge of life ') corresponds to the Primal Man, who (as Baur shows) regains among the Manichees once more a predominant place. Now in old persian myths the world-development does not begin until Ahriman has evilly slain Gayomart the Primal Man. But the connexion is not altogether clear between the descent of Primal Man into Hell and the sungod, who also descends ' into the lower parts of the earth ' to rise again in triumph. Another myth of chaldean origin (Hippol. *Philos.* v 7), as the Naassenes expressly stated, is the belief in the demonic creation of man's body, afterwards vivified in pity by the Supreme God : this is held by Satornil and Valentine, the Mandeans (as we have just seen) and their followers, the Manichees.

(ii) The Sabians—Genuine and Pseudonymous

Name acts as Disguise for the Astrology of Harran.—The *Sabians* or baptists (first named in the Coran 2, 5, 22) were by no means identical with the purely gnostical and dualist Mandeans but were a jewish-Christian sect of Babylonia, to whom the name *elkesaite* is sometimes applied. Mahomet names them as people having a written religion and classes them with Jews and Christians. From them he may well have borrowed (in his syncretic unitarianism) the practice of frequent ablutions, which made his aristocratic and pagan foes at Mecca call him *Sabian*. From these true Sabians we must carefully distinguish the Harranians, who took the name in *830* under Caliph Mamun, because it was a *religio licita* in the Coran ; under this vague title they could maintain their ancient belief and practice in the very heart of the muslim world. Harran, a day's journey south of Edessa, was a great centre of pagan and hellenistic culture since the days of Alexan-

[1] For Primal Man in pagan thought, cf. Zosimus *Poimandres* and Plotin's famous refutation of the (dualistic) gnostics ii. 9 :—the *Poimandres*, translated by Ménard among *asclepian* writings is a different version, and has much in common with the *Clementines*—embodied spirits, king-worship, seven spheres, etc.

der. It was the birthplace of Abraham,[1] a cross-road centre from Damascus to Nineveh and Carchemish, a strategic position under the first empire of Assur (*1100* B.C.) a great commercial city, and the home of Sin the Moon-god (and also of Nusku). Herodianus the historian writing *c. 240* A.D. speaks of its lunar temple as still sacred and well attended. Here Crassus was killed *53* B.C.: here 270 years later was murdered Antoninus, son of Severus, called 'Caracalla'. It did not lose its importance even under arab ascendancy; but had fallen into decay by the time of Abufeda.

Harranian Syncretism and Culture under Caliphs.—Its people were like the Druzes and Nosairis, syrian heathens, worshippers of Nature and the stars, addicted to magic and astrology. The (evil) planetary powers were appeased by offerings of blood: the Druzes' hilltops saw animals sacrificed: even human victims were from time to time offered at Harran, as late (it is said) as cent. ix of our era. Again like the Druzes, the more enlightened part held aloof from the popular rites and put together a syncretic system with Christian and neoplatonic elements. Their scholars and men of science handed on to the muslim in the abbasid age or under the liberal caliphate, the beliefs of Babylon and the culture of Greece: their favour at the caliph's court secured tolerance for the other (and truer) Sabians. Chwolsohn's volume on *Ssabismus* 1856 is still the best guide; but Dozy and de Goeje have now published new matter for the Harranian religion (in the *Acts of the Sixth Oriental Congress*, Leiden 1885). Of the *pagan* literature of Harran no vestige remains; we know that the city was a centre of stubborn resistance not only to Christian but also to muslim influence. Barhebraeus quotes the words of a native, Thabit ibn Kurra, speaking thus of this steadfast resistance; 'whilst many were subdued to error through 'persecution, our fathers under God's grace were firm and stood out man-'fully; *this blessed city has never been defiled by the error of Nazareth*'. Of Thabit's *syriac* works (most being still extant cent. xiii) all are lost: of the 150 *arabic* treatises some few survive, see Brockelmann's history. It seems clear that the Sabians, offshoot of the stock of old Babylon, worshipped chiefly the seven planets.

(iii) The Mandeans (Brandt's Latest Account).

The belated appearance of Hastings' *Enc. Rel. Eth.* vol. 8 (April 1916) has made it impossible to embody *Brandt's Latest Pronouncement* in the text: but some points in this learned and difficult article may be briefly noticed here (cf. also his *Elkasai* Leipzig 1912). This semitic people seem to have dwelt formerly much further north, nearer the sources of the great rivers, beyond which could be seen 'huge mountains towering to the sky' (§ 20): driven southwards to lead a wretched life in the low plains, they tried by frequent immersion to appropriate the virtues flowing with the streams from the holy north where was the kingdom of Light. However fanciful and inconsistent their theology, the aim of their religion is purely practical: to justify the ways of Providence to the pious, to explain their distressful lot in this world, and provide them with assurance of a blissful hereafter.

[1] The home of Laban in the story of Jacob is not here but in the Lebanon district of Hauran.

(Their creed then is one of deliverance, redemption (*moksa*), and it is hard to agree with Brandt in excluding *dualism* ' a thing quite unknown in the M. documents ' § 38.) Their faith, passing through various stages and incorporating divers foreign elements, is utterly lacking in any consistent unity: it is indeed a congeries of unreconciled strata. The earliest of these is certainly quite free from jewish or Christian influence. In *Genza* (or *Sidra Rabba*) we can trace *polytheistic* beliefs, only later coordinated under a ' light ' monotheism (parsi) and somehow attached to the planet-worship or detestation whence springs the pre-christian *gnosis* (chaldean). There is ' great fruit ', an impersonal reservoir or substance of deity whence the several deities emanate; only late there appear ' Great Mana of Glory ' as a personal divine being. Besides this we have ' ether ' (a primitive being or an emanation) ' first life '; and ' hidden first drop '—all very early powers issuing from a mysterious first ground or conceived as existing together in their own right. To this same class belongs ' Jordan ', as the heavenly stream of lustrous water, encircling the realm of ' ether ' (*ayar* which Brandt derives from greek ἀήρ). These beings seem at first to enjoy no regular precedence: later text represents Wisdom asking to be enlightened as to the grades of this hierarchy (cf. Brandt's *Mand. Schrift* 202 Göttingen 1893). Life expands or emanates (in true gnostic fashion) into more concrete and less perfect forms: so ' life ' calls ' second life ' into being by a ' request to itself '. This builds its own world and its spirits think of creating yet a third realm, our earth, whose inmates should only worship them. Great Mana then calls into being *Manda d'hayye* to make known the first kingdom and provide for its recognition and worship by men. This *Archaic Polytheism* has now given place to the single worship of ' life ', in the character of the parsi light-god, reigning beyond the region of the (babylonian) planet-gods. They have therefore become *monotheists* instead of gnostic *polytheists*. The creative spirits of the second world neither merit nor receive respect; Ptahil and the evil spirits complete the creation of earth and attempt that of man (how can B. deny a *dualistic* element?). This demiurge sometimes (1) emerges from the black water or realm of darkness, (2) acts by permission of ' life ' and oversteps his limited mandate, (3) acts in creation as colleague of evil beings, (4) boldly defies them and makes a good world into which only later evil enters by their guile. Man's true soul is brought down by Manda (in compassion) into the Frankenstein monster which Ptahil could alone produce. Hence, like the orphists, the Mandean soul in its hymns ' asserts its heritage ' in the world of light ' I am a *mana* ' (vessel or instrument, cf. S. Paul's σκεῦος ἐκλογῆς) ' of the great life '. Thus was the design of the spirits defeated; man was from the first enlightened in Adam as to the worship of the true god and the soul's destiny. The spirits now disappear and evil beings seem to take their place, introducing evils into our world, mingling them with Ptahil's good creation. These evil beings are the Seven Planets, sons of *Ruha*, and the twelve zodiac signs—whom She bore to the devil *Ur*, laid under bonds in the nether world before ever the earth could be created. These two names are not *mandean* but *hebrew*; the gnostic adapter of the story in Genesis could not use the narrative

fully since knowledge of the true god was imparted to the protoplasts at the very outset. While the Mandeans claim to possess the true faith, other religions were invented by the evil planetary spirits; Judaism by *Sames* (Shamash) the Sun, 'whom some call Adonai; Islam by *nirig* (Nergal) or the planet Mars who is called the arab 'abdala' (Mahomet). The Christian Messiah is without doubt regarded as an impostor and his disciples as liars, accusing each other of error and deceit. He is described as leader of the evil spirits who induce mankind to give up the true faith. Enos (Enoch) comes forth again to withstand this deceiving prophet who works false miracles; he carries away 365 pious disciples to the light-world and in the form of a white eagle destroys Jerusalem. Enos (like Buddha in the *Mahayana*) sends on earth semblances of himself made out of a cloud—an idea no doubt derived from passages in O. and N.T. (e.g. Daniel vii, 13, Matth. xvii, 5, 26, 64). But our Lord belongs (in their perverting syncretism) to the ranks of evil as *Isu Msiha*, and *Ruha* (Holy Spirit) is already familiar as the mother of evil, parent and consort of *Ur* the devil. He is the impostor who tries to usurp the rôle of Manda and Enos. Where the chaldean star-element survives, He is identified with planet Mercury, as Jehovah with Sun and Ruha with Venus. In the baptism of Christ in Jordan, John is at first unwilling to perform the rite, until he receives a written mandate 'Yahya, baptize the Liar in Jordan'. Yet in two tractates of the *Genza*, Christ is actually identified with the holy Manda d'hayye from the light-realm, appearing in Judea in company with Johanna, to republish the true doctrine and select the true believers!

Brandt believes that the *Parsi Monotheism* was adopted in place of a very archaic and naturalistic *gnosis c. 300–500* A.D. by the leaders of the sect. The 'source of all good and creator of all forms' dwells in the lofty north, and round him stand kings or angels who tasting of the milk-white heavenly Jordan do not know death. In the black waters below his counterpart abides, the devil (of the manichees) with serpent's body, eagle's wings and lion's head. Once with his demons he projected an attack (? in the tower of Babel) on the lord of light; but, coming to the confines of the two worlds, found no way of access. The Creator now is Gabriel, obeying the commands of the light-god. This conception is certainly parsi or even (with Brandt) jewish-christian. The distinctively mandean belief remains to the end a blend of early *gnosis* (with its chaldean basis) and the doctrine of the light-world and salvation to be therein attained. The priests of this obscure and isolated sect advanced, in the 200 years of their literary activity, from wondering and bewildered students of foreign treatises to redactors, editors and adjusters; lastly they girded themselves, very imperfectly equipped, to the task of independent composition. The *Main Features of their Creed* are often eclipsed or confused in this method; but they may be stated as follows. Above the heaven of the planets is a world of light and happiness, where dwell various heavenly beings (polytheism) or the king of light with his hosts of angels (parsi monotheism). Hence comes man's soul or spiritual essence—at least within the mandean community. Beneath is the realm of gloom and watery chaos, part being solidified to form an abode for man by different agencies (who cannot by

any means be reconciled in a consistent system). On the south of our world is the ' black water ', to the north ' the city of the Great King ' or light-realm : the faithful maintain their connexion or citizenship by bathing in the streams which flow from this region. The devout dwell here as in a foreign land, as ' pilgrims and sojourners '. Evil spirits reign over this region (as in scottish theology) in sympathy with the powers of hell once put in bondage ; they are the deities of other religions and take delight in afflicting the faithful Mandeans. With ' earnest looking forward ' the believer awaits the hour of release—from an alien world, not from sin. At death an angelic ' liberator ' descends (perhaps the *fravashi* of the parsis) to separate soul from body and bear it upwards through the heavenly spheres to the abode of light where Life reigns. To this *Happy Deliverance* the survivors contribute in the rite *massekta* ' ascension '—a solemn recitation of hymns aiding the Soul in its upward flight, past the demonic terrors or snares which are so familiar to us in ancient Egypt and later *gnosis*. Each station (or planet-sphere) is the dungeon of believers in a false religion—*matra* or prisonhouse where they are kept in ward. These correspond to the mitraic ' gates ' placed one above the other in tiers, of which Origen makes mention (*c. Cels.* vi 22). The devout soul passes through all without molestation, because they can give the magic token or ' sign ' that they have received from the holy waters of earthly Jordan. It is to be remarked, however, that the *Genza* hymns lay stress rather on the efficacy of good works and moral conduct during life on earth : ' I ' loved the life and Manda d'Hayye dwelt in my heart '. These hymns are carefully modelled upon parsi litanies, although the peculiar creed of the Mandeans is apparent. ' How I rejoice ' says the Soul ' on the day ' when my conflict is dissolved and I go to the region of the Life. At the ' ward of the Sun (*sames*) I arrive and utter a call : who will take me past ' this ward ? Thy merit, thy works and almsgiving take thee past the ' ward of Sames '. The conflict is the *Effort to Release Soul from Entanglement* in the body as with Essenes and Manichees. Heaven is thus depicted, the true home of the soul : ' I arrived at the waterbrooks, the radiant ' beam came forth to meet me ; he took me by my right hand. The holy ' ones brought their splendour and clothed me with it as with a garment. ' Life reclined upon life and found its own life '. How closely this resembles the attitude of egyptian eschatologists, how nearly akin it is to the revival of archaic chaldean and parsi beliefs in *gnosis*, need not here be further insisted upon.

NOTE : Brandt (*Elkasai* 1912) has noted the resemblances of Mandean and manichee doctrine : if this obscure, distressed and ignorant sect produced the parent of Mani, it is certain that in return Mani's own writings and doctrine impressed the Mandeans. Their *Genza* is certainly an imitation of the *Kanz-al-Ihya* or treasure of lifegiving ascribed to Mani and called *θησαυρὸς ζώης* by Epiphanius and in the *Abjuration Formula*. Titus of Bostra names it in his work against the Manichees (iii § 9, ed. Lag. Berlin 1859).

APPENDIX K

Further Remarks on the System of Mani

Mani: Life and Writings.—Mani combined magianism with a peculiar form of *gnostic* Christianity. He was born of good persian stock about *215–6* A.D. in Ecbatana, his father (afterwards a *baptist*) being Patak.[1] It thus appears that Mani was brought into contact with those gnostical sects which we know as Elkesaites and Mandeans: with any pure form of catholic doctrine he does not seem to be familiar. His father Patak was a restless syncretizer. His son kept silence for 25 years and then propounded his theory before Sapor I of Persia, on the somewhat unsuitable day of the royal enthronement. Then he travelled widely, chiefly into western China, northern India and all the lands beyond the Oxus: at a later date the manichean pope lived at Samarcand. He announced himself (like Mahomet) as the last and truest prophet, his evangel as the ultimate revelation. Allowing to other religions only a relative value, he preached the absolute, perfect and final form of faith. Sapor's heir Hormisdas V was inclined to favour him; but Sassanid royalty was the puppet of the hostile magian hierarchy. Mani suffered martyrdom under Bahram or Varanes I in *276*. His chief works, written in *syriac* (six) and *persian* (one), comprise a list with titles very similar to the divisions of the jewish Zohar (just 1000 years later): (a) the *Book of Secrets* or discussion on the followers of Marcion and Bardaisan and their view of the Bible; (b) *Book of the Giants* (or Demons); (c) *Book of Precepts for Hearers*, the most widely known of all, with summary of chief dogmata; (d) *Shahpurakam* or address to King Sapor, no doubt a later recasting of the inopportune eschatology addressed to the sovereign in *241*; (e) the *Book of Quickening*, the 'Thesaurus' of *Acta Archelai*; (f) Πραγματεία, contents unknown; (g) the sole writing of importance in persian—the 'Holy Gospel' which he wrote in opposition to the New Testament.

A System of Physical Redemption: Present World a Refining House.—Manicheism is a religion of *physical redemption*. Light and darkness, matter and spirit [2], good and evil, are the same pairs under different names. The kingdom of light has a *personal* ruler—God: but the *impersonal* realm of darkness produces Satan and his angels. It might even be said that this

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[1] So muslim tradition; possibly more worthy of credence than *Acta Archelai et Manetis*, from which Kessler opines that he was a semite—Shuravik or in latin Cubricus—and took his faith from *semitic* and *chaldean* rather than *parsi* sources.

[2] This antithesis is not quite exact and needs a certain qualification: pure platonic dualism is foreign to Mani; some elements even of earthly texture are good, as the *west-wind*, the *cooling* (northerly ?) *breeze*, *light*, *fire*, and *clear water*. The five evil elements are *mist*, *heat*, *burning wind* (Sirocco), *darkness*, *vapour*. Nor is this world-structure wholly evil or the work of evil demons or very inferior angels; *it is the beginning of deliverance*.

kingdom of evil is a *feminine* personification of the Lie : thus the two stand opposed, as in the primitive transition from Nature-worship and the matriarchate to a moral and masculine cult. Long unaware of each other the two began to mingle ; and Satan made an inroad upon light ; and *God with his consort begat Primal Man* (here again a prominent figure in the myth) *to be His champion*. But Primal Man was overcome (as in the case of Adam). God Himself took the field, vanquished evil and set the captive free ; but the divine rays were enmeshed in the darkness and the light was confused with the five evil elements. Primal Man could descend into the abyss and strike at the roots of evil, so as to hinder further increase (as Cybele castrates Attis in Emperor Julian's Discourse) ; but he cannot rescue the particles of light already entangled. These imprisoned elements have to be released and for this purpose the *present world is created and formed to be a means of deliverance*. Sun and moon are almost pure of evil elements and are reservoirs in which the rescued particles can be stored up safely. In the sun dwells Primal Man himself (quite probably identical with Mitra or Mihr) ; in the moon is the Mother of Life ; here we have a *female* element conceived in a good sense. The twelve signs of the Zodiac, like dredging-buckets on a revolving wheel, are constantly raising rescued light-particles into sun and moon. Here, purified (as in Plutarch's idea of a lunar purgatory), they finally reach their first and true home.

World Fabric Divine, but Man Demonic : The Series of Prophets.—While this world-fabric is a creature of the Good, man himself (as in gnostic systems) is a formation of the Evil Power. The first earthly man Adam was engendered by Satan who placed in him all the stolen particles he could amass, so that he might altogether control them : already man then is a ' house divided against itself '. But from the first the Light-Spirits took the protoplasts under their care. Cain and Abel were born to Satan by Eve ; only Seth is Adam's genuine offspring : Eve has very little of the light element and females are throughout inferior to man in this respect (as in Gautama's cognate system). Demons seek to bind men to them by false religion, *of which the Mosaic is the worst* ; meantime the angels are carrying on their beneficent process of distillation. Deliverance (the indian *moksa*) is gained through *knowledge* ; and preachers and prophets are sent to impart it. Adam, Noah, Abraham (? Zoroaster and Buddha also) were true envoys from the light-world ; also the phantom Christ Who made use of the diabolical Messiah of the Jews (for which historical figure Mani had no feeling but abhorrence).[1] Mani, last and greatest of the series, takes up the work of this heavenly Christ and of Paul (who is also admitted to a place of honour) : he is ' leader ', ' ambassador ' and ' Paraclete '. When all the light particles are released from their imprisonment (as far as possible) the consummation of all things is at hand. God Himself appears with His retinue of angels and of ' just men made perfect '. The good Angels who play the part of Atlas to this present universe withdraw their support, and it falls into ruins and flame. Henceforward, the realms of light and darkness are once more quite separate and distinct.

[1] Some believed this phantom to be Primal Man himself.

Dualism in a very Modified Form : Yet a Cultus of Ascetics.—As against the pure *negative* quietism of earlier dualists, Mani has much *positive* and energetic teaching, such as well becomes a pupil of Zoroaster. He stands to the abstentionist or suicidal school as Hartmann to Schopenhauer ; not to *extinguish* life but to *preserve* it is his aim. Man must cherish and strengthen the light-particles. But if the end is not pure buddhic nihilism it is to be won only by the austere ascetic. Wine, meat, marriage are prohibited ; fasting became a regular system. Prayer was used four times a day ; addressed to the God of Light or his whole kingdom, to the glorious Angels, *even to Mani himself*, the great tree which is all ' salvation '. So strict and rigorous was the life of the saint, that a lower standard was allowed to the brethren ' of the outer court '. As in the days of Montanus and the puritan rigorists, the society had to decide between *catholicity*, in which wheat and tares grew together, and the narrow exclusiveness of a small perfect group. Thus there were lay-brethren (*auditors*), like franciscan tertiaries, who could not live up to the standard of the *elect* or *perfect*. With a novel trait[1] the saint was held to be himself a *redeemer* of others, not merely one of the ransomed flock of Christ : hence unbounded veneration was paid to those pale and ascetic solitaries who followed his example. For the ' hearers ' they prayed and interceded ; they blessed their food and condescended to share it ; they alone had knowledge of the mysteries of the faith. This small hierarchy of *elect* included *teachers* or ' sons of meekness ', *governors* or overseers, ' sons of knowledge ', *elders* ' sons of understanding '. St. Austin says that there were 12 of the highest rank of teachers and 72 bishops or overseers. There was even then a Pope (*c. 400*) and we know that the office continued until a much later date in Asia (*Fihrist*). The worship (which, through the influence of the western sectaries, has set the example for all modern nonconformists) was simple, chiefly prayers and hymns and reading of scripture. The chief festival was the *Bema* or *Teacher's Chair*, in memory of Mani's martyrdom in March. Later Manichees imitated baptism and the eucharist ; the charges of abominable mysteries were facile and too prevalent (in the case of any esoteric sect) to merit our serious notice.

His Chief Source—Avesta : some Jewish Names.—The chief affinity of Mani's religion is with the *Avesta*, from which primitive doctrine he believed the magian church of the sassanid epoch to be a deterioration. The untiring Cumont has laboured to show (*Revue d'histoire religieuse*, 1907) that Mani borrows from the Avesta the notion of the Light-maiden collecting the captive particles by exciting the unholy desires of the Angels of Darkness.[2] Az in Avesta is a demon-snake who kills ' primal man ' Gayomart and is an ally of Ahriman. After he is struck down, the pious man is led up to sun and moon and to the very presence of Ahuramazda. Again, Mani

[1] For which Mani was surely indebted to jains and buddhists in India.

[2] But the story also forms the basis of earlier gnostic sects, and the date of this curious mythologeme of Prunikos cannot be determined from the composite magian scripture which was not finally redacted till the sassanid age.

describes himself as ' son of Zarvan ', Time or Destiny (cf. also the mitraic system which is much anterior to Mani). Again, the God Mihir is invoked, the ' compassionate liberator ' of men ; ' Fredon the good ' also finds his counterpart in *Feridoun* the slayer of Azi Dahaka. The (true) Jesus is identified with Ormazd's Good Thought, *Voho mano* : *Naresaf* and *Zrosch* the mighty ' redeemer of souls ' are both known in the Avesta, where Sraosha protects the world at night from demons. Mitra (in fragment 38 from Turfan) is invoked as ' great messenger of the gods, interpreter ' of the faith, and of the Elect One Jesus . . . Mar Mani, Jesu, Virgin of ' Light ! Do thou make peace in me O Light-bringer ! Mayest thou ' redeem my soul from this death in life '.[1] Of the mazdean basis of Mani's speculation there is no concealment (fragm. 543). ' Thou new ' teacher of Khorasan, ladder of the faith of Mazda, promoter of all those ' that have the true creed ! : thou wast born under a glittering star in the ' family of Rulers. Elect are these, Jesus and *Vahman* ' (= ἀγαθὴ ἔννοια as above). Judaic (or babylonish ?) ' names of angels ' are also adopted (fr. 4). After a prayer that *Zarvan* may have new victories over the Angels and Glories (? demons) comes an ascription to the ' Strong ones ' *Raphael*, *Michael*, *Gabriel* and *Sarael* . . . ' who shall set us free from the evil ' Ahriman '.[2]

A Reaction of a Moral Dualism against a Pantheizing Monism.—It seems quite clear that Mani believed himself a restorer of the ancient (*dualistic*) faith against the feeble compromise of the Zarvanites, who held that the Supreme Sovereign Zarvan created both Ormazd and Ahriman who are thus brothers, both being needed for a world-process which is becoming monistic and peaceful.[3] This reconciliation with Satan Mani called an abominable heresy (fr. 28) : ' They that adore the fire, by this they recog- ' nize that their end shall be in fire : and they say that Ormazd and ' Ahriman are brethren; wherefore for this saying shall they come to annihilation '. It was a breach of the old iranian loyalty to come to terms with the evil things, with ' spiritual wickedness in high places ', with the ' Prince ' of this world '.

Hatred of Jew and Christian Doctrine (later modified in West).—Mani accepts (from the extreme sectaries) such dogmas and phrases of Christian faith as suit his purpose ; he even calls himself ' Mani the apostle of Jesus ' the Friend, in the love of the Father '. He uses also the trinitarian formula : ' Praise and glory be to the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit '. He seems to employ the *Gospel of Peter* : references to the *Shepherd* of Hermas and reminiscences of several syriac hymns argue that these

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[1] = the existence of one born dead.

[2] To these very orthodox angelic figures, Turfan *fr.* 20 adds some strange beings from a necromantic *grimoire* :—the Lord Bar Simus, Qaftinus the mighty, and Nastikus—who may be a relation of the mandean Devil : of this motley group Jacob is said to be ' mighty angel and captain '.

[3] We have the same modified dualism in Lactantius' interpolator and something very much like it in the author himself; also in the *Clementines* ; cf. my ' Subordinate Dualism,' *Studia Biblica* Series iv. Clarendon Press.

Manichees of Chinese Turkestan had got Christian letters from their master.[1] No doubt Mani rejected Judaism and Catholicism with equal bitterness; both were religions of the Devil. But a good spirit made use of the Jewish Messiah, and he thought that heretical sects (like those of Elkesai and Bardaisan) had the truth. There were two Christs: one side or factor in this divided figure belonged to either world. But this pure dualism of magian doctrine and discipline only lasted in the east. In the west it altered its whole tone and adopted much from its hated rival, the Catholic Church: in cent. iv–v (*330–500*) it became far more like the Gospel. It drew proselytes from the discontented and decaying sects, and built its appeal upon the same ultra-refinement that tended rather to platonism than towards Christian dogma. It abolished the Old Testament and denied a really divine incarnation and so pleased the *intelligenzia*. While Manicheism remained pure in Syria, that seed-plot and hot-house of sects, it was thoroughly corrupted past recognition by Christian influence in the west. In northern Africa, the clergy were secret converts; St. Austin[2] remained in the 'outer circle' as an *auditor* for nearly ten years; and Faustus was a learned and fashionable preacher of this simple Theodicy and Gospel of Release. Thus for many centuries it was a world-religion; a standing menace in the west not only to *papacy* but to *catholicism*, until the albigensian heresy (its latest form) was stamped out with cruel necessity.[4] It won the sterner minds by a simple and rational worship and a moral theory of the universe which makes God the author of good only and revolts from a wholly unethical absolutism. It supplied the urgent needs of a revealed message, a system of redemption, an emphasis on moral virtue and courage, an assurance of a personal hereafter in the complete triumph of the right. Meantime it adroitly catered for a variety of characters; the seven ranks attracted men of very different calibre, and to the intellectual was promised (as never in the roman church) that he need not submit his reason to Authority. In some ways it has the directness of Islam; Mani is God's prophet and there is no redeemer to worship: there is only a 'physical process of redemption' (Harnack) within the compass of any man of virtuous life, which relieves God of all moral responsibility. The doctrine gives a simple solution to the problem of Evil and for the average mind answers perhaps better than any other hypothesis (except Buddhism) the actual experiences of life.[3]

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[1] All above 'fragments' are cited from Grünwedel and Huth's discoveries in Turfan, in part translated by F. W. Müller, Berlin 1904.

[2] Bousset: 'Though desperately combating the *dualism* of Mani, he 'yet introduced into western thought a number of dualist ideas only 'distinguished from Manicheism by a very keen eye and then with great 'difficulty'.

[3] Kessler (*Mani* Berlin vol ii, 1903) lays too much stress on *chaldean* elements which are really less apparent in this school than in any other gnostic sect (but cf. Aphraates' view on p. 617).

[4] A 'happy victory of the Catholic Church, it has been called: the sectarian faith was a 'sacramentalism (magic) degenerating into wild

The careful and erudite article of Bevan in *Enc. Rel. Eth.* (April 1916) gives an excellent account of *Mani and his School.* He disparages the *Acta Archelai*, notes the paucity of real knowledge in *parsi* and other texts, the utter want of sympathy in the *greek* Christians who attacked the sect ; and is tempted to pin his faith to St. Austin's somewhat vague accounts. But he doubts if even the learned Faustus had complete acquaintance with the true doctrine or with the original texts. The muslim historians alone give a calm and impartial account e.g. ibn *Wadih* in his ' World-history ' (+*c. 891* A.D.), ibn *Ishak*, a century later, in the *Fihrist* or ' Catalogue ', *Al-Biruni* (+ *1048*) in his ' Chronology ', *Shahrastani* (+ *1153*) in his great work on sects and schools : these last two were of *persian* race.

It is clear that *Mani is not a Rationalist*, any more than the gnostics : it is no longer fashionable to call these the first Christian philosophers of religion, anticipators of the scholastics, harmonists of faith and reason. He claimed a special revelation, a mysterious and esoteric knowledge of the constitution of the world : the visible universe, not a creation of the evil powers, is a vast and complex mechanism devised by God to enable the light-elements to effect their escape. Mani recognizes three authorized teachers besides himself, Zoroaster, Buddha (of whose genuine tenets he knew little) and our Lord. He himself was the Paraclete announced by Christ ; yet it does not appear that he laid claim to divinity. He places earlier prophets on the same *human* level as Christ ; therefore in Austin and Titus of Bostra we wonder at the *docetic* doctrine, confidently imputed to Mani ; still more to the violent hatred shown in *Fihrist* where he is said to call Jesus a devil (*Shaitan*) ! One of the earliest notices of Mani (by the syriac Aphraates *c. 425* A.D.) identifies the sect with a chaldean revival : ' Children ' of darkness, dwelling in gloom like snakes and practising chaldean rites ' (astrology), the doctrine of Babel ', (in *Homily* 3 ed. Parisot, Paris 1894).

The practical teaching of Mani is the *Duty of Separating the Light-Particles* from the lower realm wherein they are entangled. Evil and gloom, producing powers or beings capable of will and thought, wrest these from the upper kingdom : the notion (in Shahrastani) that the mingling of light and darkness took place ' blindly and by accident ' is certainly a later theory. In this redemptive work all men, in their several measures, ought to take a share : the highest rank, the elect, lived a life of the greatest value for furthering this process. As in the Mandeans, there is no conception of sin or the need of divine forgiveness : evil is something purely material, though matter is by no means identical with evil (note 612).

Bevan, holding Mani in his *Boldness and Originality* to be a genius ' of the first order ', deprecates the view that his system is a mere patchwork of archaic creeds : ' the fundamental principles are neither zoroastrian nor ' buddhist nor babylonian '—even the affinity to Christian belief is closer, though it would be absurd to call the school a Christian heresy. The link with the Gospel he finds in the syro-Christian Bardaisan. That he aimed chiefly at restating a now corrupted *parsism* is undoubted. Towards the

' superstition and a weak dualism wavering between ascetic and libertinism.'

worldly Jews he entertained the same hatred as is shown in Schopenhauer; world-enjoyment must give place wholly to world-surrender. He detested Moses, largely perhaps because of his sanction of animal sacrifice. The ascetic element in primitive Christians was far more to his taste than any dogma of Christology. His belief that mankind have a satanic, and not a divine origin, marked him off from the orthodox, and his peculiar physical basis made his real theory almost unintelligible to the hellenizing eastern church.

Bevan does not care to apply the term *manichean* to the western heretics of our period, and seems to disapprove strongly when a modern russian sect, molokanye, is termed a 'modified form' of Manicheism. We do not question that dualism and the doctrine of deliverance or *moksa* (cf. Oldenberg *Buddha* edit. 3 Berlin 1897) spring up independently all over the world: but the affiliation of 'paulians', bogomils, and albigenses to the sect of Mani seems quite undeniable, and the russian sectaries are direct descendants of the balkan heretics. But the chief scene of their triumphs was central Asia, where the Taghazghaz community with their prince accepted their tenets as the established religion (*c. 850–950* A.D.). We can only surmise how far this doctrine affected or coalesced with buddhism, and helped to transmute the religion of Tibet: it may however be safely asserted that either in imitation or hostility, the austere and bigoted muslim of Turkestan learnt much from the manichee sectaries. The mongol invasion of cent. xiii swept away the remains of a once flourishing 'church'.

NOTE: the remains lately found in central Asia are of great interest and difficulty: they are treated by F. W. Müller in various articles republished in Berlin 1913, by von le Coq in similar articles bearing date 1908, 9, 11, by Salemann in the same printed at Petrograd 1904, 8, 12, by Chavannes 'a manichee treatise found in China' Paris 1911 and 1912 in *Journal Asiatique*. It is clear that Bevan regards Kessler (the authority, as he believes, for Harnack's and Conybeare's articles, *Enc. Brit.*) with great suspicion as a fantastic theorist equipped with poor linguistic knowledge. He has great confidence in the *Recherches sur le Manichéisme* of Cumont and Kugener (Brussels 1908–1912). It is in Salemann's *Manichee Studies*, Petrograd 1908 that we have *Mitra* or Mithra, invoked by the sectarian writer (of a Turfan fragment) as *boxtar ud xvabar* 'redeemer and benefactor' (cf. also Hoernle's latest work, Clarendon Press, 1916).

ANARCHIC DUALISM: MAZDAK AND BABEK

Mazdak, son of Bambad, a persian of Susiana, was a disciple of Zaradusht and spread his strange views of *Religious Communism* among the people; and on becoming leader of the movement himself, gave a much greater impulse to the doctrines. The part played by Cabades (already mentioned) was dictated by political reasons, and the shah used the revolution against nobles and priests. Even after his restoration the sect intrigued to secure the succession to a son who favoured them: the massacre of the sectaries took place under the orders of Chosroes, the magian nominee and successful candidate (*528* A.D.). This bold measure, carried out several years before Cabad's death, gave his son the title Nushirvan 'he of the

' deathless spirit '. It is certain that the sect was not extirpated by this terrorism and that it continued its secret propaganda, to find vent once more in the communistic revolt of Babek, just 300 years later. Tabari, the arab historian (*838–923* A.D.) says that Mazdak enjoined on the people 'that ' they should possess their estate and families in common, this being an act ' of piety acceptable to God ; the good works which pleased Him lay ' chiefly in such social copartnership ' (ed. de Goeje, Leiden 1879–1901). The sect asserted that ' God placed the means of livelihood in the world ' that His servants might freely share them, but men had wronged each ' other and done injury to the poor. They desired to take from the rich ' to give to their less favoured neighbours ; he who possessed more than a ' due share of riches, women and estate had no better right to these goods ' than any other man. The mob gladly hailed this message and the ' followers of Mazdak would enter a man's house and spoil him of his dwell- ' ing, his women and other property, since he could offer no resistance ' (the same author vol. i 885). It is certain that this violent socialism included in its program the abolition of marriage and private ownership, the equalizing of all ranks and the denial of all civil authority. Chosroes, addressing his nobles and priests at his crowning, speaks of the ruin and havoc wrought among the wealthy by these sectaries. The upper classes bore the brunt of the revolution ; compensation had to be given and the doubtful parentage of the children of common marriages had to be settled. In spite of its rejection of normal morality the movement, like other social reforms in the east, had a religious basis (cf. Nöldeke on *Orient. Sozial.* in *Deutsche Rundschau* 1879 (Feb.). Mazdak was himself an ascetic and forbade the slaughter of animals for food. He believed his dogmas of equality and brotherhood were the revival of true zoroastrian teaching. Firdusi (*Shahnamah*) represents him saying : ' Five things—jealousy, wrath, vengeance, need ' and covetousness—turn a man from right conduct . . . because of these ' five we possess women and riches, which have destroyed the good creed ' of the world. If thou desirest that the good creed be not harmed, women ' and wealth must be in common '. Whatever the excesses of his followers, he appeared to have sincerely believed that the triumph of his communistic anarchy meant the defeat of the evil powers—the task which long ago Zoroaster had set before the nation.

This cannot be said of Babek and his reign in Tabaristan as a successful robber chieftain. His genealogy is peculiar. On Mazdak's death, Hurramah his wife fled to this region south of the Caspian (called also Mazandaran), where Islam had received a very cold welcome. Here she spread his tenets as Hurram-din. In course of time, an oil-seller from Ctesiphon migrated thither and marrying a one-eyed woman became the father of Babek. This lad entered the service of one *hurrami* chieftain at war with another and afterwards married his master's wife. This adroit lady spread the news that Javidan (her late husband) had willed to die in the flesh and transmit his spirit to Babek : all existing rulers were to be slain and the tenets of Mazdak restored. Babek became acknowledged leader and claimed to be God incarnate. He is thus a true representative of the Divine Incarnationism which is the salient feature in Shiism and other

anarchic movements of the muslim east. He held those doctrines of *hulul* (God's assumption of human form), *rijah* (reëmbodiment), *tanasuk* (soul's passage from one body to another), which marked the shiite extremists and certainly came over from Hindustan. He openly expressed the hatred of the arabian creed lurking in the entire movement however cautiously disguised ; and ordered all mosques to be overthrown and every trace of Islam to be removed (Isfandiyar's *Hist. of Tabaristan*, ed. Browne, London 1905). Yet strangely enough he does not seem to have been of pure persian origin : he spoke himself an ' outlandish tongue ' and his father sang songs in *nabatean* dialect. It was currently reported and believed that his followers, the *Babakiyah*, practised the ' extinction of the ' lamp ' at their nightly festivals. Isfaraini (+*1078*, thus more than two centuries later) says that by night they assemble in the mountains and ' agree upon all kinds of depravity with women and fluteplaying . . . ' lamps and fires are put out and each rises up to seize the female who sits ' nearest. . . . They assert that they had a king named Sharvin in the ' days of Ignorance, who was greater than the Prophet ; and in his name ' and to his honour they pay tears and lamentations ', as the Shiites still continue to do to Ali and his sons. The *Gathas* inveigh against these nocturnal assemblies (*Ys.* 32 and 48) as Bartholomæ (on the *Gathas*, Strasburg 1905) and Moulton point out (*Early Zoro.* London 1913). As in the case of the early Christians, it is a vague charge levelled against all secret meetings of a suspected sect.

We may trace certain *Cognate Movements of Anarchic Character* in the west : the Eonites were breton fanatics, disciples of a local nobleman (+ *1148* A.D.) who claimed divinity and was expected to return after death to judge the world ; they were certainly political Communists.— Perfectibilists held, like Buddha, the doctrine of complete redemption *in this life* ; mystical devotion can lead to so intimate a union with God that all base and sinful elements are annihilated. This same belief, starting with the pseudo-Denys, handed down to the Hesychasts, to the western Franciscans, Molinists and Jansenists, has passed on into some phases of english methodism. In this the doctrine wavers curiously between a high ideal of piety and unworldliness and an antinomian theory that Sin is not sin to the elect. Fraticelli, Beghards and Brethren of the Free Spirit certainly concluded that what was wrong in another was not sin for them.— The Familists were charged with very similar views ; they entertained a belief much like that of later buddhists (cf. appendix on *Mahayana*). ' Christ was not a *person* but a *quality* whereof many are partakers : ' to be raised from sin was to be born anew and endued with this same quality. Being sinless they could commit acts which in another would be heinous. William Penn (*Journal of Fox*) said that this wing of the Anabaptists fell into ' gross and enormous practices '. Baxter calls them ' infidels ' ; many doubted if there were any heaven or hell beyond the pleasures and pains of the present life—a tenet we have found among hindus and muslim.— The french branch of Familists in Picardy were styled *Illuminati* and in *1634* combined with the followers of Peter Guérin. They claimed a special revelation as to the proper means whereby to attain Christian

perfection. This perfection resulted in ' deificatio ', the *θέωσις* so often recurring in the greek Fathers. The outcome was antinomian, for ' no act ' was sinful in the case of the deified '. They were exterminated by Louis XIII, or rather by his ministers : the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes may be due in part to the fear of any form of ' protestant ' individualism in religion.—Reiner includes as a waldensian sect a curious branch called Runcari, who believed that as sin is of the heart, no part of the body below the waist can commit sin.—Lastly in our own days, the Perfectionists of Oneida (under the lead of Noyes) believed that (1) all the members of the community were fully reconciled to God, (2) and are so saved from all sin ; (3) man and woman are equal and (4) all goods should be held in common. Besides undoubted licence (approaching to regulated promiscuity), it seems certain that they dispensed, as being already perfect, with any form of religious worship. In England, Prince in 1840 claimed to be a new Messiah or rather a fresh dispensation of the Spirit : he assumed flesh to redeem the *body*, left in its estrangement from God by our Lord, who had suffered to redeem the *soul* of man only. The quite recent revelations of the Agapemone under Smyth-Pigott show how faithfully and with how little originality the ancient features are reproduced to-day.

APPENDIX L

Historic Origins of Christian Pantheism

Hellenizing Tendencies and their Culmination

Negative Theology in the Greek Church : No Social Interests.—All the world over mystical theory and practice are much the same. Almost in every case the latter creates the former; that is, the need of personal religion and a closer communion with the heart of things, reacts upon the current philosophy and interprets anew (but always on the ancient lines) God's relations to His creatures. The practical pietism of the mystic is not here our subject but the speculative creed on which it is made to rest. We have to trace the *concept* of the *Divine Being* in East and West at the close of the patristic period. Our point of departure is the Christian neoplatonism of the false Areopagite who cannot have lived before Proclus and must be referred to the latter part of the fifth century. After the problems of Christology had been (in some degree) settled or compromised, religious interest again turned to theology proper, under the guidance of the alexandrine schools of Philo and Plotinus. The ' ante-Christian con- ' ception of God ' (as Dorner calls it) was revived : He is an inaccessible unity beyond human thought or speech. No revelation, not even the embodiment of the Logos, really discloses Him to men ; He remains always *deus absconditus*, *οἰκῶν εἰς τὸ φῶς ἀπρόσιτον*. In the parallel course of pagan thought during the first four centuries there was a tendency to deny that He ever came into relation at all, either with the world or with men (so long as they continued to be men). Both gnostic and pythagorizing platonist laid great stress upon God's transcendence, and believed that

His essence could not be known except by denying or 'thinking away' all particular determination. The temper of the time did not allow them to turn for consolation to the actual world. Very little interest was taken in social life and politics. Not that men were wholly mystical or abstentionist; or that the pessimistic *gnosis* really practised its world-renouncing tenets. Rather the serious need of reform was but little felt, and an air of finality and achievement hung heavily about the imperial system. This was the more felt since its claims had been canonized by alliance with its only possible rival, the Christian church, under Constantine. The chief interest in the east, whether for the devout or the learned, remained still theology, already falling into its scholastic age. The conflict on the doctrine of man (or *anthropology*) which engrossed the more practical western minds, failed to turn attention to actual problems in daily life or church discipline. Strongly intellectualist, borrowing all its language and ideas from classical philosophers, the greek church elevated the monastic ideal and the 'theoretic life'.

'Recovery of Original Nature': how Conceived.—It is clear that the Church came to consider the chief aim of the Saviour to be the restoration *of an original nature* which man once possessed but forfeited by the Fall. Christ came to enable us to realize our idea, to clear the divine image from its defilement and disguises, to lay bare the primitive essence, which (though inamissible) had become wholly unrecognizable in most men. This essence is divine (*θεουδὴς*), not that man is consubstantial with God (*ὁμοούσιος* is vehemently denied by Clement and Origen) but that man was created in His likeness. Man is the *potentially* divine, and the religious teacher has to remind his convert (in the gnostic formula preserved by Clement) from what high dignity we have been reduced, *τίνες ἐσμὲν, τί γεγόναμεν*. This primitive nature was immortal and man lost this right to deathless life by sin and by the Fall—a theme variously expounded and never reduced to an entirely harmonious doctrine. The aim of the ubiquitous mystic in every age is to recover this affinity with God, to be transformed into this likeness: so to 'simplify' the incoherent parts of his isolated and unreal *individuality* in time (*ἁπλωσις*) that he may become a true *person* and enjoy the undivided and eternal. The methods to be adopted for this spiritual renewal or new birth vary very greatly. We have discussed the claims of vedantine 'autotheism' to acquire this deathless unity, hidden but never lost, by an instantaneous flash of thought: no stages are needed in this process; man pronounces himself to be immediately divine—indeed God Himself. This *immediacy* has been the fruitful parent of the heresies which it is our business to chronicle. Against this over-facile divinity of the soul, two chief protests had been made; by those who demand arduous and consistent effort for reviving the divine likeness by a discipline of will and by exercise of the moral virtues; and by those who (in their humility or their ignorance) reject even this modified 'inwardness' and accept salvation or immortality purely as a gift imparted from without.

In Mysteries and Orphism.—The former school will be found to include the thraco-hellenic Mysteries and the Orphic Sect into whose origins and

primitive teaching this is not the place to inquire. These points may however be taken for granted; there were grades of initiation which disposed of any belief in immediacy of achievement; there were (as in all savage analogues) strict rules of ritual *tabu* which without doubt were expanded into the demand for a high ethical standard; there was a disclosure of symbols (to which mystical import was attached) rather than any set preaching or doctrine; it was taught that the devout participant received a measure of the divine *mana* (created by the group-worship) and in the spirit of the hellenic development actually became united to the (now personal) object of the cultus; a meal, gradually modified from the wild cannibalism of a vegetation-rite into a harmless *agapè*, associated the adept with the god and with his fellow-worshippers. The union was also symbolized by a 'sacred marriage' with the god—a ritual in historic times wholly free (it would seem) from objectionable or suggestive features—although doubtless descended in unbroken lineage from a fertilizing rite, founded on belief in sympathetic magic. This symbolic transfusion of divinity into mortals started the long course of erotic imagery in Christian writers: Christ being represented as the soul's bridegroom, not merely in greek commentators on *Song of Solomon* (as Origen) but in sedate legalists of the west, like Ambrose, Jerome and Austin. But this union is only the last stage in a course of gradual initiation, and in spite of some abuses in the private methods of orphic hierophants (Plato's *Republic*) the tendency is clearly marked to move away from pure external and ceremonial towards a highly moral creed. On the whole, we may say that among the 'mystics' and orphists it was held that a man contributed by ritual and ethical purity towards the ennobling and consecration of his personality by the divine presence.

Magical Externalism in Salvation.—The other conception is purely external and almost wholly magical,—that is, grace is conveyed, in realistic fashion, by contact with symbols or objects containing *mana* and by the use of compelling phrase and formula. The moral attitude of the recipient is matter of indifference; the charm works *ex opere operato*. The divine likeness is believed to be wholly lost or so obscured that nothing but a *fiat* from without can replace it. The weak individual cannot himself either deserve or procure the divine gift and it must be mediated by duly qualified men and institutions. To this class belongs the extreme sacramentalism which can only be attributed to a surviving belief in magic, and to a very archaic religious attitude for which the divine powers have no connexion with human standards of goodness. A variant of this externalism is seen in the purely legal or juristic conception of *substitution* and *imputation*; wherein man, utterly unable of himself to find, to satisfy, or to follow God, is content to receive the credit of an *opus operatum*, by a transfer of merit which can only be called a legal fiction. These two forms of a purely external or fictitious relation between divine and human do not now so closely concern us; we are examining those conceptions of the redemptive process which bore fruit in the later *pantheism* of the east and the still later *realism* of the west.

Competence of Individual Without Mediation.—We may now classify

four theories; the *legal* by which a wholly foreign righteousness is 'imputed' by a divine judge to a criminal; the purely '*sacramental*', by which power is appropriated by the recipient through magical means; the *ethical*, which teaches a gradual approach by moral effort to a divine standard or exemplar; the *mystical* in which, either summarily or after due initiation, an original essence is laid bare and a lost or suspended divinity is again energized in us. Now in these latter forms there will arise the further question, is the unit sufficient of himself to attain this blessedness and perfection, or must the gifts and graces be mediated through visible rites and by a corporate institution? This touches at once upon the radical problem and peril of the mystic in every age. The extremist claims like the hindu autotheist, to stand entirely alone and aloof and to be a law—indeed a deity—to himself. This attitude is too familiar to need further instances; we may note in the west the admonitions of Victorinus and St. Austin. The stages laid down for the mystical ascent to perfection are without doubt intended to restrain the over ardent. From the Mysteries we have the 3 grades of proficiency, which seem roughly to correspond with *baptism*, *confirmation*, *communion*, in the normal Christian's life. Later these steps in textbooks of mystical theory will be expanded into *seven*—in deference to the universal instinct of mankind, even among those races least affected by astralism.[1]

Ethical Imitation or Mystical Union.—Another division may perhaps help us to understand the various theories of redemption and introduce us to the pantheist conceptions. A. The Christian may try to follow closely the Saviour's human example—regarding this function as that of Prophet and Pattern. This would correspond to the early followers of Buddha, the *theravadins*, who saw in him only a man gifted with a high degree of spiritual insight and ethical purity. It lay within the power of his disciples to imitate him, by their own persevering efforts and without any aid from without. In the western church this became a purely *pelagian* doctrine and was condemned not only from the point of view of theology but in the light of notorious facts in human experience. Man could not save himself. B. Hence there was inculcated a more mystical relation to Christ, not as exemplar but as indwelling force or spirit—to which St. Paul might seem to allude when he speaks of knowing Christ no longer according to the flesh (*κατὰ σάρκα*). Very early indeed the metaphor had been used of the 'birth of Christ in the believer's soul'.[2] Methodius held that each man must be born as a Christ; our spiritual nature

[1] St. Austin, *Quant. Animæ* § 30, is one of the earliest to adopt the *sevenfold* ascent; cf. 'Who dost Thy sevenfold gifts impart' (*Veni Creator*). Just after the close of our period Chancellor Gerson (1363–1429) tried 'to reduce Mysticism to an exact science tabulating and classifying . . . ' with arbitrary schematism' the earlier doctrines (Inge). These 'means' are seven: (1) the call of God; (2) one's own assurance of the call; (3) freedom from worldly encumbrances; (4) exclusive concentration on the thought of God; (5) perseverance; (6) ascetic practice; (7) resolute closing of the eye to sense perceptions.

[2] Theophilus *ad Autolycum*.

being consubstantial, not indeed with God, but with the Universal Reason Who became incarnate in Christ Jesus. We have already noted that the Alexandrines, Clement and Origen, rejected explicitly the view that man was in essence ὁμοούσιος τῷ Πατρί. But in the Logos-doctrine the human aspect of Christ was already giving way before the conception of a cosmic principle; the impersonal was superseding the person; an abstract idea was obscuring a concrete and historic individual (cf. Div.A. App. 212).

The Logos as Immanent Cosmic Principle.—There is no need to trace here the effect of hellenic thought from Heraclitus onwards in this effective depersonalizing of the Saviour. In an extreme form the historic Christ becomes either a mythical type or else a 'rational substratum' of soul common to every reasonable being. The Stoics represented this universal Logos as trying to convert the human mind into an organ of itself, though they never formulated the dogma in precise terms and were constantly baffled by the very different ideals set in the outer *nature* and by human *conscience* in the inner world. They never explained why the world-spirit on becoming conscious in man suddenly reversed its methods—a puzzle which Huxley stated clearly enough to the shallow and complacent mind of our day but was entirely unable to solve. The peripatetic school had no such problem before it: though the stoic talked of *reason* he was really interested only in *morals*, but the disciple of Aristotle had little concern except with the 'dianoëtic virtues'. Hence the mystical turn so often given to the conception of νοῦς, rather a heavenly grace, a sudden infusion of divinity, than a human faculty raised by exercise to its highest point. Alexander of Aphrodisias (in Caria) had given the former interpretation as we have already seen in the section on averroism: his περὶ ψυχῆς maintains that man's 'hylic reason' (νοῦς ὑλικὸς) is material and cannot be separated from the body: that which *actualizes* the *potential* reason is God: there is therefore no survival of a personal soul. It is of interest to note that this mystical doctrine crowns a system of *naturistic nominalism* (somewhat in the manner of Gerson or Alliacus). The *individual* is more substantive and even earlier φύσει than the *universal*; for general concepts and class-names exist only in the mind and the real objects of our thought are the separate members of the group or instances of the type. In spite of Zeller I cannot help seeing a certain kinship in the dogma (Active Intellect = God) with Aristotle's views a little earlier (apud Euseb.): the whole world is the abode of divine spirit (νοῦς) which operated within it, but νοῦς becomes an individual human spirit wherever it found an organism adapted to receive it. These writers lived under Commodus and Septimius Severus (*c. 180–210* A.D.) and well represent the mystical pantheizing strain which was needed to give to the crude materialism of the Porch a religious and devout flavour. From different standpoints both pagan and Christian agreed that the intellect at its best is equivalent to an influx of deity.

Christian Doctrine Modified.—We can trace a gradual and serious change in the Christian outlook owing to the wide prevalence of these views. The adoption of the forms of pagan philosophy and culture without doubt modified the earlier standards. The primitive Church was a simple

community or congregation of equals, waiting in hourly expectancy for the return of Christ. It was organized only by the agreement and good will of its members and although ' authority ' was not wanting its exercise was kept in the background. The ' Apostles' doctrine and fellowship ' implied the close association of these members in daily life. Jewish apocalyptic hopes—or Messianic chiliasm—kept these small companies of believers at a high pitch of spiritual exaltation. Time brought several great changes : grades of officials, closer and more authoritative organization, less congregational autonomy, differing standards of life and conduct, and, among studious apologists seeking to justify their creed before pagan culture, a sense of personal isolation and of discontent with literalism and bigotry. The alexandrine school desired not to exasperate, but to appease, earnest and reflecting heathens ; to prove that greek philosophy was the work of God, not of the devil ; to adopt current phrases and ideas from the richest dialect and thought known to mankind.

Alexandrine Intellectualism and Allegory.—Clement and Origen (not to mention the Apologists) are disciples of Philo in their efforts to recommend their own faith and to appropriate what is best in other creeds. Hence the idea of *reason* outweighs that of *redemption*.[1] Now although reason is a universal faculty and in exercising it man surrenders his private feelings and hopes, the reasoner is a solitary person among men ; he cannot remain one of a crowd, his real affinities and associates are elsewhere. Beyond the life and standard of churchly routine or scriptural ' letter ', there is a higher life, in which the ' gnostic ' becomes the citizen of an ideal world. *Gnosis* was in origin utterly independent of the church and existed indeed before the coming of our Lord : it was not (as once was maintained) an attempt to rationalize the *credenda* nor did it show the way to frame a ' scientific theology '. But it did suggest to the studious believer that the ' knowledge ', caricatured by the mystery and magic of these professors, might find a true counterpart in a more personal Christian science. That is, *faith* was to be lifted up into the higher sphere of *knowledge* ; subjective conviction was to replace obedience to external authority ; and, above all, the edifying moral lurking behind the historic ' letter ' of scripture, was to be extracted by allegory. This was a great change from congregational chiliasm or communism. Already, quite unawares, the leaders of this movement of thought have offered a certain defiance, or at least an alternative, to the *disciplina vitæ* and the *regula fidei* : and, without for a moment denying the competence of the church and its hierarchy, have found out for themselves a better way.

Redemption Imparted, not Imputed.—Hence an increased emphasis on subjectivity ; the purely external view of a mediated redemption must be done away : Christ must be born anew in the soul of each believer. A historic event, an *opus operatum*, did not suffice : the merit and virtue of the Passion must be personally appropriated. There must be no legally

[1] Already the transition can be marked in the Pauline Epistles ; compare the prominent eschatology of the early *Thessalonian* letters with the doctrine of *Corinthians, Ephesians, Colossians.*

imputed righteousness. but a ' new creature ' : no substitution, but the divine Mind actually born afresh in us. It will be noted that this theory does not imply the laying bare of primitive essence but the influx of a new influence. Life was not *imputed* but *imparted*.[1] We are saved and delivered *inside* ourselves, not *without* or from without.

A More Daring Conception of Union.—But there is (as we saw) a yet further stage for some daring speculators, in which God Himself takes the place of our personality. It is not Christ (or the Christ-spirit) that is born anew or repeats His Passion within us, but pure deity is found to be the residuum in the void created by our surrender of all creatureliness. But after Philo all theology had been abstract and apophatic ; God, the Father ' dwelling in unapproachable light ' (εἰς τὸ φῶς ἀπρόσιτον) has no attributes or qualities. The true being of the universe was *no-thing*, and as in the *Sunya Vadi* development in buddhism this was soon taken as equivalent to *nothing*. The aim of the mystic is always to become, not merely like, but one with his God ; and the extremists in east and west believed that this was attained, not as in the previous method, by the culture, but by the denial and extinction, of reason.

' Man becomes God ' : Alexandria and Cappadocia.—It is not a little strange that Christian writers should so readily have adopted the pagan phrase of ' becoming God '.[2] The doctrine of divine transcendence then held by all thinkers (in protest against stoic immanence) might, it would seem, have prevented this borrowing. It is adopted by latin as well as by greek Fathers and no disguise is attempted. Yet the Alexandrines, who employ these terms or comment upon the *Song of Songs*, are not themselves extremists. ' Clement ' says Bigg (*Christ. Plat.* Oxford 1886) ' shrank ' from his own conclusions ; though the father of all mystics himself . . . ' The gnostic's prayer even when speechless is still conscious and active ; ' it is far removed from the blank vacuity of the soul which lies dead and ' buried, asleep in Nothingness (Molinos) . . . Of ecstasy there is not a

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[1] ' For the gnostic, Christ in us is far more important than Christ for 'us '. Inge ('Alex. Theol.' *Enc. Rel. Eth.* i 318). He is speaking of Origen who certainly did not regard the historic work of the Saviour as ' mere appear- ' ance or exhibition '. Macarius *Hom.* iv 8 : ' in each believer a Christ is born ' : Methodius ' Christ must be born in every individual νοητῶς ' Long before the writer of *Ep. ad Diognetum* had said of Christ the Logos πάντοτε νέος ἐν ἁγίων καρδίαις γεννώμενος. St. Austin later wrote, (*in Johannem*, treatise 21) : ' let us congratulate ourselves and give thanks that we have been made *non solum Christianos sed Christum . . . Christus facti sumus* '. We shall see that the medieval heretics (e.g. Bogomils and their russian kindred) say instead of this ' I have become a Christ '.

[2] Cf. Clement *Str.* vi 13 μελετᾷ εἶναι θεός. I am here giving only a summary of the development before our period and need not prove by formal evidence a result which is not in dispute : Harnack's *History* must be consulted and the instances given by Inge in *Bampton Lect.* Methuen 1899 ' Deification ', as well as in articles in *Enc. Rel. Eth.*, ' Alexandrian Theology,' ' Logos '.

'trace in Clement . . . Yet he laid the fuel ready for kindling. The spark 'that was needed was the allegorical interpretation of the *Song*. This 'was supplied, strange to say, by Origen, least mystical of all divines' (p. 98 sq.). The link between the Alexandrines and the pseudo-Denys and Sudaili is supplied by Gregory of Nyss.[1] Basil holds that Christ came to reveal to us the image of God and restore it within ourselves (*Epist.* 38, 8; 236, 3; *Spir. Sanc.* ix 23); the one goal set before man is 'likeness to God'. Gregory of Naziansus adopts the expressions θέωσις, θεὸς γενέσθαι, like Clement or Hippolytus a century and a half earlier (*Orat.* i 5, xxix 17, xl 45). Both Gregories also employ the terms μῖξις, κρᾶσις for the union of the two natures in Christ; the human nature is transmuted or *deified*. Gregory of Nyss believes this process was a long one, ending only at the Ascension when the human element was fused and blended with the Deity as a drop of vinegar is lost in the ocean (*Antirhet.* 42, *Ep. ad Theoph.*). But neither approached the later (and indefensible) standpoint of a denial of personality to Christ's human soul; they say explicitly, if Christ had no human soul, the soul of man is not redeemed (*Antirh.* 11, 17; Greg. Naz. *Epp.* i *ad Cled.* 7 and ii). They rejected Origen's theory of preëxistence and prenatal fall, wherein the world is regarded as a penitentiary built to reclaim fallen spirits. But they held a very lofty view of man's original state, now forfeited through sin. Though the school lays the usual greek emphasis on Free-Will, Gregory of Nyss speaks much of the evil effects of the Fall and comes very near the later teaching of St. Austin. He regards the sacraments as an extension of the Incarnation: mankind as a whole are deified in Christ, first by the union of the humanity to Christ, next by the application to believers of this result progressively. A theory of transsubstantiation follows, the first of its kind (*Catech. Or.* § 33–37). Nyss appeals to a theory of divine immanence to support his sacramental doctrine; but he lays stress on the divine promise to be present and to operate through the means of grace; it is not then a *magical* necessity. Yet from the mystical and pantheistic suggestions in Nyss were developed the late teaching of the Monophysites and the daring theories of the false 'Areopagite'. He became indeed the source not only of a highly spiritual theory of religion but of the *realistic materialism* which has since been a marked feature in the eastern church.

Summary.—It will be remembered that the aim of this section is to survey rapidly the general results both in church-society and in dogma, of the centuries preceding our starting point. With the data supplied in the foregoing sections we are equipped and prepared for an inquiry into the final development of thought in Christian Hellenism. We can now put together the several conclusions advanced in clearer outline. First, the transition from chiliasm to intellectualism has to be noted, and from autonomous communities of expectant believers to an hierarchy organized on the imperial model, making welcome all sorts and conditions of men under obedience

[1] Cf. Diekamp *Gotteslehre d. G. von N.* 1896, Hall *Amphil. von Ikon.*; this latter writer seems to have popularized the Cappadocian divines without assenting to the Origenism which they revived.

to its orders. And at the same time, a passage from simple and subjective pietism to the need for presenting the *credenda* to a not wholly indifferent world and for laying stress on points of contact with pagan thought. There were thus 3 parties ; those who (like the followers of Montanus and Donatus) believed in a small and exclusive church of the perfect ; those who (like Cyprian, and the anonymous statesmen of the roman see) maintained the ' Catholic ' policy of a world-wide and inclusive church-state ; those who (like the alexandrines and eastern Christians in general) tolerated a visible organization and mediated gifts of grace but who set up the higher ideal—a personal appropriation by intellect of scripture and dogma—a process which sometimes transmuted the historic and personal into the mythical and abstract. Redemption of the first class implied Christ's abiding presence in a small community aloof from the world ; for the second, a grace and a discipline of life mediated by the church and its authorized ministers ; for the third, the liberation of the intellect for the free study of the world and history and then for its perfect union with the ' mind of Christ '. Without undervaluing the actual work of redemption or the human life and example of the Saviour, the alexandrine writers certainly diverted chief attention elsewhere. They adopted (like the Apologists before them) the notion of an immanent Reason and cosmic Principle which had taken flesh for a final revelation of the divine. This then tended in the case of the more sober minds towards intellectualism and allegoric exegesis ; but in more ardent temperaments it developed a pantheizing mysticism of which the results are very striking.

An established church might interpret its duties as the purest externalism : members were assured of a share in its benefit, by legal imputation or by sacramental mediation, without reference to their state of mind or motive. Individualism might protest against this brahmanic and unmoral subservience and (with Buddha and Pelagius) lay emphasis on the need for ethical endeavour and self-help : to such the human example of Christ was of the utmost value. The more devout and mystical, also resenting tutelage, might insist on individual capacity not merely to imitate Christ's human pattern but to appropriate His divine nature. It was this direct access to the Saviour that formed the common tenet of *mystic* and *intellectualist*. For both beliefs—though for the latter in larger measure—the current stoic-platonic doctrine of world-*reason* or world-*soul* was a chief constituent. It is well to remember that this theory was never expressly formulated or reduced to clearness. But in it an impersonal and cosmic principle always tended to supersede a historic and human figure. Aristotle's 'Active Intellect ' was being interpreted as an influx of deity, and we may fairly say that the alexandrines (without disparaging the moral life) regarded the exercise of the theoretic reason as the most divine level attainable by man.

It needed only a less cultured and less patient mind to give this belief a wholly mystical and anti-rational turn. The divine life is not the framing of a systematic complex of related thought, but a return into will-less nothingness. How far this extreme form of mysticism is indebted to India we cannot say. But we know that the texts and the methods arose

in Alexandria among those who never carried them to their logical conclusion; and that Cappadocian divinity in cent. iv formed the link between them and the syrian pantheists whose principles we must now discuss.

'Dionysius' or Churchly Mysticism.—Of this the pseudo-Dionysius was the most notable expounder and in any account of the western Middle Ages must occupy the chief place. The monotheists extolled these spurious writings, products of the monks of Syria. They explain the later growth of *monotheletism* and disclose the tendency to pantheism which underlay the movement. *Whether man and the creature are absolutely as nothing over against God, or are in substance almost wholly divine, the effect is the same.* The special forms of being have in themselves no meaning or value, except so far as they 'become God'; which must imply the loss and surrender of their own finiteness. Stephen Barsudaili of Edessa (*c. 490* A.D.) maintained that every creature was *consubstantial* with the Godhead, and that God would one day be all in all. In Egypt the 'Isochrist' monks held that every believer must attain divinity after the manner of Christ who is only our *examplar*, not a unique *medium* of grace. If we can trust Barhebræus (Abul Faraj), Sudaili is the Hierotheus of the pseudo-Denys;[1] in any case they lived about the same time, in the closing quarter of the fifth century and represent the last infiltration of the monistic universalism of Alexandria into Christian philosophy. 'Dionysius' strongly upholds the church and the institutional, *objective* or sacramental side of religion, while he elevates the speculative and *subjective* element: like Cabasilas (as we shall see later), or like St. Austin in the west, he tries to satisfy the instinct for *personal* and private piety without seeming to discard or disparage the *official* means of grace. In his *theology*, he gave a decided impetus to that *realistic* bias by which medieval orthodoxy, no less than sectarian heresy, was hurried along toward pantheism.

Its Realistic Basis: God Immanent yet Transcendent.—The Godhead of Jesus (*Div. Nom.* § 2 (10) is like Philo's Logos, cause of all things. It fills and maintains all things in unity; is neither *part* nor *whole*, yet again *is* both *part* and *whole*. *Perfect* in the imperfect, it is *imperfect* in the perfect, for it transcends the perfection of its creatures: that is, it is not a wholly immanent *anima mundi* which cannot be conceived as having existence out and apart from finite things. It is form and principle of form in all things; but it is also above form and destitute of it (ἀνείδεος). It is the being which dwells completely and untarnished in all things, yet at the same time is exalted far beyond all. Every principle ἀρχὴ and ordinance τάξις it determines, yet stands above them; it is the measure and time of all things, yet is above measure and prior to time. In needy things it is full; in full it overflows; it is beyond speech or names, above understanding, life, substance, nature.

This chapter *Div. Nom.* ii 10 is a supposed extract from Hierotheus' (?Barsudaili) *Elements of Theology*: ἡ πάντων αἰτία κ. ἀποπληρωτικὴ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ θεότης . . . πᾶν κ. μέρος κ. ὅλον ἐν ἑαυτῇ συνειληφυῖα κ. ὑπερέχουσα

[1] Barhebr, *Assem.* ii 293.

κ. προέχουσα, τελεία μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀτέλεσιν ἀτελὴς δὲ ἐν τοῖς τελείοις . . . εἶδος ἀιδοποιὸν ἐν τοῖς ἀνειδέοις . . . ὡς ὑπὲρ εἶδος . . . οὐσία ταῖς ὅλαις οὐσίαις ἀχράντως ἐπιβατεύουσα κ. ὑπερούσιος ἁπάσης οὐσίας ἐξῃρημένη . . ἀρχὰς κ. τάξεις ἀφορίζουσα . . κ. ὑπεριδρυμένη . . . μέτρον τῶν ὄντων κ. αἰὼν . . . πλήρης ἐν τοῖς ἐνδέεσιν ὑπερπλήρης δὲ ἐν τοῖς πλήρεσιν, ἄῤῥητος ἄφθεγκτος, ὑπὲρ νοῦν, ὑπὲρ ζωὴν, ὑπὲρ οὐσίαν.

Variations of this paradox (that God is *in* all yet far *above* all) form in truth the sole theme of Dionysius: with the genial platonic optimism of Plotinus and his pupils, he wishes to preserve God's *immanent* presence in the world as root and being of all finite things, yet to assure His *transcendence*. Hence He is that which defines and qualifies each individual thing while in His own essence He is above all things, and has no name, is no-thing. (*D.N.* i § 6 ἐν νόοις εἶναί φασι κ. ψυχαῖς κ. σώμασι κ. ἐν οὐρανῷ κ. γῇ κ. ἅμα ἐν ταὐτῷ τὸν αὐτὸν, ἐγκόσμιον · περικόσμιον ὑπερκόσμιον, ὑπερουράνιον ὑπερούσιον, ἥλιον ἀστέρα πῦρ ὕδωρ πνεῦμα δρόσον νεφέλην αὐτόλιθον κ. πέτραν—πάντα τὰ ὄντα κ. οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων. Here we are not far from David of Dinant's materialistic pantheism, nor again from the later development of buddhism and the doctrine of the eternal body of Buddha. Hence symbolic (or positive) theology can speak of His nature dimly and in parables by looking at His works; but of His true being there is only ignorance. Though (as in Plato, Plotinus and Emperor Julian) similes from sun and light occur on almost everypage, the Divine Darkness (θεῖος γνόφος) is the truest term. (*Myst. Theol.* i 1, 3; ii; iii). He uses the words ἀλογία ἀνοησία ἀνωνυμία (*D.N.*i § 1), ἀβλεψία ἀγνωσία (*M. Th.* ii).

For its relation to things he uses a technical word from Proclus the Platonist (which very clearly establishes the date of the writings) ἀμεθεξία (*D. N.* ii. § 5) there is to its participants no ἐπαφὴ, no κοινωνία. Yet § 7 these alone give us any clue as to its nature, πάντα γὰρ τὰ θεῖα ταῖς μετοχαῖς μόναις γινώσκεται, § 8 οὐδὲ γάρ ἐστιν ἀκρίβης ἐμφέρεια τοῖς αἰτιατοῖς κ. τοῖς αἰτίοις so that we are left (it would seem) without any certain knowledge of Being, as in the case of Spencer's Infinite but Unknowable Energy: ἔχει μὲν τὰ αἰτιατὰ τὰς τῶν αἰτίων ἐνδεχομένας εἰκόνας αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ αἴτια . . ἐξῄρηται κ. ὑπερίδρυται. Pleasures and pains (he says) give us pleasure and pain but do not themselves feel those sensations; fire warms and burns but is not itself warmed or burnt. All we can say is that περισσῶς κ. οὐσιωδῶς προέναστι τὰ τῶν αἰτιατῶν τοῖς αἰτίοις; but the adverbs prevent us from assuming any real likeness or analogy between *cause* and *caused*. He uses the familiar sun-metaphor (iv § 1) οὐ λογιζόμενος ἡ προαιρούμενος ἀλλ' αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι φωτίζει πάντα τὰ μετέχειν φωτὸς . . . δυνάμενα and almost seems to exclude purpose and providence like Spinoza: this essential element of religion he however restores by his stress on Christ's φιλανθρωπία—the human advent of our Saviour adapting itself very ill with the rest of his abstract neoplatonism. His idea that God is ἔρως (*D.N.* iv §§ 10, 11, 12, in which fatally, for his own claims of authorship, he quotes St. Ignatius!) to some extent also repairs this: ὁ ἀγαθουργὸς τῶν ὄντων ἔρως οὐκ εἴασεν αὐτὸν ἄγονον ἐν ἑαυτῷ μένειν § 13 τῶν πάντων ἐρωτι ἐξω ἑαυτοῦ γίνεται. The advance into creation from *essence* into *existence* is called § 14 τῆς ἐξῃρημένης ἑνώσεως πρόοδος: by it all things (even at the

extreme verge of life and being) are connected with their source and in a measure reunited thereto iv § 17; the Good *αὐτός ἐστι τὸ εἶναι τοῖς οὖσι* v § 4. In vi § 8 he says summarily *πάντα ἐστιν ὡς πάντων αἴτιος . . κ. ὑπὲρ τὰ πάντα ἐ.* All things then are reverberations or echoes (*ἀπηχήματα* viii § 2) of the central power and § 3 there is nothing which has not some share in it *ἡ ἀπειροδύναμος τοῦ θεοῦ διάδοσις εἰς πάντα τὰ ὄντα χωρεῖ κ. οὐδέν ἐ. τῶν ὄντων ὃ παντελῶς ἀφῄρηται τὸ ἔχειν τινα δύναμιν* (of *intellect*, or *reason*, or *sense*, or only *vitality*, or mere *being*, *οὐσιώδης δύναμις*) xii § 4 *ὑπερίδρυται πάντων . . τῶν μετεχόντων κ. τῶν μετοχῶν* (feminine) *ὁ ἀμέθεκτος αἴτιος.* Of Him (*M.Th.* i) all predicates must be both *affirmed* and *denied* *δεὸν ἐπ' αὐτῇ, πάσας τὰς τῶν ὄντων τιθέναι κ. καταφάσκειν θέσεις ὡς πάντων αἰτίᾳ, κ. πάσας κυριώτερον ἀποφάσκειν ὡς ὑπὲρ πάντα*: in v, *οὐδ' ἐστ' αὐτῆς καθόλου θέσις οὔτ' ἀφαίρεσις.* In sum, the Divine Power is all things and no-thing, and the world expresses the *existence* of God but gives no clue to His *essence*. Hence in Him all distinctions are cancelled, swept away and abolished: *αἱ κοινωνίαι τῶν ἐναντίων* (iv § 7): like Malebranche, *θεωρῆσαι πάντα ἐν τῶν πάντων αἰτίῳ κ. τὰ ἀλλήλοις ἐνάντια μονοειδῶς κ. ἡνωμένως* like any absolutist of Hegel's school to-day (v § 7). He is at once both greatest and least and His darkness is dark with 'excess of light' (*Epist.* 5). He is love which acts as bond and philtre to all things and turns them back to their source. Of Him all things partake 'according to the measure' or proportion of grace and fitness', just as Leibnitz' monads mirror the same universe but in diverse ways. Hence a place is left for *individuality*, —which, forgotten in Scotus Erigena, comes again to the front in Cusa's nominalism in deference to the new subjective claims of man.

Return to Source: Ultimate Pantheism.—Dionysius really adds nothing to Proclus' teaching but he attempts to find a place for the Incarnation: in the end his text is the divine *transcendence* and its correlative doctrine, the deification (*θέωσις*) of man beyond knowledge and speech if he is truly to know God. Mysticism is an *experience*, not a *knowledge* at all in the strict sense (*D.N.* ii § 9, *οὐ μόνον μαθὼν ἀλλὰ κ. παθὼν τὰ θεῖα.* In the mystical *unio* ("Ενωσις which is equivalent to *θέωσις*) he follows the phrases and usage of all such eutychian writers (on the abolition of the creature in God) and has nothing original. The sum of God's relations to man, is contained in *Eccles. Hier.* i § 2. *Ἀληθῶς δ' εἰπεῖν ἔν μέν ἐστιν οὗ πάντες οἱ θεοει δεῖς ἐφίενται μετέχουσι δ' οὐχ ἑνιαίως ταὐτοῦ τε κ. ἑνὸς ὄντος, ἀλλ' ὡς ἑκάστῳ τὰ θεῖα ζυγὰ διανέμει κατ' ἀξίαν τὴν ἀποκλήρωσιν.* The same sun shines over all, but all things do not feel, receive, or benefit by it in the same manner. God is equally good to all nations but only the Hebrews knew how to use His goodness. His main text may be called, *hierarchical* series; in a caste-fettered society he was true to the principle; the orders of being in regular gradation form a continuum, and the *differentia* of each is divinely allotted. The limitation *ὡς ἐφικτὸν, κατὰ τὸ θεμιτὸν* (*Cæl. Hier.* x § 2) recurs with significant frequency: God is always the same, the difficulty lies in us, the weakness in things; even the voluptuary is seeking *peace* and (so far as he knows it) the *Good* (*D.N.* iv § 20). If anything does not so partake § 4 *τοῦτ' οὐ τῆς ἀδρανείας ἐ. τῆς φωτιστικῆς αὐτοῦ διαδόσεως ἀλλα τῶν (διὰ φωτοληψίας ἀνεπιτηδειότητα) μὴ ἀναπ[ληρ]ουμένων εἰς τὴν*

φωτός μετουσίαν (*text. recept* = *sese explicantium*). So § 33 ὡς Πρόνοια . . . τῶν ὅλων κ. τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, οἰκείως ὅλῳ κ. ἑκάστῳ (προνοεῖ) καθ' ὅσον ἡ τῶν προνοουμένων φύσις ἐπιδέχεται. In xi § 3 he raises an interesting objection that all things do not love peace but may rejoice in ἑτερότητι κ. διακρίσει and supposes the objector to believe that this otherness is the *differentia* (or distinctive mark) of the individual (ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων ἰδιότης . .). In answer to this heraclitanplea he finds no difficulty in showing that even the restless man of pleasure is on the look-out for peace—as in Aristotle πολεμοῦμεν ἵν' εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν. Hence man knows God, not by exercise of his highest faculty but only by *ignorance*, and becomes like, not by moral effort and patient endeavour but by merging his human nature altogether in the divine.

PART V. FINAL RESULT OF EASTERN MYSTICISM

Union with God Immediate : it cannot be Gradual.—Man cannot argue from the *caused* effects (αἰτιατὰ) to the nature or essence of the *Cause*. Dionysius is already on the lines which lead to Scotism and the doctrine of pure arbitary will in God (Occam and Descartes) or pure physical, at least non-moral, necessity (Spinoza). With regard to the finite and known, God is completely transcendent and stands in a relation of exclusiveness : between God and man there is no resemblance. Hence, with the monophysites, the *human* element must vanish and be wholly swallowed up in the *divine* ; the two antitheses cannot exist together nor can one grow by endeavour and show progress into the likeness of the other, as Antioch and Nestorius had hoped to show. Nor has the universe any real or substantive existence, save in so far as God exists in it. Since it depends on Him, He must be called the *unity* of the manifold and divided, *life* of the living, essential *being* of all that is, the single *power* in all its various activities. Yet the close relation of the world of things to God is really withdrawn at every moment by the emphasis on His transcendence. Here Dionysius follows the philonian agnosticism and makes regress to a pre-Christian conception of God. Neither Trinity nor Incarnation can seriously be adjusted to such a theory, for, *ex hypothesi*, God is the ' place of the union of opposites' and in Him all distinctions subside. The *ethical* interest in theology is here quite subservient to the *speculative* : the ' philanthropy ' of the Redeemer in coming into the world is extolled and no doubt earnestly believed by the writer ; but it cannot be explained.

The Creature Lost or Burnt up in the Deity.—Hence there is but a single step to the extreme antithesis ; a denial of the transcendent Deity of whom we can have here no knowledge and form no idea. The visible world, instinct even to the Areopagite with divine life, replaces in interest the formal categories of mere Being, empty and poverty-stricken. That which God has not been pleased to reveal to men can be ignored, both by piety and secularism. There are then, dimly to be seen below the ground all the roots of later *nominalism*, which directs man to the realm of attainable knowledge ; *cultivons notre jardin*. On the other hand the main emphasis leads on to unadulterated *realism*, that is, *pantheism*. As in Aristotle, that which is most real in man, indeed his very self, is God. Realism transfers this doctrine to every finite thing ; so far as it exists at all, it is not *itself* but its *type* or universal. Hence God is the being and substance of everything and the real personality of each man. Orthodox ' realism ' in the scholastic age did not of course draw this conclusion ; but it trembled on the very verge of the pantheism of Amalric and David. Hence the creaturely and ' divided ' life of finite things is merely provisional and lasts but for a certain season. The single divine *essence* at their root must sooner or later burst out into flames and reduce all this world of semblance and partiality to nothingness : or in a more favourite simile, that portion of the divine which is in each thing must in the end convert it to its source and centre, and by assimilating each to its higher order once more make unity out of difference,—that God may be all in all.

The Doctrine Wholly Neoplatonic : Problem of Adjusting Orthodox Christology.—This ' return of the prodigal ' is expressed quite in the manner of Proclus. The divine nature is diffused in varying forms and proportions through the ranks of existence ; not (as we saw) that it can vary in itself, but the ' measure of faith ', proportion of capacity, differs in each case : it descends from higher to lower stages and thus seems to become partial and disintegrated. But the philtre of love is still effective and reverses this process so that out of the *multiple* the universe comes back to its parent *Unity*. This overflowing of Godhead into a somewhat regrettable world-process is quite as hard to understand, quite as unsatisfying to man's ethical sense, as the crude dualism of Mani or the gnostic theory of a secondary and imper-

fect creator. The Godhead still remains impersonal and incommunicable (ἀμέθεκτος); there is no genuine revelation and certainly no ethical end for it. Julian's ingenious allegorizing of the Attis-myth is on the same speculative level: in both, creation wholly divorced from any *moral* purpose becomes a mere *physical* process; the 'self-emptying' of Godhead for the sake of redemption becomes a phrase to signify the gradual weakening of divine potence till it fades into nothingness on the extreme verge of the universe. We cannot in this system attach any unique value to the historic Christ. All beings are in a sense *god-men*, and where the two natures are in the last resort incommensurable the question of degree can scarcely enter. Christ is a type of a universal process whereby (in unspeakable fashion) the Incommunicable communicates Itself. On the churchly side Dionysius holds that *magical* powers are given to churchmembers through the graduated hierarchy.[1] The ardent mystical temperament (no less than the speculative and therefore unitary and monistic) could not remain satisfied with an absolute antithesis of the divine and human natures. Yet God must be both prototype and final goal of human striving—an axiom in which churchmen were not likely to fall behind neoplatonic theosophy. But redemption (conceived after all on a purely physical level) means that *man's nature can be perfected only by abolishing it.* The *deificatio* is the passage of man from his own natural condition into something inexpressibly higher, through union with God (ἕνωσις, θέωσις). The highest aim of man is not to accord perfectly with his type or idea, but to become something else. Hence, above the *practical* virtues, the *intellectual*; above active life, 'theory' (as in the hellenic mysticism which began with Aristotle): hence a magical conception of sacramental grace, attachment to monachism, belief in supererogation, wherein

[1] It is difficult to avoid using Dorner's somewhat invidious term, if only for the sake of clearness:—we need not imply the more sinister meaning of *magical*, but only the idea of unintelligent passivity, formalism, *ex opere operato*. That this was the popular attitude, in eastern and western churches alike, cannot for a moment be denied, whatever safeguards enlightened thought may have provided for itself. The two epithets in which Dorner sums up the Middle Ages, as partly *magical* and partly *pelagian*, are most useful and suggestive for the student as a clue to a difficult phase of thought: indeed, it is not possible to dispense with them. Yet we must use them with some mental reserve.

from seeming humility there issued a thoroughly pelagian notion of human merit.

Maximus' Attempt to Find a Place for the Unit.—Maximus the Confessor continues, corrects and supplements the moni-tic (yet in the end dualistic) doctrine of the false Dionysius. He stoutly defends dyotheletism; and gives more weight than the earlier writers to the principle of *duality*. He wishes to restore real being to the world without giving it self-subsistence; it was not to be pure illusion (*Maya*), nor again permitted to exist in its own right, God being banished from it as in later deism. With him everything tends to become a *symbol* of something else; church and world, symbols of God; God and the world, symbols of the church: man represents church in symbol, and church man. Between the two terms there is therefore affinity, and also *distinction*: he has seen the importance of safeguarding the *difference*. He follows Dionysius, by justifying from the *mystical* standpoint the externalism of church-cultus and ritual; through these outward means power and grace descend from God and man is raised to Him.[1] On *negative* theology he does not lay so much stress; he feels the danger of a philonian Incommunicable: (but while he tends to regard God as μεθεκτὸς and the world as full of Him, he sometimes speaks as if it were but a mere shadow of an unknowable Being beyond all predicates). With all its obvious perils and disadvantages, the employment of the term ἔρως brought in an *ethical* character into a relation hitherto chiefly *physical*; as Dionysius says of religious experience οὐ μαθων ἀλλα παθων τα θεῖα so Maximus speaks of πάσχειν ἔκστασιν πρὸς τὸ ἐρατόν. Lover and loved *interchange* their inmost natures; God becomes man and man becomes God: he uses the term γάμος for the spiritual wedlock of God and humanity.

Incarnation Mystically Repeated in the Soul.—In such a system the features of the historic Christ tend to fade into a universal type. In Christ, the imparting process of the Godhead was complete, by which He was incarnate in the world. All Christians may be *deified*; for this very end Christ came: fulness of Godhead, in Christ by *nature*, is in us by *grace*:—so far as we are severally capable of receiving it. The Incarnation cannot strictly be called a single and unique event: it is continually being renewed, when Christ is mystically reborn in the heart

[1] Cf. the very similar thoughts on hindu sacrifice.

of the believer.[1] The whole is a comment and an expansion of Athanasius' momentous utterance, *ἵνα θεοποιηθῶμεν*. The Logos again becomes incarnate in and through the redeemed, but also takes flesh in everything; for everything is a *symbol* of God and each brings one aspect of God into view for a brief space (just as the later monads mirror, severally, a different aspect of the universe). Christ, as God-Man is precursor, forerunner, example of the (universal) *deification*; of which from His purely divine side He is the cause. The will must by degrees surrender all props and external aids; must give up the finite manifold which distracts and pulls asunder a nature which should tend to a complete unity (a common tenet of the Platonists). The letter of scripture must be transcended, even the flesh or humanity of Christ. Love presses on beyond the dualism of personality, beyond the human nature of Christ as Redeemer to the naked Logos as He was before the world was (*γυμνὸς λόγος*). Maximus' *διαδρὰς τὸ ποικίλον* is Plotinus' *τὰ πολλὰ ἀφίεις εἰς ἓν σπεύδειν* and Hegel's resolution of all manifold and all antinomies (see Wallace's Introduction to the *Logic*). Love leads to complete blindness to every vision but that of God the Beloved. In God we see only the Monad (undifferentiated Godhead), to which the monachism of our soul is correlative. If discipleship (*μαθητεία*) begins *πρὸς σάρκα* it must not so continue (quoting 2 Cor. v 16); 'faith's journey ends' in *ἁπλῆ πρὸς τὸν Λόγον χωρὶς . . . καλυμμάτων τοῦ νόος προσβολή*. The humanity is rather a hindrance to full knowledge of God and complete absorption in His love. Maximus certainly tried to bring out the element of *freedom* and *individuality*,—which implies the need of man's co-operation in the redemptive work. But how can man freely love a God who is inaccessible and incommunicable? God, as in Spinoza's system, must not be expected to 'love back': in Dorner's excellent phrase He only *absorbs*, He does not return our affection.

[1] *ἀεὶ θέλων γεννᾶται Χριστὸς μυστικῶς διὰ τῶν σωζομένων* (notice the *present* tense employed agreeably to his view on *freedom*) *κ. μήτερα πάρθενον ἀπεργαζόμενος τὴν γεννῶσαν ψυχήν in Or. Domin.* i. 354). The Soul is the Virgin Mother who bears the Saviour. He is said to be born anew in us, when the soul expresses itself in the higher virtues. The *will* of the Christian conditions this *rebirth* of the Logos and His continuous descent into the world of men. This will is *νοῦς ὀρεκτικὸς* wherein intellect, emotion (love) and steadfast will are *at* one or *as* one.

General Character of Hellenistic Mysticism : Historic Christ in the Background.—By the side of these *churchly* and *speculative* Mystics, there are traces of a pure mystical and ascetic pietism in the east which by no means exalted the external means of grace or the visible organism of an ecclesiastical society. These too employed the ' dionysiac ' similes (like the Sufis of Islam) and spoke of the ἕνωσις as γάμος, γεῦσις, συγκρᾶσις, ἁφὴ, μέθη even συμφύρεσθαι θεῷ. With the platonists they looked upon the practice of ordinary virtues and obedience to church rules and creed as the *rudiments*,—as a mere negative or cleansing process. The true end is (as with Philo) a *subjective* frame of mind, of which *objective* sacraments were only symbols. Thus they had something in common with the paulicians and much with modern Dissent. The supporters of the Church, opposing this *pelagian* merit and capacity, preferred to lay stress on man's complete ignorance of God : let us suppress thought and discourse and articulate prayer ; let us show our unquestioning devotion to the Church and her sacred *cultus*, those (magical) rites, which veil, while they image forth, Deity. Even the orthodox Christology was imperfect and Christ was regarded by them rather as example and pioneer in an achievement open to every man (Macarius, Marcius the Hermit, John of the Ladder).

APPENDIX M

Pantheism in Edessa : Bar-Sudaili

Edessene Syncretism.—The movement of which ' Dionysius ' was chief expositor has a curious history. Whatever may be the truth about the conversion of King Abgar of Edessa, it is certain that this town became the centre of a very peculiar syncretism, which had a strong influence upon Christian sects and philosophy within the church, as well as upon that singular development ' arabian thought '. Here there still survived traces of the old planetary religion of Babel and Christian converts in this region by no means forgot the older traditions and myths.[1] On the site of Edessa, a hellenistic centre, there had been an ancient city where aryan influence and indo-iranian gods are found at an early date. About cent. xv and

[1] In any exhaustive account of origins it would be needful to refer again to the peculiar forms of syro-Christian speculation, as shown in the clementine *Homilies* and *Recognitions*, certainly emanating from this district in cent. iii : but space does not allow and the two names here treated will be proof enough.

xiv B.C. we know that the Mitani brought into chaldean star-cult a creed still celestial and 'atmospheric' but much more human and personal. There were also Hittites there in still earlier days, *c. 2000* B.C. or the age of Hammurabi. The people were chiefly aramaic; under Esarhaddon and his successor to the fall of Assur (*c. 660–600*) Jews were settled there (Schiffer). Restored and called Edessa by Seleucus I (after the town in Macedon *c. 300* B.C.) it became a centre of greek learning, though the popular tongue would still be aramaic. On the decline of the seleucids house, arab influence passed in from the desert: a native 'bedouin' dynasty of *toparchs* is set up *c. 130* B.C. under Antiochus VII (von Gutschmid)—with names in the main *arabic*, though parthian influence brought it some *persian* forms. This State lasted (with varying fortunes and extent) for 350 years on the confines of the two world-empires. Including Harran, Nisibis, Tigranocerta, Samosata, Melitene, it must have been the meeting-place of every human culture and religion. One edessene prince seems to worship Atergatis, to judge from an inscription on a tall pillar (as in Lucian's *Dea Syria*) in front of a temple equipped with her sacred fish-ponds. Rendel Harris believes that these pillars were sacred also to the Dioscuri under greek influence—'twin brethren' who become with facile syncretism *Jesus* and *Judas—Thomas—Addai* (apocr. *Acta Thomæ*). At Edessa (or Adiabenè) the Old Testament was rendered into *syriac*; revised and adopted by the church it survived the shipwreck of all early syriac writings. The Gospel may have begun here in the Jews' community—about the time of Bardaisan's birth (*154* A.D.) of pagan parents of harranian type.

Bardaisan and Emanation.—Among gnostic leaders no one is more interesting than this Bardaisan of Edessa (*c. 154–220* A.D.); priest in the temple of Mabug (Hierapolis), foster brother of an Abgarid (who reigned (*212–217*); first, a follower of Valentine's heresy but in later life an orthodox convert;[1] apologist under Antoninus son of Severus ('Caracalla' *211–217*); missioner in Armenia after *212*; writer of a great *corpus* of christian hymnody; lastly, learned disputer on religion with indian envoys to the court of Rome; dying in the same year as his fellow-countryman, Emperor Elagabal—who had by a strange accident carried to Rome one of the peculiar religions of that prolific syrian district. As to the conversion of his foster-brother Abgar IX bar Manu there is great doubt (cf. Gomperz *Arch. Epigr. Mittheil.* Austr. Hung. xix 154: in *216* after great damage done to the buildings of the city by flood we find 'temple of 'the Christians' entered as a sect, not as a religion of the court). Very few other figures even of that remarkable period (*c. 130–250*) give us a richer idea of the intellectual ferment and variety then prevailing in the east. But he is named here, in an episode upon pantheism, because he wrote against Marcion's dualism and held that creation was a process whereby the world emanated from God, 'father of all living'. His pupil,

[1] I here prefer the witness of Eusebius and Moses of Chorenè: Epiphanius and Abul Faraj reverse this; 'at first a churchman' he became, like Tertullian, his western contemporary, corrupted by sectarian doctrines (cf. Haase *Zur Bardesanischen Gnosis*).

cited by Eusebius,[1] holds that nations and men lie under the stars and planets, in the true spirit of ancient Babel; and he allows to these luminaries a deputed authority from God. This belief rises later (as we have seen) into prominence in the 'arabs' like Avicenna and Averroes who, mingling this astrology with peripatetic and platonic dogma, were at once forgotten and proscribed in the muslim world; though they were able to hand on the system in the west and to rouse the second great movement in Scholasticism.[2] Man's spirit can however attain freedom when it emerges from the material sphere. This doctrine may represent the Right (or more orthodox) Wing of Bardaisan's disciples; a Left Wing certainly moved toward the abrupt dualism of early Parsism which Mani revived in later time (F. C. Burkitt, *Early Eastern Christianity*).

Ferment of Nestorians and Monophysites.—Here (after *363*) settled Ephrem Syrus,[3] and here and at Nisibis a cordial welcome was extended to expelled *nestorians*. Under Justinian the opposite school of *monophysites* began to raise their heads: a century later (*638*) Edessa passed under muslim dominion and became the channel by which Plato and Aristotle were introduced to the small circle of liberal culture in Islam and so indirectly to the west.

Sudaili's Nihilistic Pantheism.—One of Edessa's most typical products was Barsudaili, who lived under the reigns of Leo, Zeno, and Anastasius I (*c. 460–520* A.D.). He is the most extreme member of the *pantheizing* or eutychian section who opposed the nestorian distinction of Two Natures. He held that *all nature is consubstantial with God, has emanated from Him and must in the end return to Him by absorption*. He is therefore, like Origen, a universalist; in the end the worst sinner and holiest saint will be at one and equal in God;—had not Bardaisan talked with indian pantheists and held tenets which resembled this emanatist theory? First there is[4] posited Absolute Being, or the Universal Essence, (quite in the fashion of Schelling and Hegel); the twin and parallel emanations, of *spirit* and *matter*: next, the ethical side is dwelt upon, the soul's personal experience as it seeks a perfect life here, and is afterwards gradually united with the divine element.[5] The aim is to be so completely identified with the (spiritual) Christ that when He resigns all power to the Father our particular life and consciousness shall be lost in the abyss of Godhead

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[1] Nau has edited *Livre des Lois des Pays* (Paris 1899).

[2] After 1200 in the writings of Albert and Aquinas.

[3] The barbarian Emperor Zeno preceded Justinian's acts of 529–532 in closing forcibly Ephrem's 'persian' school in 489.

[4] Frothingham's ed. Leiden 1886.

[5] After a study of I, The Absolute Being, we have II, Various species of movement and ascent of *mind* to *God* in which process it must endure Christ's sufferings; III, Resurrection of *mind*, struggles with evil powers and final identification with Christ; IV, The *mind* becomes one, first with Christ, next with the Spirit, then with the Father and is finally absorbed. V, All nature becomes confounded with the Father, all distinct existence and even God Himself passes away; Essence alone remains.'

Frothingham (l.c. 49) calls 'his system openly pantheistic' or rather 'pan-nihilistic; all nature down to the lowest forms of animal life simply 'emanating from the Divinity or Chaos and in the end returning to it: 'when the consummation is complete God Himself passes away and every-'thing is swallowed up in indefinite Chaos,—which he thinks the *first* 'principle and *end* of being, admitting of no distinction'.[1] It has been held that this work of syriac pantheism (not without distinct indian influence) is the source of all the pseudo-dionysian writings. Others again suppose that in his *Book of Hierotheus on Secret Mysteries of God's House*, Barsudaili wrote a pendant and logical conclusion for them.[2]

Importance of this Doctrine for Heresy and for Orthodox Realism.—Whatever may be the exact relation to the dionysian writings, it cannot well be doubted that in these two lie the spur and incentive to pantheism in our own Middle Age. We are not then at fault in laying stress upon the influence of this peculiar thought-form, not only upon Islam shortly after but also on the Christian west. No doubt mysticism is everywhere the same and needs not to borrow; but affiliation can clearly be traced in this case. First through Erigena, then through Averroes, the syrian doctrine was made familiar to the western mind, to issue at last in a defiant and heretical form; whilst the *Hierarchies* (still reputed orthodox) form the text-book of the new churchly mysticism of cent. xiii. It is plainly origenist and so far gnostical as Origen had used the stolen weapons of *gnosis* against itself; its universalism is that of the sect of *ἰσόχριστοι* among the origenizing hermits of Egypt (*Evagr.* iv 38). It follows Origen in being not an *immediate* pantheism but a *process of pantheizing*, by which in the end all things will be transfused into God. He therefore retains the notion of development through history towards a goal not yet realized.[3] The present world-age 'which Christ called the evil period'[4] corresponds to the sixth day of the week; and the sabbatic period ('on the third day I shall cease') is a chiliastic interval before God becomes all in all and everything is of a single nature. Thus, although he does not assume actual divinity for things, yet *potentially* they are of like substance (even the demons).[5] In its development from monophysite views, it is not

[1] Yet on this work Theodosius, Patriarch of Antioch (887–896), comments with marked sympathy and approval.

[2] The name *Hierotheus* is familiar enough in the dionysian treatises; did he write them all and add a last ratification of the doctrine under his own name? Cf. *Div. Nom.* § 3 where Hierotheus is professedly Dionysius' teacher. Cf. Frothingham and Ryssel (*Zeitsch. für Kirch. Gesch.*).

[3] Whereas eastern pantheism (with its kindred or copies as a rule) is quite timeless and recognizes no purpose that is not realized at this moment here and now: cf. the absolutist writers in modern english philosophy.

[4] Curiously resembling the indian *kali-yuga*.

[5] Xenaias wrote a letter warning the people of Edessa against him: he had denied eternal punishment, abolished baptism and the sacraments, written in his cell 'All nature is consubstantial with God' and in a panic

difficult to see an emphasis on this tenet: 'divine and human natures 'were brought to harmony and sameness in Christ, because *humanity* in 'general is in essence divine'.[1] Now the Areopagite kept closely to the church and its symbols 'of heavenly things': just as in St. Austin the strong mystical and personal element is forced into partnership with outward catholicity and churchly observance.[2] But Barsudaili goes much further: there is no need of a church at all. 'All Scotus Erigena is in Barsudaili', says Harnack with truth. The heterodox mystics who alarmed Authority about *1200* were pupils of the Syrians rather than of Dionysius, who with some little ingenuity can be adjusted with orthodoxy. Now the orthodox church had already accepted a very personal mysticism and its basal dogma was a realism which blurred the distinct outlines of *singulars* and denied their worth unless they became wholly *typical*. This was a part of their hellenistic heritage in the first period as well as in the second—that is from Erigena (*850*) to Abelard, and again after the invasion of arabian and peripatetic doctrine. It is therefore not in the least surprising that the vague monistic sects of Amalric and David excited no less horror and alarm than did the frank paulician dualism of the Albigenses.

APPENDIX N

The Euchite Sect

This sect seems to be an offshoot of syrian monachism in cent. iv, aiming perhaps at a purely spiritual worship in days when the influence of the secular State was keenly felt upon the church after the alliance of Constantine. It cannot be denied, however, that in them there emerge again to light very ancient features already seen in Essenes and Therapeuts and certain societies of the further east. The Euchites, besides their most familiar name (from εὐχὴ and their doctrine of unceasing prayer), were called *Messalians* (*aramaic* for to pray), *Choreutæ* from their mystical dances, *Enthusiasts* from their claim to inspiration as the direct vehicles of the Holy Ghost. The names of certain prominent leaders also gave them the titles Adelphians, Eustathians, Marcianists, Lampetians. In *390* Flavianus, bishop of Antioch, induced the aged *Adelphius* of Edessa by pretending sympathy, to disclose to him all the secret teaching of the sect. He then chastised, excommunicated and drove into exile the heretics, convicted on their own avowal. They took refuge in Pamphylia and were again condemned by the Synod of Sidè. Some found a home in Armenia

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erased it again; cf. Barhebræus (= Abul Faraj) *Assem. Bibl. Orient.* ii, 30, 32.

[1] It is noted that, unlike Bardaisan and Origen, he made no point of liberty and human free-will, but rather taught a form of fatalism.

[2] All medieval development comes from one or other side of St. Austin: he is at once the founder of the *Catholic* Church of the Middle Age and of its rival, mystical and *protestant* individualism.

(where Christian belief was always of a peculiar kind) and others caused some excitement in the eastern capital itself. Emperor Theodosius issued decrees against them (cf. *Cod. Theod.* xvi *de hær.* vi 187) and the Council of Ephesus condemned their chief work *Asceticus*.[1] *Lampetius*, another secret leader, was a catholic priest in the diocese of (Cappadocian) Cæsarea; his bishop Alypius cited him to answer to the charge of immorality and contempt of the use of church-music as 'legal bondage'. He wrote the *Testament* to which the reply of Severus the Monophysite is still extant. Under Justinian a roman pontiff is said to have expressed himself satisfied with the orthodoxy of *Marcian*, then the leader of the sect. After a long silence or oblivion, their memory was revived when the kindred sect of bogomils appeared on the scene.

They held a singular belief, the converse of the comforting *parsi* theory of a *fravashi* or the guardian-angel of Christians. 'Every one is from his 'birth possessed by a devil who prompts him to sin'. Baptism cannot expel it: it may wash away former offences but leaves the source of evil untouched. The only remedy is intense prayerfulness; after which the demon may be visibly seen to pass out as a sow with her young ones (St. Augustin, *Hær.* 57). Full of this idea of conflict with the unclean powers, they danced to subdue the flesh and to trample on demons. 'When 'the devil is gone out', they believe that a union with the Holy Spirit ensues; the euchite becomes 'partaker in the divine nature' in the most literal sense. They repeat the similes of the heavenly Bridegroom and the blissful marriage of the converted soul. Epiphanius (*Hær.* 80) says that on hearing mention of an angel or patriarch or prophet—even of our Saviour Himself—they say 'That am I myself'. They claimed to see visions denied to others, to prophesy, to read the hearts of men, and to know the condition of the departed. They regarded Baptism and the Eucharist with complete indifference and despised the 'legal bondage' of fixed liturgy and monastic discipline. Like the Apostolics in medieval Italy or Germany, they refused to work, insisting that their whole time was spent in ceaseless prayer. They brought into vogue the (buddhist) ideal of the mendicant life and renouncing the world and its cares roamed about like the Circumcellions. They slept in the open streets and begged their way along. It was said by their foes that their perfection was *inamissible* as with the gnostics; that is, that outward acts of sin were quite indifferent to their inward virtue.

It is clear that they carried on a tradition which was by no means wholly Christian and imparted their long subterranean teaching to the 'paulitz-'ians' and bogomils of later times. They are therefore an interesting link between the period just dismissed and the medieval church which we are about to treat in the Fourth Division of our work.

[1] It is from this still extant volume that John of Damascus gleaned the summary of their chief tenets, for purposes of refutation in later time.

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DIVISION D

Authority and Free Thought in the Middle Ages

PART I

The Monistic Church

CHAPTER I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE PERIOD.

Section I. Powers and Competence of the Church

Gregory I. as Starting Point for Western Development.—The period to be now briefly reviewed is held to extend from Gregory I (*c. 600*) to the catastrophe of the Papacy under Boniface VIII: though a glance may be given at the issues and developments in a yet later age, and we may have to include (for some purposes) the period ending with the settlement of the Turks in Europe (*1453*). All dates are arbitrary and all periods artificial, —each being a tract or segment cut off at will from a continuous and unbroken history, each moment deeply laden with the past and pregnant of the future. Every writer within such a given area seeks to justify his choice of starting-point and close; and this course may well be expected from the writer of a monograph. Pope Gregory is last of roman officials and first of medieval popes and in him the moment of transition from the old to the new order, is most conspicuous. Both in politics, in church system and in moral teaching, he sets a precedent and example which later times did their best to follow. He almost broke with the byzantine Cæsar: he looked north and west for new fields of mission enterprise; he supported and defended the roman duchy and fed its poor; he made accessible the doctrines

and discipline of St. Austin and popularized a system of faith and morals which was never seriously questioned for several centuries. In him every feature and every aim of the western church becomes at once clearly marked. His successors had nothing to do but to apply his principles and methods to a new crisis or a novel material. In him the canon of the roman church was, as it were, finally closed and sealed.[1]

Collapse of East Rome : Futility of Heraclius' wars.—Scarcely less important was the date (*600*) for the Empire itself : I have elsewhere pointed out the serious *momentum* which the murder of Maurice gave to its decline.[2] Under an ignorant and brutal centurion, suddenly raised by mutiny to power, the entire tradition of Rome was lost, just as her armies were well nigh annihilated. Persia, lately the friend and ally of the Empire, became her deadly foe in avenging the death of Maurice, the benefactor and restorer of Chosroes. Heraclius inherited a futile quarrel and used up the resources of both empires in his persian wars, leaving exhausted and disaffected countries as an easy prey to the muslim. The regions which remained roman were reorganized on wholly different lines by the heraclian dynasty, and byzantine culture entered on its dark ages.

Barbarism in Gaul : Brief Reaction under Charles.—In the further west this era marks (certainly for Gaul) the victory of barbarism, the triumph of feudal self-will over uniform control, the beginning of that period of steady decentralization and particularism. Against this tendency Charles' monarchy was but the brief and unsuccessful reaction of one strong and persevering man. Therefore in the appearance of new elements and principles, in the vanishing of old traditions and landmarks, the year *600* is a suitable starting point for our inquiry.

End of the Medieval World and its Ideals (in *1453*).—Nor is the second arbitrary date (*1453*) selected without good reason. That year saw the end of english pretensions to the french throne, the return of our policy homewards to insular concerns. It proved the absolute decay of chivalry and the crusading ideal, for no Christian power went to help the last defenders of New

[1] I need not again refer to the admirable monograph of Dr. Dudden, 2 vols, Longmans, 1905.

[2] *Constitut. Hist. R. Emp.* 2 vols, Longmans, 1912.

Rome. The hopeless failure of the constitutional or conciliar movement in the western church was then made plain; and the popes decided to abandon ideal claims or duties and instead to create a profitable italian princedom out of a visionary world-empire. About that time Nicolas of Cusa was writing those works which display him as last of the Scholastics and first of modern speculators. Kingship was busy divesting itself of its knightly and romantic character, to model its policy on the selfish italian 'tyrant'. The unscrupulous and competitive aims of the modern State came into full view and were pursued without disguise. The 'Holy Roman Empire' under Frederick III became a laughing-stock and its claims to represent and supervise Christendom were entirely laid aside. Once more, on the far eastern frontier, the sons of Russia were preparing to throw off the tartar yoke of the Golden Horde, to create as the new bulwark against the yellow peoples a curious blend of monarchy, half-mongolian, half-byzantine. In the field of thought and culture, fresh notions and principles were being propounded, and in the social fabric chief power was already passing to the trading class who made the new kingship their instrument. All the aims of our modern society—competitive, egoistic and utilitarian—came into the foreground; and the archaic ideals and sanctions were forgotten or discarded. The last check upon self-seeking secularism, an ecumenical but poor and spiritual papacy, was transformed (as we shall see) into a small and ambitious kingdom of this world.

Conflict of the Old and New Ideals.—Few students of history or of religion can doubt that the interval thus marked out is one of the most interesting periods in the records of mankind. The following five centuries only show, even in their most complex results and issues, the logical deduction of a very few rudimentary principles,—the duty (for the new State-organism as well as for the unit) of survival and self-preservation, the aim of enjoyment and profit, the supreme laws of competition and self-interest. But in the centuries under review the old and the new are blended or shown in violent antithesis: the passion for peace and unity (at least as an ideal) even in the most selfish and violent breasts, the recognition by all of a universal law,[1] the deference (though it be merely titular) to a central power wholly without

[1] Even by men who never respected it themselves.

active means of defence or coercion, the general acknowledgment of an all-embracing church-state whose discipline and doctrine would last as long as the world. Yet from the minds of a society, in theory so homogeneous and harmonious, there arise from time to time cautious questionings as to the truth and finality of the tenets or the system. Few desired the break-up of a crystalline unity, either in dogma or society, even in their most wanton moments of rebellion; just as few reformers in cent. xv and xvi really wished to overthrow the papacy, or the feudal baron to abolish the monarchy.

Rupture into Fragmentary Life of Modern Times.—But little by little economic facts worked with these sceptical critics to transform Christendom into a group of hostile powers which did not recognize a common creed or a common umpire for their quarrels, whose truces were only suspended hostilities. The average citizen or subject again, instead of finding his place in life as member of a gild or tenant with certified rights under a manor, began to confront directly a central power with ever-augmented claims and means to enforce them. *Status* or the caste-system (it is said) gives way before free *contract*, and individuals covenant with each other. But in the case of nine-tenths of mankind freedom of contract is a pure mockery and there is no choice at all. All these developments are seen in the welter of medieval ideals and practice, so often wholly at variance. By degrees, out of the unnatural unity of an impossible ideal, the divers elements emerge more definite and more hostile; and at last succeed in breaking up human life into the irreconcilable, complex and separate departments in which we find it to-day.

Meaning of Authority: Not Coercive.—Our first duty is to define Authority and ask what was this power under which the helpless remnants of classical society as well as the new invading races were glad to shelter themselves. First, it was not a civil or a political power and (for a long time at least) it had no real coercive force behind it. It is hard for us to-day to conceive of any law or authority which is not at once *coercive* and *compulsory*, to many of its victims, *arbitrary* and even *unjust*. The accidental congeries, entitled States or nations to-day, have been built up by force, by kingly ambition, or by mercantile adventure. The favourite modern definitions of Law have divested it of every shred of moral meaning or appeal: it is the command of a

superior (whether *de facto* is also *de jure* does not matter). It is a uniform procrustean norm applied without respect of persons to every one living within certain arbitrary lines or frontiers. The extra-territorial or consular jurisdictions, soon to vanish, are the last relics of a time, when (as in most parts of our epoch) law was *personal* and each man carried about with him his own code as an inalienable birthright : violence might disregard this in act, but no one ever challenged the theory.

Modern Conception of Law as (non-moral) Force.—In the background of our law is *coercive* force which leaves no alternative but submission ; for the unit, one of a multitude of disconnected atoms, cannot question or defy it. In spite of some play of sentiment at times of crisis, there is no feeling of loyalty to law *as such*, because it makes no appeal to any emotion but fear or the instinct of self-interest. It is not strictly a moral force because, being universal and uniform, it only prescribes a *minimum* of social observance and confines itself (like the decalogue) mainly to *negatives* and prohibition. For positive ethical duties it leaves the subject to other influences, which it will not seek to control unless they threaten its supremacy in its own province. It provides a framework within which the unit is safeguarded and enabled (by securing other guidance) to work out his life. But the area over which it claims autocratic power is so wide that it cannot please or satisfy every section within it, and it sometimes fetters as much as it sets free. Meantime, having left out of reckoning all appeal to motive (except its own, State-utility or the 'common good') it has nothing to fall back upon in case of criticism or defiance except *force*. *Force* has now become the most striking characteristic in the conception of *Law*.

Church Supplied the Place of the State after *600* : Its Respect for the Individual.—After the fall of the roman bureaucracy, of the official and legal system, Law (in most of these centuries) was rarely strengthened by the physical arm or by the sanction of immediate penalty. It was a matter not of autocratic ordinance for a vast dominion, but a birthright of race or even family. The State (as Romans conceived it and as the modern mind again conceives it) had disappeared in the west. A man must be strong enough to enforce his birthright in person ; otherwise his titular 'rights' would not be respected. Hence a strange scene

of lawlessness, anarchy and violence—depicted in too black colours by historians equipped with very imperfect knowledge and very strong prejudices. But the uncertainty at least was bad enough; no man could be sure of winning respect for his personal rights, which to him appeared vested in the very nature of things. Alone in this precarious society, the Church of Rome upheld the idea of equity and uniform treatment, in all matters wherein uniformity was good and wholesome. Alone it maintained a perfectly coherent system of social duty and guidance. It might modify or correct, but it never challenged, the special laws of race and tribe: it only embraced those petty 'taboos' or regulations in its own directive framework. It never sought to carry out sweeping reforms on idealistic lines; and like St. Paul it publicly and officially upheld slavery as an institution, while in private it softened its worst features. It is no paradox to say that its strength lay not so much in its *catholicity* as in its provision for *individualism*. It became 'catholic' because its real aim was to bring home general truths to the unit and make 'universals' intelligible to the lay-mind of very ignorant converts.

St. Augustin and Ecclesiastical Opportunism: Catholicity of the Church.—The aim of the church was *opportunist*. The day was past when the Christian message and promise might seem to belong only to an 'assembly of the perfected', as the followers of Montanus, Novatus and Donatus had taught. Its part was to let the tares and wheat grow up together 'until the 'harvest'. St. Austin, who sets the tone and gives the dogmatic basis for the whole period, may be best known as the writer of the *City of God*, in which *ecclesia* and *seculum* are sternly contrasted. But he is no less remarkable (and far more important in influence) for his careful adjustment of church-law to the needs and capacity of the unit. Alliance with the Empire had fixed once and for all ecclesiastical policy; the church must make the best of the world as a whole and nothing must be left outside its competence or its kindly control. The ideal of a perfect spiritual community was surrendered (we cannot doubt it) with sighs and regrets. But henceforward her rulers had no option; by every permissible means the world must be kept within the net of the church. Hence accommodation, compromise, special permission, licences and indulgences for the individual

(on which the modern mind looks with comparative favour); hence on the other hand, persecution, suppression of free thought, religious wars, sanguinary crusades against muslim and heretics, the stake, the rack and the Inquisition. All these features are logical deductions from the momentous change of policy under Constantine. Then, in place of a group of convinced and converted believers (a group standing out in contrast and conflict with a naughty world), there arose the ideal of a single community, conterminous with human society, an ark from which no one was either to be excluded or allowed to escape to perdition. Civil and churchly, secular and spiritual, were but different sides of the same State. From one point of view religion made an irretrievable sacrifice of completeness and perfection; from another, in a very real sense it ' gained the whole world '.

The Monk and the Confessor : Radical Distinction of Two Lives.—The church then in *theory* maintained a most lofty and exacting code; in *practice* it modified this rigour to suit times, seasons and persons. Hence two institutions which have most excited unmerited blame—the *directorate* and the *conventual celibate life*. In the monastic system a place was left for a ' church ' of the perfect '—to which lofty ideal it was not supposed that every believer could attain. But provision was made for this exceptional spirituality, while a lower standard was required from average men. In the absence of civil law or central authority, the laymen could not safely be left to themselves; like the Jesuits in Paraguay, or the exponents of modern Socialism, the church believed that its subjects stood in hourly need of particular guidance. While its permanent rules were severe, the daily exercise or application was tender and considerate. Allowance might be made for ignorance, and by means of *penance* every law could be so modified as to press not unduly on the sinner. If the church is accused of maintaining its own sovereignty only by undermining its basis, it must also be remembered that it was the only force that could exert sovereignty at all. Both before rulers and in dealing with the great ignorant mass, it was bound to be ' time-serving ' and opportunist. Neither from the powerful nor the humble could it exact the highest standard : hence the radical distinction of cleric and layman, of the two orders; hence the carefully defined grades of sanctity

and merit,[1] works of supererogation, and the 'tariff' of penance (which later writers compared with unjust contempt to the barbaric *wergeld*).

Church as All-Inclusive Ark : Schism Most Heinous Sin.—This Authority then, the only one acknowledged by all men in western Europe, was neither autocratic nor (in its essence) coercive. No doubt St. Austin had set a perilous precedent by his welcome of civil force to crush the Donatists, and had shown against critics how wise and right and scriptural it was to 'compel them to come in'.[2] But it is important to remember that even when it had coercion at hand or in reserve, the church used it with reluctance and regret. If an individual was in dogmatic error, or open sin, it preferred to plead, to convert, to convince. The western branch never had that hatred of speculative heterodoxy which was the platonic heritage of the eastern—there heresy, the 'lie in the soul', was the chief crime. Rome, more social and less intellectual [3] held schism or open rebellion against the powers that be as the deadliest sin : the spiritual Ark was not the invisible church of correct orthodoxy, but the visible society outside of which there could be no salvation.

Freedom and Coercion under Roman Empire : Church Succeeds to Its Duties.—Effective coercion is a means of government which only of very late years has passed into the hands of rulers : autocracy is quite a modern discovery. Ancient times had no such forces at their disposal. In the primitive tribe (it is true) public opinion was despotic and denied progress or free thought to its members : all wisdom and all power to conciliate the gods were lodged in the council of the elders or more rarely in the priest-king. Monarchy and empire brought detachment from the group, that is freedom. It is curious to contrast the state-ridden citizen of ostracizing Athens or censorious Rome with the

[1] Even in a church which clung loyally to St. Austin's doctrines of universal sinfulness.

[2] In the african Church, *Tertullian* stood for exclusiveness and a 'Church of the elect', like modern Calvinism ; but Austin's master was in truth *Cyprian*, before whose eyes there first unrolled a definite scheme of universalism and comprehension.

[3] The extraordinary dearth of reflection or theology in the Capital of Christendom during this age must strike every student : the entire energy of Rome (when the papacy was free from feudal clutches) was absorbed in applying accepted dogma, in organizing and in administration.

travelling Hellenist under the Diadochi or St. Paul under Nero. Lucan is right in saying *cum domino pax ista venit*, that is, social stability can only exist under a strong central government which allows no ' private wars ' and no privileged caste. But he might in fairness have added : culture, trade, progress, enlightenment, even liberty (in any true sense) seem to need the same strong and irresponsible protector. The roman world had now lost its centre and pivot ; Emperor Maurice sent money to Gregory I instead of troops, begging him to buy off the Lombards as he could not spare soldiers to defend Rome :—this moment was the *gran rifiuto*, the great abdication of imperial Rome. The Heraclíads treated the west as a conquered province ; the Iconoclasts as a hostile nation of disloyal sectaries : but (as in Britain) the real hour of divorce and rupture sounded when the centre refused any longer to defend its subjects. The claim for the fullest autonomy was a mere matter of time. A searching autocracy, a power in some respects not less interfering than a modern ' Absolute State ', had really administered the people since perhaps the time of Hadrian (*c. 130*). Like modern bureaucracy, it had been a costly and oppressive contrivance in its later years. Since Diocletian (*c. 300*) the emperor had counted for less and less ; except Constantine and Theodosius (both called forth by a crisis), all his successors were the secluded and ignorant puppets of a court clique.[1] The impersonal machine continued grinding until the original force or *momentum* failed, when the civil and official class was no longer forthcoming. Into its place the Roman Church was called, without any of the old means for enforcing its will. It must persuade if it could not coerce. It had a divine mission to keep the *seculum* in something like order until the End. That it succeeded even so well as it did, in a heroic and almost hopeless task, is a striking proof of the Divine favour.

Papacy Forced to Assume Secular Dominion : Secularism and Feudal Seizure.—The church was unable to reject any of the

[1] I have pointed out elsewhere that even Justinian (whom Agathias called ' first real autocrat in deed as well as name ') was by no means an absolute monarch—in the sense in which Louis XI or XIV or Cromwell and Napoleon were absolute. The whole aim of Diocletian was to eliminate chance in the succession, or outside control of the prince's government. But he only succeeded in creating a Frankenstein's monster, over which the emperor's personal will could exert but little influence, where his efforts at reform were thwarted, derided and quietly ignored by vested interests.

earthly means of influence. Gregory I might be termed the first ' pope-king ', because he really fed the roman poor from his own estates and the vast areas left by the pious to church uses. Secular dominion was thrust upon him. If ever the title-deeds to temporal authority are unblemished it was the case with the papacy. A modern king lineally represents the captain of a sworn band of brigands ; and the longer his title, the worse his original claim is likely to be on purely moral grounds.[1] But temporal power and estate came by popular consent and approval to the papacy, much as some of its most loyal sons have regretted this entanglement. One result was a wealthy church among a poor people ; a pride and pomp, dislike of which was a chief lever in the paulician attack (in cent. xi and xii). Another was a still more serious drawback ; the seizure of spiritual office by feudal families, on account of its attendant worldly gods. Under the Merwings the Gallican Church was feudalized, and its benefices filled by cadets of noble lineage. So the papacy itself from the time of Theophylact (*900*) and his house, to the last vestiges of Tusculan influence (*1050*).[2] In later times french and german bishoprics, often carrying temporal power with the see, became hereditary appanages ; and on the eve of revolution (*1789*) the church in France was cleft into two parts, an aristocratic clique, monopolizing the profits, and a very democratic and plebeian priesthood, performing the duties. Yet the influence of Rome on the whole made decidedly against such a perversion of sacred funds. The church provided the sole avenue for merit and the only career for ability; now that the titular monarchy was surrounded by feudal nobles with hereditary office, who prevented the king from choosing his servitors or instructing his ministers.

Church's Basis Democratic : or, the Unit is of Value.—In spite of its wealth, the church was *democratic* ; that is, it regarded

[1] Exception must be made in the case of *free election* as in Norway of a *foreign* prince ; of Holland, Montenegro, or Serbia, where a *native* family is raised for public services ; of Belgium, Greece and some Balkan States, where an alien ruler, nominally chosen by the people he is to rule, is really imposed by foreign chancelleries.

[2] It was in reaction from this second enslavement to feudalism that Hildebrand set up his ideal of a purely spiritual monarchy and a celibate priesthood—equal units under a despotic centre, the tenets of worldly *democracy* to-day (in its modern and paradoxic meaning, see note p. 656).

all its units as immortal beings with an eternal destiny hereafter, inherent rights and duties in this world. In an age, sometimes dismissed as 'realistic', the *value of the individual* was a primary axiom.[1] He is not the naked unit of later times, tricked out with nominal 'natural rights', which neither the State nor circumstance can afford to recognize; but he is the 'brother for whom Christ died'. In the church, both militant and triumphant, there was an open career; a serf's son could become a saint or a pope here, and enjoy the Beatific Vision hereafter. Facts were often adverse to this recognition of equality, but no medieval student can afford to ignore the *democratic* principle which lay throughout at the very roots of the church-system.

Section II. Character and Aims of the Enlightened Opposition

Summary : Permanent Tutelage : Claims of the Subordinate Sciences.—We have seen then that the church was the successor of the Empire as the sole control and self-conscious authority, that it professed to give guidance to all its members in this life and salvation in the next, that in the great powers exerted in this function—rather forced upon it than usurped—it did not at once claim to be autocratic or coercive, but indeed persuasive and conciliatory, and that it did not disparage the unit as such, or his worth and freedom. There were intervals when bishops and popes were wholly ignorant of this tutelary mission, times when its wealth was seized and made subservient to secular interests;[2] but at no time was the sacred tradition allowed to become wholly extinct. But the weakness of any *tutelary* system which claims permanent tenure is obvious : also the inadequacy of any one single power to control the whole of life. At first the

[1] I need not here do more than refer the reader to Gierke's *Politics in the Middle Ages*, ed. F. W. Maitland, and my own Bampton Lectures 1905.

[2] Less excusable was the feudal and royal spoliation of the Reforming Age (e.g. the scottish nobles or the new aristocracy created by Henry VIII) : more striking is the contrast between ideal and actual in the papacy, when we reach the small selfish italian principality of the Renaissance (which is surely worse than the tusculan period because far more self-conscious and enlightened). I cannot however believe (as J. A. Symonds seems to do) that Leo X ever boasted of the profits which the 'gospel-fable' brought him.

church enjoyed a clear monopoly of culture and science as well as of religion and humane morals. By degrees the daughter-departments claimed liberty in the matter of government, policy, science, justice, even morality. The very crusades to which the popes gave sanction as a distraction from brothers' quarrels, brought in new ideals of life, new economics and a new respect for men of a different faith. Politics and ethics made tentative efforts to become independent sciences; and a basis other than religious was sought for the authority of a magistrate or a judge. The revived studies of roman Law, following close on the Wars of Investiture, gave to the civil power a novel character of *democratic absolutism*.[1]

Protests of Commerce and Enlightenment: Narrow Circle of Opponents.—The needs of commerce and public order gave fresh powers to officials who enforced public order and the observance of law; who put an end to private wars, *vendetta*, and barbarous ordeals of battle. Thought and science, hitherto practised under the church's shadow and protection, brought a few of the more enlightened minds into opposition. One of the most notable and fertile theories of the time was the Double Truth,—an accommodation or compromise, which marked out, in a complete and seemingly honest dualism, the two realms of faith and knowledge, dogma and philosophy, and kept them rigidly apart.[2] It must be noted that the mutineers belong almost entirely to the old privileged classes or to the new middle class just acquiring privilege. The church never counted the masses amongst her enemies. Movements towards reform, even if originating in honest doubt or righteous indignation, were always adroitly seized and manipulated by interested parties. Selfish motives, economic temptations, sectional interests, account for the success of such movements; the noble and the burgher were at one in desiring freedom from a control now becoming irksome and a

[1] From the point of view of strict definition or of political science a plain contradiction in terms; for democracy (if it means anything at all) implies self-government, and very limited powers allowed to any central rulers: yet democracy has never yet failed in history to lead on to the Absolute State, to the suppression of all local franchises and autonomy to the abolition of individual freedom.

[2] The old saying will recur to mind: 'When he entered his oratory 'he shut the door of his laboratory, and when he worked in his laboratory 'he shut the door of his oratory'.

share in the church's somewhat stationary wealth.[1] Again, in the world of letters or science the pioneers of progress belonged wholly to an exclusive circle of *Intelligenzia* who, like the later Whigs, were content to believe that all the world was free and happy when they found themselves without superiors.

Purely Selfish Aim of Free-Thought: Individualism and Contempt of the Masses.—It has truly been said that by *liberty* both the classical and the medieval world implied an exclusive franchise, a valuable right or privilege which marked its owner off from his fellows. There is no sign that aristocratic thought desired any general emancipation, but only its own relief from fetters; and it is abundantly clear that rationalists like Averroes were only too anxious to uphold positive belief and church-authority on the same grounds as Voltaire or Bolingbroke—to keep the ignorant in check.[2] It is therefore important to remember that Free Thought meant only the claim to liberty made by a select and enlightened class, not any general demand for relaxing the laws of order, police, or church-discipline. Certainly this is true in the time of the Renaissance, when scholars[3] and thinkers demanded for their own behoof a suspension of ordinary moral laws, which nevertheless they felt ought to be applied in other cases. But before this age of selfish individualism, often concealing itself under a seemingly generous demand for liberty, there was a time when men were still willing to submit their theses for the *imprimatur* of the church and were surprised when charged with heresy and sedition. To the end of the chapter Free Thought (in its technical sense) never wished to quarrel with the established order, or challenge a system by which, on whatever fantasies constructed, social peace and order seems to depend. Quite early there appeared the real want of

[1] Too often it must be confessed a wealth leaving its own kingdoms to accumulate in Rome; or estates and benefices lavished on foreigners and absentees.

[2] Averroes thinks with the Inquisition that heretics should be killed as a public nuisance and danger. Voltaire and the Deists in cent. xvii were at one in doubting the stability of a State of atheists; and perhaps Bayle was the earliest to defend such a community, and to believe that social honesty and virtue might survive the collapse of belief in God and the hereafter.

[3] Like the 'tyrants' whom they admired and extolled while they lived and succeeded, no less than their assassins after their death.

sympathy with the poor, the struggling and the ignorant, which has always marked *intellectualist* movements.[1]

Common People Always Supporters of the Church.—The fact must then be kept in mind throughout that the people at large were in favour of the existing order. They joined willingly (like the Spaniards under Philip II and III) in the pursuit and execution of heretics and regarded with aversion and distrust the leaders of independent thought. It can of course be said that the ignorant mob were too well dragooned and infected by the obscurantists to know or appreciate truth, but it remains certain that down to very late times medieval Authority has found its chief supporters among the lower classes. It would therefore be unfair to class these medieval movements with more modern mutinies of an oppressed or disfranchised order against an inefficient despot, feudal landlords, aggressive capitalism, or a bureaucratic State. On the whole we must say that, with very few exceptions, the challengers of Authority come from an instructed class who wanted no public revolution, only private liberty to write and think; or else from a commercial order whose economic theories and interest ran counter to the obsolete methods of church-monopoly in land, in industry and in usury.

Popular Expression of Dissent in Heresy.—From the above summary of mutinous tendencies, it will be objected, I have omitted all mention of *religious* reform: but I have in passing remarked how unwilling were the pioneers of Free Thought to undermine a system which, even if falsely founded, was of conspicuous practical value. But, that besides these scattered instances of exceptional talent there were genuinely popular movements of dissent, it would be impossible to deny. Few subjects are so interesting or so obscure as the real support and significance of the popular heretical movements, cent. xi–xiii. We can perhaps now for the first time fairly estimate the secret influences and indistinct lineage of the sects of southern France, which created a greater panic in spiritual and civil rulers alike

[1] I do not forget the generous and notable innovation of the russian *Intelligenzia* which issued from the universities to propagate anarchism among the rural *moujik*; that they were bitterly disappointed goes without saying. In the partial reaction at the Elections of 1910, 1911 our 'free and enlightened electorate' were called by their friends 'beer-'swilling numskulls'.

than did the menace of Islam itself. Perhaps in connexion, but possibly quite apart from this movement, we must trace the sporadic outbursts against a worldly hierarchy ; which, starting in a demand for purity and inwardness in religion, sometimes seemed to degenerate into licence.[1]

Was Persecution of Heresy Justified ? Dissent did not Imply Freedom.—Was this nonconformity a danger to society as then constituted, and in the extirpation of the Albigenses was a public service rendered to civilization ? This is a matter which asks for careful and impartial inquiry and the task must not be shirked. At this point it need only be said that other motives were at work besides a desire for a more spiritual church and for purer conceptions of personal religion. That the new temper shown by these dissenters would have been more tolerant and propitious than the church, to the cause of enlightenment and progress, is a thesis in support of which little proof is forthcoming. It is clear that in a later age the puritans desired to form a church-state ruled by a clericalism still more potent and inquisitive than that of Rome, without those opportunist modifications of rigid law to suit the special case which made the roman supremacy tolerable. It may be permitted to doubt if the policy of the new sects was less obscurantist than the roman system ; and to believe that the policy and success of the civil and religious power in suppressing the movement are justified at the bar of history. Still, whatever the subversive or even antinomian tendencies of the sectaries may have been, they aimed like the later Independents at congregational freedom and attacked only an authoritative church-establishment supported (at that time) by coercive methods and the civil arm. This is, of course, judged by modern standards, a step in the right direction. But here once again any sure evidence is lacking. It must not be forgotten that Law is made for the ignorant and the criminal ; yet in the interests of the whole, the virtuous and enlightened must needs bow to restrictions which are not invented for his sake. ' Rules are made ' says Captain Aubertin [2] ' for fools, but the enlightened

[1] Like the objects of St. Paul's censure or certain of the followers of *gnosis* : down to the most modern times, with some temperaments, the relaxation of *ceremonial* law always seems to imply the abolition of the *moral* as well.

[2] In a despatch from the front August 1915.

are also bound by them, although they may not need them.[1] Law is for the most part regarded as a limit and *restraint*, not as a *stimulant*; this is St. Paul's plain meaning; and the State is the agent or executive of a corrective only needed because men are ignorant or vicious. Hence the danger of a *coercive* State[2] assuming the direction of positive moral guidance,—as we find advocated by some political writers of a 'realistic' tendency. Anything corrective armed with 'compulsory powers' can but be a 'schoolmaster' (Gal. iii 24) to bring into a new order; where there shall be no further coercion but only stimulant, and expression rather than compression or suppression.

Conflict summed up in Terms, Realist and Nominalist.—Last, in the purely speculative sphere, we shall find intricate or abstract problems of logic discussed with an intensity and bitterness which show plainly that their import extends far beyond a logical interest. The very name 'Middle Ages' suggests at once the 'Schoolmen' and this again, the unending debate on 'Universals' carried on by 'realist' and 'nominalist'. This subject demands the closest attention not because of its verbal dialectic but for its underlying meaning. The *realist* is the extreme authoritarian who can only conceive the *whole* as prior to the *part*, *State* to *citizen*, and *church* to *believer*.[3] The *nominalist* is anxious to justify and account for the severally existing instances of a type. Pushed by the needs of controversy and inexorable logic he will insist that the *part* is of course prior to the *whole*, which comes only gradually into being (like the 'heap' in *sorites*), built up slowly by the aggregation of atoms one by one: at what exact point it becomes a mystical unity rather than a mere 'group-name' it is not easy to decide. It is again the assent of the concourse of citizens that gives State and officials their corporate capacity. There is no 'divine right' to start

[1] Cf. Romans xiii 3, 'Rulers are not a terror to good works, but to 'the evil . . . do that which is good and thou shalt have praise of the 'same'. It is inth is restrictive and punitive sense of *law* that he says 'we are delivered from the Law . . . I had not known sin but by the 'Law' (vii 6, 7)—which is capable of two senses: 'the commandment 'ordained to life I found to be unto death' (10). So that, although in one aspect 'the Law is holy . . . and just and good' (12) aye and spiritual (14) it was in another, 'added because of offences', παραβάσεων ἕνεκα.

[2] Still more than of a coercive church.

[3] In the realm of theology, *Godhead* to *Person*.

with, in an *individual* or a *collective* centre ; but the members of a community ' pool ' their fragments of natural right or actual power and so create an artificial and resoluble State by ' social contract '. Once again (say the nominalists) it is the holiness of believers that makes a church holy ; it is holy only by the actual sum of their collective holiness : it is not the church that makes the members holy.[1] What is the aim of the Christian message ? to establish a church or a visible kingdom of God, because of the intrinsic value and beauty of such a type or species ? or to meet the needs of individuals and bring redemption and salvation within their reach ? In the end we shall see that the ' Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath.' It was the *nominalist* principle that at last won the day ; and it is not without suggestiveness that Alliacus and Gerson, the mystics, hold this doctrine and prefer the *part* to the *whole*.

[1] On this distinction perhaps the whole of Church History will be found to turn : St. Paul (Eph. iv 16) has a very peculiar sentence which might well form the *nominalist* text : ' The whole body, fitly joined together and compacted by that which *every joint* supplieth, according to the effectual working in the measure of every part, maketh increase.' But even this passage, and many others in St. Paul, bears no less witness to the *realist* argument.

CHAPTER II. AUSTIN AND PELAGIUS: THE WHOLE AND THE PART

Section I. The Donatists and Pelagian Individualism

Career of St. Austin.—The correct attitude of the church to the old and the new world (roman and teutonic) was dictated by St. Austin, who is merely recapitulated and simplified by Pope Gregory two centuries later. His final conception of things or his cosmic system is of first-rate importance as a prelude and guide to medieval studies. In his case, as in St. Paul's, a purely personal development is seen to exert the strongest influence on history. Austin (*354–430*) started with a *rationalist* theory of the world, with *Manicheism*; which, with *Buddhism* perhaps, alone satisfies the demands of ordinary reason as a complete cosmodicy.[1] His next stadium was *Platonism*; a monism which, without actually denying evil or matter, explains them away by placing the one at the extreme end of a long development from the Good, and the other as the inseparable defect (ἔλλειψις, στέρησις) of such remoteness from perfection. Austin thus substitutes for the *material* redemption of Mani, belief in the admission to an *ideal world* of whose perfect forms all earthly things are imperfect copies. At the age of thirty-three (*386*) he was suddenly converted under a fig-tree, as Buddha attained enlightenment under the *bo-tree*.

His Combats with Ghosts of His Old Self.—The first part of his life had been spent in unceasing conflict against himself: when he became a Christian, other 'antagonists stepped into his place 'in whom a part of the original Augustin himself seems always 'incarnate' (Professor Kruger). To some extent the heresies he combatted were ghosts of his former speculations, somehow embodied in tangible form. *Donatus* and *Pelagius* stood for a

[1] It will be observed that both are *dualist* in one sense or other, and both *optimist*, inasmuch as Mani promised a final triumph of the right for the whole world, Buddha a final achievement of happiness by the single soul (either now or in a later life).

theory of *personal merit* and achievement, to which in the humility of a sincere penitent he could not assent. A brand plucked from the burning, he was the ' child of miracle ', his conversion a direct divine interposition. Strongly set as his mind was towards personal religion of a spiritual and ' protestant ' type, he could allow nothing to the soul's initiative : the Christian owed everything to God and mediately to His church. In both heresies he saw reviving his own condemned spirit of self-sufficiency, and his animosity was sharpened by shame and remorse. A certain section of the african church had always held that *personal* holiness in the ministry was required for the efficacy of sacraments, that character made sacerdotal acts valid or invalid, —in short that a priest must be a good man. Upholders of churchly ' realism ' would reply that however desirable, this was hardly indispensable ; else the churchly order and discipline might be constantly vitiated or interrupted, either by defect of will or intention or by actual sinfulness. No social system could be allowed to depend upon such untrustworthy agents. Hence in the verdict against Donatists we have only the sentence against Novatus repeated : both, like Wiclif, see a true priest only in a good man, attribute little or nothing to the church, and in the end convey back the true agency to God Himself of Whose grace the minister is but a channel.

Donatus and Spiritual Pride.—Were the *traditores* who betrayed copies of scripture in the last persecution (*305*) eligible for the priesthood ? The sterner rigorists were condemned in *313*, *314* and *316* and Constantine did not scruple to employ force to suppress the defeated party. From being heretics and schismatics they became rebels against the civil order : their goods were declared confiscate, their citizen-rights forfeit. Donatus Magnus succeeded Majorinus as bishop of Carthage, for the rigorists (*315*) and Circumcellions, runaway slaves and peasants, attached themselves to the party. A phenomenon arose in N. Africa very much resembling the Bagauds of Spain and Gaul during the period of anarchy before *285*, and the new monarchy of Diocletian and his colleagues. Now began that association of heresy and treason which led in after times to the policy of savage repression. Debtors and malcontents, under cover of religious conviction, seemed to threaten the social order. The interference of the civil power was bitterly resented ; the phrase

of Tertullian *quid imperatori cum ecclesiâ*—was revived with a new emphasis. It is to be noted that Constantine himself, who had only just issued the Edict of Toleration in *313*, did not willingly give up his neutral position as universal umpire. In *321* he restored to the Donatists their rights of worship and liberty of conscience : the points in dispute should be left to God's judgment. Constans I (*337–350*) his son and successor, desired to end a dangerous schism first by gifts and conciliation, only later by threats and force. As in earlier persecutions the civil power (always secretly animated by Gallio's spirit) was with reluctance forced to interfere. Julian (*361*) restored the rights of the schismatics while the orthodox Valentinian again withdrew them (*364–375*) : their churches were closed, their assemblies forbidden. Towards the end of the century a moderate party arose in protest against the puritan bigotry of the extremists. Honorius in *405* commanded them to return to the catholic fold. At the great conference of *411*, a nearly equal number of donatist bishops confronted the prelates of the orthodox State-church, the numbers being 279 to 286.

Two different Conceptions of the Christian Church Involved.—The real question at issue was the nature and extent of the Christian church ; whether it lost its purity and forfeited its divine grace by tolerating unworthy members within the pale. The Donatists held it to be a church of the elect, the conviction of the later Puritans : it must 'exclude all members guilty of mortal 'sin in order to safeguard its own corporate holiness'. The Catholics held that the holiness of the church was not the sum of individual virtues gathered from its constituent members, but came from God its founder Who sent His Spirit to consecrate it and through His ordained priests gave sacramental grace to the humble : the presence of unworthy members could not discount or annul the promises (*χαρίσματα ἀμεταμέλητα*). In the words of Optatus, *sanctitas de sacramentis colligitur, non de superbia personarum*. The church, in virtue of a new and imperial mission only bounded by the frontiers of the empire, could not fail to put forward this claim : if it depended on the goodness of its *parts*, it started without authority, depended wholly on a precarious human proficiency, and was not catholic. Marcellinus acting for Honorius decided in favour of the catholic claims : in *414* (just a century after their first defeat) the Donatists were denied civil

rights and next year their meetings were forbidden under penalty of death. But like most other fierce edicts of repression this statute was not very severely enforced and the schismatics were only extinguished by the saracen invasion (*c. 700*).

Realism Confronted by Nominalism, as Self-Sufficiency.—Here it will be noted we have a clear expression of the later principles of Authority and of 'realism'. It is significant that Austin, with his strong sense of individual frailty, should have taken up the cause of the *mystical* corporation: this is holy in itself and the channel of grace, even though all its ministers be sinful men. His own experience had taught him how hazardous it was to stake the value and efficacy of a corporate body on the personal virtue of its units. About the same time he was confronted by another version of exactly the same problem in the controversy with Pelagius. In this we see, as in the nestorian heresy, the effect of logic, argument, and opposition upon a one-sided yet correct opinion: it is driven into an extreme form and forced to deny all truth to the complementary doctrine. Truth being composed of opposites in equilibrium, the victory of one part to the total exclusion of the other is to be regretted: so also is the over precise formulation of dogma which naturally results from such a dispute.[1]

Morgan Pelagius in Rome: Attempt to Revive Spiritual Effort.—The cymric Morgan (*360–425*) like Erigena 400 years later, was either an Irishman or a 'Scot', '*Stolidissimus*', says the bitter Jerome, '*et Scotorum pultibus prægravatus*'.[2] A

[1] Pope Leo I's *Tome* gives us after all the *dualistic* form in which Christian dogma must always fall: it juxtaposes reverently the *divine* and the *human*, the *Infinite* and the *finite*, without any serious attempt to reconcile them: all such attempts turn out in the end to be formal, empty, and dialectical. Reason can never dispense with the need for Faith.

[2] The heavy diet of porridge was a stock sarcasm in the mouths of Morgan's and Erigena's opponents. It is not too much to say that this northerly corner (Antrim and Galloway) produced the two chief doctrines round which medieval thought revolved interminably: the contribution of the *unit* to the *whole* (Pelagius) and the comprehension and final absorption by the *whole* of the *unit* (John Scotus Erigena). Morgan is remarkable as being the pioneer of that great movement of reaction which brought back to the continent from Ireland the doctrines and mission-zeal which it had received. The close connexion of the british and eastern churches is well established. Celtic convents held intercourse with very

man of strict life to whom restraint and self-denial was easy, he was scandalized on visiting Rome about *400* to find how low was the prevailing standard of Christian life and practice. His own religious development had been equable and uninterrupted ; there was nothing in it of Austin's meteoric flights or volcanic crises. The apologists for an idle capital pleaded human weakness and the need of including as large a proportion as possible in church membership : Rome was after all a city where pagan belief was by no means as yet extinct.

Such arguments (Morgan thought) would cut away all motive for personal effort or perseverance, and would throw the whole blame on God in a thoroughly fatalistic spirit. He produced a formula which Kant in modified form repeated : *' If I ought, I ' can '*. In Africa the bishop of Carthage charged him with holding the error that the *whole human race does not die* because of Adam's default and consequent death, nor will the whole *human race* rise again *as a whole* because of Christ's resurrection. Here we have a new phase of ' realism ' : humanity is conceived not as a collective term for an aggregate of individuals, but as a corporation and a ' person ' (under roman law) with its own nature, development and continuous history.[1] Hence a judaic tendency to make very little of the unit, provided that the corporation or community has a prosperous life.[2] But the church also promised safety and easy terms to subscribing members because of its own assured position : their contribution mattered so little.

remote sects of learning and theology : Morgan (like Erigena) was quite familiar with the greek language and divinity, and at Rome joined the circle of Rufinus who desired to introduce these studies into the western empire, always backward in theological refinement and in greek learning.

[1] Lotze's very interesting strictures should be consulted, against the vague and loose talk of Lessing's *Education of the Human Race* : it is only by an unwarrantable and misleading metaphor that we speak of education or development where the *subject* is not the same throughout (*Microcosmus*).

[2] Even to-day (when there is abroad a good deal of insincere sentiment) we are not wholly reconciled to our present troubles by the thought that one day, if the planet is spared, the human race may perhaps enjoy a perfect social order. After all, if *justice* looks at the common welfare, *equity* seeks to accommodate justice to the individual case where it is harsh or unfeeling : to disregard or disparage the concrete individual here and now because of a nebulous future is quite out of keeping with the Gospel of Christ.

Hence such a system, seemingly autocratic and scornful of the particular, is in fact dangerously attractive to the vulgar. Morgan spent the years *410–415* in Palestine where the Council of Lydda absolved him from the condemnation of Carthage. The African Church, Pope Innocent and Emperor Honorius (*418*) already occupied with the last efforts of Donatus' schism, fulminated against this laxity and against the pelagian tenets. The eastern church, at that time confronting another phase of the same doctrine in Nestorius, joined in the censure (*431*).

Section II. Relations of the Divine and the Human Elements (Christology, Anthropology)

Apostles of Self-Sufficiency.—It is quite clear that Montanus, Novatian, Nestorius, together with the movements connected with the names of Donatus and Pelagius, represent a reaction against over-emphasis on the *divine* and a stirring of the *human* element in religion (whether in theology or practice): in Montanus we have a protest against the decay of holiness and personal effort in a society now supervised from above by the bishops, to the detriment (as it seemed to him) of ethical achievement. The church, even in the reign of the two Antonines, was becoming secularized and insensibly lowered its standard. In place of dead official routine and liturgy, personal and uncovenanted 'prophecy' was the mark of the new sect: celibacy, fasting, courting of martyrdom, waiting for the *parousia*, were also features. In Novatian the real point at issue was, shall the personal merit of martyrs and confessors supersede the normal official organs of authority? Shall the sacrificers to idols during stress of persecution be readmitted to communion? His followers became the Pure Sect (*καθαροί*) which, though nominally extinct about the middle of cent. v, seems to have revived in the cathars of the Middle Age.

Genuine Teaching of Nestorius.—In Nestorius we have the chief tenets of the Antiochene School forced into unnatural prominence and logical exclusiveness,—literal exegesis, the sure fact of Christ's *human* life on earth, His 'growth in grace', His genuine human consciousness (against Eutyches' absorptionism). Recent studies [1] and Bedjan's text of his *Apologia* (Leipzig

[1] Cf. Bethune-Baker's *N. and his teaching*, Cambridge 1908.

1910) reveal his true charaeter and meaning: 'I have had but 'one end in view that no one should call the Word a creature, or 'the Manhood which He assumed *incomplete*' . . . 'to maintain 'the continuance of the two natures in one person'. Leo's *Letter to Flavian* excited his admiration: 'I gave thanks to 'God that the roman church was rightly making a blameless 'confession, though it was prejudiced against me in person'. The union of the natures lay not in the suppression or absorption of the human element [1] but in the harmony of wills. 'The man-'hood' it has been said, 'was safeguarded as distinct from the '*godhead*: the union was left an ineffable mystery'. In any case the ideas of Nestorius and the School of Antioch won the day, although the leaders were condemned; and the great mission-church in Asia (which remoulded buddhism in its very furthest retreats) must be acknowledged to be *orthodox*. Without doubt greek orthodoxy saw kinship in Pelagius' theory to their own somewhat garbled and distorted view of nestorian tenets; and it was known that Celestin, the pelagian lawyer from Rome, had sought Nestorius' help and support.

Denial of Original Sin by Pelagians: Compromise of Synergism.—Putting together the exaggerated statement of enemies and the modified assertions of the 'heretics' themselves, we see that in the issue these latter tend to deny 'original sin'. They teach that, except in the example of weakness set to us by Adam, we are uninjured by his sin; we are not portions of a single *massa peccatrix*, from which only a miracle of divine predestination detaches us to be passive vehicles of grace. The mischief is done *non propagine sed exemplo*. Pelagius is quite willing to refer to God's grace all subsequent steps in Christian development, but not the first moment of turning to Him. He remembers the individual conversions of the Gospel-story, their unfettered freedom of choice; also the words that 'Christ could do no mighty 'works there because of their unbelief'. It is said that the extreme austinian (like the later calvinist) doctrine exerted a bad effect on certain african monks; who began to display either intense pride and assurance, or despair and 'wretchlessness of most unclean 'living'. In the end, whether officially recognized or no, a modified form of Pelagius' teaching entered the church; for an absolute fatalism is, of all doctrines, least in keeping with the Christian

[1] A conception leading in the end to a purely *physical* mysticism.

message. Semi-pelagians allowed that our nature was injured by the Fall, but insisted on *synergism* :—that (as in Nestorius) the divine and human wills must be *coefficients* ; so that neither in Christ's own nature nor in our own is the human factor to be overwhelmed or annihilated. In theory the Church felt bound to condemn them, e.g. at the Council of Valence in *529* where the belief that men have some ability to will good was held up to obloquy ; it could not be allowed that the beginning of salvation may lie with the sinner himself. But the real interest of the Church was to exclude *reprobation,* or the belief that God predestined to doom and would not allow the reprobate to find peace, even if they longed for salvation.[1]

Verdict Justified : Ethical Individualism Unsuited to Society.—Yet however harmless Morgan's insistence on freedom may appear, the catholic church could hardly do otherwise than condemn him; not for his tenets so much as for possible deductions therefrom. His view tended to *naturalism* which left man able of his own will to turn to the light and dispensed with Atonement and a scheme of redemption, through Christ's unique offering and the church's sacramental grace. Wherever stress has to be laid on personal effort, or the proper use of God-given faculties, there must emerge a ' broad church ' conviction that man in himself is ' self-sufficient ' unto salvation. Such a belief seemed like a revival of the pagan philosophy of stoics of the school of Aurelius or Epictetus : the Buddha's last words to his disciples are a strong insistence on ' self-help ', on the fact that man's sole saviour or destroyer is himself. How utterly inapplicable such ethical individualism was to moribund roman society, Austin saw clearly. Like Cyprian, he taught, with an ever increasing emphasis, that outside the church there was no safety ; that apart from the divinely-appointed means of grace there was no virtue ; that man himself contributed nothing to a spiritual development, which was all the work of the constraining spirit of God, assisted by humble and passive faith and the church's sacraments. This visible community, these duly appointed officials, these half-magical means of grace—implied the complete dependence of the lay element, the autocratic power of the church as a corporation with an earthly head, the exaltation of the priestly mediants able

[1] For holding this quite logical corollary of Austin's doctrine Gottes-chalk, 400 years afterwards, was flogged, degraded. and imprisoned.

to withhold or grant the sacraments which alone gave man strength for the journey.

Austin's Determined Realism and Denial of Human Merit.—Just as Pelagius was forced by controversy to over-exalt our capacity, so Austin was in duty bound to suppress and disparage it. The one was an active reformer who wished to stir sloth and supineness into new and responsible activity ; he was full of confidence in native human impulses to which he preferred to make a direct appeal. But Austin begins to despair of the world and, judging from his own miraculous experience, can allow nothing to human merit or initiative. The Eastern Church,[1] intent in truly platonic spirit on an objective world of truth, had brought out the supernatural character of the gospel, as a *fact* and a *system* : it was reserved for the western, under Austin's influence, to emphasize its relations to man in the doctrines of sin and grace, as an agency in the *subjective* world.

Here then are the chief lines of thought and church-discipline marked out already for the west at the opening of cent. v. Government was to be a persuasive and benevolent despotism, because the unit was not able to stand alone. Theory and ideal standard were to be very exalted ; but practical requirements were to be softened and modified to suit an evil and ignorant world. Hence a dualism of the *minimum* and the *maximum* : the perfect life was monastic and unworldly, but no one was to be totally excluded because he could not undertake ' a counsel of perfection '. The denial of human merit, the ensuing allowance for human frailty, was very comforting to the lukewarm Christian. Thus the life-work of St. Austin ended in a firm establishment of a great catholic state-church, which found place and duties for each several member. Though as yet unformulated, ' realism ' was

[1] It must be remembered that the greek church had to conciliate two opposite legacies ; the *ethical* self-sufficiency and individualism of classical thought, and the *intellectual* ' realism ' which (both in Plato and Aristotle) subordinated the single mind to an impersonal realm of absolute truth : hence it tended at once to be ' nominalist ' and mystical or absorptionist The strong emphasis on Free-Will in the early Apologists and greek Fathers down to Origen (with its tolerance for pagan virtue and searchings after the truth) gives way to a depreciation of daily virtue, moving step by step towards gradually realized perfection, to a desire for complete instantaneous θέωσις : of whose sometimes nihilistic forms later greek writers—as we have just seen in Sudaili—show curious traces.

the dogmatic principle on which its authority and efficacy depended. Confronting each other were seen, the world or *seculum*, the *massa peccatrix* considered as a substantial and continuous reality, involved in Adam's default and penalty,—and the City of God, the church; inside which the chosen units of the *massa* might find rest and safety, where too the tares might undisturbed grow together with the wheat until the harvest, if haply even amongst them God's special mercy might find vessels of grace.

CHAPTER III

TRIUMPHANT REALISM

SECTION I. THE DOGMATICS AND LOGICAL CONCLUSION OF REALISM: JOHN SCOTUS ERIGENA

Further Suppression of Units in Erigena's Pantheism.—The next *stadium* is seen in Erigena's explicit neoplatonic realism.[1] This, scarcely attracting notice in its own day, became an undercurrent issuing into the light, some three or four centuries later, in systems both orthodox and the reverse. As we saw in Austin and Gregory a distrust of singulars and units displayed in the exaltation of the church, so now we find the world of individuals gathered up and in the end suppressed in the goal to which cosmical evolution is tending. The chief feature of the platonism popular under the Empire and handed on to the Church is a deference to the type or idea, impatience of the particular instances. While the New Testament speaks only of *persons* (*Peter, John, Paul*) and arrests attention upon certain characters, this decadent platonism is careless of everything but types (*genera* and *species*) and the Scholastics, following it, speak of *Socrates* and *Plato* as (unhappily ?) differentiated instances of typical manhood. This curious attitude, so abhorrent from our modern induction and love of the concrete, is both *oriental* and *hellenic*.

Radical Dualism of Hellenic World-Conceptions.—While greek thought is, on one side, marked by the individual's claims to worth and free development (e.g. in sophistic and the ethical individualism of Socrates); on the other, it rules out the special, the relative and idiosyncratic, to make room for the Idea. So in *ethics* the greek schools are at first sight purely *subjective*: they scarcely recognize anything outside the single agent and the law within his breast. Yet in the higher life of thought (which

[1] A reader of this western section only, should here consult the short Appendix on the intermediate influences (at the close of Division C: on 'Dionysius' and Bar Sudaili).

transcends the ethical standpoint, though it takes it for granted or uses it as a ladder) the *objective* alone is admitted; man, putting aside his special and private imaginings, must let the stream of universal reason permeate his being and take the place of his consciousness and his mind. Hence, there is in every school of greek philosophy a palpable tendency towards *mysticism*—from the moment that intellectual interest replaces the sober but prosaic social virtues and common morality. It is impossible to free ethics from this sense of detached and unconnected happenings in a series (leading nowhither): its motto is 'do the next thing'. The life of *action* (πρᾶξις) is an illogical compromise between one's own principle and a quite alien material which seldom yields to our purpose. It is only in the life of thought (θεωρία) that man is really freed in the highest and best part of his nature. Dualism is from the first implicit in this hellenic view of the world, before ever the problem of morals became urgent. Parmenides and Democritus, on the two extreme frontiers in the greek world, set in contrast the *sensible* and the *rational* conceptions of the cosmos which are wholly distinct and irreconcilable. Later, the antithesis lay between the 'passing show' which gives us a struggle or welter of separate things and events, and the untroubled and motionless depths of unity which lie beneath this restless surface. After Alexander's conquests, the subjective schools drew away the busybody citizen of a quarrelsome little state into the serene heights of cosmopolitanism (which had no daily duties); and, while laying all possible stress on personal morality, gave no guidance for this or that action but talked only of character. Not to *do* but to *be* was the rule; and morals instead of being an activity or ἐνέργεια became synonymous with Quietism, just as in the far east.

The Two Orders in the Church: 'to *be* or to *do*': Monkish Repose and Contemplatism.—The eastern church accepted this *dualism* in ideals and accommodated it to her two orders of *laymen* and *monks*. An all-inclusive system cannot help having a graded hierarchy and unequal ranks, each with its special set of caste rules. To diversity which was not openly flagrant or rebellious, the church has always had a fixed policy of indulgence. The layman who lived in a flickering world of particulars must be guided to 'do the next thing' properly: but the monkish ideal was to 'do nothing at all'. Doing, according to all the received

axioms, is the lot of the imperfect, striving after perfection. When this is attained search and the restless action which subserves it are at an end. Readers of Austin's *Confessions* will recall his emphasis on repose in God as the object of the soul's pursuit: the old scottish catechism says that the end of man is 'to know God and to enjoy Him for ever'. Action in society and the practice of the work-a-day virtues (honesty, temperance, kindness) is all very well for average men; but in their pursuit of a quite vague and indefinite ideal, there could be no finality or achievement. The true could not be found in an ethical world of compromise where a leaden and inaccurate plumb-rule was in use (Aristotle's μολυβδινὸς κανών). Only in the field of pure thought were there to be found stable and determinate forms. Hence, God Whose Word summed up and embraced this Ideal Universe, was the sole Object in Which the soul could rest. Therefore for the contemplative or monastic life, detachment from variety was the first requirement. The course upwards was a progressive putting-off of the multiple, a gathering up of the many into a few ultimate forms, the losing of these again in the single dazzling Vision of God.

Erigena Conveys Greek Learning into the West.—Like other scoto-irish monks Erigena[1] (*800–877*) had a competent knowledge of greek, a language soon to be only obscurely known through distorting translations; Bacon in cent. xiii expressly exempts him from the deserved indictment of scholastic ignorance on this score. He is found at the court of Charles the Bald about the time of the treaty of Verdun (*843*) as head of the Palatine School. His *first* work seems to have been a (lost) treatise on the Lord's Supper which he regarded in a purely commemorative or symbolic light, like Berengar or Zwingli. Yet the very orthodox Hincmar of Rheims chose him to defend the cause of human free-will against Gotteschalk's mahometan fatalism.[2] In this essay appeared tenets so peculiar that after a formal indict-

[1] John the Scot's own pseudonym *Eriugena* certainly implies an *irish* origin, the form *Hierugena* being a punning allusion to the Isle of Saints (cf. Hierusalem for Jerusalem). Malmesbury calls him oddly *Heruligena* and his birthplace is given variously as in Ayrshire (the most likely spot), near St. Davids, or in the county of Hereford at Eriuvan.

[2] Which, as we saw above, passed beyond any comforting doctrine of assurance into a certainty of reprobation (669 n.).

ment by Drepanius Florus (canon of Lyons) Erigena was condemned by the Councils of Valence (*855*) and of Langres four years later.[1] Still protected by his powerful kingly patron, he translated the false Dionysius at his request ; thereby annoying Pope Nicholas I who insisted that the work should have been submitted for Rome's approval before publication. The king was asked to dismiss his over-learned courtier, but does not appear to have complied. Nothing further is known of his life ; he seems never to have left France and to have been living until the year *877* (Hauréau).[2]

A Convinced Scholastic : Identity of Religion and Philosophy.—He belongs to the pure neoplatonic type of mystical theologian, very much rarer in the western than in the eastern church. Yet he is also a pure Scholastic. He states in the clearest terms the harmony of *faith* and *reason*, the identity of true theology and true philosophy :—that is, in him (during the dark night of cent. ix) free-thought believes itself to be in complete accord with the dictates of Revelation and Authority.[3] But he has no doubt that it is *philosophy* or reason which is primary and superior, whilst *authority* is derived. Like Lessing or the arab speculators, he seems to believe that Authority only imposes on the ignorant and unleisured doctrines already patent to the wise : hence (*Divis. Nat.* i 71) *Ratio nequaquem ex Auctoritate pendet* (else it would be infirm if unapproved by *vera ratio*) . . . *Vera autem Ratio quum virtutibus suis rata atq. immutabilis munitur, nullius Auctoritatis astipulatione roborari indiget.* Revealed religion then sets before the vulgar, in a popular and pictorial guise, truths which the philosopher forestalls and recognizes in a refined form by the light of natural reason.[4]

Yet Philosophy (Monism) is Beyond Religion.—Now the fundamental thought of this *philosophy*, which is beyond *religion*, is the neoplatonic theory of the One which expands into the

[1] It was the former assembly which revived the gibe of Jerome on the porridge-loving Scot.

[2] The story of his visit to England, appointment by Alfred as Abbot of Malmesbury, and death at the hand of enraged students in 882 A.D. seems to be a series of later figments.

[3] *Conficitur inde veram esse philosophiam veram religionem conversimque* (de Euch.)

[4] Hence as with Maimonides and Averroes, Spinoza and Hegel, philosophy is a superior phase of religion which is only a form of truth specially prepared for the average mind.

Manifold in virtue of an inherent necessity. It is a monism which, like Spinoza's, will not admit the concept of divine *purpose* or *will*. All creatures are necessary parts of this whole and cannot be otherwise than they are; the *part* (as in every realist system) can only be explained in reference to the *whole*, only understood when its place in the Universe can be rightly assigned.[1] As in Hegel, *religion* (revelation accepted on faith) is but one stage, one element or factor, in the *explication* of the divine; but above it is the exercise of man's highest faculty (*intellectualis visio*) which enables him to transcend the realm of particular things. At this stage of human development, when our reason comes very close to the Divine Spirit, the philosopher is content with nothing individual or partial. He now grasps the whole as a whole, prior to its parts and comprehends (or absorbs) these in the entirety. At this stage, the union of divine and human is complete; God thinks in man who is no longer himself (*νοῦς ἕκαστος*). *Thought* and *being* are now identical because the *logical* series is also the *ontological*, and the course of *logic* is also the order of *creation*.

The Divine Expansion and Concentration: ? A Temporal Process.—In the *Divisio Naturæ* Erigena represents the Universe as a process, issuing out from God and returning to Him again. In the school of Proclus (*410–480*) two distinct movements were recognized, one downwards, the other up:—the *ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω* of Heraclitus or the vision of angels ascending and descending on Jacob's Ladder. It is never quite clear, when Christian divines borrow this thought, whether the double movement is timeless and eternal or had a temporal beginning and will one day have a climax in time. In pre-Christian faiths it is only mazdeism, besides the hebrew religion, that condescends to accept a real development in time and a distinct goal or 'far-off divine event', to which human society rather than creation moves. There are three factors in Scot's cosmology, or rather stages, *God*, *idea*, *matter*; the first *explicatio* of the divine *One* is into the Word, or world of forms, that is, the *one-many*. Afterwards, by a still further declension from primal unity, arises the *manifold* of

[1] This is pure and original platonism—a thing *is* only in so far as it *is good* and does its work: Dialectic, the master-science, is nothing but the power to classify, to assign a thing's right place and function in the scale or hierarchy of beings.

visible particulars. This is the accepted *schema* of the neoplatonic school and calls for no special comment. Although the existence of our world is hardly explained or justified (for why should the *one-many* be discerpted into the many ?), it is a genuine *theophany*. In this process of *outflow* (πρόοδος) and *return* to source (ἄνοδος, κάθοδος) we seem to distinguish *beginning, middle, end.* But in truth these three are one ; it is a defect of our finite understanding to conceive them as *stadia*, separated in time (and perhaps in place). It is our default that makes us conceive the real forms under conditions of *time, space, manifoldness.*[1] Created things, modelled after the primordial ideas or archetypes and their effects, have no independent being : each is a brief apparition of the divine nature and in so far has a measure of reality.

Erigena's Conception of the Trinity : Incarnation, Eternal.— God alone *is*, yet again He is really beyond *essence, truth, goodness* and *wisdom*, none of which predicates can with strictness be applied to Him. All true theology therefore is negative. But the world as His *theophany* allows us to understand something of Him : He *is* (or exists) in the being of all things, is *wise* in their own rational order and coherence, and *lives* in their ceaseless motion.[2] It is on the Holy Spirit or Third Person (as in the later Joachimites) that the principal emphasis rests. The First Person cannot be distinguished from universal substance[3] ; the Word is the ideal realm of Philo and Plotinus ; but it is the Holy Ghost which as life or motive force awakens movement within the system, first introducing *individuality* and the *multiple* and at last drawing all this outflow back again into the abyss of the divine unity. The gnostics who represent the visible cosmic process as an error and default, as a regrettable lapse from the Pleroma, would say that this demiurgic power was either an

[1] Deussen would make us add, *causality* (cf. Div. A).

[2] This goes a great deal further in the direction of *pantheism* than the tenets of Sabellius ; to Scotus the Father = οὐσία, Son = δύναμις, Spirit = ἐνέργεια : hence the deity, as it were, develops into activity and self-consciousness through the evolution of the world : the advance is from *lower* to *higher* categories, from the indeterminate to the self-determined, and therefore we may say that, to Scotus, deity is a process : the modern schools would be tempted to add ' which has not yet attained its ' final phase ' (cf. Bergson's theory of a Universe still ' in the making ').

[3] Which revivers of Erigena's doctrine in cent. xiii conceived in a purely *material* sense.

inferior god, a rival deity, or a lesser spirit like Achamoth (in Valentine's system). In any case for both, that which discerpts the ideal realm into the *manifold of time and space* cannot be the perfect God; hence the reluctance to recognize the rights of the *individual* unless he allows himself to be wholly absorbed in his *type*. Man in such a system is no longer the head or centre of creation; no doubt the Trinity finds its analogy in our nature, but God is not realized in man only but in everything created. The Incarnation of Deity is not a *single historical event of unique significance*, but is an *eternal process*.

No Purpose or Consummation in the World-Process.—The highest idea is *goodness* (as in original platonism), *being* is next, for that which is good *is*; *life* is a kind of essence, and wisdom again a kind of life. The Spirit guides the Ideas (in themselves without movement or impulse) to objectify themselves as eternal causes upon matter. It is not divine *purpose* or *will* but the divine *nature* which needs must manifest itself in the world: *God cannot be conceived without the world*. It will be seen later that this is the main point at issue between philosophy (as monistic spinozism) and the religious conception of the world. Jew and Christian are alike convinced that God *purposed* and *willed* in calling a universe out of nothing, and that this purpose is closely connected, and in a very special sense, with man and his destiny: —philosophy (if it regards the world as anything better than a mirage (*maya*) only sees it as a timeless rational system from which purpose or design is *ex hypothesi* excluded.[1]

Scripture Wholly Allegorized.—The letter of Old and New Testament Erigena takes only as symbol of an esoteric meaning. Moses' account only faintly shadows forth the timeless creation or emanative process; paradise has no spatial or local existence; the Fall is an allegory.[2] But sin and evil have no true or substantial being, and God does not know of them! For *knowledge* and *being* are one. Sin is only the illusion of the individual believing something to be good which is not; it is only the evil

[1] Cf. Maimonides *Guide of the Perplexed* Part III § xiii ed. Friedländer 1910, 272–277. In this *whole* the perfection or happiness of a part cannot possibly be the aim of the process. What is *necessary* cannot be *purposive*.

[2] The division into sex is the truth lying behind this fable as Scotus conceives it: Eve is the embodiment of *sense* which perverts *reason* and makes it forget its true nature and birthright: in the end the distinction will vanish and a purely spiritual body will be restored.

will, misdirected by its own desires, which is unhappy and dissatisfied. Hence beyond its own misery and emptiness there is no objective punishment: there is no special judge or law. Only, a personal mistake brings its own nemesis as in buddhism: God recks nothing either of the sin or the penalty of the sinner. Hell is a state of mind not a place; in the end the sinner will see his error and turn towards the light; *redemption* (in Erigena's own peculiar sense) is for all without exception: in his universalism the devil himself will be saved.

All Things Return at Last into their Source.—The 'restoration' of all things' or ἀποκατάστασις [1] is conceived in a singularly unspiritual way. The stages of final return into God follow precisely the primitive *stadia* of *explicatio* and exactly correspond: each set of particular things are gathered up and absorbed in their *species*, these again into their *genus*, these into the unique one-manifold of the Ideal World, this again into God that He may be all in all. In this very *logical* mysticism, the aim of the single soul is frankly *deificatio* or θέωσις, resumption into God. It is raised into full knowledge of God and here, once again, *knowing* and *being* are one. After all creatures have been thus reconciled and restored to deity there will be no further creation: it is the sabbath-rest of the seventh day when God exists only as *Natura quæ nec creatur nec creat*. The troubled interlude of the world-process is an uneasy period of wakefulness between two eternities of silence, repose and unconsciousness.[2]

Section II. Mysticism and Philosophy

This 'Platonism' Remains Unaltered to Present Day.—We have now examined this typical writer as one who presents us with a clear exposition of a universal system. Later thinkers

[1] Though clearly for man depending on this conversion of will to the choice of true good.

[2] Among more recent works on Erigena may be named Maurice *Mor. and Metaph. Phil.*; Kaulich's study in his scholastic *History* (Prague 1860); Stöckl's monograph 1867, Noack's (Leipzig 1876), Poole's (London 1884). Wotschke institutes a suggestive parallel between Fichte and Erigena (Halle 1896). Articles in Welzer's *Church-Lexicon* (1897) by Baumgartner, and in Herzog's *Realencycl.* vol xvii (1906) by Deutsch; Alice Gardner's *Stud. in J. Sc.* London 1900 and Dräseke's monograph (Leipzig 1902) may be consulted with profit.

can show us very few novel features; both for arab, jew and Christian the 'canon of philosophy' was really closed with Proclus and the numberless later exponents only reproduce and comment. The last great 'medieval' mystic, Spinoza, only repeats the familiar tenets in a somewhat different and more frigid manner. The attitude of Schelling or Hegel (or even Bradley) to philosophy and religion is not in essentials to be distinguished from that of Erigena, of Averroes or of 'Ramdan', the son of Maimon. Free-Thought in the age under our survey offers this interpretation of the world, at first (without sense of antagonism) as a *supplement* or better version of the pictorial religious view,—but later, when conscious of its hostility, as a *substitute*. It is therefore well to inquire further into the nature of this higher phase (as the enlightened believed it to be) in which one's intellect, united with divine reason attained first-hand knowledge of truths concealed by pictures and metaphors from the vulgar eye.

In Origin, Aristotelian: Its Transit from East to West.—It is a system of *mystic rationalism based*, not so much on Plato or the later alexandrine expositors as, *on a few texts of Aristotle*. These doctrines passed through heterodox syrian translators into a small and select group of 'arab' or rather persian philosophers, who, though nominal muslim, were entirely estranged from the spirit and dogma of Islam and represented an insurgence of pre-islamic beliefs. To these *peripatism* came as a revelation, and without suspecting that they could not at one and the same moment be followers of Aristotle and Mahomet, they began to formulate a coherent system of the universe which afterwards in the west passed current as *Averroism*.[1] At the same time that Erigena translated the false Denys in the west, the first muslim commentators were writing in the east under the patronage of the abbasid caliphs at Bagdad. To the one, the impulse came from a writer very far removed from the original classic source; to the other, almost direct from the first authority. This latter way of interpreting the world passed along the african coast into

[1] It is clear, as is shown in our last Division, that Averroes was no innovator and that he merely handed on a system already completed by his forerunners: only by degrees did the name and renown of this formidable heretic throw into the shade all earlier 'arab' philosophers and monopolize almost the sole attention of later scholastics.

Spain, where the tradition of the old school was maintained from *c. 950–1200*; when orthodox bigotry put an end to a movement of the muslim intellect which the public had never ceased to regard with the gravest suspicion.[1] It was carried into France by hebrews and was made familiar to the scholastic world both by its public translation and by its secret and heretical influence. The opening years of cent. xiii were marked by an outburst of heresy which alarmed the civil as well as the clerical power. Its chief tenets were fathered on Erigena of whom many of the new teachers were avowed followers. But it also depended upon the very similar doctrines which had passed from Irak to Spain and Egypt, and from thence to France. Of this tradition Aristotle was the chief and perhaps the only master,—but it was Aristotle interpreted by the platonizing Syncretists of Alexandria.

Its Contrast to the 'Humanism' of Religion.—This 'philosophy' suffers very little change from its earliest phase to the present day, and is marked by features strongly contrasting with the tenets on which depends any system deserving the name of religion. For religion is frankly *humanistic*. In early magic and efforts to appease unseen powers or spirits, man may not yet recognize that he and his destinies form the central motive or theme of a world-process:—which, no doubt, he did not yet contemplate either as unity or system. But he aims to make himself such a centre and theme: he wants to make friends of the unseen powers and use them for his own purposes. Now among later religious developments only four creeds[2] are humanist and historic—that is regard *man as the central actor* in a drama which has a beginning, a purpose and a climax. Zoroaster held this view and the Old Testament is throughout a continuous vindication of it. The Gospel gives it a new import and wider meaning and stirred up a society, sunk in moral or hedonistic quietism, to take sides and fight for the good cause.

[1] Arab philosophy was wholly *unpopular*: its exponents were foreigners (even Averroes was supposed by some to be a crypto-jew) upon whom the mantle of Islam sat very lightly: it depended on a few great names and was tolerated only under a few liberal or inquisitive rulers: outside the court it never flourished, and, with the death of Averroes, perished absolutely from the world of Islam scarcely leaving a vestige behind.

[2] Strictly only three; for Islam is only a restatement of certain truths taken from the Old and New Testament by an able and unscrupulous Syncretist.

The Essentials of Religion: Militant, Personal, Historic.—All three systems are militant and (in a sense) strongly *dualistic*. A favoured race is entrusted with the task of maintaining against gentile enemies the true worship of God, or of founding a *City of God* to last as a witness in an evil world till Christ comes again. This conception of an army or militant society did not, however, overshadow the individual destiny of the soldiers. The general, who in the end would be judge either to reward loyalty or punish failure, knew each of his men and took a personal interest in them. He did not estimate them according to the influence of their bodily or mental equipment but according to the zeal of their service, their faith in his justice, their unswerving will and purpose to do their best for him. This devotion was never (except by an innocent paradox) dissociated from a strong instinct of personal interest. Man serves God (like St. Christopher in the legend) because He is assumed to be the strongest power in the world; because it is only folly to throw away one's work on inferior masters. But it is to be noticed that both jew and Christian learnt to pay homage for quite other than selfish or personal motives: the spectacle of a suffering deity reinforces by an emotional appeal the allegiance owed to power.[1] Even here and in the last act of self-surrender *the eternal worth of the individual soul* is never forgotten. The Christian, whose whole creed is self-denial, is yet never called upon to *sacrifice his self*. Whatever he may be called on to suffer, he always feels that he is safe. This belief is not confined to the ignorant and humble; even the mystic—for all his indifference to selfish interests and complaints of his 'creaturehood'—wishes to *enjoy* God's presence and believes that this will be his portion through all eternity.[2]

Timeless Emanation of Philosophy: Contradicts Religion.—Now Free Thought as expressed in medieval 'philosophy' or arabian *peripatism* destroys the whole structure so carefully built up upon this refined self-love. God or the

[1] Which, as in Islam, may very likely become pure *fatalism* and indifference,—all things, being under God's arbitrary control, lie beyond the reach or estimate of human judgment.

[2] When St. Paul is willing to become *anathema* for his jewish brethren it is doubtful if he could mean total deprivation of the sense that he had willingly made this sacrifice on behalf of others; he would be 'happy even in hell' with such a consciousness.

ultimate being expands, not because he *wills*, but because he *must*: it is *nature*, not conscious *purpose*, that is at work; there is no creation at a given moment for a particular end but a timeless outflow or emanation. Man in this system of reason and necessity is just a *part* or member in a *whole*, of which he can understand the *laws* but never the *purpose*. That is, he can never understand it in the only acceptable sense. His *will* (as in Aristotle, the *moral* comes much below the *rational*, life) is quite a secondary matter and is only occupied with tiresome choices in the manifold world. Only a few can see that the highest aim of man is to rise above all particular details, above any need for action, and to contemplate the system or machine as a rational whole, necessary in all its parts.

Its Fatalism and Denial of the Part or Unit.—Free Thought then teaches the 'reign of law' and of necessity. This lesson will not satisfy normal man, who is always seeking a loophole for personal escape, hoping that an exception will be made in his case, even that a miracle may occur to save him, that inexorable law will pass him by.[1] In religion he depends on the promise of divine forgiveness, and regards grace as something which lifts him above the realm of law: he believes, like Austin, that God takes a direct interest in his welfare and salvation and has predestined him to eternal life. Now rationalism *is nothing but the exchange of this hopeful uncertainty for a fixed system which allows no exception.* It removes far afield the constant intervention of the divine or reduces it to a single action or impulse at the beginning of the universe.[2] It does not however leave the field open for the free activity of man. It rather confines and coerces him. It shares the distrust of the pious mystic for the lower world of daily happenings and believes that knowledge alone sets free. Above this restless scene is a home of peace in which the mind can forget the detail in the whole, the instance in the formal type. At the last mind can become a

[1] It is this wager or spirit of adventure which carries men through life: uncertainty and hazard form the only basis of optimism; the soldier (though I do not exclude the heroic pleasure of a forlorn hope) as a rule goes into battle with cheerful courage, not because he knows he will be killed but because he hopes that he will not.

[2] The former is the single text of Lecky and Buckle, the latter the chief religious tenet of the english deists.

'spectator of all time and all being' with Plato, with Spinoza gaze at all things *sub specie æternitatis*.

Desire to Become Divine in Greek Thought.—It was only the vision of the whole that attracted the greek thinkers after the classic age. Even in Plato and Aristotle there are distinct signs of lagging interest in the particulars. Plato's 'guardians' are not really politicians, but monks who have to leave their prayers or rosary and go back into the Cave because normal man is either a knave or a fool. His pupil from Stagira describes various States with all the carefulness of a student of universal science, but he finds the truest life elsewhere.[1] Neither social life nor inductive science had any value for the subjective schools. The philosopher wanted in a single grasp to seize the real being and import of the world. The aim was no longer to be perfect, as *man* (ἔξω ἁμαρτίας εἶναι) but to *become God*.[2]

Rationalism Ends in Superseding Reason.—Action was to cease and discursive thought as well; for in possession of the real secret of the universe the goal is found and in perfect rest no further motion is needed. The new school of platonists were complete *rationalists* until the final and crowning moment of union (ἕνωσις, συναφή). They assumed that reason could map out the whole territory of the rational. But at the end of the whole process the mystical act or experience formed the complement or climax, and alone admitted to the secret. When the pioneers threw discredit on reason in the last resort, it is not matter for surprise if their later followers rejected the theoretic groundwork or scaffolding, and pressed on with impatience towards the goal. If we are to reach the soul of the world we can only do so by becoming like it, dropping one by one the properties and qualities or predicates which make us distinct and several beings. God is nameless and beyond thought and being, to be reached only by a *theology of denial* (ἀποφατική). So the soul must surrender not merely creaturely idiosyncrasies but *reason* itself.

[1] One is tired of repeating that the greek temper is not blithe and optimistic, that greek ethics (in the self-conscious age) is not civic but distinctly anti-social, and that the subjective movement after Alexander is only the logical conclusion of tendencies easily to be traced in the earliest inquirers.

[2] This, in very different senses, may be said to be the text of epicurean and stoic as well as of neoplatonist and Christian mystic.

Feud between Philosophy and Religion in Spite of Scholastic.—Now when this doctrine was transported to the west and found a home in a scoto-irish brain, it was assumed that there was and could be no antithesis between the church's *faith* and this human *philosophy*. But the church's creed was a given material of truth, external to the mind, independent of rational grounds. The aim of scholastic is to prove the two identical, to show that reason can only endorse; but the aim of philosophy is to show that the more perfect and personal way was reached by a private and (in the end) mystical process. Hence the feud between the two methods. Scholastic was to the end assured that reason could do nothing more than repeat or codify what faith dictated; 'philosophy' believed that it could give an entirely novel interpretation of the doctrine. Hence both forms of Mysticism, orthodox and heretical, set themselves against the frigid formalism which transformed and summarized, yet never really appropriated, the articles of the *credenda*.

Two Forms of Mystical Philosophy: Emergence of Pietism as Personal Religion.—Here we have reached the parting of the ways, the divergence of the mystical tendency into two branches, that of the *intellect* and that of the *emotions*; to use a pair of later terms, *rationalism* and *pietism*. Now the latter stoutly resisted the apotheosis of Reason which marked both the divines and the philosophers. It tried to exclude the play of subtle and controversial dialectic upon the mysteries of the faith; it protested that *experience* and not *argument* was the true guide in theology. That which brought us near to God and to the right understanding of the *credenda* was not a universal faculty but a private emotion; the attitude of the redeemed and converted sinner who is conscious that in saving him God has performed a special act of mercy. In such a context ratiocination and logic are out of place—the *universal* element is not in the foreground but the *personal*. It is easy to see what will be the corollaries of an extremist in *pietism*: the *external* is *nothing* (whether as authority or formal rite or liturgy or even virtuous conduct); *inwardness* on which no judge can pass sentence from outside, is alone of worth. The visible external society or church, with its roots and interests firmly fixed among things of this dying world, is neither the source of comfort and grace nor in itself holy and spiritual: its very stress on externality condemns it. In matters touching the

soul's experience the only test or rather witness is the soul itself.

Or, Platonic and Aristotelian Theology.—Philosophy had long held that the work of the discerning reason [1] was only *propædeutic*: it prepared the way for its own destruction or denial. It was not by reason that man came near to God, but by some other and better faculty; for God is love. In this common doctrine of all pietism they were only appealing to Plato past Aristotle. In his theology, the former put *goodness* as a cosmic principle before *mind* and *being*.[2] Now although Aristotle speaks of God as *loveable* and object of desire to all the restless striving of creatures [3] he still leaves him as pure self-contemplating Mind: which, intent on the axioms of its own self-consistency, takes no thought for, is not even aware of, that world which is stirred into life and endeavour by its perfection. In Plato, to be sure, there is only an initial act of benevolence; goodness does not condescend to perform the details of the creative task which are deputed to lesser powers. Still the distinction will hold that the master held *love* to be the chief divine attribute, the pupil, *intelligence*.

Reason and Emotion as Means of Approaching God.—Hence the divergence of which we speak: on the one hand, a mystical religion which appeals to the emotions and finds its test and sanction only in the soul's experience; on the other hand, a philosophy aiming through logic and dialectic at union with an impersonal Reason.[4]

These then are the chief attitudes assumed by serious and reflective minds in the eleventh century of our era, in the first epoch of Scholastic. It remains to ascertain in detail the motives

[1] Still involving a certain dualism of *subject* and *object* though this object is no longer many but one the *νοητὸν* or *νοῦς*—though no doubt it has here passed beyond the stage of the discursive understanding with its inductive and separating tendency and its hindu love of classifying and arranging in stages and series.

[2] *Ἐπέκεινα νοῦ τε κ. οὐσίας* in *Republic*, *ἀγαθὸς ἦν* in the well known passage in *Timæus* where he speaks not of Form of Good but of an actively Good Creator.

[3] In language quite as full of unction and emotion as is e.g. Plato's *Banquet*.

[4] Whose rules and truths and methods are the same for all rational beings; the individual therefore, far from being satisfied or perfected in his original nature, is altogether suppressed.

which were stirring in the conflicts of Abelard and Bernard,—in the dogmatic reconstruction of Anselm, in the 'heretical' movements which alarmed Authority and produced a fatal rift between the church as a coercive corporation and the private conscience of its members.

CHAPTER IV

FIRST STAGE OF INTERROGATION

Section I. The Age of Abelard and Bernard

Suggested Divisions of Scholastic.—The periods and divisions of the Scholastic Age are well marked. Omitting the wholly unique and anomalous figure of Erigena, we have after *1050* the first tentative questionings of the *data* or *formulas* of theology (Berengar,. Roslin, Abelard) answered by the two different methods of Anselm and Bernard. Then, after a long interval of silence and fatigue or mere repetition, we see a systematic attempt after *1200* to formulate the harmony of *theology* and *logic* in the light of the new knowledge of greek thought. Lastly, there is the epoch of 'nominalism' in which the assumption that the two 'Sciences' are in harmony is either tacitly surrendered or flatly denied. Cousin has suggested as titles for these divisions (A) Philosophy in *subordination* to theology, (B) in *alliance*, (C) in *estrangement* and conscious opposition. But strictly, if we include Erigena, a still prior stage has to be recognized: Philosophy as *identical* with religion or, in the last resort, *superior*.

Logic and Theology Identified: Supremacy of Reason.—The 'philosophy' which the early scholastic mind applied with confidence to the dogmatic problem was chiefly *logic*. For it *logic* or the laws and order of thought is in a sense *theology*; for if these laws are valid for all rational beings they must also be part of God's mind. Only a few points in logic were applied but the single aim was generally allowed—to *rationalize* the content of faith: when the whole of Aristotle was in their hand this object was achieved; revelation was narrowly confined to the duty of imparting a very few mysteries which transcended human understanding. But this period of accord and equilibrium was very brief. No sooner was the work complete than, from two very different quarters, piety and secular wisdom raised protest against an unholy alliance. No sooner had Aquinas

finished his monumental work than Duns began his negative criticism of the elaborate structure of Reason. Even in the early epoch when logic was first applied, the effects were unhappy in the case of Berengar and others. Anselm insisted on the due subordination of logic at the outset, though he fully believed that it would be found in the end harmonious. Bernard disliked the use of dialectic in matters of belief; and more than one dogma was withdrawn from the purview of reason as resting solely on divine revelation.

The Universals: as Creative Forces.—The 'forbidden fruit', a term applied by Kant to the Absolute, was to the medieval mind, the *universal* or class-name. Porphyry (*230–303*), in a work known through Boëthius' translation, had put aside the question as too difficult for a primary text-book. What relation had the *universal* to the *particular* concrete instance? If classes and types rather than individuals are the proper objects of science, what value have the latter except (very imperfectly) to illustrate an already complete form of truth? In this academic problem we see the radical divergence of minds, attracted by *pantheism* on one hand, by atomic *individualism* on the other. Even if Erigena's neoplatonism had little influence in his day, it put forward the tenet on which medieval development seems to hinge; that thought-forms and thought-order, rules of logic satisfied by dialectic discourse, were also creative forces in *our* world, and disclosed the thoughts of God in the *divine*.[1]

Realism or 'Single Substance': Nominalism At Once Suppressed.—In cent. xi realism found in Remi of Auxerre a frank spokesman. He held that there is 'one *genus* (*οὐσία* or *essentia*), 'beyond which intellect cannot rise, which embraces all natures; 'everything that is being a portion of this essence, by partaking 'in which everything that is has its existence'. This is not platonism but the view of a brahman, or of Parmenides. Such a theory is by no means unknown in the later development of the eastern church which, through 'Denys' and Maximus Confessor, so strongly impressed Erigena. Berengar (*999–1088*) without doubt desired (in opposition) to show the importance of the *parts* as making up the *whole*: there could not be a change in the *substance* of the sacrament unless there was also a change in the

[1] It is for this reason that Hegel is called the 'last of the schoolmen', as we shall have occasion to notice later.

accidents. Roscellinus or Roslin (*c. 1050–1125*) esteemed nothing real but the *individual*; a universal substance being but a *flatus vocis*, and *trinitarian* dogma implying rather three separate and distinct Deities than a single impersonal Godhead.[1] Anselm (*1033–1109*) and William of Champeaux (*1070–1121*), in consequence of this premature nominalism, set up *realism* as the only orthodox view, its rival having proved thus early fatal to the two chief mysteries of religion. Anselm's trust in *reason* and *philosophy* is wonderful: not merely God's Being but the Trinity and Incarnation can be proved—these were later withdrawn into the sphere of mysteries, not obvious or accessible to the unaided reason. William was the pupil of Roslin and the master of Abelard (on whose account of him we depend). His doctrine falls into two phases; the former, a realism so extreme and uncompromising that it denies any real being or worth to the part or instance. Individuals are only accidents of a single identical Substance; the same *Substance* is present in its entire essence in each *individual*; *individuals* differ not in essence but only in the variety of their accidents: *socratitas* or socrates-hood is only an accident of substance *humanitas*: man is a species (*res una essentialiter*) which receives certain forms.[2] Except in these accidental variants (which make up a *personality*), humanity is at bottom one and the same.[3]

Latent Pantheism of Orthodox Church Dogma.—This is

[1] We know Roslin's views only from the reports of his enemies; as in the case of all heresies, too much stress on either of the complementary sides of a truth must lead both parties to stubborn and angry exaggeration. He held that *parts* of a thing were mere aspects under which we choose to regard it, the *individual* is in essence ἓν κ. ἀμέριστον: it exists in *its own right* and apart from other individuals. Thus we cannot truly speak of real relations, for we cannot compare them unless we are certain of the *general* character which puts them under the same class-name. This view of existence is wholly *atomic*; in theology the effect was startling: 'if we are not prepared to say three Persons are one thing, then we ought 'in strict logic to speak of three Gods'. Roslin, so far from attacking orthodoxy, believed that Lanfranc and Anselm agreed with him.

[2] We should rather expect—'is subject to certain accidents which 'make it now Socrates, now Plato'.

[3] To this very uncritical realism can be made the retort of Parmenides (in Plato's dial.) that if the *idea* or universal is wholly present in Socrates, it is entirely absorbed and used up in him; it is nowhere else found. We have seen the same difficulty in the hindu identification *atman* = *brahman*.

precisely the doctrine summed up in later times under the title *Averroism* and rejected with emphasis by the church. The pantheistic tendency of orthodox church doctrine after *1100* was not at once disclosed. When still clearer statements were brought in by the arabizing heretics (after *1200*) the church stood at bay and in Albert and Aquinas endeavours to prove its innocence. But it is not difficult to detect even in these writers a certain 'spinozism' which suppresses the unit. Hence, as we have seen, the very brief interval of complacence and equilibrium and the rapid success of the movement which, from franciscans and secularists alike, restored the individual to his rights and freedom. But in so doing it shattered into fragments the crystal orb of medieval thought. Just as the universal was pulverized into its constituent atoms, so the unitary body of human knowledge was broken up into the several and often hostile departments in which we find it to-day.[1]

Conception of Pure or Abstract Being : Chartres.—Abelard of Bath writing *de eodem et universo* (between *c. 1105* and *1115*) tries to reconcile the opinions of Plato and Aristotle on *ideal* and *real* : 'Aristotle was right in holding that *universals* exist only 'in sensible things : Plato held besides that they existed and 'could be beheld within the divine mind'. He tried to show that the two views were the same. Bernard of Chartres also

[1] With William's *secundâ* position, we cannot be detained here : it is even uncertain what it was ; instead of *essentialiter* he put either *individualiter* (Prantl and Hauréau), or *indifferenter* (Cousin and Rémusat). In the former he seems (like Plotinus) to demand a separate *universal* for each individual, or perhaps he desired to imply that while the *universal* was not multiplied, the individual was rather reduced to unity—this is of course the ordinary belief as to *univ.* and *indiv.*, but what is required since the time of Parmenides and Plato is to show, how it is possible and how it comes about ? The french interpreters who in such a matter are entitled to all respect, seem to imply not identity of *univ.* in each *indiv.* but indistinguishable *similarity*—a concession clearly on the road to nominalism : *univ.* consists of certain elements or attributes in the several *indiv.*, which are identical or *indifferent* in every instance of the type. But then the *univ.* so far from being the *substance* is merely the sum of the *attributes* classified and held together (as it were) by a common name : true being belongs only to the *indiv.* So, by a not infrequent turn in Dialectic, the opposite term is transformed or passes into its other, the *indiv.* becomes for us the *species* or *genus*, as in the phrase *nihil est omnino nisi* individuum ; *sed et illud, aliter et aliter attentum*, species *et* genus *et* generalissimum *est.*

took up this emphasis on platonic Ideas in God's mind: the actual exemplars exist in the supersensible world of the divine thought.[1] Gilbert de la Porrée, also(*1070–1154*) a pupil of Bernard of Chartres, denies that *genera* and *species* exist in their own right as *substances*: 'a thing *substat*, for it is that which *is*, *quod est*: a *universal*, is that by which a thing *is* (*quo est*), and it *subsistit*. Therefore the universal *est*, *sed non substat*, while particular things not merely *sunt* but *substant*, being subjects of accidents which can inhere in a *substance*'. Gilbert carried realism to the length of an *impersonal* theology. Commenting on Boëthius' *Trinity*, he starts from the notion that pure or *abstract* being is prior to that which is *actually*. This is God or rather the Godhead (something akin to Böhme's hidden abyss or non-explicit *gottheit*): this is incomprehensible and to be distinguished from the Triune God which is revealed to us: this pure form of being by which God is God must be kept separate from the Three Persons who are God by partaking in this Form: this is One while the Persons or Substances are Three. This distinction between *deitas* and *deus* (quite in keeping with realism) led to his condemnation by the Synod of Reims and the Pope in *1148*. To the Godhead (τὸ θεῖον) we cannot apply the categories (so in Denys' *negative* theology). Between this pure Being and Substances stand the Ideas or Forms (essences of things, *formæ nativæ*, having no relation to a thing's accidents).

The Compromise of Abelard.—Abelard now comes forward with his compromise of *conceptualism* and, like every proposer of a compromise, is claimed by either side.[2] *Genera* and *species* which are predicated of *individuals* cannot be treated as things

[1] This belief, once dismissed with scorn, as a neoplatonic perversion and thoroughly alien to Plato's doctrine of Forms, is now believed by some competent students to be the 'second manner' of the platonic development, where instead of a *republic* of wholly independent and unrelated Ideas there is a *monarchy* in the spiritual world and all the lesser ideas subsist within the Highest Soul (which is God) as His thoughts: in a measure this corresponds to Berkeleian Idealism—wherein there must be central intelligence always thinking the Forms and always viewing the objects of sense which proceed from them.

[2] To Cousin, Rémusat and Hauréau, he is a *nominalist* in more prudent fashion than Roslin (and Uberweg agrees); to Ritter and Erdmann he is a moderate *realist*: but in a question where a very slight change, or over emphasis, in one factor makes it pass over into its opposite, a prudent nominalist and a moderate realist must be much the same.

or substances, for *res de re non prædicatur*. We saw clearly that an 'indifferent' *universal* led directly to a pantheistic doctrine that all beings were in the end identical in a single substance. The universal gave not *forms* to things but only an indeterminate and indifferent substrate; how then was it the form-giver? This monism then is either spinozan or averroist, in any case pantheistic, in the sense implied by Amalric and David about *1200*. Abelard's basal tenet was 'only the individual exists 'in its own right'; whereas the system of Indifference seems to acknowledge a *universal* or generic substance as the true being or core of individual things—a dogma already familiar to us in the greek church. Yet as supporting a *via media* Abelard will not offend the convinced realist by calling universals *flatus vocis*, even if it be true that 'only individuals exist and in them nothing 'but the individual'. The distinctions of *genera* and *species* are not arbitrary nor a matter of convention or again of personal fancy. To our logical order and classifying process there was a genuine objective counterpart in the world outside. But he cannot accept the view which hypostatizes [1] these qualities found alike in the particulars, in virtue of which they are called identical. He is reaching forward to the theory which sees the individual as the only true and indivisible substance. While then he tends to an Aristotelian position about *universals*, he does not reject Plato's *universalia ante rem*.

Abelard, Sabellian and Rationalist.—In his *theology*, strictly so called, there is no doubt that Abelard tends to a sabellian theory of the Trinity in his desire to combat the tritheism latent in Roslin's views: the Persons are different *aspects* or *attributes* of Godhead (Power, Wisdom, Love). He revived too the *rationalism* of Erigena; a dogma is not true because God has said it (as e.g. Tertullian held and the scotists will hold) but because it agrees with right Reason and because our private reason accepts and ratifies it. This of course implies that *above* God is the realm of intelligibles, just as (in one construing of the myth) beyond the demiurge in *Timæus* is the ideal pattern after which he models the sensible world. God is therefore not strictly the creator of forms; and it is not His will that ordains truth: the *rational* is that system under and within which He works. Abelard's *reason*, which is to be the final test, is not private judgment

[1] Gives real substance, actual being.

but the laws or forms of this world-system, into which both God and man have access : there is then room in his doctrine for what we should term *mysticism*.

Against Slothful Surrender to Authority : Inwardness.— Against an unintelligent surrender to the voice of Authority he protests in his *Sic et Non* : which may possibly be a text-book of bold scepticism, but is more likely a treatise meant to show that even the Fathers disagreed and that their consent does not excuse us from the duty of making careful inquiry on our own account. If, by showing the antinomies and discords left in the patristic exposition of dogma, we find that truth has not yet been visibly fixed, it remains for us to start afresh and try to reconcile these conflicting statements in a *via media*. But the effect of the compilation is clearly to throw discredit on patristic authority and to raise a general feeling of distrust. Hence arise (in the interests of church discipline and assurance) the long series of *Summists*, beginning with the respectable name of Peter the Lombard, his pupil. Nearly all medieval writings are *commentaries* on works and authors of assured credit ; and the Summists give the views of the Fathers on contested points of doctrine.[1] In all his long quarrel with Bernard, Abelard[2] had this much in common : that he laid emphasis on *inwardness* (will, purpose, intention) : it is (as with the greek moralists) the subjective intent that decides the ethical value of an act. But the scholastic age, as we shall see in the section devoted to its practical side, betrayed a very slight interest in ethics and, except for

[1] The list includes Robert Pulleyn (*c.* 1090–1150), Peter Lombard (1100–1164), *magister sententiarum* (on whose text-book several hundreds of commentaries were written), Peter of Poitiers his pupil (1130–1180), Robert of Melun, Hugo of Amiens, Stephen Langton, William of Auxerre, Alan de Lille or *de Insulis* (1130–1203).

[2] Abælardus (formed from boyish nickname *bajolardus* ? pig-carrier) belonged to a noble breton house and may have had iberian blood and kinship with the scoto-irish races whence came Erigena and Duns : pupil of William of Champeaux 1100, has school of his own at Melun 1102 afterwards at St. Geneviéve, Canon in 1115 ; after his fall into sin, becomes monk in 1120, is condemned for sabellian teaching at Council of Soissons 1121 ; builds a humble cell of turfs and reeds as hermit at Nogent ; invited to breton religious house ; returns to Paris 1136 (John of Sarum heard him at this date) ; again condemned owing to the zeal of Bernard (Council of Sens 1141) ; arraigned for heresy, he appeals to Rome which ratifies the sentence ; + Cluny 1142.

monastic virtues, went for guidance rather to Aristotle than to the Bible or the Church.

Section II. Reaction of Pietism and Close of First Scholastic Period

Reaction against Dialectic : Emotional Self-Loss.—As we have already said, Bernard of Clairvaux (*1091–1153*) marks a decided protest against dialectic as applied to articles of faith and church-dogma. The scholastic movement represented by Abelard's lectures meant the unsettlement of faith for a large number of believers. The orthodox defence of Anselm appealed to just the same faculty of reason ; which, however in fact universal and impersonal, seemed to Authority very much like irresponsible private judgment. What Bernard condemns is Abelard's passion for distinctions and antithesis in matters where he *preferred to affirm and to unite*. The practical end of religion is to know God, to love and to enjoy Him. He begins with man's natural instinct of self-*love* and shows how faith transmutes this into an absorbing love of God which denies and is even unconscious of self. 'Self-loss is the final end : to lose thyself, 'to be emptied of self, to have no consciousness of self, this is to 'walk as a citizen of heaven ; as a waterdrop loses self in wine-'cask, as iron heated red-hot becomes pure fire rather than metal, 'as air filled with sunlight is transformed into its brightness' . . . so must all self be dissolved and wholly transformed into the will of God. 'If anything of man remain, how shall God be all in all ?' By the year *1125* there was prevalent a great distrust of human Reason, a reaction towards Faith, a desire to apprehend truth by some other means than critical intelligence. Bernard, no doubt with widespread approval, began or rather renewed *orthodox* mysticism ; a personal religion which made dogma its own, not by weighing arguments but by allowing free play of feeling and emotion. Yet he constitutes himself the church's great detective for heresy, and arraigns not merely Abelard the semi-nominalist but Gilbert the realist (Council of Reims, *1148*). In place of a rational apprehension of *credenda*, he devised a systematic advance through faith and feeling to the objects of desire, still conceived in a somewhat scholastic and formal manner.

The Victorine Pietists : Decay of Speculative Interest.— He was supported by the Victorines of the Augustinian Order, of whom Hugh of St. Victor [1] maintained that reasoning could not discover the uncorrupt truth of things. He did not altogether reject the design of setting forth in methodical form the content of faith and the opinion of the Fathers : he has even been called the first of the Summists. But his design was clearly rather to guard against error than to give to doctrines any formal fixity. The two Priors of St. Victor, Richard (*1162–1173*)[2] and Walter (*1173–1185*), became more and more opposed to the rationalizing activity of the age. The latter pointed out that a *Summa* is a veritable storehouse of arguments against the faith ; that in its eagerness to forestall and answer all possible objections it only suggests doubt and does not cure it. ' Summists have as ' much to say *against* as in *favour of* God's existence : Abelard ' and Peter Lombard his pupil, Gilbert and Peter of Poitiers ' are the four Labyrinths of France '. Hence by the middle of cent. xii., logical studies had fallen into discredit and even orthodox apologists were looked on with suspicion. The speculative interest, which had arisen parallel to the reforms of Clugny and of Hildebrand and to the Wars of Investiture, now died down : logic became, not a serious inquiry into the laws of thought, but the exercise of that peculiar dialectic subtlety in dispute which we associate with the term *scholastic*. Meantime the Summists were

[1] Hugo (1078–1141) born in Saxony, and so a forerunner of the german mystics rather than follower of the french ' enlightenment ' : sojourned in two victorine abbeys (Marseilles and Paris) ; canon and perhaps prior from 1130 : renown as preacher exceeded St. Bernard's ; started the victorine reactions to *pietism* (which dominated 1150–1200) ; his mystic language free from ' perilous temerities ' (Langlois) ; though he believed dialectic to be both hazardous and inadequate in matters of faith, had not the scorn of secular science which marks later victorine obscurantism ; ' knowledge ' is not the *end* of the mystical life, but only the *vestibule* ' ; he admitted *reason* as aid to help us to understand revealed truths ; a true scholastic in his curious formalism of the mystic's progress, threefold eye of the soul in *cogitatio, meditatio, contemplatio* : among recent works (besides Hauréau's *History* etc. 2nd edit. Paris 1886 and de Wulf's, Louvain 1900) there are monographs by Mignon, *Origines* etc. Paris 1895, and Kilgenstein's *Gotteslehre*, etc. 1896.

[2] Richard opposed the scholastic tenet that objects of private and mystical contemplation are in part *above* reason and in part *contrary* to reason (as e.g. the intuition of the Trinity).

mere codifiers of Authority. The mystics deplored the errors of both and devoted themselves to personal piety or even to active enterprise in missions.

Sceptical Humanism : the English Temper.—There is therefore room in this exhaustion of original thought for the impartial survey of the historian, who records the progress of a movement without himself becoming a partizan. John of Sarum (educated in France during the time of Bernard's zeal against heresy *1136–1148*) sees clearly that the intellect of the age is no longer a unity but a medley of undigested fragments : he is a critic and practical man of the world rather than a divine or philosopher. He detests the vain and trivial sophistries which had become the staple of scholastic disputes, and, joining no party, taking no side, dubbing himself academic, (that is, anti-dogmatist) he is the first notable name and pioneer in the sceptical movement which was later to end in Montaigne and the french Enlightenment. With a temper thoroughly english he regards religion as a *practical* matter—'love is the fulfilling of the law'—rather than a complex of dogmatic intricacies. Where doubt is permissible to wise men, that is in matters not yet defined and fixed by Authority, 'I 'follow in their footsteps and suspend my judgment'.[1] If the scoto-irish race gave Britain the renown of Erigena and Duns Scotus, the name of the saxon John is no less typical of the sound practical purpose and dogmatic caution of the english. His teaching in many ways reminds us of the tenets of later *utilita-*

[1] John was of saxon or english, not norman, descent and has no particular sympathy with the ingenious refinement of Lanfranc and Anselm ; he crossed to France 1136 and for two years studied at St. Geneviéve, both under Abelard and under two pupils of Bernard of Chartres (cf. Clerval's monograph on *École de Ch. au M. Age*, Paris, 1895), and after 1140 under Gilbert de la P. and Robert Pulleyn ; was present at Council of Reims at which Pope Eugenius III presided. In 1159 he composed his great work *Polycraticus* (de nugis curialium et de vestigiis philosophorum) and his *Metalogica*, or account of methods used in scholastic education. He is remarkable among men of his time for good latin and strongly practical and liberal tendencies; he may be called the forerunner of *humanism*. He became secretary to Thomas à Becket (in 1170) and bishop of Chartres 1176. He attended Council of Lateran 1179 and died in 1180 (see C. J. Webbs' *Polycr.*, 2 vols Oxford 1909). Except for an article in *Dict. Nat. Biog.*, he is neglected by his countrymen and even in Germany there seems to be no new monograph after C. Schaarschmidt's in 1862.

rianism; he opposes common sense to the profitless conflicts of realism and its foes; he is more of a ciceronian (both in polished style and sceptical outlook) than an aristotelian.[1]

[1] Of Aristotle he knew (it would appear) solely the *Organon* in latin and no other writing at all.

PART II

The Dualistic Opposition

CHAPTER V. DUALISM TRAVELS WESTWARDS

SECTION I. VITALITY OF ADOPTIANISM IN THE EAST: THE PAULICIAN SECTARIES

Emergence of Divers Elements in Alliance against Church (*1200*).—The *second* period of scholastic opens soon after *1200* with the introduction of *peripatism* by the medium of arabian and jewish purveyors. After an interval of stagnation and fatigue in which the reaction of the pious had repressed dialectical refinements, a new stimulus was given to thought, a new alarm to orthodoxy, by the Pantheists. These had learnt something from the received churchly dogma of realism, something from Spain and southern France, something from the now revived platonism of Erigena. The thirteenth century is the age of the new monkish Orders, of Frederick II (more sympathetic with muslim than Christian culture), of the Inquisition, of the Brethren of the Free Spirit, of the fall of the Empire and the approaching catastrophe of the Papacy. Opposition to Authority is not now merely a tentative questioning by the learned, but shows something of a popular movement. It is in part a continuation of Bernard's pietism and the victorine mystical doctrine; because it claims direct intercourse, even immediate union, with the divine. But it is also affiliated to the long movement of paulician dualism, strongly antagonistic to churchly authority and in its world-theory showing so marked a contrast to Islam. The new anti-hierarchical revolt took to itself a *monism*, which it learnt from philosophy, and a *personal religion*, without *media*, which had been the teaching of pietism. The grades of this heresy varied from the spiritual doctrine of Joachim's Eternal Gospel, through stages of pure

theoretic pantheism in Amalric and David, into the open antinomianism or moral 'indifference' of their extreme followers.

Effect of Crusades: Unscrupulous Savagery of New Age: Communism.—The Crusades had borne their fruit in condemning western exclusiveness and the unique claims of Christendom to a true and final form of faith. Zeal for the church had evaporated and the Holy War of *1204* was perverted into a freebooting expedition against the wealthiest town in Europe, which had stood for centuries as a sentinel against infidelity. The disguise and restraint which the church had thrown round primitive savagery was now torn off: at a time of growing knowledge and increasing apparatus of life and art, naked instincts came to the front. The first modern States were founded subject to no law but that of self-preservation. The poorer class gladly availed themselves of the new doctrines of professors that man was in the depths of his nature one with God. They readily interpreted their own vague passions or desires as the actual stirrings and intimations of the Spirit, and their emotions ran the whole gamut from highest to lowest. There is no doubt that the social structure was seriously threatened by these claims: we have only to remember the panic aroused in later times by the Peasants' War and the Anabaptist Kingdom of Munster. The movement, in origin purely *individual*, became *communist* as a natural result of the weakness of units taken severally. Yet on the whole there was little solidifying into regular communities; and the sole region where a religious feudalism menaced the civil and papal autocracy was in the favoured country of Provence and Languedoc.

Tenets of Paul of Samosata.—It appears likely that the *Paulician* heretics (and sometimes rebels) in the east-roman empire were remains of an early adoptianist sect. There is no doubt that Paul of Samosata[1] represented this ebionitic christology which, as in the later antiochene school, laid emphasis rather on the *human* nature than the divinity of Christ. In his *Treatise to Sabinus* he says: 'in fixity and resoluteness of 'character He *likened himself to God*; and having *kept Himself* '*free from sin* was united to God and was enabled to grasp the 'power to work wonders. These miracles show that over and

[1] Patriarch of Antioch, dethroned by the pagan Emperor Aurelian (272) because he did not accept the dogmatic standpoint of Rome.

'above the will, He possessed one and the same activity with God; 'He thus *won the title* of Redeemer and Saviour'. Again he repeats this in somewhat different phrase 'By struggle and hard 'work He overcame the sins of our forefathers: He *succeeded in* '*perfecting Himself* and through His *moral excellence was united* '*to God*, having attained to unity and sameness of *will and activity* 'through advances on the path of good works. . . . Thus He 'inherited the name which is above all names, the prize of love 'and affection vouchsafed to Him in grace. . . . We do not allot 'praise to those who obey merely in virtue of their nature; but 'to those in good measure who submit because their attitude is 'one of love. . . . It was in virtue of love that the Saviour 'coalesced with God, so as to suffer no divorce from Him but to 'retain for all ages to come one and the same will and activity 'with Him. . . . As *nature* manifests the substance of the 'manifold to subsist as one and the same, so the attitude of *love* 'produces in many persons unity and sameness of *will*'.

Human Effort and Adoptianism.—Our Saviour was therefore (in Paul's eyes) a man who became God, rather than God who became man: this is the dogma corresponding to Pelagius' theory in the sphere of human conduct.[1] It is the tendency of such theories to deprive the Gospel of its unique value as a revelation from above, by making Christ's life and human person typical of an advance upwards, accessible to all men. It is a symbol of the rebirth and resurrection of every believer. That which Christ *became*, viz. the Son of God, can be won by each Christian who like Him suffers and overcomes. A vulgar construction of Nestorius might easily relegate the Saviour into the same class as Hercules, Castor and Pollux, heroes who for their personal merits and achievement were made divine.[2] God does not actively help or favour His best servants, but He sets a prize and gives an example

[1] Firmicus Maternus *Math.* ii 28 (Sittl. Teubner 1894 p. 74) has a curious parallel when he exhorts the astrologer to be a good man; *ad imaginem te Divinitatis similitudinemque formo ut sis semper præconio bonitatis ornatus; oportet enim eum qui quotidie de Diis et cum Diis loquitur animum suum ita formare atque instruere, ut ad imitationem Divinitatis semper accedat . . . si purgatum animum et memorem divini seminis geris, aggredere hoc opus.*

[2] Horace, *Hac arte Pollux et vagus Hercules Enisus arces attigit igneas, Quos inter Augustus recumbens purpureo bibit ore nectar: arte* is of course ἀρετῇ personal heroism.

and all are free to follow the one and attain the other. The imperial *apotheosis* at Rome left the verdict to a popular *post-mortem* judgment of which the Senate were the spokesmen: in any case it was believed that by merit and endeavour men could become 'as gods'. The emphasis then was wholly on personal effort and sanctity, not on outward means of grace.

Doctrines of the Thonraki: Denial of Means of Grace and Frank Dualism.—Gregory Magistros, an armenian, duke of Mesopotamia under Constantine X (*1042–1054*) represents the Thonraki as saying: 'we do not worship matter but God; cross, 'hurch, priestly vestments, sacrifice of the mass,—all this we 'reckon for naught and lay stress only on the inner sense'. The Paulitzians or Paulians have obvious affinity with the followers of Mani (though they execrate him): the Father in heaven rules not this world but the world to come, and the present system lies under an evil Creator who made flesh while the good deity created angels only: the phrase 'Moses saw not God but the devil', puts them on a level with Marcion the dualist and other more strictly gnostic sects of cent. ii. Therefore they do not honour the Virgin; they allegorize the Eucharist, and assail the cross as a cursed instrument; these are to them as carnal things under the sway of the world-ruler. They show great dislike to the Apostle Peter.[1] 'We love Paul and execrate Peter', said the Thonraki, according to the Magistros. They abhorred monks and the monastic garb; so apparelled the evil world-ruler said to Peter at Christ's baptism 'This is my beloved Son'. They denied the sanctity of catholic structures of stone or wood and the efficacy of the baptismal 'bath-water': yet they baptized in water or in river and their modern followers continue the practice. In cent. xi they told the Magistros that he did not understand the mystery; 'we are in no haste to be baptized 'for baptism is death': hence it was clearly used as a rite *in extremis*, just as in the case of Constantine I (it being held that subsequent sin could not be forgiven). Like most of the gnostic

[1] Though this does not appear conspicuously in the *Key of Truth* ed. F. C. Conybeare, Oxford 1898, where it is said that not Peter alone but all the apostles constitute the church; the reader, when elected and confirmed, assumes the ritual name of Peter: this practice is found also amongst the Cathars of 1100–1200 and in the celtic church of Gildas, where every presbyter was a *Peter*.

sects (to whom outward acts were indifferent) they allowed and even counselled conformity to catholic usage; but they rejected the clerical orders of the church. Their own ministers were called by the very un-priestly names of *συνέκδημοι* (itinerant '*colporteurs*' of the type of George Borrow) and *νοτάριοι* (copyists). They dressed like laymen, dislike of sacerdotal vestments being a constant trait of the sect to this hour.

Their Gnostical Theology: Half Docetic, Half Adoptianist.—In dogma they held that God summoned an angel and bade him go to earth to be born of a woman and endure insults, suffering, and death, bestowing on him the name 'Son of God'. He was taken up into heaven and obtained the further title Christ in the time of Cæsar Augustus, 'by way of grace, and as a reward for fulfilling the commandment'. The *Key* lays more emphasis on the moment of Christ's baptism: 'then it was that He became 'Saviour of us sinners, and was filled with Godhead; *then* was 'He sealed, anointed, called by the Voice, addressed as the 'Beloved One'. It was at His baptism that Christ 'put on that 'first raiment of light which after his sin Adam forfeited in the 'garden'.[1] As to *dualism*, the Paulicians seem to follow the New Testament very literally; the tenet is most conspicuous in the greek accounts. They laid stress on the pauline contrast of *law* and *grace*, a Satan's *bondage* and the *freedom* of the Spirit. Our Lord was new creature, a fresh beginning; and therefore they denied all honour to His Mother, limiting true kinship with Him to those who *do God's will*.

Saint-Worship.—Therefore the fully initiated become in like manner *christs*; they cease to be mere hearers of the word, (the *audientes* of the western sects) and become complete vehicles of the Holy Spirit. Gregory of Nark attacks their *man-worshipping* apostasy; and it is clear that their claims to die and rise again with Christ were interpreted by foes to include physical resurrection after being put to death. In a MS. at Vienna referring to the Bogomils of cent. x., we hear of Peter 'founder of sect of 'Messalians, or Lycopetrians, of Fundaitæ and Bogomils who 'called himself Christ and promised *to rise again after death*'. These Perfect or Elect were regularly adored as *christs*, anointed by the Spirit: this practice was conveyed westwards, but it is

[1] Even orthodox armenian writers held that Christ had incorruptible flesh, made of fire and ether.

also found in the so-called Celtic Church, where a stranger venerating St. Columba 'worshipped christ in his holy person' and St. Baithene after delivering a discourse received homage from the assembled brethren: who, still kneeling and with hands outstretched to heaven, venerated 'Christ in the Saint'.[1] A modern russian sect, of undoubted lineage from the armenian thonraki, uses the same practice; in *1837* an Elect could say to his followers without giving offence: 'I am the Cross, light two tapers on my 'hands and *give me worship*, for I am able to give you salvation 'as much as the cross and the saints'. Among Cathars of the west, the Elect, being 'consoled' and having become a Paraclete in the flesh, stands in prayer with arms extended in form of a cross, and the *audientes* adore the mystical Christ in him. The sectaries of Mount Mardin, syriac-speaking shepherds, also to this day have their *christs*, as the persian interpreters of Islam had their semi-divine *imams*, as the Tibetans their *lamas*.[2] The paulicians (it is thought) encouraged this cult of a *living cross* to correct the materialistic 'fetish-worship' of the *Symbol*. There is no doubt that they represented a reaction against a gross presentment of salvation through purely sensible means and channels, and believed that man (in virtue, not of his nature, but of his will) is, when perfected, the only suitable vehicle of the divine. Hence with earlier manichees[3] and later bogomils or cathars they refuse the name *church* to material structures, finding it only in a spiritual assembly of the Elect. Neither paulician nor thonraki would allow marriage to be a sacrament, or a state consecrated by any religious ritual. So the later cathars repudiated it in the west, undoubtedly giving the great impetus to *celibacy* which the Roman Church was (in cent. xi) compelled to adopt, on pain of forfeiting the popular esteem and the influence it conferred.

[1] Adamn. *Life of St. Col.* i 44 and 37.

[2] To-day in Russia there is a bogomil sect in which one member is regularly adored by the rest of the congregation.

[3] It is not proposed to inquire closely here into the kinship and relations of the sect of Mani (on the fringe of the Christian Church like many other gnostic heresies) and the party of *paulians* or *paulitzians*: it may however be said that there was certainly a fusion in Armenia between two sects of *independent* but *kindred* beliefs.

APPENDIX A

Further Details in the History of the Paulicians

They are first mentioned by an armenian patriarch, Narses II, *c. 553* in Justinian's reign, and significantly classed with Nestorians ' in belief and prayer '. In spite of the bishop's attack they continued to work in Armenia and were reinforced by iconoclasts from Albania (in Caucasus) : the united sects had a settlement near Lake Van. Patriarch John IV in the reign of the syrian iconoclast Leo III (*c. 730*) identifies them with *Messalians*. An anonymous account in *greek* (' escorial ') was written about the middle of cent. ix (when Iconoclasm as a State-policy was nearing its downfall) ; George the Monk incorporated it into his *Chronicle*. Photius writing under the now orthodox (if disreputable) Michael III uses this freely for his *History of the Manichees*, adding certain details from his own experience of the sect ; Peter of Sicily also used it, an envoy sent by Basil I (himself of *armenian* descent) to treat for exchange of captives at *Tephricé*, the paulician citadel. Peter wrote his summary of their dogma and history for use by church-authorities in Bulgaria, whither the paulician and remaining iconoclast ' ironsides ' were sending a mission—later destined to have serious effects in west Europe. All these writers absolutely identify their teachingwith that of Mani. Paul of Samosata (says ' escorial ') was the son of a manichee woman Callinicé ; he and his brother John were despatched as missioners to Armenia (*c. 250*) in this mythical account.

In *684* Constantine IV an Heracliad, sent to suppress the sect but the officer in charge was himself converted and suffered martyrdom in *690*. A son of the chief sectary, Paul the Armenian, is said to have ' converted ' Leo III, the syrian iconoclast in *722* ; there is no doubt whatever that their tenets and aims were very similar. His successor Joseph (*745–775*) securely evangelized Phrygia and died near Pisidian Antioch under the patronage of the reforming empire. Constantine V (Leo's son), *mangeur des moines*, transferred from the eastern frontier (*752*) many sectaries, simple and warlike in character like Cromwell's ' new army ', to Thrace where Alexius I found many steadfast schismatics more than three centuries later. Remains (e.g. at Philippopolis) were discovered not only by Frederic Barbarossa in *1189* but by travellers even in cent. xix.[1]

Annoyed at the very anomalous attack of Leo V (*813–820*), himself an *armenian* and *iconoclast*, the schismatics now enter upon a fifty years' open warfare with the empire. Sergius, their spiritual chief, condemned a policy of resistance or retaliation (like Tolstoy), but few enemies wrought more mischief to Byzantium than Carbeas and Chrysochir. Theodora, Regent for Michael III and the restorer of orthodox image-cult, gave her mind to the overthrow of the sect, but not until the reign of Basil I was Tephricé captured (*873*). Another branch, remaining in Armenia came under the protection of the great Bagratid family and in the centuries

[1] John Zimisces, an *armenian* regent or coadjutor for Basil II, settled a fresh colony at Philippopolis in 969.

between *821–1040* were ruled by seven leaders or 'patriarchs', as the Magistros tell us, Duke of Mesopotamia under Constantine X (*c. 1070*). Gregory of Nark had occasion to write against them *c. 950* and in cent. xi, four armenian writers attacked their tenets, the two Narses, Aristaces and Paul the Taronite. About *1100* they were numerous on the borderland of Christendom and Islam (Cilicia and Syria). The crusaders found them on all sides and called them *Publicani*. A long silence of 600 years by no means implied their extinction as a sect: in *1828* a branch-colony settled in russian Armenia bringing with them the *Key of Truth*.[1]

Section II. Priscillianists and Balkan Schismatics

Converging Streams of Heresy in the West. The Sect of Priscillian.—The factors resisting a visible and autocratic church were too widespread to allow us to trace a single movement developing from any certain centre. It is indeed likely that *gnostic* and ultra-pietistic elements survived in every part of Christendom. We can trace the paulician colonies in Thrace, the connected bogomil movement in Bulgaria, and the affiliation of the western cathars in cent. xi. The manichees had long joined forces with the 'paulians' in the east; and the cathar church of the west is most plainly the product of composite influences. But for the special form of heresy against which the church raged furiously in cent. xiii, it would be unfair to overlook a latent survival of *Priscillianism*. Here as in other displays of *individualist* ethics, appeal was made for a church of the perfect consecrated by the personal holiness of its members (e.g. in abstinence and celibacy) rather than by the virtues of an official hierarchy.

Priscillian, a rich spanish layman, believed that the true life for every believer was unbroken intercourse with God. He laid emphasis (like the paulicians a little later) upon man as a fit abode for the divine, 'Know ye not that ye are the temple of God?' (1 Cor. iii 16). To become such a habitation for the divine mere acceptance by faith is not enough; hard present effort and ascetic practice is needed: marriage is to be shunned as quite incompatible with the higher life. His disciples were called *spiritales* and *abstinentes*. The movement towards *celibacy* was of course strongly supported by Jerome: in *384* there had been a popular outburst in Rome against the 'hindu' *gymnosophists*, monks who declaimed against the married state. Pope

[1] Edited at Oxford by F. C. Conybeare, whose patient research has thrown a flood of light upon an obscure and important subject.

Siricius speaks of these puritan extremists with great scorn. The church, now for more than half a century closely allied with the empire, became a bulwark of the social order, and was rejecting all who (like Donatus) wished to create a small group of 'montanist' elect instead of recognizing a world-wide and inclusive organization. It is difficult to-day to impute definite heresy to Priscillian, since the publishing of eleven treatises by Schepss (Vienna 1885). But he was accused of 'over-goodness', said to have been used as a cloke for magic and libertinage. The first charge is true; he was addicted to occult sciences: the second is the vulgar indictment levelled at all secret or select societies.

The Civil Arm and Condign Penalty for Heresiarch.—Emperor Gratian at first threatened to banish the sectaries (*380*), but on Priscillian's appeal withdrew the ban: his murderer and successor Maximus III (*383–388*) became the first imperial persecutor to the death. Appealing against the sentence of the Synod of Bordeaux (*384*) the leader of the sect was suddenly seized and with six companions burnt alive at Trêves (*385*). The terrible precedent of the stake for heresy had now been set. Though the founder suffered condign punishment (to the grief of Ambrose and Martin of Tours), his views spread in the south of France where the later cathars became dominant: in *412* the bishops of Arles and of Aix in Provence were deposed as 'manichees'. Proclus of Marseilles and the two archbishops of Narbonne and Vienne were also regarded with suspicion as heretical rigorists.[1] The ascetic spirit of the heresy passed, under due churchly supervision, into celibacy and the conventual or strictly monastic system. But the Catholic Church no doubt wisely refused to consider this buddhistic ideal as the duty of every believer and, when it revived again in a schismatic sect, it was never strictly followed except by a very few.

Bogomils in Bulgaria: their 'Paulician' Tenets and Dualism.—Whilst early western 'heresy' had prepared the ground in south-eastern France and left here and there memories and

[1] Besides the first synod of Saragossa in 380 those of Astorga 446 and Toledo 447 condemned this exclusive ideal of Christian life, but the tenets of the sect continued in open practice until the second synod of Braga in 563. Fifteen years after his execution the charges against Pr. were reviewed by the Council of Toledo 400: the most serious *dogmatic* error was said to be his rendering of *innascibilis* for ἀγέννητος: did this imply that he held only a *docetic* or mystical Christ?

perhaps even secret members, the chief influx of anti-hieratic dualism came from the east, across the Adriatic or overland along the Alps. The bogomils of Bulgaria were identified both with the euchites (or massalians) and the later *Pavlikeni* in slavonic writings of cent. xiii. But they rose long before, the connecting link between the sects of east and west : in the latter region they were known as *Bulgari* (or ' bougres ') in cent. xii and xiii.[1] Like the paulicians (of whom they may be held an offshoot) the bogomils combined *adoptianist* with *manichean* tenets : Paul of Samosata, their real founder, they often mistook for the apostle. They seemed to deny Christ's supernatural birth and His prior coëxistence with Father and Spirit ; to refuse value to sacraments, outward rites and ordinances ; to interpret miracles in a mystical or allegoric sense, not regarding them as actual events ; to confer baptism on adults only, sometimes withholding all physical signs (water and unction with oil) ; to hold their assemblies, not in special edifices but in private houses, like our ' prayer-meetings ' ; to elect no priests or ministers in authority, but only ' teachers ' from among their own members, on whom the congregation at large laid hands ; to reject marriage as a sacrament, monachism, fasting on special days, images, crosses and ' idolatrous ' reverence paid to saints and relics. The congregation was composed of the ' elect ' and (as with the paulians) *each member could win the same perfection as Christ* and become like Him a vehicle of the Holy Spirit. For Christ was only Son of God through grace as were the prophets of old ; and they refused to believe that the elements were converted in the Eucharist into His flesh and blood. Both in the original and in its russian branches to the present day, the old *gnostic dualism* is a conspicuous feature.[2] There existed among them

[1] In 1207 the *Bulgarorum hæresis* is named ; in 1223 the Albigenses are identified with the ' Bougres ' of that provençal district, and the Pope of the Albigenses is said to reside within the confines of Bulgaria. From this kingdom went forth, after the destruction of its independence by Basil II (completed by 1020), the missioners into Russia who founded sects (existing to the present hour) like the Strigolniki, Molokani and Doukhobors. The whole slavonic temper is charged with ardent self-sacrifice, indeed love of pain and martyrdom for its own sake ; of which Tolstoy is the most remarkable literary exponent, and the present war of idealism and self-denial (1916) the plainest evidence.

[2] Partly from marcionite influence (shown in the anti-semitic tone of

apocryphal writings, referred to the authorship of notable ' popes ' as Bogomil himself or Jeremiah ; they contained accounts of the origin of the world and of man, the causes of sin, a scheme of redemption, disputes between fictitious characters (body and soul, good and evil, heaven and hell).[1] Their dualistic theology is of a very primitive gnostic stamp.

Their Gnostical Mythology and Hatred of Church.— God had two sons, Satanail the elder and Michael : the former rebelled and became the Spirit of evil, creating the lower heavens and earth, but unable to complete the creation of man. Therefore on his humble request the spirit of life is breathed in from above. Adam (like a feudal serf) was bound by regular covenant to the fallen ruler and allowed on conditions to till the soil. Michael (the Holy Ghost), in order to save this unhappy race from serfdom, assumes human shape ; or is united at baptism as dove with the man Jesus, whom for his goodness God had elected and consecrated. Our Lord had now received power to break the clay-tablet by which Adam and his seed were ' fast bound ' to slavery. Satanail is vanquished and obliged to drop the last syllable of his name, the syllable *il* or *el* in which all his virtue and power resided. But he was still able to execute his vengeance and bring Christ to the death of the Cross. The so-called ' catholic and orthodox ' Church is the invention of Satan—with its monks, priests, churches, vestments, rites, fastings and sacraments. The true church must therefore keep aloof from an evil world, the work of Lucifer or Satan, the fallen elder son of God ; but it does not appear that they carried *ascesis* to extremes. Each community chose its own twelve apostles, women being also eligible for the number of *elect*. There was much magic formula and conjuring of the bad spirits: their travelling priests went about professing to heal the sick, and expel demons : also to spread secretly copies of the curious cryptic writings which (as good catholics said) ' no orthodox person might read '.

Progress and Fortunes of the Sect in Bulgaria and Bosnia.— Bogomilism clung to the mountain-chain of central and southern Europe and radiated from Hæmus along the Carpathians and

the early MSS.), partly from the definite *duplicity* of the light and dark worlds in Mani's system.

[1] These were set forth in the *Paleya* (historic Bible) or in dialogues between Christ and the Apostles or church-teachers.

westward along the Alps and Pyrenees. The two great paulician settlements already named [1] made of the region about Philippopolis the centre of a great propaganda. These long-settled schismatics fraternized with the Bulgars across the border, and converted a bulgarian prince. Bogomil, their eponymous hero, is said to have lived under Czar Simeon (*927–968*) and, both in his case and that of Jeremiah, the slavonic sources plainly insist on their *manichean* doctrine. Missioners were sent into Russia to dispute with the church newly founded there (*1004*) : Adrian a priest was found teaching bogomil, that is, dualistic tenets and was imprisoned by the bishop of Kieff. More than 100 years later Demetrius became preacher of heresy in southern Russia. Spreading to the west, the sect gained ground in Serbia ; Stepan Nemanya tried to expel them about *1185*. Refugees arrived in Bosnia [2] and there gained a hearing under the name of *Patarenes* ; from thence they penetrated into Piedmont. The Hungarians tried to oust the bogomils from Bosnia and did not cease their efforts until the turkish conquest brought tolerance of these peculiar tenets ; indeed, many noble bosnian families accepted Islam with alacrity : there is no vestige of the heresy now to be found in the land, except perhaps in current folk-lore. But in its most ancient strongholds (Philippopolis and Nicopolis) the sectaries remained unmolested until most of them accepted the

[1] Of Constantine V *c.* 750 and of John I Zimisces 2 centuries later.

[2] Their converts included many bosnian nobles or *bolyars* (βοΐλαδες) and even the Ban Kulin 1180–1204 (whose reign covered the interval between the fall of the Comneni and the taking of Byzantium by the 'latin' freebooters) : it is thought that Kulin, who much increased the wealth and commerce of his country, saw in the new faith a valuable barrier against Hungary. But its king Bela III, acting on pope Innocent's suggestion, compelled him to recant. Yet the magnates nearly three years later dethroned the orthodox Stepan to place Matthew Ninoslav, a professed bogomil, in power. Forced by Gregory IX to accept Christian baptism he abjured the detested faith of the church in 1233. He resisted Hungary and orthodoxy for many years ; but was treated with distinct favour by the pope till his death in 1250 owing to the importance of his kingdom during the mongol panic. Then followed 50 years of orthodoxy under direct hungarian suzerainty ; and nationalism came once more to the front with the bogomil candidate for the banate (1322) when Stepan Kotromanic came to power. When the Turks appeared, they were aided by renegade Slavs who were undoubtedly bogomils. (Among bogomil remains in Bosnia may be named the cemeteries of the sect at Foca on the Drina.)

roman faith in *1650*.[1] In Bulgaria the bogomil disputes certainly assisted letters and imagination : under Czar Simeon, John the Exarch wrote an account of a creation (no doubt orthodox) called *Shestodner* or ἑξαήμερον, Cosmas and Athanasius of Jerusalem attacked the growing sect which had just produced the Questions of Saint Ivan Bogoslav on the origin and end of the world. Together with gnostical cosmogonies there also appeared romantic tales and works of fiction, stories of Alexander, of Troy, and of *Barlaam* and *Josaphat* (founded on Buddha's biography.)

The Western Cathars : The World of Fallen Angels.—The Cathars appear in the west about the opening of cent. xi. Plainly affiliated to the bulgarian sects and through them to the paulician communities of Armenia, they held to the *dualism* which marks the doctrine of Marcion and Mani. There was war in heaven and Satan was cast out with his rebel angels, to be imprisoned in material bodies as a punishment.[2] Others held that Satan himself made them ' coats of skins ' for their duties in the new world created by him as a rival to heaven. There are left behind in the upper world the unfallen angel-frames, ' houses not made with ' hands, everlasting tunics '. The evil god Satan is lord of this world and inspired the harsher parts of the Old Testament : he has power over the *outward* man, over flesh and the body of decay. The world is the only purgatory or hell, standing in complete contrast and antithesis to the eternal world, to the *inward* man, and to Christ's kingdom which ' is not of this world '. Our souls here long to regain their celestial tunics, to be clothed upon by the habitation left in heaven at the moment of their expulsion : while ' at home here in the body they are absent ' from the Lord ' (cf. Phil. i 23). Flesh cannot inherit the higher kingdom, and there is no resurrection : the lower nature is irredeemable and must be wholly surrendered.

Deliverance of the Spirit.—Man can however overcome the

[1] Fourteen villages of Pavlikeni near Nicopolis accepted it and one near Bucharest. To-day there are nearly 2,000 roman catholics under two bishops, nearly all descendants of the medieval *Pavlikeni*, chiefly in the neighbourhood of Philippopolis and Sistova.

[2] This belief, slightly differing from the bogomil, is a remnant of the ancient orphic doctrine or at least strongly resembles it : men are ' the ' brood of Titans ' but, inspired by a heavenly strain in them, can overcome their lower and brutal nature and suffer the divine to emerge.

fatal effects of the Fall and leave his prison-house of clay; not by death, for, dying without reconcilement to God through Christ a soul passes into a new cycle of birth,[1] sometimes being even degraded into the form of a beast. As in Egypt, the sect held that frightful demons, 'dwellers on the threshold', pursue the soul just escaped from the body and force it to take refuge in the nearest body as an asylum. A man must be made a new creature, receive the gift of Spirit as did Christ our example, and become a vehicle for the Paraclete. Christ was a lifegiving Spirit and the *boni homines* (or *bons hommes*) are His envoys upon earth. They alone have the true baptism of the Spirit, which has nothing in common with the Johannine rite of water-immersion: this belongs to the outer world of fleeting show which is throughout hostile to the kingdom of God.

The Two Ranks or Orders: Worship of the Perfect.—There were two classes, the *credentes* and the *perfecti*: the latter formed the ruling class (both men and women), the ordained ministry (as it were) who had received the fullest ritual of *consolamentum*. They had supreme control and exacted not merely unquestioning obedience but actual worship from the faithful, who prostrated themselves when asking for their prayers.[2] They were chosen vessels of election in whom already the Paraclete dwelt; in their hearts was the spirit of God's son, enabling them to cry with assurance 'Abba Father'. They alone were sons 'by adoption 'and grace', and alone might use the Lord's Prayer. In curious contrast to the bogomils who rejected church fasting, the cathars abstained on Monday, Wednesday and Friday (using a diet of bread and water only), and kept three lenten periods in the year. The *credens*, under probation for the higher stage, fasted continuously for a year or eighteen months. So rigorous was the life of the *perfectus* that most deferred the final rite which admitted to it until their death-bed. At this point strict celibacy was demanded and the husband separated from his wife. All increase of the human family is in itself evil; the 'forbidden 'fruit' was Adam's marriage with Eve.[3] In God's kingdom there

[1] The hindu *samsara*, the orphic doctrine (sanctioned by Empedocles, Pythagoras and Plato) of τροχὸς or κύκλος γενέσεως.

[2] The *credens*, as yet unreconciled to God, could only invoke the living saint and use his powerful intercession to mediate on his behalf.

[3] The *Patarenes* of Milan were specially anxious to impose celibacy on the clergy, about the middle of cent. xi, and no doubt popular clamour,

is no marrying or giving in marriage. Where Scripture seems to sanction and even praise the nuptial state, a mystical meaning was given, referring to Christ and the church. The *perfectus* must leave family and household, which are hindrances to the divine kinship. He may eat no fleshmeat except fish: cheese, eggs and milk were forbidden him. Like the buddhist, jain, or pythagorist he could not eat an animal, because within it a human soul might be serving its term of probation or penalty. He might kill nothing and (as with the Quakers) might not take an oath.

Complete Initiation in Rite of Consolamentum.—The central rite (*consolamentum*) was a spiritual baptism by fire and the Spirit, which Christ promised to send from the Father: it removes original sin, retrieving the evil effect of the Fall, restoring the heavenly habitation, the tunics of immortality with which the soul yearns to be clothed. A *perfectus* after 'consolation' is an angel walking in a dissolving fleshly body and ready to meet the Saviour. In the rite of full initiation the Perfect (who admits the novice like the Master of a Freemason's Lodge) delivers an address calling him (as in Armenia) by the name *Peter*, and explaining the adoption and indwelling of the Spirit in the elect. He repeats and comments on the Lord's Prayer clause by clause. Then comes the Renouncement, not only of Satan and his kingdom on earth but of his babylonish church, its magical rites, carnal baptism, and the sign of the cross impressed on the forehead. A true spiritual baptism follows, with a book of the Gospels laid on the head by the *perfects'* hands; and, while passages of Scripture are recited, the newly admitted brother receives the apostolic power to bind and loose.[1] The ideal standard of a holy life is now set before him; and great stress is laid on non-resistance to evil. Not only shall he love his enemies in the abstract but pardon all severally who do him injury, pray for his calumniators, give mantle or cheek to the violent and refrain from judging or condemning any man. Here once again is an integral factor in the Quakers' practice and probably a permanent element in russian 'heresy' (though we know it chiefly in the west as an eccentricity of Tolstoy). The postulant now demands forgive-

quite as much as the needs of church discipline and policy, obliged Hildebrand to enforce it over Christendom.

[1] Which formed the base of the new hierarchic *clericalism* of the presbytery in Scotland or Geneva.

ness for all his past sins (according to the formula of the primitive church) from God and from the congregation : ' I come for par-' don to God, to the church and to you all '. The closing act is the *consolamentum* in the strictest sense ; the volumes of the Gospel are taken from the white cloth on the table and laid on the head, while all the *boni homines* present place on him their right hand and pray ' Holy Father, welcome this Thy servant and send upon him Thy grace and Holy Spirit ' ; the Lord's prayer and the first seventeen verses of St. John's Gospel conclude the ceremony. The new *perfectus* is girt about the paps with the sacred thread (probably a following of brahman usage), robed in a black gown (afterwards a symbol of anti-hierarchic and protestant ritual), and receives from all present the kiss of peace. The ceremony [1] bears the strongest resemblance to the primitive rite of Ordination.[2]

The Lord's Supper and the Blessed Bread.—As to the Lord's Supper it was rather a blessing of bread than a Mass or Eucharist ; the consecrating prayer was the ' Our Father '. The eldest present says ' Thanks be to the God of Jesus Christ, may the Spirit be with us all ', and distributes to every one ' no one believ-' ing that out of it the body of Christ is made '.[3] This service was held once a month and the *credentes* were present, probably as partakers : the table covered with a white cloth and bearing the Gospels gave it the name *apparellamentum* : the *perfecti* were adored and the kiss of peace imparted. In spite of their distrust of matter and symbols, great efficacy was attached to the *pain béni* ; it was sometimes kept for years, and sent into distant parts whither the *perfecti* could not go themselves : it was tied in white bags and worn round the neck, and on a deathbed might even take the place of the ritual of *consolamentum*.[4]

[1] As Abbé Guirard and F. C. Conybeare very justly remark.

[2] The Bible is still laid on the head of Bachelors admitted to the degree of Master of Arts in our older universities, together with a like invocation of the Trinity by the Vice-Chancellor.

[3] These words are from a contemporary writer in cent. xiii (MS. in Milan Library). The next phrase is curious : ' The *Albanenses* however ' even deny that the bread can be blessed ; or sanctified, because it is ' material ' :—that is, the Albigeois carried to the farthest extreme the *dualism* and *docetism* which looked on the whole world with aversion as a work of Satan.

[4] It is said that Extreme Unction was invented by the catholics to take the place of this final rite,—just as *celibacy* and the *mendicant orders*

PART II

The Dualistic Opposition

CHAPTER VI. DOUBT AND DUALISM INVADE THE THOUGHT OF MONISTIC CHRISTENDOM

Absence of Dualism : but no Direct Recourse to Nature.— If late classical society suffered from 'failure of nerve' (as Professors Bury and Murray suggest) the new races also, confronted with the still imposing fabric of Rome, certainly grew less self-reliant and assured. They did not admire *individuals* in the decadent empire so much as *institutions*; and medieval realism may well have derived some stimulus from this genuine if unwilling homage to the majesty of Church or State. But the units, who made up the collective group and inherited the tradition, were in themselves often feeble and contemptible. Hence an unlimited respect for the past and a need to lean upon Authority. The world was quite unprepared to betake itself to Nature or to remodel conventions upon its laws and suggestions. There was a general lack of interest in concrete facts; and the eyes of the truest Christians seemed resolutely closed against the charm of the external world.[1] It would however be extremely unjust to dismiss patristic sentiment as *dualist* or manichee. In its estimate of the visible world, it is singularly free from that brooding melancholy which marks the devout stoics and wholly defeats their academic thesis of monism. Whilst it is marked by credulity or a ready welcome for the marvellous, it exhibits nothing of that later *satanism* which in some enlight-

were imitated; the ban on the reading of Scripture is said by some (e.g. Conybeare) to be a direct result of the 'constant polemic of the cathar 'teachers' against the character of Jehovah in the Old Testament.

[1] I must here acknowledge my debt to Taylor's interesting and comprehensive work *The Medieval Mind*, Macmillan 1911, which displays great patience, research and sympathy: no doubt, no single author is capable of doing justice to every aspect of a many-sided age, but on the whole his book is a safe guide for the student of an obscure period.

ened countries down to a late date surrendered the world around us to the Prince of Evil.[1] Universal belief in symbolism and allegory enabled the gulf between two worlds to be bridged with success. Every physical or historic event might have a spiritual meaning or counterpart, and divinity shone through the whole texture of the natural universe. The greek Fathers never doubted that, while God is in His essence unattainable, He shows Himself to us in His Creation. In nature He has translated His benevolent energies into a language which we can understand (cf. St. Basil *Against Eunomius* ii 32 and *Epistle* 234). Our world exists only to manifest its Creator; we are led to grasp, by analogy with its wise and beautiful order, the heavenly wisdom and the uncreated beauty (St. Gregory of Nyss, *de infantibus* Patr. Gr. xlvi 181, *Epist.* 20 ib. 1079). Plato and Origen united to teach that between the higher and the lower, the ideal and real, existed the closest affinities and resemblances. Things of sense were used as sign-posts to guide to truth. Some of the best expressions of admiration for the visible world and natural scenery can be found in the greek writers (Basil *Hexa.* iii 10, vi 1; Gregory of Nazianzus *Oratio* xxviii, Greg. Nyss. l.c.). The genial side of platonism—not its most prominent feature—was in St. Austin quite submerged by his manicheism, which infected all his later thought (and so all medieval theology) with a profound sense of sin and estrangement. Hence, here again, he upholds two sides of an antitheton which can in no wise be brought into harmony: God is the sole cause yet man is somehow free and defiant. Though there is but one real potentate, yet the present order is in a sense under the dominion of Satan; yet he is but a rebel servant who even by his rebellion helps to fulfil the everlasting decrees.

Monarchianism: God in Nature and History.—Therefore in nature, all proceeds from God and happens with His consent. In Ambrose *Hexaemeron* (i 6) Creation springs from the direct operation of God's inscrutable will. As in the school of orthodox muslim atomism, this will is the sole cause of all things. No doubt there was a tendency to look beyond the actual to the spiritual of which it was symbol and vaticination. The Fathers did not believe the age of miracles past and so accurate know-

[1] Cf. the remarkable chapters in Buckle—a work wherein the prejudices of rationalism are seen to turn against itself.

ledge of natural law had little interest for them. They were content when such facts confirmed or illustrated Holy Writ, and they accepted the fabulous as readily as the well attested. Certain myths of strange animals or odd events with an edifying moral, were never questioned through the whole period. This belief in the visible as vesture and symbol of the divine had a strong influence also upon politics. Man and the universe were made by God; it was a creation out of nothing and therefore miraculous, depending on no law and arising from no cause except His unsearchable will. God never ceases to direct creation towards the accomplishment of His purpose. In Scripture, this purpose was as fully set forth as man's weakness could permit; and in the last resort the scheme was individualistic and rested upon the individual worth of each immortal soul. This conviction (which Gierke has so well set forth in his *Political Theory* &c. ed. Maitland) forms the complement and the corrective of the speculative realism which placed value in the group (or idea) and not in the units composing it. From these premises the theory of one in *many* proceeds; the unity of Christendom gained by co-ordinating, not suppressing, the varying local usage and franchise. In *history*, as in '*nature*', God's hand was always to be traced. Austin and Orosius are both apologetic historians who desire to show the gradual working out of the divine purpose in the rise and fall of empires. Both nature and man fulfil these designs—the first willingly, the latter whether he will or no. The feebleness or imperfection of nature is not due to failure of loyalty: in his *Anticlaudian*, the fleming Alan of Lille[1] speaks of Nature's anxious care in bestowing her gifts so that the finished work may appear harmonious in every detail. When she desires to invest this work with qualities beyond her power to bestow, she has to appeal to her sisters, who form a heavenly council. Prudence discourses on man's dual constitution, soul and body: Nature and her ministers can create and sustain his mortal part but the soul demands a heavenly Artificer. If we compare this attitude with Plato's, we shall see that there is far less dualism; the notion of an evil world-soul, thwarting God's designs, is entirely absent; nature errs only from defect, not defiance. It is curious to trace the growth of superstition and a belief in a satanic administration of the world: we shall see that bishops of the Caroline Age are far

[1] *Patrol. Lat.*, vol. ccx and *Rolls Series*, vol lix.

more enlightened than the persecutors of the Albigensian Crusade, who gave the signal for a terrified attack on witchcraft and heresy.

Monism : in Thought and Politics.—The results of this convinced *monism* are seen in the world of *politics* (as we have already said) and also in the world *of thought*. It was held impossible (in spite of monkish ideals and *external ascesis*) that any divorce could exist between the parts of man's nature. There was one truth only, and revelation (as in Lessing's *Education*) only forestalls the action of reason and gives to *faith* the dogmas which *intellect* can later appropriate—a passage from πίστις to γνῶσις, as in the theory of Clement of Alexandria. The world, thus pronounced *one*, could have but one truth. It is significant that amid all the austinian doctrines of the Fall, inherent taint, weakness of human will and understanding, very little emphasis was in theoretic matters allowed to this disability. How much in the medieval temper is naïvely pelagian and optimistic ! As mankind is really one, so each man is a unity and there can be only an illusory conflict between his faculties. An ultimate antithesis of *faith* and *reason* seemed inconceivable ; this doctrine was reserved for the nominalism which heralds the modern agnostic spirit and its division of life into distinct and separate segments. No doubt it was always felt (even by Roger Bacon) that an interest in the outer world must lead up to higher truths and all study should be ancillary to salvation. But science and religion could not contradict one another ; they were complementary, and Nature around us was full of subtle analogies and allegories which sought to stir us to understand the truth they shadowed forth. Roger's attitude is utterly different from that of his later namesake, who being equally sincere in both realms of religion and inductive knowledge, urges men not to confuse or to attempt to reconcile them but to keep each free from contamination with the other. Of the ultimate unity of *faith* and *knowledge* Scholastic is the proof. It starts from the conviction that only a little trouble is needed to exhibit true philosophy as identical with true religion—Erigena's proposition. Hence the emphasis on logic and dialectic and the notional presentation of dogma, with which modern religion is so little concerned.[1] Hence also the abhorrence felt and expressed

[1] In spite of the plentiful crop of 'harmonies' of science and faith

for the inevitable compromise of the Double Truth at the close of our period,—a heresy combated with almost as much warmth as antisocial dualism, which in great measure was its natural companion.

Society, as Universe, Continuous.—The whole world was good and belonged to one sovereign ; though, as in society, there were grades and stages of higher and lower. In the hierarchy (which to modern liberty and atomic equality appears so unjust and 'feudal') each member was proud of his rank—not ashamed, as in the case of inferior social status to-day. Peasant risings demanded only the restoration of old rights and privileges, wrongfully suppressed within the memory of man. Only a small section of wild religious communists from time to time shocked the law-abiding spirit of the great mass by inopportune demands for abstract equality. The system of *gradation* was very generally accepted, a principle both Christian and neoplatonic—for Plotinus' emanatism shows that all things issue from God though at different intervals. Of permanent antithesis there is no trace, either between social classes or branches of knowledge, or political ideals, or between the faith and the fullest exercise of reason.

Abhorrence of the Two-fold Truth.—It does not at all appear that the schoolman in attacking the Double Truth of averroism was merely showing a horror of hypocrisy, a hatred of heresy concealed under ironical deference. The medieval spirit, feeling no doubt the certainty of coming rupture between the great political heads of Christendom, was thrown into a genuine alarm by the sudden cleavage between the realms of secular and divine knowledge. Human nature, made one by its Creator and readjusted to itself as well as to God by the work of Christ, was again 'split asunder' as with a hatchet (Anaxagoras). It is idle to repeat the old fallacy that the upholders of Double Truth were foes of faith and the established religion. It is only in a logical theory (quite useless for the practical work of life) that man can to-day contemplate human experience, a unit or a race, as a harmonious unity. Only mysticism can give this immediate assurance ; the practical faith is content to defer attainment of unity, and to work towards it in the various pro-

and the interest shown in some quarters in formal accuracy and dogmatic statement.

vinces of life with different sets of axioms suitable for each. From Protagoras onwards to Francis Bacon and Locke, the 'agnostic', who would rather not examine dogma by reason or analyse his piety too carefully, has been unfairly set down as a hypocrite. The Middle Ages held to the doctrine of unity through stages of proficiency in an unbroken series—each grade or group (as each unit in it) being of value just in its place and because of its special equipment. Averroes (as we saw) had most certainly upheld both the value of religion and its relative truth: of which however philosophy was the final expression. He was no wanton iconoclast and like all serious thinkers at that time would have put obstinate heretics and nonconformists to death. His dual attitude to ultimate matters was perfectly sincere. Siger of Brabant startled the Christian world by his advocacy of the same compromise.[1] Yet we find Aquinas (*c. Gent.* ii 4) asserting the view *quod aliter considerat de creaturis Philosophus et aliter Theologus*. The latter considers them 'so far as there may be 'in them some resemblance to God' . . . 'not after their own 'kind, fire as fire, but rather as representing the divine altitude'. But the former considers what belongs to them according to their own nature. The 'Science of the faith' must not be held incomplete because it passes over many properties of things, as the shape of the heaven or the quality of motion. Philosophy regards creatures *in themselves* and devises its divisions so as to correspond with the different *genera* of things—that is, its supreme task, as in dialectic, is to classify; and although it draws us on from them into a knowledge of God, this thought and interest is last. Faith views the creatures solely *in ordine ad Deum* and from the outset confines itself to this aspect,—or rather first considers them in their relation to God and only afterwards in their own nature.

Confident Rationalism: Logic identified with Ontology.—It was part of this singular assurance that they held *logic* and *ontology* to be one. Reason was fully competent to classify the world of creatures and even the spiritual realm, because the rules and

[1] Mandonnet, *Siger de B. et l'averroisme latin au xiii siècle*, Fribourg 1899 (sec. ed. at Louvain). Dante who seems to hint that he committed suicide (or languished in prison for long before execution *Parad.* x 134) very oddly places him in Paradise side by side with his bitter foe, Aquinas. His death may be placed in 1283–4. Cf. also de Wulf's *Hist. Med. Phil.* Longmans 1909.

procedure of *thought* were also the rules and procedure of *being*. Rather should we say that our thoughts, through Christ, were also the divine thoughts. In them we enjoyed an inlet, not only into the divine categories, but into God's purpose. The astonishing treatise of Anselm, *Cur Deus homo*, replaces by daring speculation the obsequious compiling of patristic judgments such as we find in the Caroline Age. In truth, Anselm is even a bolder rationalist than his opponent Abelard: he no longer culls from the 'meads' or 'pantries' of the Fathers but claims (like many other rationalists) a direct revelation 'as God disclosed it to me'. But it was a disclosure to the intellect, not a mystical intuition: Anselm never felt himself to be a purely passive instrument or vehicle of a message. It may be said that logic does not ask if its contents represent *realities*, but only seeks to secure proper conclusions from *assumed* premises. But it never retained this purely formal post as guardian of accuracy in discussion. It was always inclined to pass over or beyond its proper sphere into *ontology* or *metaphysics*. Like the Greeks the schoolmen certainly believed in a correspondence between the necessities of thought or the conclusions of logic and the ultimate truths or realities. Before nominalism arose they did not doubt that the veritable nature of things could be expressed by our thought after patient efforts at precision of statement and definition. 'Anselm' says Kaftan (*Truth Christ. Rel.* Div. i ch. 2) 'on the ground of 'his realism and austinian platonism, overcame all the misgivings 'aroused against dialectic, and just because of this attitude cher-'ished such strong confidence that rational research would and 'must lead to the same results as the faith that rests upon 'Authority'.

Growth of Scepticism during the Period: Protest against Intellectualism.—We can trace towards the end of our period a gradual weakening of this belief. Anselm still ventures to prove the whole of dogma true on speculative lines; but Aquinas has learnt to discern dogmas capable of rational proof from such as depend on a special divine revelation. The being and unity of God philosophy could recognize and prove by the light of natural reason, but trinitarian dogma surpasses human powers to conceive or understand (*c. Gent.* i 3, *Summa* I i 1). Nor can the Incarnation, creation in time, the Sacraments, eschatology, be divined by the unaided mind of man—that is by the mind of

Aristotle as representing the highest non-prophetic development of human faculties. Duns Scotus, though a titular realist, forms a link of connexion between these already diffident theologians and later nominalism. He already announced the principle of the Twofold Truth. He doubted if theology could properly be called a science. He held it in any case to repose on principles of its own, valid only within its province ; and believed it to be *practical* rather than *speculative* in aim and character. Hence Duns' emphasis on the primacy of the will as against thomist intellectualism. Aquinas, the pious aristotelian, never doubted that *theoria* stood above *praxis* : the knowledge of God is the true end of all men (*c. Gent.* iii 25) and therefore the chief good ; not even moral acts and virtues ought to be mistaken for it—the only *summum bonum* is to know God (26–37). It is not the dim and confused knowledge of average men, nor that attained by demonstration, nor that won by faith. It is in the end a gift of God and our full happiness is only secured hereafter by the *visio dei*. But while there is thus surrender to the divine grace and acceptance of the divine bounty, the whole tone is philosophic. For Aristotle, his guide, *dianoetic* virtues enjoy the highest honour, and contemplation is man's chief purpose as it is his chief good. Like the absolutists of our own time (Bradley and A. E. Taylor in his earlier manner) Aquinas believes that our end and happiness cannot possibly lie in a series of moral actions, because this has in itself no completeness and points to a purpose outside themselves (*c. Gent.* iii 34). He gives Aristotle as his authority (i 5) for the statement that man must aspire to the divine through knowledge.

Nominalism Atomic and Disruptive.—Not only then is the true end of man put out of the reach of the great mass of mankind, but it does not occur to schoolmen like Aquinas to consider the proof of religion chiefly in relation to the believer's *personal* faith. Agreeably to the current realism (however tender in

[1] Kaftan very justly says that ' Such principles as that of the Twofold ' Truth signify nothing but the bankruptcy of scientific theology '—that is, Christian faith ratified and confirmed by the speculative arguments of hellenic wisdom. But he does not say that it implies *either* the falsity of a religious creed that will not submit to categories only suited for positive knowledge *or* the hypocrisy of all who use, for different departments of life, different sets of axioms and postulates.

practice towards individuals), God is believed to deal with the unity only through the church, the divinely commissioned collective group: which gives holiness to its members, is not made holy by the sum of their virtues. It is then important only that the church's authority should be justified in the sight of reason-in-general, not brought home to the inmost heart of each constituent. Protestantism, as we know, went to the other extreme and opposed personal faith and the direct accessibility of divine revelation to all outward dogmatic or discipline of an ecclesiastical system. In concluding this section it is well to remark that unlike eastern tendencies the catholic church never surrendered or disparaged its hold on ethical conduct: it never condoned an antinomian who pleaded that works were not really included in the scheme of salvation. No doubt to the active moral life was assigned a lower position than to the monastic and contemplative: no doubt a practical solicitude for their converts prevented the pastors from preaching a liberty which could only become licence. To-day we must recognize that on the whole the catholic church has preserved a control over the general behaviour of the laity to which no protestant communion can lay claim—in spite of the efforts of the presbyterian hierarchs in Scotland and Geneva. Still it remains true that in theory the Christian's supernatural aim does not lie in the plane of simple morality, but in knowledge.[1]

New Antitheses in Law and Politics.—The same gradually increasing rift, the same emergence of *antitheta* not to be reconciled, is seen in the domain of politics and law. No true medieval thinker or reformer until the very close of our period doubted that there existed a *natural law*, lying behind all human convention and positive enactment and having its source in the very

[1] Kaftan l.c, Div. I. ch. iii exaggerates somewhat when he roundly asserts: 'Nothing is known of the truth that to fulfil the divine precepts 'is itself a factor of man's blessedness, and directly promotes growth in 'the knowledge of God': he implies of course that all moral acts (like acts of penance) are hard external conditions of obtaining a quite different kind of reward, and that there can be no pleasure or finality in their performance.' 'Obedience is an indispensable condition of blessedness', but by no means the blessedness itself. Hence Kant is nearer to the catholic position than he could have imagined possible, in his rationalist moralism and his (quite medieval) postponement of the recompense of virtue to another life.

nature of God Himself. According as He was conceived either as a magnified earthly monarch or as eternal thought, it was held to emanate from His will (as in Judaism and Islam) or from His reason. But the latter view is far the more prevalent. A knowledge of this law is implanted in the mind of all men because they partake of reason (λογικὰ ζῶα). Of it actual codes are the extended application or paraphrase, sometimes the perversion. By comparison with it their commands must be tested. That it existed nowhere in accessible form did not diminish the devoutness of the stoic, the roman jurist or the Christian. It was best seen in those precepts of universal validity, approved by the agreement of mankind (*consensus hominum*) or law of nations (*jus gentium*). This latter was held to be *jus naturale*, adapted to the circumstances of fallen man, and recognizing unwillingly certain new and evil factors (like war or slavery) which might be modified but not wholly expelled. *Jus divinum* formed yet a third class which was revealed not to secure earthly happiness or social welfare but to further the transcendental end of man. Gratianus believed that *natural law* was to be found in the Law and Gospel, no doubt allowing that much therein contained was beyond it. Roman jurists had developed a rough sketch of a universal ethics, based on the needs of the peregrine prætor and the provincial governors, but also upon a real humanitarian feeling, clearly to be seen as early as the time of Cæsar and Cicero. The *jus gentium* as containing the broadest principles of justice and expediency—no roman could ever become a pure idealist—was held to correspond to the *law of nature*. In Christian times the law and gospel succeeded to this code, inductively reached by dealing with and comparing specific cases between foreign litigants. Pagan ethics were summed up in the two rules, for *personal* and *social* conduct; *honeste vivere, neminem lædere*. Gratian interprets the *jus naturæ* (as contained in Law and Gospel) as the command 'to do as one would be done by', the prohibition 'to do to another what one would not wish to 'happen to oneself'. In *Decretum* I ix (II) he desires to judge all other positive codes by this standard both *natural* and *divine*: 'Nothing is commanded, nothing forbidden by *natural* '*law* except what God wills or prohibits; nothing again is 'found in Scripture Canon except what is in the divine laws; 'therefore the divine laws will rest in nature' *divinæ leges natura*

consistent.[1] 'Whatsoever constitutions, whether in church or 'State, are contrary to natural law must be excluded'. It never troubled the minds of these advocates that the greatest problem would be to discover (1) an authorized copy of pure *natural-divine* law, (2) a judge who would interpret and apply it to existing codes. How kindred and harmonious the two spheres of sacred and profane were believed to be is seen in Justinian's words (in *Digest*, ch. i) where jurisprudence is called a science of *divine* as well as *human* matters.

Various Sources of Law: *Democratic* Theory.—But notions about the origin and author of Law had become hopelessly confused by the time of Gregory's pontificate (*600* A.D.). There were three acknowledged sources—God Himself, a people's custom and the ruler's will. However autocratic and purely imperial roman law seems to us, the basis of popular consent and sanction was never forgotten. When in rare moments a ruler or his advisers asked 'By what authority I do these things?' the theoretical answer would be 'because I have received a 'mandate from the people to be their executive and legislative 'magistrate'. Justinian allowed (I 3, 32) that he was bound to recognize not only the edicts of princes but customs and usages approved by the people: the question of possible conflict of the two (as in Sophocles' *Antigone*) did not seem to arise. No doubt an emperor would have pronounced the ἄγραφα νόμιμα—so antique that 'the memory of man runneth not to the contrary' —superior to the provisional statutes of one of his predecessors, which quite probably he might feel called upon to revoke. But while jurists and princes bowed with deference to the confessedly democratic basis of all law, in effect by the time of the Theodosian Code (*438*) both classical citizens and teutonic invaders of the empire were prepared to accept law instead as the edict of a superior, as the *ukase* of a nearly irresponsible sovereign. To this tame surrender of the exercise of unquestioned rights the supineness of the people contributed far more than the tyrannical policy of autocrats. Neither on roman nor teutonic soil did 'peoples' exist, 'folks' each with a tradition and usage of their own. Augustus had ended the discord of Rome and the provinces by allowing civic autonomy (and, in consequence, isolation and

[1] Others read *divine* but the adverb is not so suitable here as the adjective.

exclusiveness), while for imperial matters the master of legions was supreme in his council or camp, after due debate with his staff. No small independent city could understand or visualize the vast questions with which the emperor and his advisers dealt. No body of cosmopolitan nominees had taken the place of the *fæx Romuli* as the 'Roman People'. The idea remained a generous fiction, flattering after the enfranchisement of Antoninus V (*211*) to the feelings of men from Carlisle to the Tigris, but quite harmless as a restraint upon those masterful and laborious rulers whose policy and self-devotion kept culture alive and made social intercourse possible. The teutonic groups again were no longer tribes and families but atomic aggregates of 'kin-shattered men', united for booty or permanent settlement under a chosen leader—who only in later times was transformed into a legitimate king. In neither race was there any longer a body of citizens agreeing on definite points of law or procedure or social aims, or a *corpus* of public opinion coextensive with any area of political power.

In Practice, Monarchical.—As in the present day, democracy was either a regretful retrospect, or an ideal in some few minds, or (far more effectively) a convenient legal fiction to cover autocracy —but actually it did not exist at all. The barbarian nomads knew law only as the express command of their military captain, the royal lawgiver. All his civil power was later based upon his right to allot conquered land to his soldiers—in which practice the teutonic 'feudalism' of the *comitatus* (there were no more pure *gentes*) met and coalesced with the roman autonomy of great provincial nobles. So in the roman empire forty years before the retirement of Romulus 'Augustulus' (in *476*) the code was chiefly thought of as a ruler's mandate.[1] The *Codex* and the *Novels* belonged to this order; they are professedly the command of a sovereign and superior, issuing them without the smallest doubts of his own competency. They were accepted by an age which had become wholly monarchical in its outlook and ideal.

Unity of Christendom under Non-Coercive Leaders.—In spite of the silence, isolation and parochialism of the petty communities

[1] It is noted that Justinian's *Digest* fell still-born just a century later; men could not understand it because it was not the definite order of a prince.

or 'manors' into which Europe was breaking up, some notion of unity was maintained by the church. Belief in Christendom was never quite extinct. The papal monarchy took the place of the abdicated successors of Justinian. The theory was widely held[1] that mankind was an *organism*, an animated body, *corpus mysticum*—like man the unit, of dual nature, soul and body; it needed therefore two kinds of rulers, working in harmony for its double end, the welfare of man in this world and his eternal happiness hereafter. These rulers were not regarded as needing coercive powers for their ecumenical jurisdiction. It was a general belief that secular authority was based only on the evil result of the Fall, that coercive government was due only to sin. St. Austin reviewing all past history—as then known to students—calls the series of world-empires *magna latrocinia*, though he finds some excuse for the roman power which had recently become the patron of the church. Unable to create (even in theory) a consistent political system, men upheld, or rather gave exclusive emphasis to, one of two notions. Two thoughts met and conflicted; in the New Testament the origin of secular power is *Divine*, that is, exists and is justified by God's permission, whereas in imperial theory its source is in the last resort *popular*. In neither theory was it regarded as *unlimited*: God could dispose at pleasure of the kingdoms of the world and the secular ruler was in any case held accountable to the *natural law*, of which his own constitutions like the prætorian edicts were but comments and expansion. There was never wanting an opinion which limited, while it consecrated the kingly power—that a ruler was the people's nominee and representative. It was always held that by the *jus gentium* each nation had a right to choose its own prince, or indeed, its own form of government.

Double Aspect of Civil Power: Divine and Representative.—Kings thus had a dual aspect—whether as the elect of heaven, trustees of a divine estate, pastors of God's flock, or as chosen magistrates of a free community. In the one case the Church, in the other the Estates—an outcome in part of roman *collegia*—watched jealously over the executive power and its possible encroachments. Law, both in making and application, long remained the property of the people, even when roman tradition

[1] An attempt which has been revived in our time by Herbert Spencer and by certain upholders of the State, as ethical and spiritual.

(never quite obsolete) invested the new kings with something like the absolutism of Cæsar (e.g. under the Merwings). For the Anglo-Saxons law was not a royal duty but rather a matter for the popular courts (cf. Taylor *Med. Mind*, I 142). Almost the sole aim of early barbarian codes is to check the blood-feud and its wasting effects on a spirited community; its unique object was to keep the peace, which only by degrees came to be looked on as the king's. A fixed table of values (*wergeld*) and the intervention of the State withdrew the right of private vengeance and retaliation from the *sippe* or pledged brotherhood (whether of kinship or association). This makes for order and a pacific settlement of disputes, such as guarantees greater freedom for the unit: order and liberty go hand in hand. But the old tribal sanctions are dissolved; the close mutual dependence of kinsmen is a thing of the past. The average man (as in our own day) is free, but only to choose a new master. The ultimate gainer will be the new monarchy and the new State which, having broken up the intermediate groups and burst the fetters of tribal and local custom, binds the now incoherent mass of the subjects to itself by indissoluble ties.

Compact as Basis of Authority.—Christendom was a unity in multiplicity, for no attempt was made to make government and constitution uniform by any of the princes who brought some method and central control into the conflicting and overlapping polities. In spite of its theory, the practice of the western world was centrifugal down to the last century in our period. The realm of Charles was 'misjoined and unrelated . . . galvanized' into a temporary activity', relapsing into chaos when the purposeful will was removed. 'No single Government' says Taylor with truth, 'save when temporarily energized by some extraordinary 'ruler, could control such enormous and widely spread regions'. Instincts were in general purely parochial or manorial; and the closing of facilities for intercourse created purely local societies in place of a large cosmopolitan culture under the roman empire. Here once again the church and chivalry were more effective than government in bringing men into some kind of sympathy. In these tiny communities, in spite of occasional brutalities, manorial government rested on some contract of which 'custom' was the outcome. The Middle Age is the great period of *elective kingship*, although as under the roman empire there was a

natural tendency to crystallize into dynasties and close the avenues of democratic ambition, quite as much for the public good as for the selfish purpose of the great families already in possession. Compact with a ruler was a widely accepted notion and found its authority in the book of Samuel. No family claimed an absolute or irrevocable plenitude of power until the Hohenstaufen; everywhere else people or overlord or church had rights of restraint or deposition over a governor who exceeded or abused his mandate. The duties of an executive were confined, it must be remembered, within very narrow limits; and we may (without fear of denial) pronounce medieval society, down to a very humble stratum, to be essentially *self-governing*, to an extent quite inconceivable to the bureaucrat or the subject of the modern State. Government was in fact a court of last appeal, only to be invoked when all normal means of usage, tradition, arbitrage had been exhausted.

Absolute 'Monarchies' at close of Period: Influence on the Modern State.—This period however witnesses (chiefly towards its close) a steady increase in the claims put forward for absolute monarchy—whether of papal or secular autocracy. For a brief space perhaps under Frederic Barbarossa it was believed that the empire might provide the unique commonwealth under a single head; but it lacked machinery and officials, it was without tact or conciliation—it was not even master in its own house. The failure of the emperor to overpower the Lombard League or come to terms with the new industrial movement, sounded the knell of idealistic imperialism and gave presages of all our modern problems. His son and grandson renounced dreams for reality and confined their interest to a definite region. They were kings within an 'impersonal' district whose resources they developed to the best of their power; they were not leaders of men and the close personal tie between ruler and subject disappears. In spite of the theatrical prominence of certain royal figures, the real success of the centralizing movement is due to anonymous forces. As to-day, the sovereign became the stalking-horse either of ambitious trade-interests, discontented but powerful classes, or political adventurers. The people at large, no doubt saved in some cases from petty tyrants, were in most others deprived of their natural friends and protectors. Their franchises were curtailed and their burdens increased: the

manor dues and royal subsidies had before been settled on the principle *ne varietur*, but the greed of the new State was as insatiate as its needs were urgent. It assumed functions to which nothing but a central and unlimited autocracy could do justice; and it has to the present hour followed a consistent policy of expelling all competitors and counterchecks by which its unique initiative was thwarted. Ignorant historians have been pleased to see in the 'constitutional' movement a victory of freedom over personal tyranny; future chroniclers will probably see in this nothing but the tightening of fetters and the substitution of a genuine for a feeble and apologetic autocracy. We have at the present hour no doubt a conflict between right and wrong, between the frankly un-moral State and the State which still feels bound by certain ethical restraints. But the two ideals which are fighting are in effect the same; both are forms of *militant efficiency*. The industrialism of Germany has invoked the medieval caste of feudalism under an emperor who last of all european monarchs has come into his prerogative. But the Socialist State has the same ends in view, even if it pursue them in a more scrupulous spirit. It is pathetic to read two motions at a recent meeting of trade-unionists,—that Prussian militarism must be crushed; that the State must in future control this and that department of human life. Is it really supposed that autocracy in any form can be other than evil or that its methods will perceptibly differ? To no class of men can unlimited authority be safely permitted; history clearly proves that it has been best administered by kings who are responsible with their persons than by committees or bureaucrats who are not. But the active monarch is an exception in history, and power usually falls into the hands of the anonymous cliques and whig oligarchies. Of these results the Angevins and Hohenstaufens were the earliest sources and examples. They were aided by those who hated or distrusted the Church, by the commercial class who chafed against the restraints of feudal customhouses and the wastefulness and disorder of petty wars, by the supporters of an idealized roman autocracy, by the admirers of the petty municipal franchises of the greek cities, by democratic writers like Marsilius who upheld, as against any limiting power, the absolute supremacy of the secular State. All these parties joined in heaping power upon the ruler; law, once an edict of God imparted to the

reason of mankind, became the command of a sovereign and the interest of the stronger; and society as a whole moved slowly away from an ethical mooring and advanced to the position in which we find it to-day.

Summary.—We have attempted in this chapter to examine the medieval tendencies towards theoretical unity and the opposite currents which submerged them. The chief problem for their statesmen and thinkers was to arrange all the departments of life under a single set of axioms, themselves derived from the Christian faith,—to subordinate all activities to a single aim, the eternal welfare of men. It was never doubted that this was the duty of all pastors and governors in church and civil life; hence both the neglect of worldly injustice and the painful persecution of heresy which startles our sensitive modern conscience. Hence too that abhorrence of dualism which brought into the platonic continuity of the world-process a crude antithesis, — that fear and suspicion of the Twofold Truth which is a commonplace to the modern mind. It has been seen that without any direct or inductive 'interrogation of nature' the world outside was regarded as a divine creation and symbol; and the natural reason, while needing divine grace for its final perfection, was adequate of itself to discover God and understand His mysteries. No ultimate antithesis was conceived between *faith* and *reason*, any more than between the *spiritual* and *civil* heads of Christendom. The present life was a prelude and necessary discipline for the life of true blessedness in heaven. In every department there is seen what may be termed a *monarchianism* in *duality*. Society like the Universe was a continuous whole: a graded hierarchy of class and station presented no real difficulties, when each order (even the humblest) had both rights and duties of which it was proud. Into this ideal (for it was never realized in actual life) came the disintegrating forces whose influence we have to trace. Into the assured intellectualism of the Schoolmen there creeps a note of doubt—not so much of the dogma of the creed, but of the human arguments which were used to support it. The period ends in the victory of doubt, pious or otherwise, over a complacent rationalism based on a platonic 'theory of 'Forms'. Nominalism is seen to be a necessary outcome of an age discontented with a premature unification of life. It was atomic and disruptive, corresponding to the small regional auto-

cracies which rose on the dissolution of the old Christian monarchy. It confined man in effect to his own personal experience and advantage—whether of soul or body. It might be intensely devout, it might develop into a wholly anarchic and iconoclast temper. But it no longer believed in the objectives. Morality ceased to be a concern of the new secular government—a fact to which we have persistently closed our eyes of recent years, only to suffer a rude awakening. In place of a law of nature, really in its origin divine, is the conception of law as the will of a master, the interest of the stronger (whether one or many); in place of an ethical ideal the modern State obeys only the adage *Salus Reipublicæ Suprema Lex*. Meantime, the judgment of what constitutes this salvation of the community rests on no general opinion of the subject class but is confined to the competence of a ruling group, growing with every extension of science more irresponsible and coercive. In the matter of the helplessness of the people, naturally ethical, against such rulers, the transference of supreme power from one to many and from many to one brings no respite or consolation. Of the beginnings of this new commonwealth, of its aims and policy, the close of our period gives us authentic details.

APPENDIX B

Waldenses

The Waldenses are first met with in southern France after the middle of cent. xii (*c. 1170*) and in the reign of Emperor Frederic I. We know of them chiefly from reports of enemies or the records of prejudiced tribunals. They had few documents of their own and no confidence can be placed in their later attempts (cent. xvi) to create a literature claiming to be early and authentic. The church and people tended to 'syncretize' heresy and to thrust together various sects under a single sentence of condemnation. But even allowing for this we cannot divorce the Waldenses who have happened to survive till to-day, from the medieval *dualists* of the school of Cathars or Manichees. Here once again it may be stated that the basal doctrines of this chief heresy are *inwardness* founded on dogmatic *dualism*, strong protest against all *outward* or official authority and a rich and secularized church, a severe ascetic ideal which (as in the gnostical sects) easily passed over for most men into antinomian indifference and left the work of maintaining a standard, too lofty for most converts, to a very small and highly venerated body of elect. It is not doubtful that this movement spread along trade-routes and by means of commercial relations, that it appealed chiefly to the burgess class at the moment

when the *Commune* was regaining its franchises in France and Italy (*c. 1025–1100*). Catharism 'forms the abiding background of medieval 'heresy' says Bishop Creighton with truth. The 'outer ring' of *credentes* were no doubt ignorant of the extreme views held by the *perfecti*. Ordinary hearers must have regarded their public preaching and example as a reforming agency, as the true ideal of Christian life, not as the overthrow of Christian dogma or as a menace to morality. Wherever discontent formed against a worldly church and unworthy ministers, it was forced to ally itself with this widespread dualism. All sects in the end were driven to borrow something from the Cathars.[1]

Almost at the same moment that Pascal II was suggesting the surrender of church estates, a monk of Zeeland (*1110*) asserted, with Novatian and the Donatists of old, that a 'sacrament was only valid if the minister was 'holy'. Peter de Bruys at Embrun denied the change of substance in the elements, rejected the use of churches, infant baptism, and prayers and masses for the departed: the Henricians (followers of Henry of Lausanne, his disciple) collected at Tours, whence Berengar had come a century before, to propound the purely symbolic and spiritual character of the Eucharist. The reforms of Gregory VII had not produced the expected results; the church was more deeply attached to the world than before, and thinking men demanded as guides men of holy lives rather than of authentic credentials and official commission. Peter Waldo was a rich Lyons merchant who gave up his goods, as Pope Pascal II had not been allowed to do, and went forth to preach that apostolic *poverty* which was later to become the watchword of the stricter Franciscans. He expounded Scripture somewhat freely, was forbidden to continue by Alexander IV and excommunicated by Lucius III (*1184*). Some of his followers became reconciled to the church and others were swept away in the Albigensian Wars. The sect bearing the founder's name was expressly banned in the great Council of the Lateran (*1215*). Driven from the busy centres of traffic the sectaries took refuge in the secluded fastnesses of Piedmont.

According to Sacconi's account of their opinions (*1250*) the Waldenses were of two groups, of which the *lombard* was the more extreme: the *alpine* and french branch held that oaths and capital punishment were unlawful, that the Roman Church is not Christ's Church, and that any layman without commission may consecrate the Sacrament. The lombard section (following the monk of Zeeland in *1110*) denied that any priest guilty of mortal sin could consecrate, held as naught all fast days and festivals, and identified Rome with Babylon and the Scarlet Woman in the Revelation. At the Bergamo Conference (*1218*) this branch showed more hostility to an organized priesthood than the ultramontane division. They were therefore more *democratic* than the Cathars. For there was no official priesthood and all were allowed to preach without distinction of age or sex. Each member of a congregation might sit to judge the works and conversation of the acting ministers; on their collective approval

[1] Hildebrand did not scruple to enlist the puritanism of Milan and the zeal of Patarene sectaries against simony and a married clergy.

depended the value of the Sacraments. Therefore with complete logic they withdrew from the ministry of the church and chose ministers whose merits the faithful recognized: '*election* took the place of *ordination*' (Creighton); in place of a magic faculty transferred by apostolic succession, a public vote decided who was the best spokesman of the congregation and the best example before their eyes of a holy life.

In *1530* a letter to Œcolampadius (on the question of union with the swiss and german reformers) contains certain details which show that a very simple community had grown up entirely surrendering the 'esoteric' and dualistic tenets which had marked the primitive phase. In a measure reconciled to the church of Rome, they accepted the Sacraments from the regular priesthood, but held to their own private discipline and had their own meetings for edification.[1] The *barba* (or ministers) were labouring men, set apart at the age of 20 and receiving instruction during the winter months for 3 or 4 years, finally serving as menials in a waldense nunnery for 2 years. Ordained by the laying-on of hands, they went forth in pairs like the evangelists of the gospel. Celibacy was the rule but it was allowed to be the cause of some abuses and scandals. They visited all within their district, heard confession and gave spiritual advice, in return receiving food and raiment. According to apostolic example, they also worked with their own hands. The sect by this time acknowledged seven sacraments but allegorized their import: they prayed to the Blessed Virgin and the Saints and admitted (as we saw) auricular confession. On the other hand they denied the sacrificial aspect of the Eucharist and the doctrine of purgatory; they refused to observe Catholic fasts and festivals. They show that Luther's teaching on God's *foreknowledge* and *human freewill* much perturbed them; true to the archaic connexion of all such sects with Adoptianism, they held that *men did good works through natural virtue* with Pelagius, and added (as an afterthought) *stirred and assisted by divine grace*. 'Thus the Vaudois' says the bishop 'ceased to be 'relics of the past and became absorbed in the general movement 'of Protestantism'. Yet they still continued to excite among Catholics the same vindictive and resentful terror which attached in our period to an esoteric creed.

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[1] It is to be noted that Œcolampadius highly disapproved of the outward conformity and partial submission to the priesthood which they had inherited from their earliest gnostic forefathers in cent. ii: 'God is a 'jealous God and suffereth not His Elect to put their necks under the yoke 'of Antichrist'.

CHAPTER VII. HISTORY OF CATHARS AND ALBIGENSES

Section I. Struggle of Authority and the Sects to 1330

The earliest Cathars who suffered at the hands of Authority appeared at Limousin in the second decade of cent. xi *c. 1012–1020*: some were put to death at Toulouse in *1022*, where also their doctrine was formally condemned by a church council *1056*. . In *1101* Raoul Ardent, and in *1114* Robert of Arbrissel, were invited to this district to preach against Catharism. But, as in Bulgaria and Bosnia, the sect had already found noble patrons and protectors, such as William IX Duke of Aquitaine, and a *second* Council of Toulouse *1119* demanded the aid of the secular arm in vain. Meantime two zealous evangelists, Peter of Bruys (hence Petrobrusians) and Henry of Lausanne (whence Henricians), had further excited popular feeling in Perigord, Languedoc and Provence against the Church. There can be no doubt that the masses entertained genuine respect for the simple and ascetic enthusiasts, the *bons hommes*, who attacked the wealth, abuses and formalism of the establishment. An older stratum of the populace may well have contained latent seeds of old gnostic sects and remnants of the Priscillians. The temper of the south in culture, social intercourse and religion, was wholly alien to the less refined but more docile frankish kingdom of the north; and between the two there exists even to-day a total lack of sympathy. The southern courts were the centre of a brilliant and in some respects pagan society, and it was here that the first distinct protests against Rome were clearly heard. Very different reasons urged noble and peasant to favour the new or revived sect of Cathars. The one resented the supervision and envied the riches of churchmen; the other contrasted the earnestness of the 'colporteurs' with the worldliness of time-serving priests. If the peasant demanded a purer creed and worship, the noble wished to be relieved from all restraint, as can

be proved from the annals of Troubadours. The begging itinerant gospellers (to whom the Mendicants stood both as a reaction and a copy) were exactly to their taste ; they asked for no earthly recompense and kept the people quiet. It is however likely that there was another side to this quakerlike submissiveness. The chief 'anarchist doctrine' of the Cathars may have been their refusal to take oath ; but it is certain that, by large sections of the people as well as by the authorities, they were regarded as conducting an anti-social propaganda. Any secret society is suspected in an ignorant and yet earnest age : there is no doubt that the crime of Philip the Fair against the Templars was largely condoned even by moderate men. The church and civil power merely carried on the apprehensive policy of the roman empire against unrecognized forms of faith and usage. The preachers made no pretence of conciliation ; and in denouncing the Catholic Church were not careful of their language. The result was not merely a long smouldering quarrel, as between papists and orangemen to-day ; but a serious civil war in which religion played only a restricted part and the ultimate prizes fell, not to Rome but to french monarchy and the new central State. In the last scenes of the Albigensian Crusade a crushing blow was dealt, not only at a highly refined culture and at a curious survival of anti-christian teaching, but at the whole feudal system of local franchise and autonomy.

In *1147* Eugenius III sent his friend and counsellor St. Bernard on a second mission of remonstrance and conciliation, of which the success was trivial. Nearly twenty years later (in *1165*) we find catharist teachers and catholic priests meeting on equal terms at Lombers to discuss points of doctrine and practice,—just as Catholics and Donatists met and disputed in Africa. The zenith of power was reached by the sect or community in *1167*, when at St. Felix Caraman (near Toulouse) a great synod was held undisturbed, in which deputies sat from Languedoc, Italy and the remote mother-land, Bulgaria. Cardinal Peter (once bishop of Meaux) tried in vain to refute the tolosan heresy in *1178* ; Cardinal Henry (formerly abbot of Clairvaux) laboured in vain in *1180–81*, but he attempted the first armed attack on a sectarian citadel at Lavaur. The stronghold fell and the viscount of Béziers, the patron of the sectaries, was forced to submit and make his peace with the church : but this defect had but

slight consequence. Meantime Councils had thundered in vain, at Tours (*1163*) and at the Lateran (*1179*). Innocent III decided to extirpate the movement, first by sending a *third* mission into the plague-stricken district under two cistercians Guido and Regnier (*1198–99*) and a *fourth* in *1203* under Raoul and Peter de Castelnau and (somewhat later) under Arnold, abbot of the Cistercians.

Now appeared another and perhaps unexpected factor in the opposition to Authority. Besides nobles and people, the diocesan prelates strongly resented the claims and the methods of these exceptional commissioners and papal plenipotentiaries. In *1204* the pope, in order to leave the field free for his own envoys, suspended the southern bishops from their functions. In *1207* Peter excommunicated Raymond VI, count of Toulouse, as aiding and abetting the heretics and in *1209* was murdered. At this Innocent bade the Cistercians preach the Holy War against infidels no less dangerous to faith and society than the muslim. This was waged for twenty years (*1200–1220*) and ended (as we have said) in the overthrow of provençal culture and the end of feudal independence for Béziers and Toulouse. Even then the heretics [1] found asylum under the new count of Toulouse (Raymond VII) and the count of Foix; like the 'mass-priests' under Elizabeth, the *bons hommes*, now proscribed by the law (*faidits*), found shelter both in castle and hut. It must be remembered that the number of these *perfecti* was relatively small; the *credentes* or proselytes and novices formed far the greater part and were probably ignorant of the *gnostic dualism* which underlay the catharist theology: these were allowed (like sectaries under the pagan empire) to conform and compromise but under promise and covenant (*convenanza*) to become heretics and receive the *consolamentum* sometime before their death. Thus the ascetic rigorists who sought to escape this evil life by

[1] Who after 1180 seem to have been generally styled *Albigeois* or *Albigenses*; the name first occurs in the chronicles of Geoffrey de Vigeois. But in spite of this title connecting the sect with Albi (*Albiga*) the head-quarters always continued at Toulouse which is nearly 50 miles south-west. The Viscounty of Albi was a fief of Toulouse; but there was a duel for supremacy between viscount and bishop, in which the latter won. The lay-lord's estates were given to Simon de Montfort and later passed to the french crown. The convention of 1264 gave to the 'prince-bishop' of Albi the chief secular power within the city.

starvation and the *endura* were at all times few in number; but they were the objects of an adoring reverence from the people and one cause (by steadfast example and unceasing protest) of the special reforms in the Catholic Church between *1050–1250*. The Inquisition continued its work during the whole of cent. xiii with central offices at Toulouse, Carcassone and Albi. The nobles of Languedoc rose in revolt against these strenuous measures (*1240–42*) and the burghers of Narbonne (*1234*) and of Toulouse (*1235*) tried in vain to expel the papal officers. In *1245* the officers and troops of the French king seized Montségur and burned 200 Cathars in a single day. Severe reprisals were threatened against all laymen suspected of sympathy with the sect (Council of Narbonne, *1235*); Papal Bull *Ad extirpanda*, *1252*). In *1298–99* the preaching of Peter Authier for a moment revived the zeal and drooping fortunes of the Cathars; and a revolt more political than religious broke out against the french tyranny[1] under the two Bernards and Almeric (or Amaury) of Narbonne (*c. 1301*). This outbreak was followed by fresh and untiring activities on the part of the Inquisitors, Bernard of Caux and others. With such success were their efforts crowned that after *1330* there are few notices of proceedings against Cathars in the archives of the Holy Inquisition.

Section II. Growth in Theory and Practice of Religious Persecution

The Tolerant Roman Empire set the Example.—Having now reached this central event in the medieval conflict of Authority and Free-Thought, it is time to inquire into the motives and causes of persecution for matters of conscience and belief.[2] It

[1] The strongly political and 'nationalist' character of the movement is seen in this saying: 'Clergy and French, they are one and the same thing'; the priests were regarded as emissaries rather of french absolutism than as servitors of the papacy. We are reminded of the complaint of the Trasteverini in Rome (not long after 1870): when the new monarchy increased taxation, these heirs or remnants of the ancient Romans believed it was the work of the French; and declined to distinguish between the Piedmontese and the nation which for so many years had upheld the temporal power against the attacks of Piedmont.

[2] Only of late years has it been possible to review the past with an unbiassed survey, to transport our mind without undue rancour and prejudice into an atmosphere so unfamiliar: Buckle and Lecky are quite

is now clear that it was not the Roman Church which hurried reluctant civil officers and a humane populace into a policy of savage repression, but that the first move came from the nervous apprehension of the secular authority and the panic of a mob. The roman emperors had been much in earnest (at least by edict and ordinance) in stamping out *manicheism*, whether because of the awful blasphemy that identifies God and the devil, or because of the secret anti-social aims suspected in all such world-renouncing sects.[1] The Manichees were specially singled out for capital penalties in the laws against heresy or schism, and the usual humanity of the most tolerant princes was suspended in their single case. Until the pagan attack ceased, Christian opinion shows no trace of a desire to compel faith by violent means. Constantine was clearly reluctant to interfere by means of the civil arm in the matter of Donatism. The savage and orthodox Valentinian I was perhaps the earliest prince to begin a coercive policy [2] which Theodosius and his son Honorius found it advisable to continue. In little more than half a century there were sixty-eight enactments against heresy, with penalty of exile, loss of property, and in the case of the followers of Mani and Donatus [3] of death. But these sanctions only applied to overt acts, not to private opinion and belief. Yet how laxly these laws were applied may be seen in Austin's case: the manichees were certainly not hunted and punished in fact, however fierce the laws which had been registered in the statute book.[4] Against

right in referring our modern *tolerance* in matters of conscience and religion to a growth of doubt or indifference,—and (we may add) to a comparative unconcern for other individuals and their welfare, which can exist side by side with (and is perhaps indirectly fostered by) a great interest in *classes* and a humanitarian dislike of punishing or inflicting pain on *persons*.

[1] Innocent III found adequate ground for suspicion of heresy in 'leading a solitary life, refusal to conform to prevailing habits and manners' and frequenting unauthorized assemblies'. This is a good instance of the fear of over holiness or 'unco' guidness' which was a leading motive throughout.

[2] Though Constans and Constantius I are not wholly free from blame, and by this time the arian dispute had embittered men's minds.

[3] This latter sect were treated more severely on grounds of active sedition and riotous conduct.

[4] Austin (as we saw) recognized the need of *temperata severitas* (fine, exile or whipping) for the turbulent donatists: Optatus of Milevi is the only catholic writer who approves of their repression by every means (*De Schism. D.* iii 3).

Emperor Maximus' hasty sentence upon Priscillian, a protest was raised both by Martin of Tours and Ambrose of Milan which found an echo even in Rome itself (*385*). In the east, John Chrysostom held it 'an inexpiable crime' to put to death for heresy, though he thought that heretics should not be allowed freedom of meeting or speech. During the so-called Dark Ages (*c. 550–1000*) we do not find any traces of coercive policy; and the tolerance of the foremost Caroline bishops throws light on an age often misunderstood.

Rare Precedents for Severity: Violence of the Mob and Protests of the Episcopate—Towards the year *1000* the disciples of a certain Vilgard of Ravenna, supposed to hold manichean tenets, were destroyed in Italy and Sardinia by 'fire and sword' (Raoul Glaber). It is very possible that this gave a precedent for the memorable *auto da fé* in Orleans (*1022*) under orders from Robert the Pious, king of France. After this date examples of burning and strangling criminous heretics are not wanting in Germany and Italy, France and England: but it is always the civil power that intervenes, and the part played by churchmen is ambiguous right up to the year *1200*. While the cathar *bons hommes* won the hearty liking and respect of one section of the people, they undoubtedly managed to rouse the most furious panic and hatred in another. As under the pagan empire, it was largely the mob that forced action upon rulers: at Orleans it was the people who were directly responsible (though the king gave his sanction), as also thirty years later at Goslar (*1051*) in Germany; in neither case is the part played by the bishops at all clear, except that they made inquiry into doctrine upon the demand of the State. At Asti (Italy) in *1034*, the bishop's name is found among the rulers who attacked the Cathars, but he certainly did not take the foremost part in the proceedings: at Milan the magistrates—against the will of the archbishop—gave heretics the single option to adore the Cross or die. Theodosius, bishop of Liège, is noted as the only churchman who affirmed that the duty of the secular arm was to punish heretics severely (*c. 1050*); and his predecessor, Wazo, had expressly condemned any capital punishment and urged his brother of Châlons to be content with peaceful methods of conversion. In the next century Peter the Cantor, afterwards bishop of Paris (+ *1197*) protested against the death sentence. The Councils were equally cautious and reserved in calling in the

aid of the civil power: at Reims (*1049*) the obstinate heretic is to be excommunicated; at Reims again a century later (*1148*), at Toulouse (*1119*) and the Lateran (*1139*), the need of *potestates exteræ* is acknowledged and secular princes are forbidden to give heretics asylum, but there is no mention of the capital penalty. In *1163* the Council of Tours suggested the definite penalties of prison and confiscation. At Soissons (*1114*) it is expressly stated that the mob were afraid of the tenderness or indulgence of the clergy, and burnt heretics during the bishop's absence: and in *1149* it was again the infuriated mob who burnt the iconoclast Peter of Bruys. Earlier at Liège (*1144*) the bishop saved certain heretics from imminent death at the people's hands; at Cologne (*1163*) the archbishop tried to do so in vain, the mob insisting on execution before trial. In *1155* occurred the case of Arnold of Brescia who, although 'delated' by the untiring Bernard of Clairvaux to the civil power, was executed as a political offender and a traitor. Even against this act of imperial justice the Abbot Gero of Reichersperg (+ *1169*) issued a remonstrance suggesting prison or exile as a more fitting penalty; and St. Bernard himself in dealing with northern heresy at Cologne never suggested or approved the extreme rigour of the law.

Reluctant and Late Adoption of Rigorous Policy.—A vigorous policy on the part of churchmen seems to begin at Vézelay where (*1167*) for the first time perhaps heretics were burnt after a clerical sentence pronounced by abbot and bishops. In the last twenty years of cent. xi, savage measures of repression were taken in the diocese of Auxerre and of Reims: in the one, Bishop Hugh (*1183–1206*) took on himself very wide powers indeed, and in the latter, William the archbishop, acting in concert with the court of Flanders, burned heretics without scruple or pity. But the definite recognition of rigorism may be referred to the opening years of cent. xiii and the pontificate of Innocent III: henceforward trials and sentences were to follow a strict policy of 'canonic and legitimate sanctions'. Justinian's severe clause against the manichees was repeated word for word by Anselm of Lucca and Ivo of Chartres.[1] While Gratian in his *Decretum* limits the penalties (with St. Austin) to exile or mulct, his commentators declare boldly that impenitent heretics ought to be punished with death. Lucius III took measures with

[1] If he is, as is averred, the author of *Panormia*.

Emperor Frederic I to stamp out heterodoxy, first excommunicating and then handing culprits over to the secular arm for such civil penalties as was judged fitting : the emperor laid them under the imperial ban (exile, loss of property and of all civil rights). It is said that in *1194* Raymond V of Toulouse enacted [1] the death-penalty against the unwelcome heretic refugees who had made his country their headquarters. It is likely that Peter II of Aragon, first of western sovereigns, decreed death by burning (*1197*) against those heretics who did not leave his kingdom by a certain date. In the next year (*1198*) Innocent III began his serious and deliberate policy of extermination. His juristic mind could assimilate heresy to high treason (with its appropriate sanctions) and he urged the secular rulers to the severest measures (*1199* and *1207*). Laymen and clerics acted together in Paris under the command of Philip Augustus, in sentencing to the fire the disciples of Amalric (*1209*). By this time the civil and ecclesiastical mind was thoroughly roused either by panic, righteous indignation or a sincere desire to save souls hereafter, by meting out the extreme punishments here. Henceforward but rare and timid voices are raised against the most condign punishment of heretics.

Influence of the Hohenstaufens : Frederick, Innocent, and the Inquisition.—Yet even in the Council of Toulouse (at the end of the long Albigensian wars, *1229*) we find no defined policy or organization, while the due procedure was still uncertain and varied in different regions. In the first quarter of cent. xiii besides the fiery death of disciples of Amalric in Paris, executions took place at Strasburg and Cambrai, at Troyes and Besançon, after *ecclesiastical* trials.[2] It was the 'free-thinker' Frederick II who in the clearest and most incontestable manner enacted *death*, banishment and confiscation against heretics within the Empire (*1220–1230*). There is every reason to believe that he influenced Honorius III and Gregory IX in the direction of harshness. The dominican bishop of Brescia—on this point

[1] But some competent critics have denied that the law is genuine.

[2] This assumption (or at least control) of *secular* power was based on a vague permission in decrees of Louis VIII and IX (1223–1272) *animadversione debita* or *quod debebunt*, where discretion was certainly given to the *baillis* and (perhaps) the death-sentence was not contemplated in the lesser courts without further authority from above.

a sound wibelline—subjected his see-town to the fullest rigour of Frederic's decree. It was Gregory who under these influences was finally induced to organize that great lever of orthodoxy—the monkish Inquisition, chiefly recruited from the dominican order as more learned and austere, as more familiar with corporate discipline. In *1232* the monk Alberic made a tour of Lombardy in the character of *inquisitor hæreticæ pravitatis*: about the same time Conrad of Marburg [1] received a like commission, and Gregory in *1233* wrote to the bishops of southern France, announcing his purpose of employing in future only members of the preaching orders for the repression of heresy. With these regular troops and sworn henchmen the papacy could now apply a uniform policy from the centre: the semi-feudal independence of the bishop within his diocese was a thing of the past.

CHAPTER VIII. THE STATE-CHURCH RETALIATES

Section I. The Inquisition

Reign of Terror in Southern France.—Such then was the new power which entered southern France to destroy heresy. For a century Languedoc was laid waste by a reign of terror, long after heresy had lost religious, political, and even social importance. Inquisitors like Arnaud, Cella, Bernard of Caux, Foulques and Nicolas of Abbeville, acted as absolute military dictators in a land of rebels, burning, confiscating, attacking the

[1] The Inquisition was never so uniformly exercised in *teutonic* as in *latin* countries: there can be no doubt that a dim tradition of imperial autocracy and the maxim *Salus Reipublicæ Suprema Lex* went far to reconcile the Romance peoples to a tightening of bonds which (in that age at least!) Germans would not tolerate: still the Waldenses and followers of Ortlieb of Strassburg were hunted down *c.* 1200. Thirty years later Conrad was resisted by the nobles and died by an assassin's hand; the Council of Mainz (1234) dealt tenderly with his murderers. The german prelates always tried to limit the Pope's authority, in this as in other matters. The 'custom of the country' both in north and south was against clerical courts; Sachsen- and Schwaben-*Spiegel* seem either to limit or to ignore any special ecclesiastical claims. The Beghards of cent. xiv were held in check by the ordinary jurisdiction of the bishops, and Marsilius of Padua gave to the *secular* power the sole right to judge and condemn, the priest's duty being merely to advise. Both in Frederic II and Marsilius we see clearly that apostles of 'free-thought' and of a strong secular State were by no means inclined to mercy or toleration. The later history of *persecution* in Germany does not here concern us.

good name of the dead and the peace of mind of the living. Royal officials lent willing aid to a system which brought great wealth to the crown. Several times the terrified people retaliated; and the murder of the whole body of the Inquisitors at Avignonet in *1292* led to a long series of reprisals until *1300*. When the franciscan Bernard Délicieux sought to moderate inquisitorial frenzy and official greed, as the champion of a wrongly oppressed people, king and pope (*c. 1300*) both seemed inclined at first to support him and withdraw a commission from agents who had abused it. But the *political* side was uppermost in the mind of Philip the Fair,[1] and Languedoc had displayed *separatist* tendencies which alarmed him on behalf of the new realm of France.[2] Persecution redoubled its intensity during the years *1308–1323* and the new monarchy, now reinforced by the spoils of the Temple, showed itself merciless. A similar increase in laws of savage repression against poor vagrants and in execution of nobles marks the Tudor period in England: here once again 'reform' and enlightenment so far from softening the code created a deliberate barbarism. Cathar heresy was practically extinct after *1350*.

Spasmodic Violence in the North.—In the north of France unorthodox belief was far less common and victims of the State were few; but there is the curious episode of Robert le Bougre's brief tyranny. A renegade cathar with all the vindictiveness of a pervert, he allied with bishops and count Theobald of Champagne against his old associates (*1233–39*) in Burgundy, Flanders and Champagne. At last the pope himself checked his ferocity and imprisoned him for life. About *1300* the flemish and german heresies found their way into France under the name of the Free Spirit: two pantheistic and visionary females were burnt in this

[1] Or his advisers; this pioneer of the centralized and secular State of modern times being a very ambiguous and obscure character: it is doubtful if the whole movement was not under the control of his middle-class advisers, who were, like Richelieu and others in later times, *plus royalistes que le roi*.

[2] To the same cause (and not to a love of barbarity for its own sake) we must refer the severe treatment of Huguenots by the french crown and its advisers; long after they had ceased to be a dangerous movement of *republican separatism*, with anarchical views somewhat analogous to those of our Long Parliament.

century; Margaret Porette in *1310*, Jean Daubentan in *1373*.[1]

Sorcery and Witchcraft in France.—Meantime, apart from dualistic ingratitude to the Creator and anti-social tendencies, there occurred from time to time outbreaks of the 'old religion' (as Italians call it): magic and sorcery and a professed cult of evil powers. It is quite impossible to say how far this has any connexion with manichean heresy: it is also useless to deny the real panic which its suspicions produced in the normal mind, even in the most phlegmatic and patient of european races.[2] Sorcery came into fashion (perhaps after the inquiry into the Templar's heterodoxy) about the beginning of cent. xiv and John xxii handed over the cognizance of witchcraft and similar charges to the Inquisition. The Holy Office, in such crises during the Middle Age, seems at once to recover all its forfeited popularity. In France the Vauderie at Arras (*1459*) produced a dozen victims for the stake; Dauphiny and Gascony were also scenes of execution.[3] But in France after the end of catharism (*c. 1350*) the Inquisition was no longer so conspicuous; the secular arm claimed through the *Parlement* of Paris this jurisdiction over magicians (*1374*); and in *1378* even the University is found settling a case of demonology. It may be noted that the civil power always exacted the extreme penalty of death. When reform movements began in France in cent. xvi, it fell to these two native bodies to deal with heresy and not to the roman Inquisition.

Persecution as Result of Genuine Panic.—It is obvious to our mature judgment to-day that this repression of Free-Thought was rather a movement of panic than an outburst of primitive savagery: at least this is true of the churchmen's attitude. They steeled themselves to a hateful task[4] by the thought of a supreme duty, not merely towards an outraged God but towards a church-state menaced by the most insidious poison within. Savage tribes show in very early stages of development the greatest jealousy in matters of magic and religion: private appeal

[1] This latter started the curious sect of Turlupins, which reappears at Arras and Douai so late as 1421.

[2] For this epidemic of terror and (on the other hand) manifest self-delusion, consult Lecky and Buckle.

[3] The great epoch of witchcraft (between 1450 and 1700) falls however outside our period.

[4] There are of course a few cases in which it was pursued *con amore*; as in that of Robert le Bougre, the converted cathar.

to the gods or potencies on behalf of individual welfare is always resented and punished. Until a very late period the old roman principle is everywhere upheld; *nemo privatim habessit deos*. The church-state of the Middle Age adopted, not without praiseworthy reticence and regret, the very severe attitude of hebrew law on sorcery and unbelief, together with the pagan and imperial insistence on uniformity. With both was mingled the dread of offending God by neglect of His honour and (as already said) a genuine acceptance of the hard function of 'brother's keeper', of the difficult task of saving him even against his will, 'yet so as by fire'. Thus the *social* end was reinforced by a distinct *moral* and benevolent motive. From this sense of duty, both to an organism and to its unhealthy members, arose all the worst features which overrode every rule of fair trial and impartial procedure. The tribunal was secret and arbitrary, the judges were themselves the accusers; their object, to ascertain and extirpate dangerous tendencies, not to punish individual offences or proved crimes. All other heinous sins gave way before the one terrible indictment of heresy. Peter Martyr's assassins were not tried for murder, but for blasphemy. The culprit was taken unawares and put in gaol on mere suspicion; little value was attached to his palinodes or professions of orthodox faith; none to his external actions of formal piety. Herein the church was wholly justified; from cent. ii onwards heresy had always claimed the right to lurk under conformity and the spanish treatment of 'new Christians' (whether of moorish or hebrew race) was neither unfair nor illogical.

Peculiar Methods and Aims of the Tribunal.—The accused person did not know who had denounced him or the names of the witnesses. He was earnestly implored to turn king's evidence and to disclose accomplices, as fellow-conspirators against the existing order. As in the United States to the present hour, ingenious devices were used to weaken his moral and bodily strength and entrap him unawares into some avowal of guilt. Torture formed part of this system, not at first with church sanction:[1] it must be confessed that it was a loan from the imperial example of Frederic II who formally ordered its use in his Sicilian

[1] Innocent IV 1252 in *Ad Extirpanda* and Urban IV were the first pontiffs to *approve* its use in cases of heresy.

Constitution (*1231*).[1] 'There was never' says Dr. Lea[2] 'any 'case of an acquittal pure and simple'; the judges, that is, would never allow that they had been misinformed; but of course upon a very large number only nominal penances were imposed and the penitent was formally 'reconciled' to the church. Only a small proportion of the accused were committed to the flames. Bernard Guy who will not readily be charged with over-tenderness handed over to the secular power only forty-two out of 930 (between *1308* and *1323*)—a proportion of less than half per cent.[3]

Section II. The Holy Office and Secular Statecraft

Precedent for State Confiscations.—Quite apart from the genuine terror felt towards wrong doctrine and its consequences on the social order and God's favour towards the community, it cannot be denied that the modern State, then growing into a consciousness of its full power, looked on enviously at the Inquisitors' work and girded itself for the great acts of sweeping confiscation at a later day. The new autocratic commonwealth desired by the trading class and dimly preferred by the people at large to feudal particularism, was determined to get rich at all costs and by any means. Even the best kings of France regarded a share in the spoils of the Inquisition as a legitimate source of crown-revenues.[4] A special class of civil official (*procureur des encours*) was created to collect the forfeited property and annex the estates to the domain-lands. Under Alfonso, Count of Poitiers, great abuses arose in Languedoc owing to their grasping and tyrannous conduct. The papacy also claimed its portion of the spoils and the Inquisitors after *1252* had a direct interest in giving an adverse

[1] Here once again we remark the refined cruelty, egoistic statecraft and contempt of Christian ideals which came from the Saracen south and by means of the italian tyrants passed into general favour.

[2] *Hist. Inquis. Spain*, 5 vols. London, 1905–8.

[3] It was Bernard who waxed indignant when Clement V ordered inquiry into the prisons of Languedoc (where the figures of mortality had been rising) on the ground that it would interfere with the repute of the Inquisition: his *Liber Sentt. Inquis.* contains posthumous verdicts passed after death on 89 persons.

[4] Besides Emperor Frederic I (decree of Verona) we have the case of Louis VIII 1226 and St. Louis IX 1234, also Raymund VII of Toulouse.

verdict.[1] In France, Italy and Germany the two forces shared in the proceeds of confiscation; in secularist Venice the whole amount went to the State; while in Spain only the property of heretical vassals of the church and recreant clerics went to ecclesiastical purposes.

Fiscal Temptations.—Clement V tried earnestly to reform the whole procedure of a tribunal which had long passed out of control: he made careful inquiries into the financial and economic aspect of the Inquisition *1337–38*. Charles V of France prevailed on Gregory XI in *1378*, to abolish any restriction on the civil powers. The example had been set early in the century: the facility with which the wealth of a strong corporation had been quietly transferred to the State formed a precedent for augmenting the revenue which no ruler could afford to overlook in future. It is to be feared that, when convictions decayed and a period of italian unbelief and statecraft set in, secular rulers upheld the obsolete powers of the Inquisition merely from motives of gain.[2]

Lombard Heresy and its Suppression.—Italian heresy was often in large measure *political* in character, as we see plainly in the case of Arnold of Brescia. Sometimes it was anti-clerical because wibelline and imperialist; sometimes the movement was communal and republican. Lombardy, on the high road of the bulgarian evangelists, was a veritable focus of sects and the cathars had many companions. Under Innocent III stronger methods were employed by John of Vicenza, Sacchoni, and Roland of Cremona, who found at Milan a hotbed of sectarian zeal. Peter Martyr met his death in *1252*, and four years later Alexander IV doubled the number of Inquisitors acting in Lombardy. Brother Ruggieri took up the orthodox campaign at Florence, and throughout Tuscany indulgences were promised to those who would aid the church to extirpate heretics. As in Provence, the threatened faction defended itself by open and secret resistance: Brother Conrad was killed in the Valtelline in *1277* and in *1279* the mob of Parma rose against the Inquisitors. At Ferrara, the people venerated the remains and adored the memory of a

[1] Like the *delatores* under the roman empire.

[2] A great uncertainty in the value of contracts, conveyances, and agreements to purchase is to be noted as a natural result of the precarious tenure of all property.

certain ascetic, Ponzilupo, who had been executed: the church had hard work to suppress the new hero-cult. Still more exciting was the struggle against Legarelli and Dolcigno who founded a sect of *Apostolics*. As elsewhere, the noble families were not behindhand in support of a pietistic movement which opposed priestcraft; and the *Messianist* sect of Guglielma numbered many powerful adherents.

Comparative Immunity of Southern Italy: Papal States.—It is not a little curious that while the north submitted to the Inquisition (its power reaching a zenith under Ugolini), southern Italy was almost immune. The 'Two Sicilies', even under the ruthless Charles of Anjou, never gave a sincere welcome to the tribunal and refugees found ready and safe asylum in his dominions. Moreover Sicily itself, in passing under the rule of Aragon, became a thoroughly anti-papal region and offered a home to exiled heretics. In the 'Papal States' charges of heresy were intermingled with political rancour and personal animosity. Like *majestas* under the pagan empire, an indictment for heresy was the decisive *complementum omnium accusationum*: Boniface VIII on the eve of the great Jubilee declared the Colonna *heretics*. Confusion reigned between the loyalty owed by a Christian to the head of the church, and the fealty of a subject towards a territorial prince: the spiritual side of the papacy of course suffered. Rienzi when raising the question of the pope's sovereignty over Rome, was conveniently accused of heresy: so too the Venetians, who in *1309* protested against Clement V's annexation of Ferrara. Savonarola in later times might have escaped papal censure on religious grounds, if he had not interfered with Alexander VI's policy at Florence.

Papal Attempts in Bosnia: Bohemia.—Across the Adriatic, Catharism was a strong and firmly compacted society or federation towards *1200*; Innocent III and Honorius III sent dominican friars, to convert or terrorize; they were by no means amiably received. Gregory IX preached a crusade against bosnian heresy in *1234* and only added fuel to the ardour of the sects. Boniface VIII tried in vain to set up the Inquisition there in the closing years of the century (*1298*); John XXII fared little better when after five and twenty years he renewed the effort. Persecution only welded the sectaries into closer union and prepared the slavonic communities to hail the muslim as their deliverers from

an intolerable oppression. As we have already seen, their hatred of the foreign yoke of Rome inclined them to open apostasy from any and every form of Christian belief; and large numbers willingly accepted Islam. Further north, the Waldenses had settled themselves firmly in Bohemia *1200–1250*: Innocent IV *1245* and Alexander IV *1257* ordered their indictment and established the Inquisition there. For nearly a century, until *1535* the solicitude of the papacy was constant and unavailing. Luciferians and Brethren of the Free Spirit joined the Waldenses, and the active campaigns of the bohemian and silesian prelates bore no result. Already the way was prepared for a joyful welcome to hussite teaching; wherein, as in so many decisive movements of thought in the Middle Age, the original impulse had come from the British Isles.

Fanatic Outbreaks in Germany.—In Germany itself the mystical pietism which heralded the reform of Luther demands a special notice which we cannot here bestow. Here, to complete the survey of inquisitorial coercion, the effort of Innocent V *1353*, of Urban V *1362* (supported by Emperor Charles IV) and of Gregory XI *1372* may be named; only the last of which was in any measure successful. Beghards and Beguines were to be suppressed and their communities scattered, and the mystical epidemics of wild dancing or self-torture sternly put down. Here Gregory found himself unable to set up an independent tribunal: after angry protests from both magistrates and bishops against the dictatorial powers claimed by his envoys, he consented to allow the diocesan to control his officers.

Late Arrival of Inquisition in Spain.—Spain not only remained for long exempt from the attentions of the Holy Office, but, like Germany, in the end maintained state-control over it. Edicts against heretics had been issued by Alfonso II and Peter II towards the close of cent. xii, but the Cathars never gained much footing in the peninsula and the chief danger lay in crypto-jews and muslim renegades. Not till Gregory IX was the Inquisition sent over into Aragon *1232* and *1237–8* and already in *1233* James I had by a civil edict of great sternness assumed the initiative in suppressing heretics and relegated the Office to a second place. The people showed the greatest dislike to the foreign tribunal, and (as in France, Germany and Italy) an Inquisitor was murdered. In *1235* the Cortes forbad the use of

torture with James' consent. The king-emperor Alfonso X of Castile also took steps *c. 1255* to secularize inquiries into heresy and put a veto upon the use of torture—which means of extracting confession afterwards became very general in Spain and Portugal. In *1300* Spain had no real Inquisition. It was not against heresy or indeed 'free thought' that Spain had to direct her energies, and the real scope of her long persecuting activity does not strictly fall within our period.

Pantheism in Spain.—But though the main business of the spanish Office dealt with *Marranos* and *Conversos* that is, Jews and Moors, who had become catholics under pressure, there were not wanting analogues to the old pantheist sects which frightened the sovereigns of the further east at an earlier date. Mystics of every species were regarded with suspicion and furnished a due *quota* of victims. The *Alumbrados* (illuminati) were akin to medieval sectaries like the Beghards and the Brethren of the Free Spirit. This charge was often levelled against the most zealous supporters of the church, the papacy and orthodox belief. Loyola was twice sent to prison; Theresa was more than once formally denounced and her *Conceptos del Amor Divino* was prohibited; Molinos was arrested and condemned *1683* and *1687* and his followers, real or supposed, were intermittently attacked up to *1781*.[1]

National and Anti-Papal Character of Spanish Office.—It will be enough to say that the Holy Office in Spain assumed a peculiar character; it was a *national*, that is both a *royal* and a *popular* institution: it was a stern engine of political unity by means of enforced uniformity of creed. The Spaniards looked upon heresy as a national plague; upon the Inquisition as an indispensable agent of the public welfare. Here again the most serious economic paralysis was seen to result from the precarious value of

[1] Salomon Reinach bears welcome (but unexpected) testimony to the humanity and merciful character of the spanish Office (*Revue Critique*, art. on H. C. Lea's *Inquisition*. All kinds of civil offences were attracted to this tribunal: 'though it may have been indiscreet in meddling with 'affairs which did not concern it, it was not cruel and *men always preferred* '*to fall into the hands of the Inquisition* rather than appear before the 'secular judges or even the roman Inquisitors'. Pursuit of sorcery was very common in the spanish colonies (as Mexico and the Philippines), yet it is notable that catholic Spain was never disgraced by any systematic massacre of witches.

property and the uncertain character of covenants. The Crown and the Inquisition were all-powerful against the pope, and appeals to Rome were expressly forbidden. Yet the Holy Office was by no means a mere organ of despotism: it was by a 'co-'incidence' (H. C. Lea) only that 'central absolutism grew up 'alongside of it'. Like the Spartans, the old spanish Christians, whose fathers had for centuries battled against the miscreants, lived as conquerors in a country by no means wholly subdued. An early tolerance gave way, under the strain of active warfare, and secret suspicion, before a quiet but merciless policy of suppression. In this matter royalty may have been a prime mover, but in this function it acted solely as the interpreter of the people's will.

APPENDIX C

Long Persecution of Heresy and Witchcraft: its Motives

Heresy as a Gangrene and Public Peril.—A modern mind—sensitive in bearing or witnessing pain, humane because compassionate of misery in the brief span of life, and tolerant because indifferent to dogma and uncertain of penalty or comfort in the hereafter—cannot fail to view the long annals of persecution with abhorrence and disgust. Yet, while we deplore the distress caused by a mistaken policy, we are not justified in passing a hasty verdict on its perpetrators. St. Cyprian was perhaps the first to propound the basal theory that heretics are *ipso facto* schismatics and that outside the church[1] there was no salvation. As an organism and institution the church has to defend itself against foes within and without and her first duty is self-preservation. False doctrine secretly invading the faithful was a plague-spot, a gangrene: '*ense recidendum* '*est*'. We have already noted the universal distrust shown by primitive man towards *private* religion. 'Public opinion' says Jevons *Introd. Hist. Rel.* 'does not approve of the worship paid by an individual member of a 'Gold Coast tribe to a *suhman* or *private tutelar* deity; his dealings with 'it are regarded in the nature of "black art", as it is not a god of the 'community'. The Chinese have never ceased to regard buddhism as *sic* a heterodox cult, contrasted with the two *religiones licitæ*, the Confucian ethic and Tao. The muslim world in its ages of independent thought has constantly been agitated by such feelings; and the triumphant party always persecutes for the good of the community, the purity of the faith and the maintenance of the divine favour. Secrecy of worship or eccentric conduct alarms the conventionalism of any narrow and earnest society;

[1] Soon to become the visible church-state of Constantine and the Middle Ages.

humanity is a virtue which flourishes best when cynicism and doubt have ousted any sincere convictions.

Conflict between Two Sides of the Austinian System.—Authority, sure of its mission, felt itself bound to save society and its members from corruption at all costs. After all, catharism in its esoteric circles involved a total repudiation of the Bible and the God which it reveals. Openly hostile to the Hebrew Deity, it presents us with a theology which is certainly not Christian and adopts a portion of the New Testament only to pervert it ingeniously for its own ends. On the ground of *discipline* again it is hard to see what alternative policy lay before the church in its attitude to the Vaudois or to the disciples of Wiclif or Hus. These puritan sectaries could indeed appeal to one side of the system handed down by St. Austin. They objected to the hierarchy of office which placed all power either in a personal autocracy or a small number of noble officials, not elected by any popular vote and often closely united with worldly families and interests. They felt that a divine decree, predestinating the individual to God's favour and guaranteed by an inalienable personal experience, must be of far greater value than visible membership of a fallible church and conformity to its often superstitious ritual. They claimed to examine the personal fitness of ministers for sacred office, before entrusting them with the power of the keys. But the church as being the ordained vehicle of truth and salvation could not accept these suggestions: it could appeal to another side of austinian doctrine, no less important. Against predestination and personal experience, it was obliged to set up a simpler and more universal test. Recognizing (with Austin) man's frail and sinful nature, it refused to regard merit in the minister as implying of itself alone any sacramental validity. The church in short was a society with a regular civil service and a standing army; it could not allow its chief duties to be performed by enthusiasts or knights errant.[1]

Luther strengthens the Hands of the Secular State.—Protestant churches can say little against their 'erring sister' in the matter of persecution. Without doubt Luther wished and intended to keep inward religion, faith and conscience, outside the reach of foreign interference. He wished to confine the civil government and its coercive regimen to the sphere of the secular and outward life. His very first principle was the sacredness of the interior life which was accountable to no earthly power but to God alone. 'How could the Emperor', he asks, with Tertullian and Donatus, 'acquire the right to rule my faith?' In theory at least he disapproved of violent measures for the repression of heresy: 'it is a spiritual thing which 'cannot be hewn, or burned, or drowned: God's Word alone can heal it'. Yet his new exaltation of the civil power and his terror of mob-law drove him into an attitude quite incompatible with these lofty professions of tolerance. Lutherans as well as catholics accepted the Peace of Augsburg and the dangerous principle *cujus regio ejus religio*; the ruler's choice bound the resident within his dominions and the licence to emigrate was

[1] The writings of Cyprian, the acknowledged master of the last latin Father, show very clearly the importance of this distinction.

often a mockery. Luther himself was by no means of a tolerant or inclusive spirit: he would not accept Zwingli's friendship or proffered hand (at the Marburg Colloquy): the Swiss (he said) were of another spirit and he expressed surprise that men of such views should even desire brotherly relations with the reformers of Wittenberg.

New Clericalism of the Presbytery (a Cathar Doctrine).—When protestant churches were formally organized it was seen that *clericalism* had not been an exclusive feature of the older system. Calvin indeed allowed the *Consistory* to impose spiritual penalties alone; but the old idea survived intact, that the State was bound in duty to help the church in maintaining purity of life and doctrine. In Geneva, as for a time in Scotland, the presbytery really became the chief civil power and the church and State were actually conterminous. On the ground of the extreme danger of anti-trinitarian dogma Calvin consented to Servetus'[1] death, and as a whole the body of the reformed churches believed that he had done right. The dutch Synod of Dort exiled the Arminians as well as condemned their beliefs, and when the Edict of Nantes was revoked the still dominant party in protestantism could not in equity plead unfair treatment of the Huguenots. It must not be forgotten that its cruel repression of witchcraft stands on exactly the same level as the extinction of heresy by fire.

In Period *600–1300* Steady Decline in Humanity; Carolingian Enlightenment.—In the treatment of witches the culture of our period shows a unique instance of a steady decline in humanity and intelligence—a striking contrast to the development marked in other departments. We leave it not only in its last and worst stages (*1300*) but with promise (unhappily fully realized) of a still further deterioration. In this matter alone, enlightenment, art, science and the revival of classical studies brought no sort of relief. The state of popular practice and opinion in the days of Agobard (*c. 780–845* A.D.) and Cotton Mather (*c. 1691–2*) can only be compared (and contrasted) with feelings of shame and amazement. For 900 years the movement of thought and the procedure of justice were steadily retrograde. It is true that the Old Testament lends unqualified support to the belief in witches' abnormal power; and 'witchcraft' is included by St. Paul in a notable list of crimes. Again, popular practice and beliefs, poetic allusion and the statute-book prove beyond question

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[1] There can be no doubt that pantheism was rightly detected in his *Christi Restitu* (1553). Now all such dogma was dreaded by the Middle Age and the period of Reform, the more because realism (on which it is based) had been for so long the accepted philosophy of the orthodox. It is plain *that Calvin attempted to modify the form of the penalty at the stake and wished him to be beheaded:* but the sentence itself he fully approved. The execution may even be said to have had with it 'the general voice of 'Christendom' as well as that of the Reformed Churches. On Oct. 14 1554 Melancthon wrote to Calvin *tuo judicio prorsus assentior; affirmo etiam vestros magistratus juste fecisse quod hominem blasphemum (re ordine judicata) interfecerunt.*

the prevalence of such notions under the pagan empire of Rome.[1] The Christian attitude is never quite defined: does man ally with an actual power of evil? or does he delude himself while robbing God of His due honour? is it *idolatry* or *superstition*? The Church finally decided for the former and the Council of Elvira (*306*) regarded witchcraft as apostasy from God and a genuine compact with devils; even in death the last Sacrament could not be given to the guilty persons. A century later St. Austin has no doubt that there is (as in the persistent Faust-myth) a covenant with a real and objective power: at Worms (*829*) the frankish bishops expressed their belief in genuine diabolic aid for love-potions, raising storms, and stealing milk or fruit.

Hallucination, not Covenant with Evil.—Against this credulity may be set the anathema of an Irish Synod (*c. 800*) upon any Christian who is foolish enough to believe in *strigæ* (or vampires) and the Wild Hunt or Witches' Sabbath through the air. Just a year earlier (*799*) the Synod of Reisbach demands that the witch be put to penance in church but inflicts no earthly punishment in a case where the eternal doom is so certain: the sceptical Tiberius might have said, *deorum injurias dis curæ*. Agobard of Lyons (coadjutor in *813*, archbishop *816–840*) conducted a polemic against such theories as had been accepted by his brethren at Worms: he denounced trial by ordeal of fire and water, belief in witchcraft, and ascription of tempests to art magic.[2] He also questioned the dogma of literal inspiration, the cult of images and the adoration of departed saints. Somewhat later Regius of Prum (*c. 900*) asserts that the nocturnal flight with 'Diana'[3] is pure delusion, but that the devil suggests it to the hallucinant. Burchard of Worms in *1025* thinks a course of two years' penance a wholesome discipline for any one believing in *strigæ*.[4] Stephen of Hungary (king *997–1038*) also holds the *strigæ* to be a myth, though he had no doubt that some witches could concoct poisons and were *maleficæ* or workers of black magic. Meantime the civil law regarded such 'ill wishing' or mixture of venomous drugs as an offence against the safety of others. Both frank and alemann codes of cent. vi (under the Merwings from Clovis to Clotaire) recognize the *maleficæ*, but dismiss the vampire and night-rider as a delusion: the latter code (in *600*) even expressly forbad private torture of

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[1] One of the most curious episodes in the early Christian empire is found in Ammianus; Valens creates a reign of terror in Antioch in the very futile attempt to kill his successor, whose initial letter had been revealed by the *chaldæus* or *mathematicus* to some inquisitive, if not seditious, person.

[2] The *immissores tempestatum* who were believed in and feared down to cent. xvii: Lecky narrates a singular instance in the eastern counties resulting in the death of the person suspected, on unimpeachable evidence (as it was then held).

[3] Or Frau Holde, which common to all northern myths developed into the Witches' Sabbath and the festival of the Brocken.

[4] These *Unholde* were believed to extract the heart of sleepers, cook and eat it, replacing it by a piece of wood: this is of course a variant of the 'changeling' myth and the 'separable soul' which are ubiquitous.

women suspected of malice and *strigism*. Rothar forbade the judges to sentence the *striga* to death; Charles the Great (like Burchard later) even punished belief in this superstition.

Steady Increase of Superstition.—With the panic-stricken period of cent. xiii a new epoch of credulity and attendant cruelty begins. Superstition, gathering momentum and conviction from the very number of its victims, reigns supreme until the close of cent. xvii in the most enlightened and humane regions of the old and new worlds. The *striga* is now solemnly invested with actuality and the natural fears of the ignorant receive sanction from the approval of the learned and from scholastic ingenuity. Cæsar of Heisterbach (*c. 1225*) believes in female monsters (like ogres in folk tales) who kill and eat children. William of Paris, a few years later, agrees with this, but denies that they are real women and attributes this cannibalism to Frau Holde's revel-rout. But very soon *a priori* argument disposed of objections to *human* riders through the air, and the Witches' Sabbath became an acknowledged article of popular belief. The old norse myth of disembodied spirits hunting under the leadership of 'Diana' or Herodias (!) becomes an assembly of females on *terra firma* to pay homage to their master, Satan. Kurtz rightly speaks of *heresy* and *sorcery* (*Ch. Hist.* ii 195) as two correlated agencies, resting on demonic powers and highly pleasing to the world of evil. In the Mendicant Orders, the usual antithesis was seen, the followers of Dominic showing the utmost zeal and credulity and the humaner franciscans rejecting the belief. It is certain that the catholics retorted on the half-pagan cathars the old charges levelled against the secret assemblies of early Christians, that their worship was the cult of demons. The dualists retaliated in the style of Marcion; either side taunted the other with adoring the Devil.[1]

The Witches' Sabbath.—In *1250* certain bishops gave a detailed description of the Witches' Sabbath to the dominican monk, Stephen de Bourbon, and in *1275* the Holy Office held its first inquiry into such a case. Magic is now considered to be an integral part of *heresy*, that all-embracing indictment of cent. xiii. Thomas Aquinas steadfastly upholds the reality of the crime, and from *1258* the Inquisition took cognizance of witchcraft. The great increase in the number of charges and executions is found after the year *1320*. In Paris the Parlement in *1391* transferred jurisdiction to the secular Courts. Elsewhere the Inquisitors maintained their control and the great witch-hunt of the years *1431* to *1447* was a clerical as well as a secular movement.

Cruel Treatment under the Renaissance. Late Survival of Death Penalty.—When the papacy was italianized and undermined by luxury and unbelief, Innocent VIII (*1481*) issued his Bull against witchcraft, *Summis desiderantes*, and the *Malleus Maleficarum* (*1489*) provided a textbook which

[1] It is quite impossible to avoid connecting the *Sabbath* with *Sabazios* (rather than with Sabaoth), a title of the thracian beer-god, who afterwards became the wine-god Dionysus with his train of Mænads or *female* votaries the incidents of this actual nocturnal cult by ecstasy seem faithfully reproduced in medieval and later portrayals of satanic worship.

actually spread superstition among the masses from above. This is perhaps a unique instance of a vulgar belief fostered, a popular panic sedulously increased, by learning and culture. The later chapters of this terrible persecution do not belong to our period: it must suffice to say that the last english trial took place in *1712*, the last execution in Scotland in *1722*, the last outburst in America (under Cotton Mather) in *1691*. But in latin countries we find a witch-burning at Seville by the Holy Office in *1781*, in South America and Mexico as late as *1850*, Peru giving a final instance of death at the stake in *1888*. In the half-civilized 'prussian' region of Germany a capital sentence was carried out at Posen in *1793*.[1] Meantime in cent. xvi attempts were made to restore the theory of *delusion* and *hallucination*; Weier in *1563* wrote *De Præstigiis dæmonum*, Reginald Scott in *1584 Discovery of Witchcraft*, King James VI his reply to such scepticism in *1597*, *Demonology*. Spee's *Cautio Criminalis* in *1631* had some effect in restraining pursuit, and Bekker's famous work on the *Enchanted World* (*Betooverde Wereld*) appeared in *1691*, the same year that Mather began his campaign in New England. It is worth notice that Bodin, the great french publicist, demanded that John Uvier, the *rationalizer* of witchcraft, should be sent to the stake for his presumption in denying it. The *dualist* belief in the joint government of the universe lasted longest in Scotland, for although the last sentence was carried out in *1722*, the statutes were not repealed until *1736*; the Associate Presbytery in *1743* registering a solemn protest against this leniency 'as contrary to the 'express law of God, for which a holy God may be provoked in a way of 'righteous judgment'. Thus to the end is contained the notion of danger to society; first, through the welcome given to evil agencies, and next through the vengeance of an offended deity who visits on the entire community the blasphemous apostasy of a few.

APPENDIX D

Free Thought in the Courts of Southern France

Humanistic Satirists of the Church: Goliards.—It is easy to exaggerate the pagan and anti-clerical tendencies of Goliards and Troubadours, but there is proof enough that both parties aimed at enfranchising thought and its expression, possibly, the conscience and moral conduct as well, from tutelage and restraint. In Ireland there had been a serious struggle. between the *bards* and the *clergy*. Southern France was the scene of a kindred movement, only this time the aggressors are the new poets of

[1] It is said that Benedict Carpzov 1595–1666 condemned 20,000 victims! This accomplished man belonged to a saxon and protestant family eminent in law, politics, and theology: he was privy councillor at Dresden in 1653. He did much to reduce german law to system and his latin works (from 1638–1657) had a wide influence outside Saxony. He perused the Bible 53 times and made copious notes which have been allowed to remain in MS.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

canon and precentor of Lincoln, and rector of Westbury (Glos.) ; in *1199* he was a candidate for the see of Hereford. He died before *1210*.[1] In his undoubted work *de Nugis*, he satirized the loose or idle life of the average cleric with all the complacence of a well-endowed pluralist.[2] It is quite clear that he came under the influence of a french feudal court at Champagne, where the feeling of resentment against irksome restraint might well arise.

A. **Trouvères of Northern France.**—The bards of these northern courts are known by the name *trouvères*, composers of a peculiar kind of unimpassioned erotic poetry, ' pedants and attorneys of a fantastic tribunal of ' sentiment ' (Gosse), ' enveloping in the fewest lines the largest number of ' ideas, or rather commonplaces of the most frigid and impersonal type ' (Jeanroy). Eleanor of Aquitaine, granddaughter of a famous troubadour William IX, introduced the southern fashion of artificial poesy into the french court on her marriage with Louis VII (*1137*). The Crusades brought the art of north and south into connexion ; and although the northern is not entirely beholden in its origin, yet its handlers are less ingenious, graceful and delicate. What is certainly a direct imitation of the south is court-patronage. Marie was Regent of Champagne in the last twenty years of cent. xii (*1180–1197*)—a court where Walter Mapes had been made welcome on his way to the Lateran (*1179*) : under her favour wrote and sang Barbezieu Brulé and Christian of Troyes. At the court of Blois her sister extended protection to Walter of Arras and de Couci. A sister-in-law, Alice (second wife of Louis VII in *1160*) gave a welcome to Béthune, perhaps the most famous and original of the *trouvères*. Some were named tutors to princes like William III of Macon and Philip Augustus of France. Thibaut IV of Navarre, John of Jerusalem, and Louis of Blois were rulers who indulged in poesy as a noble pastime. These courtly minstrels rose to fame in the last quarter of the century and cultivated their refined lyrics till *1240*, especially during the Albigensian Wars. About *1230* the burgher circles of Flanders, Picardy, and Artois adopted the fashion from the feudal courts. The latest scenes of their successes were Arras and Reims. With the decay of feudal centres in the north the art declined ; about *1280* the school suddenly disappeared and oblivion overtook the names of the court-lyrists.[3] Their songs were no ' wood-notes wild ' of unstudied feeling, but like poetry in the Fujiwara epoch of japanese culture, efforts of intelligence, ' pieces of wilful and elaborate casuistry '. (Gosse). The strictest rules were laid down for the platonic courtship of some idealized (and always married) lady : love ' became a science and a cult and was practised ' according to the laws of precise etiquette '.

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[1] When Giraldus Cambrensis utters a prayer for his soul in a *second* edition of his *Hibernica*.

[2] Ed. T. Wright for Camden Society London 1847. Latest edit. *Anecd. Oxon.* ed. M. R. James, Clarendon Press 1914.

[3] It is interesting to compare with this decay of a refined art the extinction of the many small feudal centres of teutonic culture in cent. xviii before the new autocratic secularism of the german empire.

B. **Troubadours in Provence.**—The *troubadour* of Provence was the earlier counterpart,—an inventive improvist who discovered new forms for his brief lyrical stanza charged with meaning. The origin of the school is princely, if we accept William IX, Duke of Aquitaine and Count of Poitiers,[1] as their founder: twenty-three ruling princes followed his example (including our Richard I.) and the larger number belonged to a noble class. But the wanderers of humbler origin were well received and enjoyed the same freedom of speech, being allowed (like court jesters) to treat questions of political interest with impunity.[2] The *joglar* or *jongleur* who arranged the words to music, attended the itinerant troubadour,—the two were separated by a caste-barrier, though the *jongleur* could rise by merit into the superior rank. A curious career is noted in Folquet of Marseilles, born in Genoa; he took orders some time after *1192*, became a cistercian abbot in Provence and in *1205* Bishop of Toulouse (+ *1231*); he was noted for his hatred of the Albigenses of whom it is said that he slew 500,000! So Bertram de Born, Viscount of Hautefort (Perigord) became devout (or perhaps bigoted) in his old age (+ *1205*). The anonymous 'Prior of Montaudon' satirized the formalism and complexity of these platonic amours, neglected the laws of a precise gallantry and held up ladies and their lovers to derision.

Rapid Decay together with the Feudal Courts.—The prosperous period of these courtly poets ended about *1210*: the south had long enjoyed peace, with its consequences—refinement, wealth, and corruption. The noble houses, plunged in extravagance, sank into decay, and the stern attack of king and pope against the albigenses completed the ruin of their patrons. The northern barons fell upon Béziers, and Carcassone in *1209*. Most of these generous protectors were unorthodox, and, though certainly not themselves ascetic, they gave warm support to the heretic puritans. They shared in their downfall. If William IX had desired to found an Order for the worship of Venus, Figuevia, son of a tailor in Toulouse, represented a fierce onslaught upon the papacy, declared himself openly a heretic and was supported by ct. Raymond. With the fall of the southern feudal courts the exotic poetry and its artists ceased to be: culture in Languedoc sank rapidly into barbarism again, or rather exchanged the

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[1] Ruler from 1087–1127 'type of medieval gallantry', violent, brilliant and impudent: a crusader in 1101 without success: as anxious as Frederic II of Prussia (in the matter of flute-playing) to be accounted an expert and not an amateur: according to William of Malmesbury projected a religious house *for the cult of Venus*.

[2] Chiefly in the *tenson*, in dialogue form, two persons discussing a point in formal erotic casuistry, at times, matters of *religious* or *satiric* import: the essence of these poems is *lyrical* and not *epic* or *dramatic* (Gosse). For *political* comments, Gerald de Bornel (named by Dante and compared with Arnold Bresc. *De Vulg. Eloq.*) may be mentioned; he lamented a brutal age and the oppression of feudal princes, like the Viscount of Limoges who burnt his house down.

poetic art of lyrical individualism [1] for a deeper interest in the jewish and arabian philosophy of the world.

APPENDIX E

Popular Dualism: Attested by Folkloré

Balkan Folk Tales.—It seems likely in the light of recent inquiry by Moses Gaster and others [2] that an interesting side of folklore in eastern Europe may be traced to the influence of bogomil and catharist *colporteurs*. Gaster speaks (p. 11) of 'the all-pervading influence of religious sects 'stretching from far east to extreme west, embracing all the cultured 'nations of Europe and impressing them with the same seal'. Their legends and tales, containing a strong didactic and ethical strain, offered a *modified* form of Christian belief and propounded a novel solution for the world-problem suitable to the popular intellect. This teaching by fable sought to account for the existence of evil and to ward off its effects. It sank deeper into the peasants' mind than the official doctrine of the church, met and satisfied the questions of primitive pagan thought, and brought about 'that surprising *spiritual unification* in the religion of the masses 'which survives in folklore'.

Originated on E. Roman Soil.—This influence seems to radiate from a single centre, to last quite 200 or 300 years, and to leave behind indelible traces. It is not a primitive survival but a recent phase of thought. Treating the Æsopic beast-fables of Rumania, Gaster is convinced that they do not stand isolated (23) but form part of 'a group of tales and 'legends common to most of the surrounding nations in a more or less 'complete degree . . . they are so much akin that they must have reached 'these nations almost simultaneously'. Now the Gipsies (it is well known) dwelt long and peacefully in Rumania—a happy episode in the 'long-'drawn agony of suspicion and hatred'. Were they the channel? But they are not 'likely carriers of folk tales'. Nor, in spite of buddhist 'transformations' into animal-forms, is it probable that the Mongols are accountable. The centre is the east-roman empire—as he quaintly calls it

[1] A last figure is Riquier of Narbonne 1230–1294 who left his patroness, the viscountess of the town, and visited Louis IX and Alfonso X the 'king-emperor'. He found, like other troubadours, a welcome in this spanish court, where the patron was himself a poet in *galician*. Lyrics in *provençal* attributed to the king were written by his visitors. Riquier spent his latter days with Henry II, count of Rodez, the last feudal prince to patronize letters. Conscious of the coming eclipse of his art he expressed sorrow at having come into the world too late. Cf. Joseph Anglade ed. Paris 1905.

[2] Cf. M. Gaster's introd. to his spirited rendering of *Rumanian Bird and Beast Stories*, Folklore Soc. Publ. (Sidgwick and Jackson London 1915). The learned author is a vice-president of the Folklore Soc., of the Roy. Asiatic Soc. and of the Jewish Histor. Soc., and has served as president of the first and third.

'Byzance'—and the tales came in on the crest of the religious wave known either as manicheism, or as the heresy of the bogomils. This dualist heterodox teaching extended from the indian border far into southern France across central Europe. This popular literature followed the example of early gnostic pseudepigrapha and the rich stratum of apocryphal Gospels and Acts in the first days of the church.[1] The sectarian '*colporteurs*' alone, 'Paulitzians' and Bogomils, came into direct contact with the masses of the people, since they preached in preference to the poor and lowly.

Under Influence of Parsism and Egypt.—The cosmogonic tales, unlike Rig x 129 with its insistent monism, teach a *dualistic* origin of the world, as did iranian Zoroaster and (his possible pupils) the norsemen and goths of a later age. The same kind of dualist legends about creation are found on the outskirts of ancient Iran and in Russia. Avesta teaching certainly spread both north and west,—as well as south and east as we have had occasion to show. The norse creed, with its strenuous resistance to evil, may well be a somewhat pessimistic offshoot of this iranian dualism of light and gloom, the antithesis being accentuated by the rigours of a northern winter.[2] From Iran these notions passed through Asia Minor or even across the Euxine into Thrace and the Balkans—a district teeming with a medley of peoples, mostly at a low level of culture and (except in the orthodox church and the ever-dwindling official circle of really greek byzantines) quite lacking in a literature of their own. Though veiled in a decent Christian garb, the stories of the Evil One suggest Ahriman—God's opposite and negative, not (as in our Scriptures) merely an impertinent rebel. The Balkans seem to be the editing centre for the diffusion of these tales and a step further back we find the source in Asia Minor.[3] India is not the focus though it abounds in animal tales; but Egypt may well be one source: the *Story of Ahikar* (Elephantine papyrus) must be dated in the very last years of the native monarchy and may come from Syria-Phenice or directly from Egypt itself.[4] There is no reason why such a story should not travel east as well as west to find a home in India—whose contact with western influence has been much underrated.

Their Heterodox and Anti-Clerical Aim.—The sectaries made clever use (it would seem) of these animal-tales, drawing morals, confirming a dualist theory of word-origins and holding up the powers that be to contempt both in church and state.[5] In estimating the harsh policy of the authorities this insidious propaganda of *anti-social* (no less than *anti-dogmatic*) tenets must not be forgotten. The *popular* origin of the satire

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[1] It must be remembered that Gnosticism is *earlier* than Christianity.

[2] Cf. Dähnhardt *Naturs agen*, Berlin 1907.

[3] I may refer to my *Constit. Hist. R.E.* (Longmans 1910, vol. ii, 135, 151, 173, 181, 325, 391, 469, 472) as well as to earlier pages of this work for the Paulicians and the imperial policy of transplanting whole tribes of eastern sectaries into the empty districts of Macedon and Thrace.

[4] Cf. edit. of *Wisdom of Ahiqar*, Rendel Harris & Conybeare.

[5] The parallel in the west would be 'Reineke Fuchs' (see p. 766).

is quite evident : the lower classes of Europe may justly say, with the latin critic, *satira quidem tota nostra est.* In it none are assailed more violently than the clergy. Moses Gaster believes in a ' deliberate attempt to lower ' and destroy the influence and authority of the Church in general and of ' its ministers in particular : only partizans of heterodox teaching could ' find pleasure and profit in applying beast-tales to break down the walls ' of the Church '. This outspoken criticism did not arise within the orthodox ramparts ; it was imported wholesale from without. When under Innocent III the Church awoke to its danger (after spasmodic attempts at repression), when the Christian pantheists become an acknowledged sect of immoral tendency, when arab learning brought in a medley of undigested lore—Peter Cloot was burnt at Paris (*1208*) for heresy ; he is believed to be a writer in the *Reynard* cycle and its connexion with heterodox views is not for a moment in dispute.

Carried About by Bogomil Dualists.—Thus the Rumanian tales owe their present shape (if not origin) to the dualistic preaching of manichee bogomils, and through their medium have come across from Syria and Asia Minor to the Balkans, from Tephrikè to Philippopolis. They were carried further west in the spread of heresy which alarmed all rulers alike after *1000.* From this school learnt Russians and Bulgars, Saxons and Huns. As these notions are modern so are the tales of relatively recent origin. They are not local survivals of primitive and pelasgic paganism but ' sparks from a great light that fell down from heaven ' (Gaster), echoes of gnostic cosmogony. The lapse of angels and man's creation are blended together (as indeed in Origen's first scheme of Christian theology). Under many names this teaching is one, and in substance may be traced back to the orphists of *600* B.C.

Orphic and Gnostic Affinities.—There are two rival creators at work in the world, and the universe (as in norse myth) is parted out between the powers of light and darkness. The latter wishes to share in (or to steal) the virtue of the former.[1] This idea forms the basis of the Prometheus legend and of the orphic Titan story. The devil or lower demiurge thieves some of the empyrean fire and scatters it in sparks under the load of matter, that it may never escape : ' these sparks are the human soul deeply embed- ' ded in clay, anxious always to be reunited with the ancient glory ' (Gaster). These angelic scintillations become here glow-worms,[2] the heavenly

[1] See Story xv, ' Devil Stealing the Sun ' : when Peter, John, and Elias had left, ' the heathen gods stormed paradise and have taken away ' the moon, the stars, the sun and the throne of judgment : they have ' carried it all away into hell.' Elias or *Ilie* helps the angels and saints to recover it. Gaster well suggests that in this syncretism, the story and properties of the prophet Elijah have become mixed with the character of the sun-god Helios.

[2] Angels are sent (Story iv 74) to earth and one falls in love with an earth-maiden, as in Genesis ; when the rest were turned into bright and happy stars ' to smile joyful and kindly upon the earth ' (although unworthy to enter the courts of heaven and bearing tidings of the world's

light shining faintly through the vesture of decay. We hear of the Fall of Rebel Angels in these stories and of angelic rulers of the star spheres.

Ground Prepared by Gothic Arianism since *350*.—Lastly, we may ask how the sectaries were able to spread their doctrine westwards with such prompt and lasting effect? It may be replied briefly: they followed the track of the arian Goths and sowed their seed upon soil already well prepared to receive it. It is now held probable that the Goths migrated from the west shore of the Caspian—within the circle of Avesta and *parsi* influence—under pressure from mongolic disturbances in the seething cauldron of Central Asia. Thence they settled between Ural and Don and in cent. ii A.D. are found in the modern Rumania and the ancient Pannonia. Becoming arians (c. *300*) the bulk of the nation (so far as it survived) was never converted: they remained, even when gothic kings in Spain and Lombardy became orthodox, quite staunch to the peculiar arian compromise. Just 700 years before the Albigensian Crusade, Clovis the catholic attacked the heretics under King Alaric in the country north of the Pyrenees. Here too (as we saw) the priscillianist movement (a form of Mani's dualism) enjoyed a brief and stormy existence and was driven underground rather than extinguished. Meantime in the Balkans, Slavs under the leadership of Bulgars form kingdoms and these masters and organizers hail from the old home of the Goths near the Volga. When they are converted (after king Boris, the first Christian convert *c. 850*) the heresy of Bogomils and Cathars is found spreading to such an extent as to menace the very existence of the orthodox church. When Rome and the eastern church broke away from communion, the breach enabled the sectaries midway between them to win new influence through the mutual hate and reproaches of the two parties.

Sectarian Appeal to the Common People: Bible Translated.—Thus they reached the heart of the people, while the orthodox churches continued to maintain official tongues, a formal liturgy, and a fixed doctrinal system into which the unlearned could not enter. These preachers (like Ulfilas [1]

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evil ways) the angel who wanted to return was changed to a fiery and unsteady star. This in the end God hurled down to earth, bursting into a shower as it fell: 'The sparks never died out; the glow-worms carry them 'still'. It may here be noted that the very egyptian *soul-pilgrimage after death* (*Story* xviii 343) bids the soul pass on unharmed until 'in mercy thou 'hast gained the *seven heavy Toll-houses*', analogous to the seven planetary spheres of the gnostics and of earlier chaldeism, through which the soul can only pass securely by the use of magic and words of power.

[1] *c.* 311–383 A.D.: of a cappadocian family taken prisoner in 264 by the gothic raiders: sent as envoy to Constantinople 332 he was ordained bishop and sent back to his own country in 341. With the sanction of Emperor Constance II 349 he led a great colony of his converts across the Danube to escape from the fury of the persecuting gothic king Athanaric. This was settled in Mœsia at the foot of Hæmus, near the modern Trnova, which developed into a peaceable and pastoral community; but, as we can see later, never lost the traces and prejudices of its heretical origin.

some centuries before) offered religion in a popular form ; Scriptures were translated and subsidiary legends written of an edifying character. It was Ulfilas' outstanding merit that he rendered the Bible into gothic. The use of the vernacular was a distinctive mark of both arians and later sectaries. In the Balkans so great was their dislike of the catholic establishment that on the arrival of muslim conquerors, prominent cathars in Dalmatia and Bosnia embraced islam with readiness.[1] It is thus clear that the medieval rulers had good reasons for believing the sectaries of Provence to be a muslim outpost in some sense ; for those evangelists who came westward to make proselytes and attack existing conditions had left behind kinsmen who were warm adherents of Islam. Even in gothic Spain the Council of Toledo (*589*), after the Court had abjured the arian creed, put under anathema ' the abominable treatises which we ' composed to seduce provincials into arianism '.[2] All the sectaries used popular writings in the vernacular ; their clergy disputed with success against catholic priests owing to their greater knowledge of Scripture.

The ' forbidden books '[3] were preserved in slavonic and rumanian versions and some are to be discovered to-day held in high honour by russian sectaries. The oldest french rendering of the Bible was the work of Albigenses : the Church forbade the use of it at Toulouse in *1229*, and some time before, a translation had been publicly burnt as a work of the devil. Arius had (as we know) tried to popularize his views in rhythmical songs for sailors and artizans and had also enlisted the aid of popular melody. This religious minstrelsy made a deep impression on the ignorant and unlettered, as upon the welsh to-day. The Church knew of no such popular tunes or methods ; the service was conducted by, and was intelligible to, the clergy alone.[4] St. Ambrose may have tried to imitate the enemy ; *fas est et ab hoste doceri.*

Ebionism and Unfounded Charge of Devil Worship.—In theology the folk-stories are ebionistic—where our Lord is named (and this is by no means frequent) He is depicted as a *deified* human being : God Himself is more like Ialdabaoth of the Gnostics than the distant sovereign of the hebrews, Jehovah. But He is well meaning though not all powerful,

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[1] Not that this *unitarian* creed was strictly suitable to their tenets, but even this monism had been tempered by doctrines of Sheitan, Eblis and the djinns.

[2] King Recared, now a penitent convert, is speaking of his and his people's former misdeeds.

[3] The mass of sectarian *apocrypha* had outspoken *dualistic* views : the *Lucidaria*, as known in versions prepared for the west, had been thoroughly purged of extreme heterodoxy, that possible converts might not be frightened off.

[4] The former marks for distinguishing high and low church—surpliced choir in a confined chancel space as contrasted with a west-end gallery with epicene singers—bear witness to this : hymns are strictly illegal and the anthem alone is allowed, to be sung by professional and semi-clerical vicars-choral—not by the people at large.

and (as with Zoroaster or Priscillian) snakes, wolves and toads are made by the devil. The Bogomils do not *bring in* Christianity as evangelists: they rather *contaminate* it where it already exists by offering a spurious world-theory for which some detached phrases of Scripture lend support. They made up a religion of their own 'clothing it' (says Gaster) 'in beautiful 'tales, answering the expectation and satisfying the curiosity of the rank 'and file, giving a glimpse of the moral beauty which underlay the work of 'creation. They tended to purify the heart and elevate the soul by allegories, parables, apologues' (*op. cit.* 52). The russian sectaries continue to this present hour to hold these tenets of Mani and to practise customs utterly repugnant to church theory and discipline. It is not a little singular that these foes of the Evil Principle should be regarded as devil-worshippers by the orthodox rabble. In heresy-hunts and witch-burning (reaching its zenith among protestant nations) this charge was the 'basic 'principle, chief head of accusation: it was clearly devised against the 'followers of the dualistic teaching' (Gaster). The *perfecti* (Story xxii, 123) were accused of being the devil's servants, able to turn themselves into cats and dogs at will—the cat being his special favourite. It was said that they enticed the world to his worship and almost succeeded in detaching whole nations. Any public distress might be ascribed to their machinations and people have always been ready to trace their own ills, troubles or losses, to such malevolent agency. By a curious irony it was the very dualism of the ascetic Cathars—together with the vague catholic belief that every effort is justified against the devil's (supposed) votaries—which led to the increase of superstition which we have remarked and, through terror of sorcery and witchcraft, to the Holy Office of the Inquisition.

NOTE: REINEKE FUCHS.

The latin form is perhaps oldest and *Reinardus* may date from cent. xi or even x: it was written by flemish priests. *Le Roman de Renart* (40,000 lines,) appears in France between *1150* and *1350* as a vehicle of satiric comment by burgher-poets on the vices of the great and the abuses of church and state. It was an alsatian or suabian monk, Glichezar, who based his version on the french (1180); hitherto the beast-epic was represented only by the latin *Ecbasis captivi* (ed. Vogt, Strassburg 1875). In *1498* appeared a low-saxon version of the flemish poem *Reinaert de Vos*. It is a parody of human life and the struggle for existence, written in a cynical spirit: it is the apotheosis of selfish craft: sly hits at medieval statecraft, manners, religion, are obvious. A danish version does not appear till the era of reform, *1555*. The Dutch had a version three centuries earlier by William the Minstrel. Richard Garnett calls the poem 'a 'genuine expression of the staid and homely teutonic mind'. The lively gallic spirit gave it sting and bitterness; even Philip IV is said to have annoyed Pope Boniface by representing Reynaud's Procession (Cf. Carlyle *For. Quart. Rev.* 1831.)

APPENDIX F

Manichee Revivalism in Modern Russia

The russian sectaries (*raskolniki*) are the direct descendants of the bogomil propagandists. In spite of their harmless quietism and innocent lives it requires only a turn of temperament to convert a schismatic into a dangerous mutineer; and to-day the Czardom had to face much the same problems that confronted church and state in cent. xiii. The religious, Christian, idealist basis of Anarchism is of course obvious. Like the French Revolution it gathered all its strength from a few disconnected axioms or promises in the New Testament. Here once again, 'quakers' have become practical destroyers of government and the social order; and although these violent reformers form a minority in the sects and disavow any religious influence, the powers of the State regard all schismatics with equal disfavour on their account.

While sects (or at least opinions and modes of life) similar to catharism have enjoyed an unbroken life among the slavonic peoples, it cannot be doubted that the western sympathies of the Czardom, antedating Peter's accession, brought out their antagonism. The Old Believers struggled against polish luxury and latin heresy from *1656* onwards, their conviction inspired the rising of the Strelitzi on more than one occasion against dangerous novelties. The new coercive and germanized State-system was held in abhorrence. Some extremists (the *Bez-popovtsi*) regard the orthodox church as the craven instrument of Antichrist (the heretic Czar) and reject the priest's ministry. They acknowledge only the rite of baptism, and elect proper persons (as they think) to administer it; they observe rigorous fasts and attach much value to outward acts of devotion, though some as the Deniers (*nyetovsti*) believe any common or formal worship to be superfluous. Some, like the gymnosophists of Hindustan, believe in self-immolation as the fitting end of the religious life.[1] Several sects reject legal marriage and do not settle in homes, as the Pilgrims (*stranniki*) and the Runners (*byeguni*).

Fanatical sects, perhaps not fairly to be traced to the Old Believers, are the Flagellants (*khlysti*), an eastern counterpart of a phenomenon familiar enough in the west. In *1645* God the Father descended on Mount Gorodim into the body of a peasant and chose another peasant as His Son, the Christ—a curious revival of the older incarnationist doctrines. Suslov as Christ chose 12 apostles and a Mother of God. Twice executed, he rose again and did not die till *1716*, after appointing a successor. The several communities have a Christ and a *theotokos*, who receive worship in virtue of the spirit of God dwelling in them. Believers, male and female, must take these as a model and subdue the flesh, which is the creation of the Evil One. As in buddhism and amongst early quakers, marriage and the use of meat and wine are forbidden. Their meetings are marked by

[1] These are named from a certain Philip who burned himself alive for the Redeemer's sake under Empress Anna in 1743.

solemn dances, becoming wild like the dervishes' ritual waltzes, ending in convulsions, catalepsy, or prophesying with tongues.

The *skoptsi* or self-mutilators go further in their hatred for the present world-order and imitate Origen; the sect is said to have been founded (*c. 1770*) by Selivanoff and Andrei Ivanoff, in an ascetic reaction against the libertine excesses of certain *khlysti*.[1] Sent to Siberia in *1775* Selivanoff returned as the Son of God, incarnate in the person of Peter III (!). This is a very curious analogue to the oriental Imamate and the devotion gathering round the memory of an unhappy monarch, who was believed to have suffered a violent death. He took the name *God of God* and *King of kings*, and lived 18 years in Petrograd in a disciple's house, receiving homage both as heavenly and earthly ruler. Arrested by another madman, Paul I, he was again confined (*1797*) but released under his amiable successor: in *1820* he was once more shut up in a *suzdal* convent, dying in *1832*, more than 60 years after the origin of the sect. This dualist and ascetic program induced nobles and bureaucrats, priests and traders to join the sect. In 20 years (*1847–66*) 755 members were transported to Siberia, and in *1874* the total membership was given at 5444, of whom 863 were actual self-mutilators; in *1876*, 130 were transported after a single trial. Some have escaped to Rumania. Marriage is not wholly rejected nor is the end of the species desired; but, as in the conventual system, the perfection of the *unit* is the true religious aim and not the welfare of a society or a church. They dance like the dervishes to induce spiritual exaltation; their meetings are held late at night and under oath of secrecy; a form of Eucharist invented by Selivanoff is also celebrated. They buy children from the poor to educate in the tenets of the sect: when it numbers a thousand gross (Rev. xiv) a Messiah shall arise and a reign of the saints will be set up on earth. It is said that their favourite trade is that of *moneychanger*, perhaps on account of the apocryphal saying of Christ, *ἐστὲ ἀγαθοὶ τραπεζῖται*.[2] Of the whole of this movement of resignation and celibacy, Tolstoy and Dostoieffsky are merely the literary exponents, in a gospel of pain and surrender.

The *molokani*, who continue to drink milk (*moloko*) even during fasts, are first heard of soon after Peter III's murder in *1762* (which handed over Russia to a german princess under the influence of french sceptical enlightenment, and certainly gave an impetus to religious, as later to political, discontent). They call themselves the 'truly spiritual', reject the sacraments, are careless of all external forms and interpret scripture by allegory and symbol. The Doukhobors (*dukhobortsi*) even set the Inner Light

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[1] Both these mystical sects deny the efficacy of minister and sacrament, but the *khlysti* hold their 'pentecostal' dances in secret and outwardly profess conformity: their affinity to the ancient Euchites or Messalians is obvious.

[2] K. K. Grass has published at Leipzig (1904–07) two monographs on the *skoptsi* scriptures and on the russian sects in general. Cf. N. Tsakni *Russie Sectaire* (1888) and Bonwetsch in Herzog-Hauck *Realenc.* on *Raskolniken* (ed. 3, vol xvi 436, 1905.)

above Scripture and, with the *Molokani*, deny civil authority and refuse military service—without which Russia would relapse into a mass of disconnected slavonic *mirs*. First heard of *c. 1750*, they became obnoxious to the russian church-state which began a severe repressive policy. They are dualists like their prototype, the bogomil sect, and hold the very ancient orphic belief that the soul of man, once on the divine plane (the gnostic *pleroma*), has fallen from grace and happiness into this carnal world. Incarnation of God in Christ is not a solitary historic event of immense moment but is again and again repeated in the faithful: each believer can be truly termed God (in a sense) when he has fully opened his heart to the indwelling Spirit. God's spirit is present in man's soul and directs his actions. Christ appeared in order to give an example of suffering for truth's sake. He still suffers when we do not live 'according to the spirit'. The visible Church and all outward or formal acts are to them as nothing. Though they assemble on fixed days, greeting each other as vehicles of the Holy Ghost, they only pray inwardly and in silence. Their notion of love, as sole virtue and method of social intercourse, their doctrine of the absolute equality of all living creatures [1], lead to collision with the bureaucracy and the laws of the State; though they profess willingness to obey in all matters where conscience is not wronged. Industrious and peaceable, they show a high standard of Christian living like the Quakers, and their emigrants to Canada (from *1899* onwards) bear the best moral character as useful and inoffensive citizens. The absolute agreement of this sect in life and doctrine with the ascetic dualists of our period is incontestable. We can even go further back and see in them the descendants both of Euchites and Essenes. The 'passive resister' and the 'conscientious objector' in our own country is likewise affiliated to these early despisers of militarism and the coercive State.

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[1] This is a distinctly eastern trait.

CHAPTER IX (*a*) THE MENDICANT ORDERS

SECTION I. THE ORTHODOX FRANCISCANS

Heretical Influence on Church Reform.—Hildebrand and Cluny had opposed to the puritan dualists of cent. xi, a reform of the secularized church, very closely imitating many of the enemies' tactics and in fact complying with their chief demands. Again, in cent. xiii the Mendicant Orders were established to rival the unworldly poverty and missionary zeal of the non-conformists. Once started, this movement advanced with great speed. *Dominic* died in *1221, Francis of Assisi* five years later; but by the middle of the century the Orders had spread over Europe and Asia and numbered their friars by thousands. The great cities were no longer left to the free-thinking burghers and the chairs of the Universities were held by brethren. From their ranks came the chief divines and scholastics of the Constructive Age, and from them came the final effort to close up the breaches in medieval thought. About *1250* arose Carmelites, Austin Friars, and Servites; lesser societies sprang up with such luxuriance that the Council of Lyons (*1274*) suppressed all but five and refused leave for the creation of new brotherhoods. In close connexion with the Franciscans, also arose the lay Tertiaries whose example was followed by the *Humiliati*.

New Voluntary Associations.—This movement of *voluntary associations*, contrasted with the rigid ties of *status* or *political allegiance*, must have met and satisfied an earnest popular demand. The individual finds that membership of the two great objectives, church and state, does not respond to his subjective needs, whether earthly or spiritual. The State indeed was but just passing out of feudal compromise and counterpoise into its modern and unitary, that is autocratic, phase. Long established systems and institutions began to make conscious appeal to his loyalty or his intellect: dogma, having been challenged by heresy, was now reduced to a *corpus* of reasoned truth. For the zealous to be a churchman was not enough; they must of their

own choice and freewill take vows and come joyfully under a severe discipline. The Mendicant Orders mark the first impulses of *individualism*; like the Jesuits later, they aim (it is true) at *reaction*, but it is by new methods and from a fresh standpoint. The death knell of *caste* and *status* is sounding. The object of the new aggregations is the defence, by flying squadrons and guerilla warfare, of a religious monarchy, no longer able to depend on its slow-moving regular troops or militia. In a sense they mark (like the cluniac movement) a recognition of defeat: the heretics declaimed against a rich and worldly church and strove to revive the poverty of the early Christians.

Interest in the Neglected Classes.—The towns (as in our own day) had grown unwieldy and were no longer properly served with clergy; the italian cities were careless and secularist while at the same time willing to respect devotion and single-mindedness in others. The pendulum since cent. xi had begun to swing back from *rural* or *urban* communities: and the bishop and baron were left high and dry in their remote castles while the tide of the trading movement swept past them. The parochial system had broken down and the massed populace made light of the control or guidance of the church. The friars (like the dualist *colporteurs*) travelled about preaching. Or they set up in the poorest urban districts and worked by preference in the 'east end'.

Wide Sympathies: Democratic and Nominalist.—But though their supreme interest was directed towards a religious and social revival, all the new tendencies in reason and faith, in art and science, found a welcome with the mendicant friars. If monks were in this century the chief schoolmen and systematizers, they were also the first humanists. Many, turning from subtleties of dogma and fixing their thoughts on the practical needs of poor and sinful men, bring once more into prominence the human life and example of Christ. Hence the impetus to a movement known by the vague title of *democracy*, which is strictly only *nominalism* applied to society. In place of universal terms gathering up the component and contemptible atoms, interest began to centre round the experience of individuals—not merely in the mystical, but in the actual, world. This subjective interest found vent in the universities, where all things were discussed with a growing tendency towards a utilitarian standpoint;

and also in the busy urban communes where pioneers of democratic freedom knocked steadily at the doors of privilege.

Early Franciscan Poverty and Simple Life.—The ideal of apostolic poverty is the root-principle of Francis of Assisi, and he was followed by Dominic and other founders. He meant his brothers to work (as Vaudois ministers did) for their own living; they were to have recourse to the alms of the faithful only if other means of livelihood failed. But as spiritual duties and summons thickened, it was found difficult to follow the trade of a handicraftsman. Into a rigid system which tolerated no funds, no revenue and no lands, there crept the modifications and concessions to worldly circumstances, which caused serious troubles within the Franciscan Order and have to-day been generally accepted by monastic communities.

The Penitents of Assisi, or Minors (*c. 1210*) had no fixed abode but lived in huts of branches; they went about in couples[1] dressed in peasants' clothes; they did field work and mixed with labourers and outcasts, carrying the message of God's kingdom to the lowly and distressed. They put by nothing for the morrow and were forbidden to receive or store money. No ascetic practice was enjoined; they might eat whatever was set before them, even meat, and recognized no fast beyond the usual days of obligation. There was no formal noviciate, no attempt to organize. Missions were started to Moors and Saracens, and in the years *1217–1219* provinces under their own officials were set up in France, Germany, Spain, Hungary and Palestine. The first Chapters, as in other *democratic* societies were attended by the whole body, but after *1219* only by officials and provincial deputies.

Papal Recognition: and Schism of the Lax and the Rigorists.—In *1220* Francis found that he must have his 'Order' recognized and made authentic. Honorius III granted a Bull, which made the brethren an Order in the technical sense: the noviciate was to last a year and the vows then taken were to last for life. Francis died in *1226* and next year John Parenti succeeded, to be at once confronted with the question of poverty and its limits and its obligation. Gregory IX denied the binding character of Francis' Testament, as the general Chapter had not given its sanction;

[1] Like the Vaudois ministers in later times, *c.* 1530; no doubt in obedience to a very early Gospel tradition.

trustees were now allowed to hold money, and administer property on behalf of the Order. John and the rigorist party (zealots or spirituals) made protest, but he was displaced in *1232* and Elias of Cortona became head, under whom the Order increased and prospered. After seven years, Elias' worldly politics and (as it was said) his lax conduct provoked a reaction in which the Academics of Paris and of Oxford bore a leading part : he was deposed in the very presence of Gregory IX. The democratic extremists at this time disliked the conversion of a simple brotherhood into a papal Order, the learned studies and the attendance of members at Universities. They desired to return to the booths and the street preaching of the first members, to the arduous work amongst the very poor. Elias had persecuted them ; some were beaten, several put in prison, and one killed while trying to escape. Into this voluntary system there had already entered the stern voice of autocracy and methods of coercion. Between them and the party of relaxed discipline, were the great bulk of Moderates, anxious to keep the distinctive marks of Francis' own spirit but approving a development by worldly influence, by learning, by science and by academic studies such as the other Orders allowed. This party included most friars in England, Germany and France and it was their persistence that expelled Elias.

Progress of Disaffection.—Under John of Parma (*1247–1257*) the Zealots (or 'intransigeant' element) came into power, while the whole Order became entangled with the mystical and prophetic views of Joachim of Floris and were accused of heresy and dangerous apocalyptic extravagance. John resigned and St. Bonaventura [1] ruled for the next seventeen years, a longer tenure than any preceding ruler. Belonging to the Moderates, he tried to hold the balance, but the Zealots were driven into open mutiny against this well-meant compromise. The latent puritan separatism (which Francis had for some time held at bay

[1] The attitude of the Moderates towards the abuses of a wealthy and feudalized church could not be better stated than in his words (*In Sentt.* IV xxxvii i, 3) in favour of clerical celibacy : 'If bishops and archbishops now 'had children, they would rob and plunder all the goods of the church, so 'that little or nothing would be left for the poor. For since they now heap 'up riches and endow nephews, albeit removed from them by wellnigh 'incalculable degrees of affinity, what would they do if they had legitimate 'children as their heirs ?'

by his new brotherhood) now became overt. Several heretical sects were formed resembling the montanists of old and, like them, claiming a special and personal illumination. Even when the Council of Vienne decided in *1312* on a strict application of the rule (the *usus pauper et tenuis* of worldly goods), some formed a schism in Provence.[1] The Inquisition brought twenty-five before its tribunal and sent four to the stake at Marseilles in *1319*.

Observants, Strict but Orthodox.—The next movement towards internal reform was that of the *Observants* (*c. 1310*) who restored a moderate strictness of life, but allowed study. In *1517* Leo X wisely divided the Order into two sections, recognizing that the austere party must be satisfied without being permitted to assume sole control. The *Conventuals* were permitted under papal Bulls and dispensations to hold property in their corporate capacity like other Orders, while the strict *Observants* were allowed to follow Francis' own rule. It is worthy of notice that the english friars chiefly belonged to the moderate party but nobly upheld the idea of poverty down to the Visitation of the spoilers under Henry VIII. To the Order belonged Roger Bacon, Alexander of Hales, and those great renewers of the philosophic standpoint, Duns Scotus and William of Occam.

Section II. The False Franciscans or Little Brothers

Heretical and Revolutionary Development.—The name *Fraticelli* was given to a number of sects which attempted to lurk under the disguise of the franciscan mantle. Already in *1238* within twelve years of Francis' decease, Gregory IX denounces as forgers (*falsarii*) those who use the mendicant habit for private vanity or for unauthorized ends. Dolcigno (already mentioned as a puritan leader) was called *fratricello* ' being no brother of an ' Order under rule '.[2] In *1317* John XXII classes the fraticelli together with ' Brethren of the Poor Life, Bizocchi, Beguines ', as *profanæ multitudinis viri*. Next year he fulminates against the fraticelli of Sicily, gathered under Henry of Ceva, in the Bull *Gloriosam Ecclesiam*. Here a section of the Zealots or rigorists had been made welcome by Frederic of Sicily when expelled through the animosity of Boniface VIII. At first holding them-

[1] No doubt finding that the Albigenses had left traditions of austerity and unworldliness, as infallible tokens of membership of the true Church.

[2] John Villani in his contemp. *Chronicle*.

selves to be the only true followers of Francis, they advanced (as the Montanists) to the position that in them was to be found the only true Catholic Church. Excommunicated as rebels and schismatics, 'preachers of false and pestiferous doctrines', they elected a general and in *1313* a pope who took the name Celestine in memory of that truly spiritual pontiff whom Boniface had compelled to resign by artifice.

Cultus of Celestine V: his Brief Papacy.—Born of poor parents and *indoctus libris*, this simple benedictine hermit, Peter, had founded in the Abruzzi a small community of ascetics (*c. 1260*): there was little in common between the Order of Benedict and the new *Celestines*. After a long papal vacancy on Nicolas IV's death in *1294*, Charles of Naples insisted on a Conclave and the cardinals believed that they could rule in the name of the pious hermit Peter. His election as Celestine V was hailed by apocalyptic dreamers and followers of Joachim, no less than by earnest reformers who believed that only the unworldly and monastic ideal could regenerate the times. After ruling for six months he resigned in December, to enjoy relief from the burden of government and enjoy more leisure for devotion and ascetic practice. He died in *1296* and was canonized in *1313* by the Avignonese pontiff, Clement V. He had induced the ancient house of Benedictines on Monte Cassino to accept his novel system of ascetic rules and discipline; and fifty of his 'celestine hermits' were sent thither. But his nominees were expelled in the secular reaction which brought in Benedict Gaetano under the name Boniface VIII and ended in the ruin of the papacy and in the 'babylonian exile'. Peter (or Celestine V) was in close sympathy with the extreme party of Franciscans and tried to unite them with his own hermits in a single body. This union did not survive his downfall. But in the choice of a papal title in *1313* there is clearly a regretful look thrown back on the last spiritual pontiff for whom worldly influences had been too strong.[1]

[1] As to the views and character of his successor Boniface VIII much difference of opinion has prevailed; inquiry seems however to show (1) that the Bull of 1302 *Unam Sanctam* is authentic and in the main drafted by the pope himself, a man learned in civil and canon law and formerly advocate and notary at the papal court: in stating the prerogative he outdistances Hildebrand or Innocent III; (2) that the charges of heresy cannot be easily dismissed as an idle and prejudiced french calumny against the man whom the king was bent on ruining; Boniface may have held

Alarming Competition: Rival Pope.—Their brethren in Tuscany were vigorously attacked by the Inquisition: in Florence severe laws were made but as a whole the people prevented their application. Wibellines gave the new sect a warm welcome as a useful anti-papal engine. Puritans who desired to leave the church altogether were induced to join them and Rienzi at one time thought of becoming a member. More orthodox Franciscans sought by patient pleading to bring the Fraticelli back to the fold,—such as da Trinci, Stronconi and St. Bernardine of Siena in the years *1396–1400*. The popes were alarmed at the social influence no less than the dogmatic errors of the sect, and Martin V, after attacking them in two Bulls (*1418–1421*) entrusted legates with the duty of pursuit. In *1426* he proclaimed a special crusade against the heretics, with two Observants as inquisitors without limit of district, Capistrano and della Marca.

Difficult Suppression of the Fraticelli.—From the latter's account we learn [1] that, like the Cathars, they formed a rival church and a distinct and 'antinomian' society. They had an 'emperor 'of the Christians' one Majoretto, and a pope Rinaldo (*1429*) and a successor called Gabriel; he bore the title 'bishop of Philadelphia'—a mystical name for the true church. There were bishops of Florence, Venice and some sicilian towns; and at Peniscola in *1423*, there lived a heretic pope with his college of cardinals, no attempt being made at concealment. The fiery attacks of the papacy lasted nearly a quarter of a century (*1425–1449*) before the sect could be finally crushed. The people, always a factor of importance in the growth or suppression of heresy, had transferred their respect and support to the *Observants*, in which body Capistrano had been already recognized as a worker of miracles. Executions took place between *1466–1471* and in the latter year Scarlino was sent to the Tuscan court to hunt out the

certain *averroist* doctrines and denied the personal survival of the soul after death. Among later works may be named Loserth *Gesch. des spätiren Mittelalters* (Munich 1903); H. Finke's *Aus den Tagen* B. viii (Münster 1902) and *Kirchen Lex.* xii. (1901); Schotz' work on the 'Publicists under 'Philip the Fair and B. viii' (Stuttgard 1903); Wenck's inquiry into his heretical opinions (von Sybel's *Hist. Zeitsch.* Munich 1905), Mirbt's *Quellen zur Gesch. des Papsttums* (Tübingen 1901),—to which Robinson's *Readings in Eur. Hist.* (vol i Boston 1904) may be added.

[1] *Dial. c. Fratic.* in Baluze and Mansi *Miscell.* iv.

last survivors. Thereafter the heretical name vanishes from the page of history.

(β) NEW MOVEMENTS AFTER *1200*

SECTION I. THE NEW APOCALYPTIC: JOACHIM AND HIS FOLLOWERS

Various Influences upon the New Scholastic Age.—The division of scholastic efforts into two periods is well marked and indisputable. In John of Sarum we see a critical and in some sense ironical spirit, which ushers in a time of barrenness and exhaustion. An entirely new stimulus can be clearly detected in the opening years of cent. xiii. We have no right to assert that, apart from this novel and foreign impulse, the mind of western Christendom would have settled down into a stagnant and byzantine idleness. Nevertheless, its future departures and heroic achievements are due to an inrush of new ideas. To the Christian world Arabs and Jews made 'a rich but dangerous present'[1] in the complete works of Aristotle and his commentators. We have seen how, through jewish mediation and at first under such clerical patrons as Archbishop Raimund of Toledo (*c. 1130*), these writings passed northwards from Spain, then the chief hearth of culture, into the long disaffected districts of southern France. Amongst other works we have the jewish *Fons Vitæ* by Avicebron, the *Liber de Causis*, and the *Theology* of Aristotle—all three neoplatonic compilations, and the two latter passing as genuine writings of the Philosopher, esteemed amongst the muslim as the greatest of mankind. The basic principle was, perhaps, emanation of all creatures from God in ranks of ever decreasing perfection. On the other hand, a very distinct claim is put forward for the value and permanence of the physical universe. The reaction was natural: if God be remote and only in modified sense a providential ruler, both man and the world must come by their independent rights. This corresponds to the catholic vacillation in the church between *magical* and *pelagian* views of human nature and the use of the sacraments. Above and beyond reason in both religions was sometimes set a mystical faculty, a higher state of the conscious spirit, which is either man himself at his best or the influx and indwelling of God.

[1] This is Hauréau's expression *Hist. Phil. Scol.* vol. i 382 ed. 2, Paris 1870.

Dangers of Earlier Realism Disclosed : Sympathy with the Unit.—It is certain that later scholastics (like Aquinas) found that the current realism, adopted to safeguard *theology*, had introduced a very perilous conception into *anthropology*. The 'distinction' of natures' as in the earlier epoch of *Christology* had to be carefully preserved. Against the purely intellectual character of this highest gift or development in man, arose a protest on the side of emotion and the heart. A novel sympathy was shown with the neglected poor disciple, on whose behalf the Church was now consciously exerting herself by means of the Mendicant Orders. The two chief doctrines fathered on Averroes—(1) the world's eternity : (2) unity of Intellect—seemed to destroy the peculiar meaning and value of average man and to pour contempt on his struggles after perfection. The great Summists of cent. xiii are, it is true, still *realists* ; even Duns Scotus has not yet broken away from the orthodox doctrine. But all writers of this second period are on their way to inductive and empirical science in the religious area. They are advancing steadily towards recognition of the finality and worth of the singulars, towards the adjustment to their several needs and welfare of every objective canon. We notice that when religion seems to become more accommodating and sympathetic, the Civil State, as if suddenly conscious of a new mission, becomes more exacting. Thus, while inward faith tends to be a matter of pure individual conviction and freedom, outward life and conduct has to submit to a regimentation, growing always more rigorous down to the present hour.

The Mystical Movement.—Unorthodox cosmic rationalism was by no means the chief result or lesson of the jewish and arabic teaching. We have seen that Averroes can display a *mystical* side with perfect sincerity. It is not only peripatetic science but platonic religiosity which Christendom has to accept. Thus in the first years of cent. xiii there is a revival of a daring pantheism in which the individual found a consecration of his own inward impulses and a release from any legal and clerical restraint. The ascetic leader of this development (which might clearly be either wholesome or pernicious) was Abbot Joachim of Floris. It is now well known that the forebodings of the advent of the Evil One upon earth and the Final Judgment of mankind must be transferred from the mythical date *1000* to more than

two centuries later.[1] It was Joachim's apocalyptic writings which produced the peculiar atmosphere of alarmed expectancy which enabled welf and wibelline to retort upon each other the name of Antichrist. The visionaries of the extreme Franciscan Left (if I may use the expression) regarded the pope as Antichrist [2] or his forerunner.

Abbot Joachim.—The calabrian abbot taught (*Expos. Magni Abbatis Ioach. in Apoc.*) that *Rome* is Babylon, the Beast rising from the sea *Islam*, the False Prophet the *heresies* then swarming; and that the present age would soon draw to its close, giving place to the Millennium. The chiliasm of the sectaries is always a mark of democratic claims and deep discontent; wherever it appears it betokens hatred of a secularized church and a foreign and selfish authority. Within the church itself this hope comforted the purer souls who longed to return to apostolic poverty and to the equal rights of all faithful people. It unites with, or is a salient feature of, *mysticism* when it ceases to be purely personal. It appears not merely among the pious and fervent but is seen even in practical and modern minds like Occam. Of this Chiliasm the 'Everlasting Gospel' of Joachim was the first semi-official pronouncement, a recognition within the church by one whose loyalty and faith were never doubted—at least in his lifetime.

Born in Calabria near Cosenza *c. 1145*, of noble parents, he served at the Court of Roger, duke of Apulia. He journeyed to Palestine and Byzantium, where he was 'converted' during a plague, in the reign of Manuel Comnenus. By *1177* he was cistercian abbot of Corazzo. He visited Lucius III in *1183*, and Urban III two years later. Clement III writing in *1188* names two of his works, the *Expositio* being one, and urges him to continue the useful task. Finding his monks lax and recalcitrant, he retired from Corazzo and founded an order of his own on Monte Nero,

[1] I do not forget Adso's work written in 954 for Queen Gerburga, *De Ortu et Tempore Antichristi*, but too much stress has been laid on the panic of the closing years of cent. x. Bernard, a thuringian hermit, was perhaps the most strenuous preacher of an imminent doom (+ 960). His views were combated as a dangerous error by one of the most learned clerics of the age, Abbot Abbo of Fleury sur Loire.

[2] To this period belong the *Ludus de A.* edited by Wilh. Meyer, and Milic of Kremsier's *Libellus de A.* By the time of Wiclif and his disciple Purvey the papacy was identified with Antichrist. This conviction upheld Hus and Luther in their struggle and thus one chief article of extreme protestantism can be traced back to Joachim.

the abbey 'of St. John in Fiore'. Favoured by the gifts and patronage of Frederic II and Constance his wife, he did not forfeit the approval of pope Innocent III (*1204*) who confirmed and recognized *Ordo Florensis* and Joachim's proposed rules for its guidance. He had submitted his writings to the Holy See in *1200*. He died in *1202* and did not live to witness the strange perversion of his views and teaching that soon followed. The Lateran Council of *1215* condemned a work on the Trinity emanating from Floris but once more approved the Order. Even as late as *1220* Honorius III issued a Bull recognizing Joachim as orthodox and ordering all men to respect his disciples. He exerted a good influence on the kings of England and France, Richard I and Philip Augustus. His genuine works are accounted to be *Concordia Vet. et Novi Test.* (Venice *1519*), *Psalterium Decem Chordarum* and *Expositio in Apocal.* (both Venice *1527*).

His Three Ages of the World : from Montanus.—It is hard to decide upon the genuine and spurious works of one so highly favoured by the Church and yet supposed in later times to be her bitterest foe. In his authentic works Joachim's views are simple and, to be candid, unoriginal. In the *Expositio* i 5 he defines the Three Ages [1] of Father (*Law*) Son (*Gospel*) and Holy Spirit : each is preceded by a time of brooding or incubation ; though God only revealed Himself fully to Abraham, the apprenticeship of our race began with Adam. St. Benedict of Nursia is the precursor for the last age which opens in *1260*. In the first Age the *Letter* ruled ; in second there was a blend of *Spirit* with *Letter* ; in the last *Spirit* will alone prevail. In the first period only obedience was needed to the law's requirements ; under the Son *study* and *wisdom* were enjoined, as men strove to attain mystical knowledge. The full liberty of the Spirit would arise in a purely monastic age, when contemplation would lead on to intuition and ecstasy : then the only worship would consist of *prayer* and song. Montanus had taught a very similar doctrine of the Three States, believing that revelation culminated in his sect ; Tertullian (as we know) held the same views. This doctrine represents an uprising of a greek-orthodox and hellenic

[1] The *triad*, as a key to the mysteries of theology, nature and thought, is of course familiar to hegelian students and readers of text-books on the history of philosophy : Fichte and Schlegel and Comte show the same feature. But more strange is Vico's adoption of this formula (*New Science*): *first* the Divine Age, when men in their social infancy are ruled by priestly authority, *second* the Heroic, when conquerors govern by brute force, *third* the Human or civilized period—which being ended the cycle begins anew.

ideal against the visible and secular latin church,—of Basil against Benedict, of the *theoretic* against the *practical* life. St. Peter's church will not be abolished, but only purged; and the spiritual monks will supersede an active pastoral hierarchy. In this sabbatic period the world becomes one great convent; Rachel—the practical life—effaces herself before Joseph, conceived as the *contemplative* ideal. Christ's own teaching and the value of external sacraments seem destined to pass away in the new Age; for men will have advanced from symbols (*significantia*) to their substance (*significata*) and faith is swallowed up in sight.

The Theory Adopted by Franciscan 'Spirituals'.—Vague expectation of a New Age or a Messiah may take several forms.[1] Franciscan rigorists believed that their founder was the initiator of this Third Age of the Spirit. Some of their religious houses became centres of an apocalyptic 'joachimism'. The Hermit Hugh of Digne at Hyères with his circle fully believed in the coming triumph of a purely ascetic ideal. John of Parma was elected general of the Order by joachimite partizans in *1247*; and when Alexander IV in the interests of peaceful compromise forced him to resign, they became frankly anti-papal.

Expected Triumph of Ascetic and Encratite Ideal: Condemned.—In *1254* appeared the *Introduction to the Eternal Gospel*, the work of Gerard of Borgo San Donnino, a franciscan 'spiritual'—teaching that the calabrian abbot had supplied the key to Holy Writ and that the eternal sense of Old and New Testament might now be extracted by the new Order in whom Joachim's ideal was already realized. The work was denounced by the Bishop of Paris to Innocent IV, and, under his successor Alexander IV, a Commission at Anagni[2] ordered its destruction (*1255*). The Council of Arles, five years later, condemned Joachim's writings and disciples. The *Expositio* on the Apocalypse was now greatly interpolated and made to include violent onslaughts on the papal system. Beside the Franciscan Order itself, the italian schisms under the Fraticelli and the followers of Segarelli and Dolcigno

[1] Paul D. Alphandéry, Sorbonne Professor of the History of Dogma, has written *Les Idées Morales chez les hétérodoxes latins au début du xiii^e^ Siècle.*

[2] See H. Denifle's monograph on the 'Eternal Gospel and Anagni 'commission' *Arch. für Liter. und Kirch. gesch. des Mittelalters I.*

were steeped in Joachim's ideas. Roger Bacon was consoled by these hopes of a reign of peace and justice; Dante held Joachim in high esteem (*Par.* xii. 140). Literature grew to vast proportions; the method of exegesis by allegory was adopted by Ubertin of Casale, Bartholomew of Pisa, Telesphorus the calabrian hermit, Seraphin of Fermo, Annius of Viterbo and Cælius Pannonius.[1]

Attack on the Secularized Church: Apostolics.—Various branches of the old buddhist or encratite ideal gathered under the shelter of this name and desired to break wholly with a secularized church. In ancient days the Apostolics had rejected marriage and property together with the use of wine and meat.[2] The Cathars of Cologne (*c. 1146*) formed a very similar Society within the church.[3] They forbade marriage, use of meat, baptism of children, cult of saints, ritual fasting, masses for the dead, and the accepted doctrine of the Eucharist. They attacked the priesthood and believed that the whole force of the church had been diverted into secular and profane ambitions. They may have been followers of Henry of Lausanne, and Bernard of Clairvaux does not know a collective title for this ascetic brotherhood.[4] In the environs of Périgueux he met some of Henry's

[1] Preger published in 1874 at Munich and Leipzig lengthy and learned works on this movement, as preparing the way for the german mystics of the following century: Renan treats it in *Nouv. Etudes d'Histoire Relig.* Paris 1884 and in the same year appeared Tocco's *Eresia nel medio evo* Florence 1884; Gebhardt published two years later (1886) 'new inquiries 'into the history of Joachimism' *Revue Hist.* xxxi, and Haupt preceded him very closely *Zur Gesch. des Joachimismus* (*Zeitsch. für Kirch. Gesch.* vii 1885). Among more recent appreciations are Fournier's works (Paris 1900) '*J. de F. ses doctrines son influence* and *Études sur J. de F. et ses doctrines* Paris 1909, Jones' *Studies in Mystical Religion* London 1909, and Workman's *Christian Thought to the Reformation* London 1911. But the article by Dr. Ehrle, Vatican Librarian, in Wetzer's *Kirchenlexikon* must not be overlooked.

[2] The sect was common in the old haunts of montanism (Phryg. Cilic. Pisid. Pamphyl. and central Asia Minor): they upheld a buddhist and essene standard of life and refused to readmit the lapsed, like other rigorist sects. St. Basil knew some but by St. Austin's latter days (*c.* 410) they had become extinct.

[3] The Provost of Steinfeld wrote to St. Bernard about them, Mabillon *V. An.* iii 452.

[4] *Quo nomine istos titulove consebis?* Serm. in *Cantica* lxvi.

disciples in 1146, who[1] condemned earthly riches, denied the value of sacraments, image-cult and good works, were vegetarian celibates and teetotallers. Some time after *1250* the *Apostolic Brethren* arose in Italy from a blend of franciscan and joachimite tenets. Gerard Segarelli was a parmese artizan of pious and earnest temperament whom the Franciscans had rejected for admission to their order. By minute details he strove to conform to the human life of Christ.[2] He walked the streets of Parma chanting *penitenz agite*, and formed a society of peasants and mechanics, living as beggars in chastity, poverty and complete idleness. The church was for some time indulgent; Bishop Opizo protected the sturdy rogues who played at asceticism. Only in *1286* did Pope Honorius IV desire them to enter some recognized Order. They refused and Segarelli was imprisoned: in Germany and England measures had to be taken against the Apostolics.[3] Nicolas IV persecuted the now rebel sect from the year *1291* onwards; Segarelli suffered the extreme penalty of the State in *1300* as a relapsed heretic.

Revolutionary Chiliasm of Dolcino.—Under Dolcino or Dolcigno of Novara, the sect assumed more precise outlines and a more decided anti-papal policy. He wrote a letter after *1300*, announcing that Joachim's Third Age began with the 'martyred' Segarelli and called himself an angel sent from God to explain scripture prophecies. Frederic of Sicily was the conqueror expected. He formed a sect of 4000 under four leaders, including himself and his spiritual Sister, Margaret Franck. In him a mystical antipathy to formal rites and secular business turned into a violent propaganda, communist and strongly anti-sacerdotal. He gave himself a messianic character and announced (like John of Leyden) a sort of millennial kingdom; the theocratic Anabaptists of Munster in cent. xvi could find in him their prototype. Clement V preached a crusade in *1305* against the heresy and the sectarian army entrenched in the Vercelli highlands long resisted the papal power. In March *1307* the ringleader Dolcino was captured and subjected to fearful torture

[1] According to the witness of Herbert the monk.

[2] i.e. he became as the syrian mystics *ἰσόχριστος*; he was circumcised, wrapped in swaddling clothes and laid in a manger. Cf. the rites of the hindu 'twice-born'.

[3] At Würzburg in 1287, Chichester in 1289.

throughout a whole spring day; Margaret was burnt to death by slow fire. But the sect spread northward into Languedoc and Germany and even westwards into Spain. Councils at Cologne *1306*, Trier *1310*, Spoleto *1311*, condemned them. At Avignon and Toulouse they were fiercely pursued and disappear after *1375*.[1] Villani (*Chron.* viii ch. 84) calls Dolcino 'no brother 'of any ordered rule but a *fraticello* without an Order'. Angelo of Clarins in his *Seven Tribulations*, written to glorify the spiritual branch of the Franciscans, calls the Dolcinoists 'disciples of the 'Devil'.[2]

Section II. Fanatics and Puritans in Teutonic Lands

Northern Developments in France and Germany.—The Joachimite movement penetrated also into teutonic lands. Already there appear Beguins and Beghards from the end of cent. xii; associations both for men and women, free indeed from taint of heresy but too independent and unconventional to stand within the permanent favour of the church. Female piety had even before this date taken a free mystical turn, in Hildegard of Bingen and Elizabeth of Schönau with their apocalyptic visions. The next notable figure, Mechthild of Magdeburg, is a very distinct disciple of Joachim, and her work is the oldest of its kind in the german tongue.

Hildegard (*1098–1180*) born of noble parents, educated in the benedictine convent of Disibodenberg where she became abbess in *1136*. Urged to publish her visions she wrote *Scivias* in the years *1141–1151*: St. Bernard acknowledged her as a prophetess and procured her recognition by Eugenius III at Trier in *1148*. Anastasius IV and Adrian IV corresponded with her and Emperors Conrad III and Frederick Barbarossa did the same. She was the most vivid echo of the hopes and fears of an age of ferment and vague spiritual exaltation or expectancy: see Paul Franche's monograph in the series of *Les Saints*, Paris 1903. She has never been formally canonized but finds a place on Sept. 17 in the Roman Martyrology.

Elizabeth of Schönau follows a still earlier female visionary Helentrude

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[1] In Germany, Inquisitor Eylard burnt two Apostolics in 1402 at Lubeck and at Wismar.

[2] It will be recalled that the Fraticelli were the latest survivals of this antipapal movement: from Martin V in 1448 down to 1471 Rome was constantly occupied in efforts to suppress them. For 23 years they were hunted down and died out as a sect after losing the favour of the common people: a valuable authority is Inquisitor Giacomo della Marca's *Dial. contra Fraticellos* (Baluze and Mansi *Miscell.* iv 595–610); here again Dr. Ehrle has done good service by his researches.

(a nun of Heerse near Paderborn, before *1050*), in recounting the exploits of the mythical St. Ursula and her companions. She revealed her *clairvoyant* account in a jargon of latin and german and her brother Egbert turned them into clerkly latin. She identified in a trance certain epitaphs found in *1156*, in the roman cemetery at Cologne ; the saintly spirit of St. Verena, Ursula's cousin, used her as a medium and disclosed the martyrdom as occurring under ' Maximus ' (probably Maximianus *305*) : but it is fair to say that Elizabeth did not always trust her own spiritualist disclosures.

In Amalric or Amaury of Bena who died only five years later than Joachim (*1207*) the long submerged views of Erigena came again to the surface and were blended with the theories of the calabrian abbot. As in creation, there is a progressive revelation of God in history also—conceived as Father, Son and Spirit.[1] As Mosaism and the ritual-law came to a term in Christ, so the Church's Sacraments (still savouring of the fleshly and external) were to lose value and efficiency in the light of the coming Dispensation of the Holy Ghost. In the Amalricans [2] God is once more incarnate ; He is, as it were, embodied in a collective group or corporation. The impulses and desires of the flesh are dictated by the Spirit, indeed are His express voice. Here, as in the east, pantheism was combined with an ethical *adiaphory*, which began in a pious reaction against magical forms and the *opus operatum* and ended in the licence of pure subjectivity. The Church was quite just in her theory of affiliation : Erigena's work was solemnly burnt in public in *1225*. The Brethren of the New or Free Spirit [2] spread into the north of France and found a ready welcome among swiss and teutons. Along the Rhine-valley they made numerous converts after *1280* and during the next century, and allied with the

[1] All this is found repeated by modern neo-*trinitarians* like Schelling and Hegel who see in this dogma a remedy against the barren *unitarian* deism of cent. xviii and indeed a key to every mystery of thought or the universe.

[2] These sectaries are accused of reviving the *adiaphory* of the Adamites who gave an antinomian turn to religion in northern Africa (between 150–230) and perhaps set a precedent for the circumcellions. A blend of *ascetic* and *gnostical* (perhaps ophite) views, the school professed to return to Adam's state of innocence before the Fall. They rejected marriage and lived ' without law '. As the eastern sects they held that actions were neither good nor bad, whatever they did. For the Brethren in the later age the hostile epithet ' libertines ' was invented during cent. xiii, and the usual charge of *free-living* was added to that of *free-thought*.

Beghards, corrupting both their doctrine and practice.[1] It is from this 'seed-ground' that Eckhart and the other german mystics sprang up—reactions no doubt wholly moral but only half-orthodox, leading on directly to the great movement of Luther and the purely personal and intimate religion—which, however seldom attained, is the ideal and aim of all protestant teaching.

NOTE.

Beghards and Beguines.

The Beghards and the Beguines are an institution of cent. xii. The now admitted founder was Lambert priest of Liège, + *1187*, called '*le 'bègue quia balbus erat*' Ægid. *Gesta Pontif. Leodens. c. 1251* (it is mere coincidence that the kindred Lollards bear a name connected with *lõllen* = *stammer*). In *1170* he started sisterhoods without vows, mainly for Crusaders' widows: the rules were chastity and good works: the members did not beg but worked with their hands and nursed the sick, leading a common life. Loosely organized, the various houses followed divers paths of development; some were converted to the rule of the tertiaries of Dominic, Francis and the Augustinians. Others fell under the influence of extreme communist mystics, gave up work for the more Christ-like mendicant life (as it was supposed to be), practised cruel tortures and fell away into dangerous heresies. The *male* communities are not mentioned till *1220* (Louvain) and *1228* (Antwerp); they were never so numerous and lapsed more quickly into discredit. Chiefly composed of flemish artizans and, like the *tisserands*, weavers by trade, they had at first an intimate connexion with craft-gilds, which disappeared when mendicancy was recognized as the true spiritual ideal. While some were embodied as tertiaries in the order of friars, the great part like the *circumcellions* (*c. 400* A.D.) in Africa formed groups of sturdy vagrants living on enforced charities; the word being imported into England as *beggar* during cent. xii. (No doubt the harsh repression of vagrancy under the Tudors was partly due to fear of a fanatical religious communism.) Religion was the cloke for their demands. At Trier in *1310* the Synod condemned men 'who under pretext of feigned religion and through hatred of manual 'labour go round begging, holding conventicles and posing before simple 'folk as interpreters of Holy Writ'. Clement V at Vienne next year (*1311*) recognized in them the chief promoters in the spread of heresy. The male communities did not survive cent. xiv, and the female almshouses of the common life were not formally reinstated until the reign of Eugenius IV (*1431–1447*).[2] Before Eckhart the Dominican began to

[1] It cannot be doubted that the extinction of the Universal Empire, the recognized abuses in church government and the constant vacancies in the Holy See had by this date destroyed the people's confidence in a *disinterested tutelary system*; on which confidence Authority must always depend for its chief moral support.

[2] Cf. *Realencycl.* Haupt's article 'Beginen'.

preach at Cologne (*1325*) it is certain that he had come in contact at Strassburg with the Beghards and Brethren of the Free Spirit : he may well have accepted and developed their doctrine while guarding against the abuses and perversions to which any pantheizing theory seems liable. In *1327* their opponents took hold of certain phrases in Eckhart's writing and summoned him before the Inquisitors at Cologne. He agreed to recant and disavow whatever could be proved erroneous and asked his judges to consult John xxii. Before *1329* he died and in that year certain statements and opinions were expressly censured, undoubtedly because of their presumed sympathy with a dangerous heresy.[1]

The Flagellants show another form of strictly personal religion which demands to suffer the *pains*, as well as to enjoy the raptures, of the mystic. Such an offering to divine beings is as old as religious sentiment itself.[2] In cent. xi Peter Damian (+ *1072*) warmly recommended, and himself employed, the lash as a substitute for the recitation of psalms as a penitential exercise—1000 strokes being held equal to 10 psalms, 15,000 to the whole psalter. The monk Dominic Loricatus (+ *1060*) also used the scourge as a penance. St. Dominic gave himself 300,000 strokes in 6 days. The Franciscans too adopted the practice and Antony of Padua sang the praises of flagellation. But the flagellants, properly so called, arose from a peculiar movement amongst the people themselves in northern Italy.[3] Raineri of Perugia was the leader of a brotherhood of penance in that district. Over Lombardy the communities were thickly spread by the year *1259* and the movement spread into Germany along the Rhine and into Bohemia. The town magistrates (like Pallavicino of Milan) tried to stop these grotesque excesses. Children of five years old joined the processions (*Chron. Mon. Patav.*). ' The flagellants came through ' the whole world ' says Salimbene (*1220–1288*) : ' small and great, nobles ' and men of the people, scourged themselves through the streets, bishops ' and men of religion at their head. Peace was made of former enmities ' and men gave back what they had wrongfully taken. The priests had

[1] J. Bach in his monograph (1864) calls him ' father of german specu- ' lation ' ; even if this be an overstatement, his great influence on later development is undoubted and owes much to the more spiritual tenets of the Brethren, cf. Delacroix *Le Myst. Specul. en Allem. au* xiv^e^ siècle (Paris 1900) and Laudauer's edition of his writings (Berlin 1903), Buttner's (Leipzig 1903 and following years). Schopoff's monograph (Leipzig 1889) and Kramm's (Bonn 1889) are to be consulted : see on the general question R. M. Jones *Mystical Religion*, New York 1909 and Jundt's *Hist. du Panth. popul. au moyen age* (Paris 1875).

[2] Cf. priests of Baal ; ritual whipping in honour of Isis (Herod. ii 40, 61) : in Sparta of children at altar of Artemis Orthia (Plutarch *Instit. Spart.* § 40) : women at Alea (also in Pelop.) in Dionysus' temple (Pausanias *Arcad.* 23) : priests of Cybele and roman women at Lupercalia—as expiation of trespass or magical means to ensure fertility.

[3] For the excitable religious spirit of N. Italy, cf. Gebhardt's *Italie Mystique*.

'scarce time to eat, so anxious were folk to confess their sins.' Dying down for a time, the practice was revived in Germany after the Black Death (*1349*).[1] This revival seems to start from Hungary and became the cause of public disorders and an interruption to social life and security, being combined with *pogroms* against the Jews and against the monks. Letters from heaven were read which foretold terrible penalties if mankind refused this method of averting the divine anger. These companies spread from Poland into Holland and Flanders: 100 members visited Clement VI at Avignon where he condemned them; just as Cyprian had condemned the pardons and indulgences granted by the confessors, as a menace to the official priesthood and to the ordinary means of grace. Many leaders suffered death at the stake; only the spanish dominican Ferrer pleaded their cause at Constance (*1417*) and was sternly rebuked by Chancellor Gerson: the flagellants (he thought) betrayed a tendency to slight the Sacraments of Confession and Penance and refused to honour the martyrs venerated by the Church, professing themselves superior in merit through their self-inflicted sufferings.

In *1414* Conrad Schmidt was the leader of a band in Thuringia under the name 'Brethren of the Cross'. In this region the movement was allied with chiliastic expectancy: the leader believed himself to be Enoch re-incarnate and prophesied the downfall of Rome and the sacramental system, the imminent recognition by all mankind that salvation could only be attained by the whip. Joined by many of the vagrant Beghards, the united society suffered grievous persecution at the hands of Eylard Schöneveld and became nearly extinct. But the notion held its ground in the southern parts of France: King Henry III tried to revive it in Paris by his personal example, but his rationalist successor forbade these corybantic outbursts. It was again revived by some extreme jansenists in cent. xviii, and is not wholly unknown as a religious phenomenon in catholic lands to-day. This penitential movement was at the outset well organized and under control. A member promised due obedience to his captain, paid his own expenses, and was obliged to prove the sanction of his wife, and his friendly relations with all men. He was forbidden to speak to a woman or to beg for food or to enter any house uninvited; but he might accept victuals and two nights' lodging if willingly offered. Twice a day he lashed himself in public, believing that the blood thus shed would mingle with the Saviour's and would wash away all sin. The chanting of psalms and hymns became a marked feature in these penitential bands and exerted a striking influence upon the development of singing in the churches (cf. Bäumker *Kath. Deutsches Kirchenlied* ii 201 Freiburg 1883). The flagellants certainly believed that self-torture in its own right brought salvation and made man acceptable to God without the medium of Church or Sacraments. Some, in their hysterical exaltation, claimed to cure disease and expel demons, even to raise the dead. A letter from heaven, ordaining forgiveness to all who flogged themselves for thirty-three days

[1] But the flagellant revival began *before* the appearance of the plague, according to Höniger (*Der Schwartze Tod*, Berlin 1885).

and a half, was read aloud in many places and being accepted as authentic created a profound impression.[1] There is no doubt that the primitive discipline of the companies waned and gave way to the strangest subjective excesses and hallucinations.

Section III. Materialistic Pantheism: Amalric and David

Salvation by Knowledge of Oneness with God.—The peculiar tenets of Amalric, already named, merit a closer attention. He was born at Bena within the diocese of Chartres, a centre from much earlier times of vigorous and independent thought. He lectured in Paris on Aristotle and on Christian dogma and was much esteemed there for his dialectical skill. But in *1204* Innocent III ordered him to recant certain errors in his public teaching, in spite of a personal appeal and defence of his views addressed to the pope: he is said to have died of humiliation. In *1209* the methods employed in the Albigensian Crusade were also directed (as we saw) against his followers; ten were burnt and his body was exhumed to suffer a like fate. Only three axioms can with certainty be attributed to the Amalrican sect (if it deserves this title): *God is all*[2]; *every Christian must believe that he is a member of Christ's body* (such belief being (? alone) necessary for salvation); *he who remains in the love of God cannot sin.*

Innocent III (*Conc. Later.* iv cap. 2) says that 'Almaric's' mind has been so blinded by the Father of Lies *ut ejus doctrina non tam hæretica censenda sit quam* insana. Ostiensis says, that his *primus et summus error fuit quod* 'omnia sunt Deus' . . . *et sequitur non facile posse negari* 'Creatorem et creaturam idem esse.' The same author adds another error, clearly borrowed direct from Erigena 'quod primordiales causæ 'quæ vocantur ideæ, creant et creantur'. In the same style Amalric reëchoes the hibernian divine in his 'deus finis omnium quia omnia 'reversura sunt in ipsum ut in deo immutabiliter conquiescant ut unum 'individuum . . . deus est essentia omnium creaturarum et esse omnium.'

Affinity with hindu autotheism cannot fail to be recognized, although there is no need to postulate any direct influence. For Amalric merely brings to light the underlying peril, the legitimate deduction of medieval realism: *God as the true being of every individual thing*, in so far as it has any existence. Against this view the anthropomorphic legalism of the hebrews and the auto-

[1] Among more recent works may be named Cooper's *Flagellation* London 1908.

[2] God, *immanent* in all things, was in a special manner incarnate in the Amalricans: *omnia unum quia quicquid est est Deus.*

cratic sovereignty of muslim theology make effective protests: the ' substances must not be confounded ' and there is an immense gulf between our nature and God. While some were contented to fill up the void with semi-divine and heroic mediaries,[1] others, more daring, insisted on emphasizing an *immediate* unity with the divine. Here again *union* with the divine was already achieved the moment the individual recognized it—as in the *atman*-doctrine: there were no tedious stages to surmount or series of ritual or moral acts to perform; every one who felt himself to be divine was at once united with God. In Sudâili and Erigena, this unity of all things in God[2] was treated in a cosmic and speculative manner: now it was a personal protest against the claims of clerical mediators who had patently failed in their task. The stimulus was the need of the heart to find peace in its creator; and in some few cases no doubt, the desire to justify human passions and greed by claiming for them a divine mandate. Here again the excesses of a few extremists compromised the fame of all such pretenders to inward illumination; so the anabaptist libertinage for a long period prejudiced the popular view of that most harmless and exemplary of sects, the Quakers. But the social powers cannot be blamed for accepting the maxim, *ex uno disce omnes.*

[Besides Preger's work on the *German Mystics*, Leipzig 1874, and Hauréau's *Phil. Scolast.* Paris 1872, Schmidt's *Hist. de l'Egl. de l'Occ. pend. le Moyen Age* may be consulted Paris 1885; but the sect of Amalric is only known through the witness of its opponents and no fresh tidings about its fortunes and tenets can be expected. The acute work of Father Kleutgen (french transl. *La Phil. Schol.* Paris 1870) should be consulted on this pantheizing tendency in Realism: e.g. vol iv, 232: ' To see in a ' thing nothing but an individuation of a universal Real ', *ce serait tomber dans ce faux* réalisme *dans lequel l'antiquité elle-même avait reconnu une grande affinité avec le* panthéisme. He is indignant when Günther accuses some of the schoolmen of holding that ' God is the form of the soul ': it is certain however that this sect believed it. In i 407 he thus expresses the doctrine of Amaury of Chartres (as he calls him) *Dieu est lui-même ce qu'il y a d'idéal dans les choses ou qu'il est leur être ou essence propre.* He is sure that Scholastic avoided this error (368 and cf. also his *Theol. der Vorzeit* I ii ch. iii). He defends the early apologist Justin from pantheism (ii 360): *Evidemment nous ne devons pas interpréter ces paroles* Apology ii 8 *dans un sens* panthéistique, *comme si la Raison primitive, le Logos*

[1] Or examples, as in ' nestorian ' and adoptianist sects.

[2] Which, in some form or other, must be the basis of every religion.

divin, se divisait ou se fractionnait dans toutes les âmes douées de l'intelligence, comme en autant de rayons.]

Materialistic Pantheism.—There is no doubt that David of Dinan (in Belgium) Amalric's disciple carried the theory of man's *deificatio* still further. His writing *Quaterni* was condemned and burnt at Paris in *1209* and he imperilled his life by his extreme claims to divinity: his views are known only by references in Albert and Thomas. The former renders by *de divisionibus* David's work *de tomis*. In it God was identified not merely (as in some phases of arab thought) as the indivisible spirit-substance or νοῦς but as the indivisible matter out of which the world is made. That is (as in Spinoza) God appears to us under the two forms *thought* and *extension*, and in Him all things are one and at rest; so waves rise from the sea into an appearance only of autonomous life and tumult which does not disturb the serene depths. David argued that if soul and body were diverse there must be some higher nature in which both together might coalesce and find their unity and this again would be God, either as νοῦς or as primal matter. It is likely that this dialectical pantheism—at first sight so loosely related to religious needs or emotion—arose from a general tendency of protest against the cathar *dualism*. It is not a little curious that Duns Scotus (who was technically a *realist*) inclined to a view not clearly distinct from David's, on the *materia prima*—a formless primitive substance which provided a substrate and common element for all finite things. In this respect, then, he was far nearer to *pantheism* than St. Thomas, whose aristotelian 'dualism' (as it might be called) preserved the sharp distinction. In another respect by the emphasis on *Will* rather than *Reason* (upon an *individual*, that is, rather than a *common*, property), Duns who lies in this respect under arab and muslim influence, amply atones for this seeming lapse into a *material* pantheism. The discovery among a few heretics of a *parsi* theory of two opposite powers would certainly lead 'harmonizing minds' to the other extreme of undifferentiated *monism*. Between two views equally fatal to freedom and the Christian conception of man, Authority maintained its attitude of terrified alarm and its policy of stern repression in both cases.

APPENDIX G

Antichrist and Christian Chiliasm

As opposed to the peripatetic and arabian 'eternity of the cosmos', there now appeared the protest of the historic consciousness which sees in the development of mankind a divine purpose working up to a climax or catastrophe. It had been a favourite task for some of the later Fathers to divide the history into periods, often from a *Sabbatic* standpoint—as Austin in *Civ. Dei* xxii § 30, reviewing the Seven World-Ages in the light of Genesis i. Orosius, his spanish admirer, follows this suggestion and writes his history in seven books. Bede adopted the same distribution and was perhaps the first to believe that the last and seventh age would close in the year *1000*. Abbot Adso (already named) spoke of the apostasy which would precede the final climax, and Abbo (as we saw) felt bound to deny the prophetic terrorism of the hermit Bernard. But before this Erigena (+ *c. 890*) had divided the first six ages preceding the sabbatical repose into three, distinguished by three priesthoods; the Christian order would be abolished in the future when all the faithful would serve as priests and see God face to face. While he referred, no doubt, to the everlasting life, his words were eagerly accepted by the enemies of the roman hierarchy as promising a change of regimen in this.

In his *de Concordia* book v § 84 Joachim illustrates his (montanist) theory of Three Ages in several ways: the successive phases are *knowledge, wisdom, perfect intuition:* slave's *bondage,* filial *submission, freedom: trial, action, contemplation: fear, faith, love: old men, youths, children: stars, dawn,* full *daylight: winter, spring, summer: nettles, thorns, wheat.* It is to be noted that Dante, his admirer, foretells God's vengeance upon the Dragon (the babylonish *Tiamat*) and announces the champion 510 = DVX who will kill the Giant (*comm.* Purgat. xxxiii 43).

An important stimulus for the development of a theory of *Antichrist* in our period was given by the (so-called) *Tiburtine Sibyl* (on which Sackurs, Kampers, Bousset have expended much care, 1896 and foll. years). This medieval pseudepigraph dates from cent. iv and *apparently* refers to Emperor Constans, son of Constantine the Great, who reigned *337–350* in the west. In it appears the belief that before the coming of Antichrist, a single ruler shall possess the whole world and shall surrender his crown to God upon Golgotha. This holy universal emperor became the champion against Islam when that menace to the Christian Church arose. He was to wake out of his slumbers, overcome the infidel and obtain the empire over all mankind. It is curious to note that the original of this now believing prince was Nero the persecutor, who was held to have departed safely to the parthian court in *68* A.D. whence he was to return and once more persecute the Christians. There is a byzantine prophecy attributed (obviously in error) to Emperor Leo VI the Wise (*886–911*), which predicts the fall of the Comneni and the rise from his grave of the slumbering prince who is to rule the world. Under the rule of the frankish raiders at Byzantium (*1204–1268*), such a prophecy was composed, foretelling the

revival of a greek empire (under the house of Palæologus). In the west, 'the legend' says Bousset 'even made history'. The *Tiburtine Sibyl* was now associated with the teutonic emperors. Chiliasm found more definite expression after *1000* and was intensified by the Crusades and the success of the Cluniac Reform. The title Antichrist, or the subordinate dignity of forerunner of Antichrist, was freely bestowed on all political opponents by every party. It was exchanged in the welf and wibelline conflict, and in the fatal struggle between the popes and Frederic II. The Franciscans (as we know) very strangely adopted the half-mussulman emperor as the faithful world-ruler because of his hatred of the papacy. The belief that Rome was Babylon, the pope Antichrist or his forerunner 'became of worldwide importance' (Bousset). The franciscan extremists no doubt handed on this pregnant prejudice to the reformers. The bohemian Milic, Matthias of Janow, Wiclif and Purvey, Hus and Luther, all held firmly to the belief, finding in it much comfort and encouragement in their struggles. That 'the Pope is Antichrist' was raised to the level of a dogma of faith in Luther's Articles of Schmalkald. Since then the belief is found chiefly in academic commentators on the *Apocalypse* and in certain ignorant circles where prejudices die slowly.

Section IV.—Great Scholastic Systems: Challenge of Nominalism

New Interest in Practical Questions.—We do not propose to follow scholastic development in its greatest age. We have only to trace very briefly the influence of Aristotle in his entirety on some points of dogma. We notice first, an interest in questions more vital than that of Universals: problems relating to the elements of substance, *principium individuationis*, origin of Ideas and ideas, how they exist in God's mind and then, derivatively, in our own. The ideal world is composed of exemplars which exist in the divine: so Bonaventura held in a sort of revived platonism which included a rejection of Aristotle's doctrine that the world is eternal: so too William of Auvergne (+*1249*) for whom this archetypal world is true God and Son of God.

Transcendence of God: the Double Truth.—But the greatest change wrought by this arabic hellenism was the distinction of truths demonstrable by reason and revealed truths. Aristotle stood for rational monotheism; and henceforth the existence of God as a concept attainable by the natural reason is set apart from other specially Christian doctrines. This simple religion[1] is accessible both to heathen greek and to infidel muslim, and the

[1] It will later be called *deism* or natural religion.

scholastics did not scruple to use their arguments. But the problems of the Trinity and of Christology are now detached from the sphere of rational inquiry. Patristic platonism had allowed of analogies in pagan thought for these doctrines, but with the employment of the entire works of Aristotle no farther appeals could be made; the *transcendence* of a single unique and necessary Being takes the place of a theory of *immanence*. There is a great gulf fixed between the Creator and His creatures. In the increasing mistrust of human faculties,[1] natural enough in an age of social disintegration and immoral revolt, sceptic nominalism still further withdrew dogma and its proofs from the competence of reason, but (as yet) without casting doubt on the truth of the doctrines themselves.

Theology (in Nominalism) becomes Practical Piety instead of Speculation.—To Occam theology is not a *science* in the strict sense nor is it concerned with the realm of knowledge and universal truth wherein man is least an individual. It is practical and indeed *utilitarian*, not a speculative inquiry but a means by which men attain happiness here and hereafter by obedience and faith. Already, under cover of religious needs, individualism and subjectivity had put forth its claims—soon destined to pass into inductive science and sensualism, into a love of the secular reality of the concrete world.[2] Thus philosophy and theology as reason and faith are finally sundered and indeed confronted as antitheta. The two-fold nature of Truth or the double set of axioms serving for two different provinces, now becomes, as in India, a familiar doctrine.[3] But Nominalism could ally itself with a truly devout and personal mysticism, as in Cardinal Alliacus (*1350–1425*) and Gerson (*1363–1429*), both chancellors of Paris and in high repute for orthodoxy. But we need not, at least at this point, overstep the limits which our period sets.

[1] Already beginning in John of Sarum.

[2] For which, unhappily, in this period, we are unable to employ the term *realism*.

[3] Simon of Tournay was censured in 1200 for holding this convenient and indeed inevitable compromise: John xxii forbids the theory in 1276: with Occam it became a necessary postulate for the double attitude which man has to take up towards the blended world of *fact* and of *hope*.

CHAPTER X. THE TEMPLARS

SECTION I. THEIR WEALTH AND SUDDEN CATASTROPHE

We have now and again crossed the proper frontiers of our period that a later development may throw light back upon the sources and exhibit their immanent tendency. But our real terminus is the pontificate of Boniface VIII, the reign of Philip the Fair and the destruction of the Templars. All these phenomena prove the decay of the medieval idealism and the perversion of institutions now grown archaic to the purely secular ends of modern times. The overthrow of the Templars shows plainly the exclusive and autocratic claims of the utilitarian centralized State. But it is also the last instance of that genuine or suspected heresy which alarmed Authority throughout our period.

Modest Beginnings : Rapid Growth.—In *1119* two knights, one from Burgundy one from northern France, undertook to defend pilgrims in the Holy Land ; a small company took an oath to the Patriarch of Jerusalem and bound themselves under authority both as a *religious* community and a *military* order. The members lived in chastity, poverty, obedience [1] ; and found their chief active duty in guarding the public roads in Palestine. Baldwin the king gave them the (so-called) Temple of Solomon in the Holy City and they derived their name from it. They devoted themselves to reclaiming and converting to penitence and sacred uses the rabble of excommunicate and stranded knights who had come to the Holy Land rather for plunder than holy ends. Later, the Templars were for this reason immune from sentences of excommunication pronounced by bishops and parochial ministers. Recommended by St. Bernard of Clairvaux, they obtained the sanction of the Council of Troyes in *1128*

[1] This implicit obedience, as in muslim sects and the later jesuits was of the essence of the Order : a knight must go instantly wherever a superior bade him ' as if it were God Himself Who commanded '.

where the rules of the Order were drawn up. With their constitution and history we are not now closely concerned; and a few details must suffice. By the date of Frederic II's death, they formed a wealthy and exempt body with their own clergy, immune from other clerical interference. A steady stream of endowments in the two centuries of the Order had converted it into the richest corporation in Christendom.

'Immunity' of the Order.—Its peculiar rules constituted it one of the most powerful governments of the time, not merely issuing orders within the territorial limits of their exempt estates but forming in every kingdom a separate State, a force to be reckoned with, an *imperium in imperio*.[1] Popes allowed them to have and control their own churches and churchyards, exempt from normal rules of interdicts and other church bans; they were relieved from payment of tithe and from the action of all papal censures or decrees, unless they were expressly named in them. Recognizing no metropolitan or diocesan authority, they formed a separate militant diocese with the pope at their head, scattered over all Western Europe and a large part of Nearer Asia.

Early Charges against Templars: Assassins their Vassals.—As to the repute of the Order, it must be noted that they became at an early hour a target for charges of treachery and muslim sympathies. When Emperor Conrad III failed before Damascus in *1149*, the Templars were believed to have a secret understanding with the garrison of that city. In *1153* William of Tyre implies that in invading Ascalon for the sake of booty the Templars met a well deserved disaster. In *1154*, they were said to have sold, for 60,000 gold pieces, a prince of Egypt who had wished to become Christian; he was taken home to suffer certain death at the hands of his fanatical family. In *1166* Amaury,[2] king of

[1] They had lands in Normandy before 1135, were settled in Castile 1129, Languedoc 1136, Rome 1138, Brittany 1141, across the Rhine about the same date. In Spain (it was said) Alfonso I of Aragon and Navarre gave them a third of his kingdom (Mariana); Louis VII in France allotted them the low-lying site of the Temple outside Paris. In 1279 King Philip ceded *high and low justice* in the whole fortified quarter on the right bank, allowed them right of castle-guard by their own men, and relieved them of the usual escheats and forfeitures to the Crown: he dispensed with feudal service within these precincts and undertook not to levy *taille* or tax there.

[2] This name is of course a form of *Amalric* which we have found also spelled *Almaric*; at the present day it is found usually as Almeric.

Jerusalem, hanged twelve members of the Order for betraying a fortress to Nureddin, and in *1168* the Templars repaid him by offering a firm resistance to his expedition against Cairo. But in *1170* they fought in alliance with Baldwin IV at the victory of Ascalon. During the Mastership of Odo de Saint Amand, the head of the Assassins offered to accept the Christian faith if relieved from the tribute paid by this redoubtable sectarian chief to the Templars for nearly twenty-five years. His envoy was murdered by them in *1172*, and Odo refused to yield the offenders to the royal justice.[1] It was a faction led by Gerard, Grand Master in *1186*, that led to a schism in the Christian camp and to the overthrow of the kingdom: when Jerusalem fell (*1187*), the Templars' treasures were used (perhaps for the last time) for their original aim—to redeem the poorer Christians from slavery. After a short tenure of Cyprus, they took up their headquarters at Acre and built the wonderful stronghold near, whence the Fifth Crusade started in *1218* against Egypt.

Their Hatred of Frederic II: Later Heroism.—To Frederic II they were opposed throughout, and once again were accused of informing the sultan of the emperor's pilgrimage to the river Jordan. They refused to attend his coronation and Frederic affronted the Grand Master in public and laid siege to their fortress at Acre. When he came home to Apulia, he gave the first signal for the intended attack by ordering the seizure of their estates in his dominions and the exile of all the members. When the Christian army was annihilated in *1244* at Gaza, the whole body of 300 knights (except eighteen) were killed, together with the Grand Master. In Egypt, six years later, the still wealthy remnants of the Order advanced the funds for the ransom of Louis IX. Sultan Bibars reduced the fortress of Safed in *1266* and of the Templar garrison of *600* knights, all preferred death to apostasy: Antioch fell in *1268* and the Templars then held nothing but the stronghold of Acre. But this citadel was reduced in *1291*, some few months after the capture of Tripoli: the Grand Master de Beaujeu lost his life in the assault. Cyprus

[1] Years later under Louis IX, the Grand Master rebuked the haughty language of the Assassin deputies in the king's presence. It cannot be disputed that they had long and important dealings with this 'extreme left' of muslim bigotry and were therefore suspected (not unfairly) of imbibing their precepts and following their principles.

now became their headquarters. But the period of their activity and usefulness in the East may be said to close with the century.

Their Surprising Wealth and Modern Methods of Finance.—In the west the Order had acquired the riches, influence and unpopularity which fall to the lot of all financiers and capitalists in a society only slowly passing into the usage of money currency. From them were chosen the Almoners of our own Henry III and Philip the Fair; a Grand Master was godfather to Louis IX's daughter; another stood sponsor to a child of the very king who wrought their overthrow. They were invited to take part in the Councils of the Lateran *1215* and of Lyons *1274*. When Frederic II attacked them (as we have seen) the papacy retorted on their behalf by excommunicating him, and before his death he was obliged to restore their forfeited estates. About that time their manors, scattered over all Europe from Denmark and Ireland to Spain and Cyprus, numbered 9000.[1] In *1200* they received 20,000 gold pieces as revenue from Armenia. Their Temples were royal treasuries; as in England under Henry III, who borrowed from the Order the purchase money of Oléron in *1235*. Edward I had borrowed 25,000 *livres* of which the Order freely remitted 20,000. Philip IV exacted from them the dowry of his daughter on her marriage with Edward II of England. The last Grand Master de Molay arrived in France with 150,000 gold florins and ten mules-burdens of unminted silver. Paris became the centre of a great financial business; for the treasures were not hoarded, but issued as loans on proper security. The Order was the chief and safest means of exchange; their citadels were impregnable banks and their convoys were protected both by religion and arms. They were the predecessors of the great secular italian financiers of later times. Their ruin was thus in large measure due to the jealousy and distrust of a feudal society; where the central authority, stricken with poverty and thwarted at every turn by lack of funds, was yet already confronted with all the imperious calls and novel duties of the modern State. The Templars, diffused in their commanderies over Europe, nominally subject to the civil power, never enjoyed the absolute sovereignty of the prussian knights or of the Order of

[1] So Matthew Paris: Alberic de Tribus Fontibus gives nearly 2000 less, but even then their estates are more than double the holdings of the Order of St. John.

St. John in Rhodes or Malta. But their wealth amply compensated for the lack of this formal autonomy, and in effect they were far more powerful than Orders confined within certain territorial limits on the confines of Christendom.

Close Alliance of Templars and Philip IV.—The advisers of Philip IV had from the first attempted to curtail their influence. In *1287* estates acquired by them since *1258* were declared confiscate. Two years later, the *Ordonnance de Ferrières* further curtailed their property and their rights of interference with the royal vassals. Next year (*1290*) the *Parlement* recognized the rights and privileges only of those who actually wore the habit. From *1293–1307* this policy was entirely remodelled and the needy king entered into a close alliance with the Templars against the pope. He revoked the restrictive measures, while extending and confirming their earlier privileges; in *1297* he borrowed from them 2500 *livres*; in *1303* he signed a formal treaty against the pope with their Visitor, Hugh Peraud, and next year appointed him receiver of royal revenues. A charter was issued during the campaign in Flanders exempting the Order from all disabilities (by *mortmain* or otherwise) in acquiring property In *1306* the king took refuge in the Temple from the fury of the mob and in the spring of *1307* was present at the installation of a new knight.

Sudden Change of Policy in France and Spain.—Six months later he arrested the members (October 13, *1307*) and forced them to confession of real or simulated guilt by the most cruel tortures. Besides the obvious motive of the State's necessity, which now began to recognize no scruples or moral restraint, the king had in view another aim—the union of the Military and Religious Orders under the French Crown. There was to be in future one single body, the knights of Jerusalem, of which the king was to be the head.[1] In *1305*, de Floyran of Béziers delated the society to King James of Aragon [2] who seems to have promised him a share of the spoils. He turned also to the french king who welcomed him gladly. Twelve spies gained admittance to the Order and the new french pope, Clement V, was approached with sug-

[1] An amalgamation had been proposed at Lyons in 1274 but the knights of the Temple and the Hospital rejected the scheme.

[2] Villani calls him Squin de Florian; the informer claimed his reward in a letter dated Jan. 21, 1308.

gestions.[1] But he expressed his disbelief in the charges alleged and the king, disregarding his verdict, appealed directly to the Inquisition which could act without consulting the See of Rome. Thus the Crusade against the Albigenses and the special measures conceded by the papacy against heresy led at once to the overthrow of the Order by means which were perfectly legal.

Inquisition Subservient to Philip.—The Holy Office performed for the french king the same time-serving functions as the english parliament in the case of Henry VIII's confiscations. De Molay and sixty brethren were seized in Paris, and listened in a public session of the University to a catalogue of their crimes. Eloquent preachers inflamed the anger of the citizens against their secret wickedness—and (no doubt) their obvious wealth. Thirty-six of this number died under the torture; 123, out of 138 examined in the capital, admitted that on reception they had spat upon the Cross. Many, under fear or pain of torture, confessed to any and every charge alleged against them; the only respite from acute suffering was procured by such avowals. The Grand Master signed a letter (October 25) in which he told the knights that he had denied Christ and insulted His emblem; the grosser indictments freely levelled at the Templars and himself he indignantly denied.[2] Philip sent letters to Edward II of England, James of Aragon and the (now merely titular) Emperor Albert of Germany, asking them to cooperate in the overthrow of a sect no less pernicious than the heretics of Provence. He met with an opposition in England which does credit to an english sovereign who has never received his due from historians. Edward desired before taking action to hear the reports of his own officials at Agen, and in December wrote strongly to Castile and Portugal, to Sicily and Aragon, urging their sovereigns not to believe the indictment until clearly proved. James, while expressing his surprise and incredulity, promised to proceed

[1] Bertrand de Got, Archbishop of Bordeaux, pope June 5, 1305, elected through the influence and by the bribery of Philip IV.

[2] We have noted the connexion between unnatural sexual crime and savage shamanism, or medieval heresy: Cf. Westermarck *Origin and Development* etc. vol ii. The 'bulgarian' heretics or 'bougres' excited terror as well as disgust: the practices of which they were accused (no doubt as unjustly as primitive Christians) of incest and cannibalism, were always associated in public feeling with treason and blasphemy against God and a secret conspiracy to subvert the entire social order.

if required by the church. Clement V was annoyed at the french king's almost 'imperial' initiative, and saw in it encroachment on the rights and jurisdiction of Rome. He ordered a general arrest by kings and potentates that he might keep the matter in his own hands. The sovereigns of Europe obeyed, no doubt from divers motives, and by the month of May the strongholds and persons of the Templars were in the hands of the civil power from England to Cyprus.[1] In June, king and pope came to an agreement, Clement withdrawing his recent ban on the powers of the Holy Office in France (the king's chief lever) and Philip handing over to papal deputies the estates and persons of the Order. The Grand Master and the Preceptors of Cyprus, Normandy and Aquitaine were to be reserved for the cognisance of the pope himself; and diocesan bishops together with papal assessors were to examine the cases of the several knights. Escheated property was to be devoted to the needs of the Holy Land and a new Crusade, but (as in the english 'Reformation') the king through his adroit agents was able to divert the greater part to the uses of a gaping treasury. In August *1309* the Templars were invited to defend their Order; this was a mere ruse and those who, emboldened by this appeal, retracted the confessions before extorted by torture were burnt at the stake.[2] Forty-six now withdrew their recent defence in terror and the pope at the Council of Vienne (*1311*) refused to listen to their case, throwing seven Templars into prison who still offered an *apologia*. In *1312* (May 2) he transferred by Bull their estates to the Knights of St. John[3]: four days later (May 6) he expressly guards himself

[1] Where the surrender took place on May 27: in Aragon and Castile forcible resistance was shown, Monzon being captured after a long siege on May 17, and Castellat only falling in November. That the suspicion of their faith was not wholly unfounded is clear from this fact; many spanish Templars embraced Islam and joined Granada against Castile: the easy conversion of the bosnian nobility on the approach of the Turks will recur to mind. Others, in spite of the generous treatment of individual members after the disbanding of the Order in Spain, took service with the african Moors. Finke *Papstum* etc. i chap 10, Münster 1907.

[2] 54 retractors in Paris on May 12, 1310 by the sentence of archbishop of Sens, 4 at Senlis and 9 by order of the archbishop of Reims.

[3] Except in the case of lands in Spain, and Majorca. In Spain liberal pensions were granted; some continued to live in groups on their old estates but without official organization; many married as being absolved from their vows; others served the muslim on both sides of the Straits.

against a definite sentence of guilt.[1] De Molay, after his double retractation, was as brave as Cranmer in his last moments, and died at the stake (March 14, *1314*); had he persisted in his original confession he would have only suffered imprisonment for life.

Section II. Their Indictment and Apologists

Peculiar Charges against a Secret Society.—It is now time to consider the nature and grounds of the charges made against the Templars. Alone among the Orders they carried on their rites of initiation in secret and thus excited the curious or calumnious to evil comment and surmise. Chapters were held in guarded rooms with strictest privacy and at break of day; no participant might reveal what took place at each lodge-meeting *even* to a brother-member. Suspicious or prurient minds invented the usual tales about esoteric societies: at his reception, the postulant spat on the crucifix, denied Christ, and was required to bear sexual outrage without complaint. At the Mass the words *Hoc est Corpus Meum* were omitted, and on Good Friday the Cross was trampled under foot. A form of devil-worship was used—either of a black cat or a black idol called Baphomet.[2] Devils taking the form of women lent their aid to the Templars' orgies and boys were admitted to the Order to be corrupted.[3] It was

Their castles were however given to other Orders—but the king and *ricos hombres* (like Henry VIII and his new nobility) no doubt acquired a very large share.

[1] *Non per modum definitivæ sententiæ* (since we could not deliver such after the inquiries and processes held upon the Templars) *sed per viam provisionis et ordinationis apostolicæ*. The pope, not being a free agent and unable to withstand Philip's will, took care nevertheless to refrain from promising wholesale abolition or from allowing that the charges were proved beyond doubt. When the archbishop of Sens, de Marigny, a complete tool of the king, condemned the Templars, the papal commission replied with sympathy and regret; but could not interfere with the normal powers of a metropolitan.

[2] So two Templars, examined at Carcassone; a Templar at Florence however called it *Magomet* (thus like Buddha, Mahomet from a prophet had become an object of worship !) the two words are the same, *baffumerie* is the same as *mômerie* or mummery. Hammer-Purgstall in his *Myst. Baph. Revel.* (Vienna 1818) traces Templar belief and practice to a gnostic and ophite revival and derives the name from *βαφὴ μητοῦς*, or *baptism* of the *Supreme Wisdom*.

[3] In 1307 many young lads were found as members, being received

said that parents killed their children who had chanced to witness these sacred rites or had refused to submit to the brothers' outrages; in France it was believed that the Order roasted the children born of their amours and anointed their idol with the fat.

Heretical (?) Gnostic or Muslim Sympathies.—Modern critical research begins with Purgstall's ingenious affiliation to early gnostic heresy (*1818*) and nearly forty years later (*1855*) he replies to the doubters by producing *gnostic* emblems or caskets said to have been found on Temple sites.[1] Wilcke[2] criticizes this notion of an ophitic tendency and believes their secret doctrine to be merely the unitarian *deism* of Islam. Both Ranke and Weber adopted the suggestion. Prutz expanded Loiseleur's argument by a more careful scrutiny in his *Geheimlehre*. But (after an attack by Schottmuller *Untergang des T. Ordens*, 1887) he modified his views (*Entwicklung etc.* 1888). He denied that the Templars as a body had any fixed or precise 'secret 'doctrine', while still holding that to spit on the Cross and to deny Christ were required at initiation as a 'rough test of that 'unfaltering obedience' which these medieval knightly and religious Orders borrowed without doubt from the muslim. He suggests that these were interpreted in the light of later heresies, the aversion of the cathars to the Cross being notorious. Knowledge of eastern nations, arab chivalry and plighted faith, contact with new ideals and a richer culture,—all this had broken down exclusiveness and weakened the unique claims of the Gospel. The Holy War had been diverted into business channels or open buccaneering raids. Men's absolute belief in the Gospel message, and in a church which claimed a unique monopoly of salvation, had been much impaired. The apologue of the *Three Rings* conveyed a very widespread conception of religion and the pious were already searching for the mysterious author of the *Three Impostors*. It was the beginning of an age when a universal faith, a *natural* or *rational* religion, was urged against positive and dogmatic creeds.

without any sufficient noviciate; the tale is well known of children at play warning each other not to let Templars kiss them.

[1] No such symbols however were alleged against the Templars at the trials of 1309–1312.

[2] *Gesch. des Tempelherren ordens* 3 vols, Leipzig 1826, revised 1860.

Modern Pleas for a Complete Acquittal.—Meantime there had never been wanting apologists who protested their complete innocence on the count of heresy and perhaps also on the moral charges.[1] In *1654* du Puy, king's librarian at Paris, felt himself constrained by loyalty to the new absolute monarchy to prove their guilt against those who acquitted an Order only to convict a king. An editor of a later edition (Brussels, 1751) undoubtedly was a Freemason who tried to clear the indictment and affiliate to the condemned Order the new and rapidly increasing brotherhood of speculative *deism*.[2] The Benedictines (as Vaisséte and the Prior of Etival, Paris 1789) also appeared as champions of their innocence. After the Revolution Raynouard (*Monum. Hist.* etc., Paris 1813) followed up this tendency and urged the case for a complete acquittal. Havemann (*Gesch. des Ausganges d. T.*, Stuttgard 1846) writes to the same effect. German [3] and french scholars like Mignet, Guizot, Renan, Lavocat [4] joined the list of their champions. Michelet however withdrew from this favourable opinion in editing the *Procès;* Boutaric compromises: while rejecting the charge of heresy, he accepts (like Prutz) the charge of defiling the Cross and of giving a lewd parody of the 'kiss of peace'. Dollinger altogether rejected even this indictment and he was followed by the convinced apologists Wenck and Gmelin.[5] The english historian of the Holy Office, H. C. Lea (1885), believed the Templars innocent, and further research by Finke (1907) seems to corroborate the verdict of acquittal.

Many Countries Refused to Join in the Verdict.—It would appear that anything like a general *demoralization* of the Order is fairly disproved, nor can we doubt that most confessions were wrung out by torture and the answers to the question dictated by violence. In Spain, the Councils of Salamanca and Tarragona (*1312*) refused to believe in their guilt and acquitted them even

[1] In their own age by Dante, Villani and Antonino Archbishop of Padua.

[2] Direct connexion of course cannot be held—in spite of Jeremiah Cross's *Templars' Chart*, N. York 1845—but that the old Templars and the modern Freemasons are beholden to heretical and muslim analogies cannot be doubted.

[3] Cf. G. Schnürer *Die Urspringliche Templerregel*, 1903.

[4] Cf. *Procès des frères et de l'Ordre du Temple*, Paris 1888.

[5] *Schuld oder Unschuld*, 1893.

after they had resisted the royal forces as open rebels. In Portugal a commission reported that the charges were baseless. In Germany, Sicily, North Italy, Cyprus, their case was favourably considered: at Messina, Trier, Bologna and in the Romagna, no evidence against them was forthcoming; at Ravenna the bench decided strongly against using torture and the accused Templars, even those who had previously confessed guilt, were acquitted (June *1310*). In Florence the confession is suspected on account of its very detail and minuteness. In England only four out of eighty knights allowed that they had formally apostatized as novices. The gravest witness in our country comes from rivals or acknowledged foes of the Order—the friars of St. Francis or the Dominicans. It seems likely that to secure freedom with a mild penance it was only needful to confess to defiling the Cross: and it was the avowedly guilty who were favoured. The whole aim and policy of the State was to create irresistible public feeling against the Templars by what seemed overwhelming evidence.

Muslim Influence Undoubted: Popular Panic.—That the great bulk of the Order were pious Christians seems beyond all doubt. But there must have been some ground for the popular acquiescence in their harsh treatment, not wholly explained by the unscrupulous greed of the King's advisers, the greedy ministers of the Modern State. In the main this motive was fear of the unknown and concealed,—popular panic at the secret spread of esoteric doctrine and abnormal practice. The whole tendency of ranks and grades of initiation (with their respective *arcana*) is to dissolve any binding rules and beliefs, if utility demand and authority command. Autocracy or the un-moral dictate of public weal makes its appearance in the world with the half-bandit states of Islam. It is beyond question that the Templars had long and profitable dealings with the Assassins and they may have acquiesced in the moral *indifferentism* which marked the secret societies of the further east and (as we have shown) pervaded the muslim world.

Chief Cause of Overthrow: Urgent Needs of the Modern State.—It may have been accident that led their enemies to connect them with cathar and albigensian dualism; such members as had rejected positive Christian revelation were more likely to have been *unitarians* like their oriental models. That, like the Goliards or Troubadours, some knights held dogma lightly

and secretly sneered at the ascetic hypocrisy of pious catholics is more than probable. That some practised love of boys (now become an oriental vice) either as a rite or an appetite is not beyond credence; what age or race has been wholly exempt from the vice itself or from a very facile suspicion of its prevalence? The bond with esoteric gnosticism cannot be proved; but we may safely assert that while the great majority were guiltless of the charges, it is likely that in certain of the higher grades moral lapses and unbelief, both borrowed from long contact with the east, were tolerated, if not encouraged. Certain rites or forms, at first innocent, may have later assumed a sinister meaning. Still, it cannot be denied that as in the english Reformation the chief cause of their overthrow was the need and the avarice of the central power in the first modern State. That the people at large, still mindful of the catharist panic, accepted the scandal which their rulers sedulously spread, is probable from a survey of any period of religious persecution or of the pursuit of witchcraft.[1]

The remaining chapters of this book aim at tracing the evolution of modern State-Sovereignty and the collapse of the idealistic standards and moral convictions to which the Middle Age has always (at least in theory) clung. They will be little more than a commentary or a paraphrase of texts or statements already familiar in these pages.

[1] Dollinger's words about the great *Dies Nefastus* of human history Oct. 13, 1307, are familiar: that the whole case gave immense impetus to the use of torture and the verdicts on mere suspicion cannot be denied: it is largely to blame for the terrors of later penal codes and the frenzied terror which carried along protestant no less than catholic communities into the most hideous excesses.

SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS

PREFACE TO SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAYS

In the preceding pages I have attempted to trace the development of religious beliefs all over the known world within certain limits of time. It has been impossible to avoid the search for sources and origins in a very remote past, with which modern students have but recently made us familiar. The evolution has been throughout *mental* and in great measure independent of social and political changes. Only in Islam have we had occasion to connect closely the rise and needs of a novel ideal of the State with modifications in religious dogma or moral practice. In the west (see Division D) the progress of thought has been traced by itself; though it has not been possible altogether to separate this evolution from references to parallel movements in politics. But in these supplementary essays I have tried to bring into prominence the *material* elements which without doubt exerted a deep influence on the tendencies of thought and religion.

In doing so the purely abstract and academic character of the previous discussions seems to vanish, and we are able (so at least I imagine) to trace the profound effect of these various thought-forms upon our modern life and society. I have elsewhere endeavoured to abate the illfounded complacence of the modern mind as to its convictions, ideals and achievements. Since I began this work the great european war has given a support and ratification to my fears or prophecies. The history of orthodox Authority and the unceasing challenge of heresy rests upon certain fundamental differences in social ideals which will last as long as the world. The dangers of the unlimited and autocratic State of our own time are not confined—as some fondly believe—to teutonic countries. What has once occurred may occur again, and the lesson of the war must be for many years to come greater preparedness and efficiency, further powers for the centralized executive to be won only by the wholesale surrender of individual freedom. Against this all the vague aspirations after liberty—socialism, anarchy, communism, millenarian hopes—must in the future be arrayed. My studies have not certainly empowered me to deliver any encouraging message: I have been contented to trace the facts and the origins of social movements which have jeopardized or extinguished some of the dearest ideals of mankind.

A. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF CHRISTENDOM AFTER *600*: CHIEF IMPULSES TO DEVELOPMENT

SECTION I. UNDER THEODORIC AND CHARLES THE GREAT.

'Christendom' as Unitary Ideal: Universal Competence of the Monarchy (whether Papal or Imperial).—The period from Gregory I to Boniface VIII, forms a continuous whole in western development; it is dominated by a single spiritual ideal, 'Christendom'. It might be called the Epoch

of the Crusades. It begins with an avowal of its own weakness on the part of the secular and imperial power ; which had never shrunk so much in territory or pretension as under Phocas (*602–610* A.D.) or been so humble and apologetic in its claims as under Maurice his victim. The only coherent and unifying power lay in the western papacy ; it is this which initiates any other movements of consolidation. Charles' empire was religious and spiritual, but left a legacy of problems, on the exact relation of the secular arm and the pope, which ended in the overthrow of both. The dominant ideal was that of a unity, symbolized and guaranteed by the two powers, acting harmoniously but in different spheres. Gregory did not wish to become emperor, nor did Hildebrand. Neither Charles nor Otto nor even Frederic II wished to dethrone the papacy, but only to replace a bad by a good pope. The notion of a Christian commonwealth or republic on roman imperial lines prevailed throughout the entire period. A passionate craving for unity (if only in theory) was the chief note sounded amid all the restless and opportunist egoism of medieval practice. A concrete all-embracing unity confronted the militant and ambitious religion of Islam : it could not have survived the outcome of the Crusades, nor the dominance of modern individualism in an atmosphere where purely unselfish and objective ideals cannot survive. But it came to ruin chiefly by the internal struggles between its two rival ' consuls '. In the height of its vigour and success the Monarchy (whether papal or imperial) claimed to find a place and employment for each class and every unit ; it left no department of life or thought outside its competence and control.[1] It had long surrendered belief in a limited church of the Perfect, the Montanist ideal ; and recognized that ' the tares must grow together until the har-' vest ', that the church's net contained fish both bad and good. This absorbing passion for universalism sometimes gives its policy an air of fatal compromise : it was an offer to pare and whittle away the realistic universals to make them fit actual life and its uneven and anomalous particulars. The dominant philosophy in this period soars into cloudland, abhorring unique detail and the rough edges of individual things, wherein the modern eye finds its chief interest. The theology of the Schoolmen is inhuman, where it is not coldly rationalist ; and while we do not doubt that many of them were good pastors, advisers and consolers of their flock, there is very little trace of such sympathy in their treatises. Unless all particulars are purged away from the perfect and flawless type, nothing (it was thought) had been achieved : hence mysticism is the end and aim, however rarely attained : hence, in spite of the rich interest in art and the beauties as well as the duties of life, the real home is the Heavenly Jerusalem, *urbs beata sion illa*,—a corruption easily passing into a pure buddhic negative, in spite of the earthly colours and concrete features added by popular thought.[2]

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[1] This does not of course imply the deliberate extinction of local autonomies or personal franchise ; nor the perpetual coercive interference of the modern absolute State.

[2] See Royce's *World & Individual*, 172, 3 (New York 1900).

Economic Environment : The Two Periods of Defence and Aggression.—It will not be out of place if, as we have to follow the course of spiritual and transcendental thought, we ask first in what economic surroundings will it be seen to arise ? Without wholly accepting a purely economic basis for the social and even mental development of man, it is idle to deny that material environment is a factor of the highest importance.[1] We can detect the *material* basis of the early monarchies and the source of early creeds in natural facts and fears : all the great early kingships (Egypt, China, Chaldea) depend on control of the water-supply. The break-up of the roman empire left the old economic life of the west suspended. The papacy alone had a true personality and a world-consciousness in these times ; it entertained an *à priori* policy. But still it depended largely upon the principles of a new economy struggling to emerge. It will be well to examine its chief features.[2] This long period can (like others) be variously divided into artificial sections ; but for our purpose we may count from *600–1050* as the *defensive* Age of Christendom just as *1050* to *1300* is *aggressive* and reconstructive. In the first we have tentative endeavours to form an organized polity by men exposed to serious danger from without : it is only in the middle of cent. xi that barbarous inundations cease and allow Europe to assume very nearly her modern outlines. The mongol panic nearly two hundred years later was but a faint echo of the days of muslim, norsemen, danes and huns. Even under Charles the Mediterranean might be called a ' mohammedan lake ' ; a hundred years later the normans received their first good title to estate as vassals and subjects (*910* or *911*) ; the slavonic monarchies were only converted towards the year *1000* ; the hungarian raiders settled down at that time and gave up their nomadic habits and savage religion ; and only with the conquest of England and southern Italy did the epoch of the ' Folk-wandering ' come to a final term.[3]

A New Departure in *1050* : Leading up to Climax of Cent. xiii.—The second division opens with Clugny, Hildebrand and the Crusades ; when Christendom, forced by the popes into a unity of purpose and policy, assumed the aggressive towards the infidel world. Meantime, economic

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[1] See Seligman's *Econ. Interpr. of Hist.* (New York 1902) for a very able plea.

[2] I am in the following pages much beholden to Archdeacon Cunningham's *Western Civilization*, vol. ii ; I express here my grateful thanks.

[3] About 1050, Europe settled, with the two great victories of normans in England and Italy, into its present outlines (the only notable change in later times occurring in 1453, when Asia, entering at Byzantium, was expelled in Russia) : from 600 there had been a slow and painful process of development, interrupted by constant inroads of muslim, danes, norsemen and magyars. The following division is, like the New Empire in ancient Egypt (*c.* 1580–1200 B.C.) a violent anti-semitic reaction which carried the wars of revenge into the heart of the enemy's country. The Middle Ages end only when this crusading and militant spirit is altogether extinct, and is used by hypocrites as a cloak for personal greed.

conditions are seen to expand and the commoners win freedom, while the central power is weakened by the struggle of its two representatives. With cent. xiii comes a flood of new ideas, new learning, new and secular ways of looking at the world and human life. These the old idealism, now much weakened in conviction and intensity, confronts in vain.[1] The rationalistic pantheism of Islam and the individualism of the selfish classical citizen begin to undermine the faith and convictions on which Christianity reposed. Henceforth, and chiefly after the revolt of the north from Rome, Europe is the cockpit of conflicting interests, sometimes genuinely *political* and *racial* but in the main purely *economic.*[2]

Great Services of Episcopate in Preserving Roman Culture.—In the first or *defensive* epoch, the bonds which knit men's lives together were largely derived from the fragmentary principles of classical society, from the 'ruins of the roman empire'. The tradition lingered on of a unifying and beneficent power which God had ratified; and from time to time gave impulse to reform or innovations which only proposed to restore the ancient system. In no province did the barbarians erase all tokens of roman occupation; even in Britain their scanty vestiges became models for future improvement; even in frankish Gaul of the north they were not obliterated. When order was once again secured there was ample material lying ready to hand; manual skill and mechanical art were but sleeping. In some measure then, institutions were restored which 'had decayed but 'were not extinct': and competent observers trace in the new revival a development 'closely following on the lines of the old'.

It is interesting to trace our debt to the *episcopate* in the years following the gradual ebbing of roman influence in the west. Justinian certainly recognized it in his *Pragmatic Sanction* for Italy on its reconquest. It was remembered how just after *450* Lupus of Troyes and Leo of Rome had appeased Attila, the scourge of God. In the same age we have the heroism of Anianus of Orleans and the firm and tactful policy of Apollinaris Sidonius of Clermont. It was mainly, perhaps only, in *episcopal* see-towns that continuous urban life kept alive, in an age which once again 'shifted the centre of gravity from the urban community to the rural district' (Guizot): Cologne, Trier, Metz, Mains, Spires, Worms, Strasburg are cases in point with an unbroken history both for town and church. As the pope was forced to be relieving-officer[3] for famine-stricken Rome, so bishops, protecting their flocks and sees from pillage, also helped to advance trading interests when occasion arose. They were indeed bound to regulate and

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[1] Cunningham (vol. ii 70) says well: 'This century was one of the 'great eras in the world's history, an age of remarkable artistic and poetic 'production, of unrivalled philosophic and legal acumen, of military 'expeditions and commercial enterprise . . . an age which left abundant 'proof of its material prosperity in the magnificent buildings which remain.'

[2] These words were written before the present war, which is the best argument for their truth (1916).

[3] See Dudden's excellent monograph on *Gregory the Great* (Longmans 1905)—an indispensable introduction to the study of the Middle Ages.

supervise industrial life in their diocese (*Cod. Just.* i 4, 26 § 2) even by the recognition of the absentee emperor. Patiens of Lyons feeds the starving Arvernians just before the close of the western dynasty (*474*); Synesius in Cyrene had already found his refined leisure of hunting and philosophy saddled with very similar duties. Bishops were set to watch and control the officers and deputies, whom the central government eyed with such strange suspicion and distrust; they were auditors of expenditure, supervised the sale of necessaries (*Dig.* i 4. 18 § 7) and controlled the excessive profits of middlemen and purveyors (*C. J.* i 4 i). It does not appear that any bishop actually filled the post of *defensor civitatis*, an office instituted by a merciful emperor as a counterpoise against his own fiscal agents.[1] But the prelate was expected, and indeed obliged, to take a share in every side of life; and wherever traces of the old administrative methods survive into later times, this survival seems due to their character and energy, to the continuous tradition and definite policy which were found in their persons alone.

Abortive Attempt of Theodoric the Arian: *Civilitas*.—Two secular rulers in this age entertained schemes no less definite than the church's aim: Theodoric and Charles the Frank. It was Theodoric's aim to preserve the mechanism and traditions of imperial Rome. So far as he could, he followed the ancient lines, in land-survey and assessment, in collecting the *census*, in the fiscal system. He kept up the postal and transit system, repaired walls, aqueducts and other public works. He made a serious (but futile) effort to give good and just government to two distinct and unreconciled races and creeds. He desired to maintain 'law and order', a notion embodied in the single word *civilitas*, so constantly recurring in the formal court dialect of Cassiodorus. Like Kublai Khan or the manchu emperors of the recent chinese dynasty, he did not wish to pose as a mere captain of mercenaries, leader of a cantonment of troops or an 'army 'of occupation'. He desired to appear as the emperor's deputy, as the impartial judge over Goth and Roman alike. The philosophic and stoic basis of Rome's jurisprudence is not forgotten: he appeals rather to this 'natural law' than to religion (*recta ratio* Cass. *Var.* ix 33). The main duty was rather to preserve peace than to maintain true religion—about which there was some dispute. He believed he could unite the gothic and roman races without losing or blurring their idiosyncrasy; he hoped, while keeping them distinct in character and occupation, to make them live as brethren.[2] Where a community could not pay its dues, taxes

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[1] The authority which the emperors entrusted to the bishops was sometimes turned against themselves; Ambrose defied Theodosius at Milan (390) and put him to open penance; Agapetus resisted Justinian (530); Gregory I sometimes reproves Maurice as a superior, sometimes advises him as an equal.

[2] His sense of equity is seen in a sincere respect for vested interests, even when hard to justify: the aqueducts had been tapped and the stream diverted to private mills; the evil practice was forbidden (*Var.* iii 31) but compensation was paid to pleaders of thirty years' prescription.

were remitted; as to Arles (*Var.* iii 39), Apulia (i 16) Venetia (xii 7), Liguria (xii 28). Rates were equitably revised from time to time (ix. 10). A more doubtful benefit to the subject-class was an attempt to fix maximum prices, as in Diocletian's Edict. The notion underlying this edict extended its scope and was reinforced by religious sentiment: an ideal Christian charity is supposed to govern the rules of trade, the conduct of business. The *curator* was to fix 'moderate rates of exchange' (vii 12) and not allow the seller to get the best of the bargain; a *defensor* was to fix prices according to 'the bad or good season' (vii 11). *Forestalling* and *regrading* in times of scarcity were expressly condemned (ix 5). In the eastern world there had been legislation under Zeno (*474–491*) against trade-monopolies which enhanced prices for the consumer and also against trade-unions among artizans (*Cod. Just.* iv 59. 2 § 1–3).

Failure due to Want of Homogeneity in Race and Creed.—The good designs of Theodoric were frustrated by his Arianism. Catholic bishops were drawn into a confederacy, by their common need of resisting barbarian kings of heretical belief in Africa, Italy, Spain, Burgundy, lastly in Lombardy. The turning-point in this epoch is the conversion of Clovis; on this all future development is seen to hinge. The papal power, forced into the arms of the Franks by the heresy of the kings and the iconoclasm of the armenian 'puritans' at Byzantium, based its authority on a spiritual appeal: they asked obedience in God's name not as the natural right of a ruler or as a matter of contract. 'Right reason' no longer appears as the ground, but God's will and the ruler's command as His lieutenant or vicegerent: only as a ruler speaks or holds office in the name of God, can he claim obedience from his subjects (this will be, in later time, Wiclif's novel and unwelcome doctrine). The church therefore is bound to ally herself in the end with an orthodox sovereign; any other policy was but a provisional compromise. This alliance is pregnant with the future; and until *1200* the history of Europe is only the attempt to formulate the terms of the compact.

The Frankish Merwings and Survivals of Tradition.—The merwing Franks (the most inferior royalty among all the barbarian States) tried to follow imperial methods; not with the generous convictions of Ataulf (Orosius vii 43) or with the farsighted policy of Theodoric, but merely from want of originality, as the line of least resistance. Over large districts, not only in favoured towns, there prevailed an 'unbroken economic life'. The Franks collected taxes by roman methods, valued estates for assessment according to the old cadasters, and levied the land-tax by the same means. (Cf. Dahn on *Merwing Finance* and Pardessus.) This interest of the State favoured private property, the title to which was duly registered: Gaul was still a country of deeds and archives and public notaries. Even the life of joint-stock mercantile societies was not interrupted: the postal service was maintained at least in the first century of the new dominion: the sailors and butchers of Paris claimed in later time a continuous and privileged history. Much then of the heritage of roman life survived.

Manual Activity and Industrious Example in Convents.—We have seen then how Christian teaching and authority formed a powerful support of

law and order during the transition. On these two moral influences are seen to depend all the conditions of material progress. The barbarians were, as a rule, glad to avail themselves of such guidance and even to submit to control. Still more strictly economic was early conventual life in the 'Christian industrial colonies, moulding society rather by ex-'ample than precept'. Manual labour was a bounden duty undertaken as a godly discipline, not for reward nor as a drudgery to weary the rebel flesh.[1] Cunningham says with great truth 'There was neither greed of 'gain, nor the reluctant service of the slave, but simply a duty to be done 'diligently unto the Lord.' The acknowledged guide in conduct and belief, St. Austin, had urged the need of bodily labour (*de. op. mon.* § 35); the rule of St. Benedict (*cap.* 48) made it an indispensable part of a monk's daily routine. When copying and illuminating were regarded as substitutes, the example lost much of its efficacy of appeal with the working classes—who in any age can only be made to understand one form of exertion. In the wilds created by curial misgovernment, fiscal rapacity and foreign inroads, the Benedictines set up houses on the models of the roman villa.

Their Economic and Commercial Value.—Like the great noble's estate in the pages of Apollinaris Sidonius (*c. 450* A.D.), the convent was self-sufficing. The abbot, taking the *seigneur's* place, organized not only the tasks of husbandry but the crafts of artizans, each being set to work at his own trade for the common benefit. Under the last effective Merwing Dagobert I St. Eligius, the goldsmith, established his house at Solignac in *631* for 500 brothers, including craftsmen of divers trades. Surplus produce was sold and thus convents became manufactories and commercial centres of exchange, brought constantly into economic touch with the outer world. The *negociator ecclesiæ* was to be one 'who could rarely or never be 'overreached at a bargain and would himself never overreach another; 'or speak falsely in order to buy more cheaply or sell more dearly' (Rule of Peter de Honestis iii 29). The 'immunities' which from this time forward were lavishly issued to abbeys by the Ministers of the Crown, allowed them to buy and convey goods free of toll. With the Carlings this monkish trading was further developed; Louis I grants to the convent of Tours freedom from toll throughout his wide dominions. The monks were therefore interested in the bridges and highways, in their repair and maintenance: they also taught laymen that it was a pious labour to restore and keep them in order: hence the story of St. Christopher and his pious work as a ferryman. A regular transport system on Loire and Seine was owed to the abbeys, who required their serfs to provide oxen and carts or else permitted them (even at this early date) to pay a commutation instead of *corvée*. This traffic was extended in the orderly days of Charles the Great, and no doubt provoked the envy and greed of the danish invaders against these too opulent religious houses.

[1] The Celtic tradition (in St. Columban) is as strict in enjoining manual labour, like the hermits' basket-work in Egypt; and when the benedictine rule fell into elegant refinement and slackness the cistercian and carthusian orders again reverted to the ideal of honest toil.

Charlemagne: *utilitas*.—Transient though it was, the empire of the Carlings left more enduring traces than the compromise of Theodoric. Charles the Great tried to reorganize society through the influence of a single civil but consecrated authority, and his reign may be deemed a turning-point in the history of western Europe, the beginning of the modern world. His *capitula* had direct and lasting influence on the polities in France and Germany; and most later kings (who were able to form a policy) took the first frankish emperor as a model. In his person centred the vague reverence held towards the pacific and idealized roman empire under which the Saviour was born; down to the age of Dante the true type of a well-ordered Christian State was the empire of Augustus as remodelled by Charles. His very practical aim is constantly set forth; where Theodoric aims at *civilitas*, Charles sets *utilitas* in the forefront. It was his deep regard for order and security which led him to subdue the Saxons and round off his south-eastern frontier by ending the Avar menace. He wished to develop, not merely to tax; like our King Edward VII he made his own royal estate a model of skilful business-management. City-life was little developed; the household was still the *economic* as well as the *military* unit: it was also the basis of justice and poor-relief. Its members were regarded, not as contracting parties for personal profit but as a natural social group: each member must take his share in mutual offices for the common good as a bounden duty.

The Royal Estates a Model: Economic Autonomy of the *Villa*.—The rules laid down for royal estates were meant to be copied on the 'benefices' allotted to abbot and noble, that everywhere resources might be improved and enlarged. The great household was the *economic* and social unit under Charles. Whether under lay-proprietor or abbot, it was competent to deal with nearly every relation of life, justice, relief of the indigent, military service, fiscal dues. The emperor-king and his court bound together these insulated and self-sufficing communities; and while he guided, or even dictated, the general rules of their policy, he had neither wish nor power to interfere in their daily routine or local autonomy. In that age the 'people'[1] did not exist: every advance towards sympathy or consolidation depended on some movement from above. Large households were always increasing by the willing submission and surrender of small freeholders, whose interest it was rather to become members of a better organized whole than remain in poverty-stricken isolation. The King's *judices* were expected to keep accounts and survey inventories. Within the estate money did not circulate: Charles rejected the bullionism of the Merwings who, like later Spain, ignorantly placed the welfare of the State in idle and hoarded treasure.[2] Charles' great household, as an ideal and practical unit, was introduced by the Normans into England; and at the present

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[1] In a sense the 'people' never does exist, the modern aggregations which have but slowly acquired a common feeling of nationality, being the creations of royal caprice or policy, of conquest or of accident.

[2] See Dahn (*lib. cit.*) & Levasseur i 151.

moment accounts for a social supremacy in the country or county which has long survived its *economic* inferiority.

His Development of Foreign Trade.—Trading intercourse he also tried to develop: he secured from the muslim concessions by which Marseilles and Narbonne became ports for levantine commerce: his well-known treaty with Caliph Harun ensured protection for merchants as well as pilgrims—if indeed the two classes could be clearly discriminated. He sought to make a canal to join Danube and Main, no doubt chiefly for use in war but also for peaceful ends. Mainz became the startingpoint of a trade-route to the east, to Bohemia and Moravia and even to the wilder tribes along the Baltic; at that time Erfurt, Magdeburg, and Jumna rose into notice as centres for northern produce, like furs and amber. Ports were created or improved for sea-trading and maritime intercourse; Nantes, Bordeaux (for Ireland and Spain), Rouen and Boulogne; this last was the chief port on the Channel and already possessed a lighthouse. A fleet was kept in southern waters against the Moors, and in northern against the Norsemen. The ancient towns of the Rhine valley Cologne, Coblenz, Mainz and Strasburg became very rich; at Mainz Charles built a bridge at great cost (Eginhard's *Life* § 17). He also protected the small trader from the exactions of petty feudal particularism. He collected his own customs at recognized points but he would allow no other competitors to thwart trade. He suppressed the tolls of the local magnate, to the Revolution a hindrance and a discomfort to all parties concerned: he punished those who stretched a rope across a river to stop free traffic (*Capitul.* A.D. *805, 6*). But the active trade with foreign countries was still in foreign hands. Syrians had a settlement in Paris (Gregory of Tours, x 26) and had been the chief mediaries between east and west. The Jews now replaced them: they had an old colony at Cologne and factories at Aix, Magdeburg, Paris, Orleans, Clermont and Narbonne. But even for trading in the Levant there were found Christians bold enough to adventure; and we know that monastic commerce was well established. Charles sought to reform the currency and adopt a uniform standard in weights and measures; but he had little success: yet his unit of currency passed with the Normans into England and has displaced the saxon method of reckoning down to the present hour.

Religious Complexion of his Social System: Gospel to Regulate Commerce.—To all this development of *material* resources Charles sought to give a religious complexion. The *civil* power he used to uphold and supplement *spiritual* authority. He legislates against markets and fairs on Sunday (*Capit.* A.D. *813*); observance of the Lord's Day and payment of tithe were required from Saxons as well as Franks. He met the old evils of sturdy beggary (since the Bagauda rising *c. 275–290*) by giving the deserving poor local maintenance (*Capit.* A.D. *806*.)[1] This relief was deemed a special duty of religious houses. Charles was anxious to bring these privileged convents under better discipline; his son, Louis I (*Capit.*

[1] At the same date we hear of the growth of πτωχοτροφεῖα under the Amorian Dynasty at Byzantium.

A.D. *817*) gives detailed instruction even for internal affairs, directing that on fast-days bodily work should be light, that books from the Library should be lent to the monks for private study. Church property had to be protected against malversation (*Capit.* A.D. *806*), against the building schemes of ambitious abbots (A.D. *811*), against the prevailing interest taken by the monk in worldly business [1] (A.D. *789–794*). Lastly even among secular folk a high standard of commercial morality was enjoined. An attempt is made to define legitimate gain and distinguish what is merely mean or usurious; some forms of bargaining are censured (A.D. *809*); special enactments are made in case of famine (A.D. *805*); and on some occasions a *maximum* price is fixed by law (A.D. *794* and *808*). Here is an effort to secure unity and adapt every relation and department of life to the precepts of the Gospel and the rule of the Church. Such a scheme could not be achieved by Theodoric with his two distinct nations and two hostile creeds; with his precarious right of tenure and his semi-dependence on a distant suzerain. But Charles, however short-lived his polity, set the model of the Holy Roman Empire for the western mind in all its familiar and unchanging features.

Section II. Rise of the Communes: New Monetary Basis for Social Exchange.

The Towns.—In the next two centuries the State is purely on the defensive, and rulers have no time for new schemes of reconstruction. But we may question if the northern 'tumults' were as fatal to economic progress as has been thought: large areas in north, and afterwards in south, Germany were filled with yeomen settlers, a migration which (according to Lamprecht) began as early as the days of Charles himself. In cent. xi and xii there are tokens of vigorous urban life in Flanders, Rhineland and in France itself: new towns were founded in teutonic lands between *1100* and *1300*, after the historic example of Henry the Fowler in the saxon north. The revival of town life in the epoch of the *communes* is now the salient feature—a transition from something like a patriarchate, national or religious, to a tie, still in a sense religious, but in the main contractual and utilitarian. 'In the *household*' says Cunningham (ii 56) 'there is only one proprietor, 'who has power to control the resources of the establishment; the *town* 'is a social group in which there are *several* proprietors, and therefore '*several* households.' We have here the old contrast between the lord and father, absolute within the family circle, but only one among his peers when he walks abroad or meets his equals (e.g. in the Senate) for common counsel. Thus a monastery was never a town proper, because there were no separate proprietors with exclusive private rights and independence (so far) within the group. Whence came the new urban populace? In a society of households with men tied to the soil either by ownership or personal service, there could be little freedom of movement; it is not easy at first sight to decide whence the urban areas could have been recruited. Through-

[1] Under William the Lion in Scotland (some centuries later) convents and religious houses were charged with being mere 'trading corporations'.

out France, old roman cities seemed, even in days of the greatest poverty, to have continued to exist as *towns* (in the economic sense). The Abbeys would attract and employ, besides the head negotiator, a large number of 'outside agents' and other settlers who had craved right of asylum; pilgrims and foreign traders might also be taken into account. We know that one duty of the carolingian *missi* was to report upon the arrival of *advenæ* (alien immigrants) within their district. Another very obvious cause of settlement within town-walls was the need of protection during the inroads of the Danes; the town of cent. x was, before anything else, a *byrh*, a *burg* (*Perg*amus), a fortress.

As Privileged and Autonomous Corporations.—By the end of our period the town is not merely an accidental congeries of men seeking safety in asylum, but has become a corporate body. The inmates enjoy common rights and duties, and the group (even if an exclusive oligarchy) has some semblance of unity. There was the common town-land, market-rights open to all qualified citizens, a common obligation (as in the byzantine system of ἀλληλέγγυον) to discharge the fiscal dues or *fee-farm rent*, common duties of watch and ward and maintenance of the city walls. Lastly, there was the common interest in the struggle for autonomy against feudal lordship. Patrons in cent. xii and xiii were fully alive to the need of constituting towns with their civil privileges: kings and nobles are seen to plant and encourage such trading centres by a deliberate policy.[1] Between *1200–1300* several towns arose in Saxony from the mining industry; the english kings founded others in their french possessions at favourable points of the intersection of trade-routes. New towns and larger suburbs were laid out by french kings and by Edward I on french soil; Montpazier and Carcassone may be taken as examples.

The New Aristocracy of Traders: The Gilds.—At first the aristocracy of the town was formed of all who had proprietary rights in the town-land; but this exclusive caste gave way before the interests of the more active traders, who, as the leading factor in prosperity, claimed almost exclusive power and privilege. Landless men and wealthy settlers are received into gilds which can be traced to very early times. The *gild-merchant* was formed to enable townsmen to engage in passive trade at home on the best terms; all men great or small could buy in a collective bargain from travelling salesmen, afterward sharing the goods in proportion to their *quota*. *Craft-gilds* appear as early as cent. xii in the Cordubans or cord-wainers of Rouen, the weavers of London and other 'companies'. They bear close resemblance to roman *collegia*, and may possibly be a continuous survival with unbroken tradition. Civic life received its greatest impulse in the time of the Crusades, and its revival has been called the 'last stone in the foundations of medieval Christendom': whereas in a study of

[1] Professor Pirenne of Ghent sees clearly that no one motive or fact will account for the birth of towns in this age: 'Les villes sont nées spontanément sous l'action des causes économiques qu'a suscitées en Europe la renaissance du commerce et de l'industrie'. *Rev. Hist.* lvii 68, 1895.

Phenice or of greco-roman culture it confronts us at the outset ready made. The tide of commercial prosperity (cent. xi and xii) flowed from south to north, from Italy, Septimania and Provence, then to the Rhine, Flanders and the north of France, lastly to England. As the towns became rich they could secure freedom: by fighting, or more often (like a roman slave) by purchase. In *1100–1200* the towns had outlived the tutelage of a patron: just as the Reform Bill of 1832 dislodged the technical and titular 'patron of the borough' who like the 'patron of the advowson' held a recognized, if somewhat anomalous, position. The freedom of Venice, Naples and Amalfi under Byzantium gave a model and set a standard: the imperial cities in Germany aimed at a like measure of autonomy. French townsmen formed themselves into sworn *communes* against the *seigneurs*; their success transferred power from a landed noble or a churchman to a moneyed 'aristocracy' within the city walls, branded by their opponents as 'usurers' (*Synod of Paris, 1213*). Here was repeated the old struggle of classical days between the landed *eupatrid* or patrician and the plebeian with money: a contest which still continues to the present moment. The demands of the townsmen however do not seem to be excessive: (1) their own courts and tribunals for cases of *law merchant*, (2) exemption from oppressive or arbitrary tolls.

Royal Patronage of the Communes.—While *seigneurs* and *clergy* opposed the communes, royalty were disposed to favour them, as it slowly mounted its steep and difficult path to absolute power. The subtle Capets gave support to the claims of boroughs standing on seigneurial land *outside* the king's own demesne. Some lords saw the advantage of strengthening their commercial centres: many had returned from the Holy Wars with depleted revenues and much altered views on trade. Each town that won its charter, its belfry, and its common seal, became an autonomous centre of municipal life; it raised its own funds for government and police, for the payment of the 'enfranchisement-fee' which ended its copyhold or villein-tenure. This was paid by taxes, sometimes levied on all houses and occupiers, sometimes on the mercantile gilds according to their wealth and standing. This democratic aristocracy who paid taxes and commuted fee-farm rent were very jealous of any intrusion or encroachments: the privileges of citizenship were never lavished to outsiders, and to the present moment a swiss canton will be found to retain traces of this genuinely republican exclusiveness. As citizens of a chartered town they had status, not only in their own country (or artificial State) but all over Europe. A creditor would get the mayor of his city to write to the chief officer of the town wherein his debtor resided. A merchant did not claim commercial status as of english or french birth but in virtue of citizenship in some privileged town. This status he derived from his municipal standing and it was recognized wherever merchants congregated. He carried his own *law merchant* about with him in his own person: this was valid nearly all over Christendom, which was thus, even for industrial and secular purposes, by no means an empty name: by it he rose above the petty local customs and dues, tolls and restrictions, by which later Europe fettered trade and hindered friendly intercourse. It was the *native* (or foreign) merchant

who, as possessing capital, found the money for the overlord's composition, led the *communes* in trade or conflict and acquired through money a dominating influence within the walls. The Papal Bankers and agents were also important and indeed ecumenical personages: in Florence cloth-importers, in London grocers, seemed to monopolize the chief civic dignities.

The Craft-Gilds and Freemasonry.—But besides these (private) organizations of moneyed men, were the *craft-gilds*. In the time of our Henry I there were weavers' gilds at Oxford, Marlborough and Beverley, of cord-wainers at Rouen, of drapers at Valenciennes, of tanners at Ghent. Paris in cent. xiii had a completely organized system of (probably very recent) gilds and industrial companies,[1] not less in number than one hundred. Although 'speculative' masonry in our own time has no practical craft, yet there are many points in which its rules resemble the old methods of the 'operative' craft: the three degrees of entered apprentice, fellow-craftsman or journeyman, master-mason (who was able to start business on his own account). Such a corporate society could enforce rules and bye-laws on its members; it did not allow outsiders to practise the calling (hence the archaic gift to-day of the *freedom* of the city); it had common funds levied from all members and made gratuitous loans to needy brethren and grants to the sick or distressed.

New Monetary Basis of Society: Scutage and Commutation.—The thirteenth century, which heard the loftiest claims urged in turn by pope and emperor and witnessed the downfall of both, was the age in which this prosperity rose to a zenith. It was not merely a time of rapid transition but of 'economic revolution'. Commercial intercourse between distant centres destroyed barter in kind and personal services, diffusing money instead and bringing in the notion of separate legal covenants in place of permanent obligations of soil and person. All governments became keenly alive to the financial convenience of money payments (scutage). The new demands of fiscal agents forced owners of land to get a *solid*, and not as heretofore a *sentimental*, value from their land. They became indeed 'usurers', the contumelious name by which the synod of Paris in *1213* branded the revolting *communes*. There grew up besides a bitter feeling against Jews as commanding a monopoly of this precious vehicle of exchange—a feeling which survives to-day in such communities of eastern Europe as are still at a similar level of culture. Without this easy means of exchange and a class of men suited by nature to control it, society must have stagnated or crystallized in a 'Stationary State', in isolated and self-sufficing *household* groups. The same cause lies behind *constitutional* as behind *economic* development. When public burdens were assessed and collected in terms of money, the subject-class began to aim at controlling the power of the purse. In England *personal service* and *payment in kind* (surviving latest in church-tithes)[2] gave way, by the reign of Edward I, to a *money-revenue*.

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[1] Cf. Etienne Boileau's *Book of Crafts*.

[2] Let it be remembered, however, how very large a proportion dwelt

Taxation and Representation.—Effective central government became at last feasible, and the control of taxation was an object of desire for all. The subject had not claimed to supervise customs on imports, which did not seem to touch him very closely, nor had he complained of traditional dues, fixed like manorial quit-rents on the principle *ne varietur*, nor again had he greatly cared how the sums were spent. But now the appetite of the central power had grown with feeding; the dues demanded by it were constantly shifting according (as it seemed) to a purely arbitrary caprice: hence those who felt and suffered by these changes were fully justified in demanding some control. How totally diverse this conception of control of finance through Parliament is from our present anomalous system of government by the untaxed multitude need not here be further remarked.

The Papacy as Tax-Gatherer, Forerunner of the Modern State.—It cannot be denied that in the making of the modern State (chiefly marked by this successive increase of taxation) the Papacy bore a large share. The needs of the papal court and the wide area whence its dues were drawn hastened the change to cash-payments. Pontifical bankers or agents were ubiquitous and transmitted dues which could never have been paid in kind. England was a principal sufferer, having been heavily burdened, since the conquest, with papal dues. But it was not in the present period that these demands reached a climax and provoked rebellion: it was during the age of the *secularized* papacy (cent. xiv and xv) that the worst exactions were seen. The popes then set the example of a pure money-revenue: it was imitated by kings. In cent. xii we have the *Scaccary Dialogue* of Bishop Richard: whence we can trace the analogy between regal and papal sources of income:—there is domain land, taxation and profits of jurisdiction in both. Details show that even in the early part of the century some part of the King's revenue had been gathered in kind (*D. de Scc.* i 7), and the fiscal system described in the treatise was clearly of recent origin. Even under Edward I the supplies voted by Parliament were transmitted in wool to Flanders and there sold.

Fiscal Finance in England.—Even after our period it would seem that English fiscal finance was not yet settled on a monetary basis. For this transition the aid of capital and capitalists was indispensable: the Monarchy henceforth dispenses with the support of its former friends and peers, the feudal nobility, and leans more and more completely on the help of the banker and the Jew. William I had desired to *monetize* his revenues and had brought over some Hebrews as necessary allies. The subject's wealth

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in the country: in cent. xiii *natural* economy was still dominant in rural districts, indeed for long after: in Scotland in cent. xviii a great part of farm rent was paid in kind. Serfs worked on their own and their masters' plots and were paid by rations (not money) and by the value of their own copy-holdings. Or (as in the *métayer* system) produce might be divided between master or landlord and actual cultivators. Proprietors dispensed with money-relations and organized their property on a self-sufficing basis. We can imagine how they resented the sudden and disconcerting demands for money on the part of fiscal agents of the Monarchy.

in land and goods was not directly accessible to the Crown ; the Jews could advance on security of taxes paid in kind ; or might lend to an impecunious taxpayer who pledged his acres. Neither in industry nor commerce did they materially assist the development of english resources, but without doubt they helped on these fiscal changes. Matters had indeed changed when Edward I found himself able to dispense with their services and banish them from the country. After the beginning of cent. xiii they were less important and conspicuous, and italian bankers (trained perhaps in the papal employment) broke down their monopoly.

The City Takes Place of Villa (or Manor) **as Social Unit.**—The city with its network of foreign and distant relations has thus in this age become the economic unit in place of the *household* ; and the future lies with the city and its mobile capital. Still the household is not yet obsolete. Land, as more than 1000 years before in the *villa*, was owned in blocks and tilled by dependents who gave personal service or paid their dues in kind. The household was a *productive* but it was also an *educational* centre. Each estate was meant to be self-sufficing and, since the Conqueror had adroitly separated the various holdings of his favourites, the noble, like an itinerant Merwing king, was often on progress, travelling to and fro between his several properties. The *service* dues from the copyholders were carefully set down, and this was the rule in cent. xiii : though even here, as in the military scutage, it was sometimes convenient both for lord and tenant to commute for a sum. By degrees every duty rendered was assessed in terms of *money*, a return, not for the value of his holding, but for the worth of his service ; hence the trivial amount to-day of *quit-rents* in considerable holdings of copy-land. In the next period in England, after the Black Death had disorganized the bond of labour and capital, of lord and vassal, money payment became everywhere the rule : and the competitive system and spirit, hitherto excluded both by sentiment and religious teaching, entered into the life of master and servant alike. The servant demanded that his wages should not be settled by old assessment rates but by *competition* ; while the former let out his estates, not for a nominal sum or an annual compliment, but frankly to the highest bidder ; hence in cent. xv and xvi the complaint that the small yeoman was ousted in favour of the sheep-farmer who could offer more rent. So great was the moral prejudice against this purely mercantile method of settling tenants that only in cent. xvii did it wholly lose its discredit—and then only when the new protestant nobility and gentry, enriched by abbey-lands, overpowered the regal prerogative and began the epoch of the Whig Oligarchy.

Section III. Influence of the Church : Commercial Morality and Slavery : Foreign Stimuli

Church Leads, and Attempts to Guide, New Social Changes.—This *economic* transition (of which some chief features have been surveyed) was conducted in a homogeneous Christendom and under priestly rule. As in India, only the common aims and institutions of a class analogous to brahmans gave even a semblance of unity to the congeries of races, to the

puzzling medley of independent, yet overlapping, States. Since Charles there was (in theory at least) a single social organism; but it was not in cent. xi a *military* empire but an *ecclesiastical* society. There was a common religious life and belief which placed spiritual weapons in the hands of the meanest clerk. There was a universal system of Canon Law dealing with many matters now accounted far remote from the sacred province—with trading morality, with marriage, and with testaments. There was the common duty of paying dues to Rome, a practice which created a vast fiscal system and, while its abuses caused the (largely) economic crisis of the Reformation, served as a model to kings and capitalists. A clerical framework then, *religious*, *legal*, and *financial* held society together, and the later voice of protest questioned the rights of the church in each department of tutelage or exploitation. But in its best days the church brought about (as nothing else could) the revival of society. Religion was not, as Montanism desired it to be, ' the mere sentiment of pious individuals, ' but a living force permeating all the remnants of civilization ' (Cunningham ii 69). Hence the attempt to *moralize* trade, to ' proclaim unfalteringly ' according to the program of modern visionaries, ' that moral laws are superior to physical facts.' In cent. xiii economic problems were debated by metaphysicians who brought into a fluctuating region of exchange the notion of a fixed and ideal standard: they asked what was the *just price* of each thing. It need not be pointed out that the quest is futile: the laws of *supply and demand* form refutation enough. Value does not *inhere* in an object; is not *intrinsic* (like the *essence* in Realism). It rises from the wants, needs and preferences of men; it is *subjective*, relative and is constantly varying. There can be no just or ideal value which every article ought to possess: into such a matter ' *ought* ' cannot enter.

Moral Effort to Restrain Usury and Profits of Trade.—The medieval mind looked with suspicion and dislike upon the merchant who made good bargains, who acquired wealth by exchange of commodities: writers openly censured a man who bought articles to sell elsewhere at a profit, just as to-day a certain distrust is felt at transactions in shares. A *reasonable* price, they thought, should be fixed by calculating the cost of production; no exceptional value should be admitted, e.g. that arising from failure of crop or output elsewhere. In towns definite limits were fixed to prices; a *maximum* was common, a *minimum* much less frequent (but is sometimes found in the case of english wool destined for the continent). Here too as in the whole personal service and dues of a Manor, the aim was *ne varietur*—that is, to systematize a regular and unvarying payment with which competition or ' higher offers ' could not interfere.

Power or Property a Trust: Clerical Teaching.—When we regard these traces of a Christian influence (however mistakenly applied to the world of hard facts) we cannot doubt that social progress was largely controlled by impartial moralists, by a clerical caste. The dream of Charles seemed almost a sober truth; a well-organized empire guided by a spiritual power and permeated by religious and moral sentiments. The great roman heritage had been recast by Charles, on the *political* and *municipal* side

and on the *economic* side as well. Its commercial and industrial life was settled according to a Christian standpoint in town and in country. Dominant throughout the realm were certain moral conceptions, wholly unfamiliar to the ancient world, whether in its zenith or decline. Institutions in the Middle Ages were formed under the impulse and stimulus of moral notions and religious principles which their forerunners would have expressly denied. All power and office was now held to be a sacred trust; all rulers were responsible to God for its exercise over the subjects entrusted to their keeping; the rich man must render a strict account of the use of his wealth, (and these uses were dictated by piety and sentiment, not always on the wisest lines). The medieval owner at his best felt (as Wiclif afterwards taught explicitly) that he was merely a trustee and a steward. If personal and private possession is not to become a social menace, it is clear that some such conviction must be upheld.

Labour Ennobled and Consecrated.—On the other hand, the necessary drudgery of the greater part of mankind was transfigured by the gospel-message; but there was no hurried 'abolitionism' for the basis of *slavery*. Greek life, aiming at the leisure and philosophy of a few, rested on a despicable basis of forced labour, which however in practice lost many of its worst features. But the Church taught the equality of men, but the difference of function: it held fast to the dignity of labour. Work became not a means to an end, but a discipline of character and a duty to be done, not to society but to God. Besides, the Church tried as we have seen to *moralize* industry and trade. If Greece improved on the phenician ideal of mere plenty and gross comfort, the Gospel remoulded the *economic* life from the standpoint of personal responsibilities. For Catholicism is founded upon individualism, upon a firm belief in the worth of the unit—without which conviction no group or community (as a realistic abstraction) can have any value. Realistic socialism or the Catholic Church in its social aspect, or any doctrine which appeals to us in the name of an abstraction, has to depend on this value, which only resides in the *whole* because each several *part* contributes its share. The basis of the medieval polity (even of papal aggrandisement in its most meddlesome and tyrannic forms) was a sense of the soul's immortal worth and destiny, coupled with a strong belief in democratic equality.

Respect for the Unit (typical of the Medieval Mind).—The papacy was the champion of liberty because it claimed to control rulers in virtue of its divine commission. It did not fetter individual freedom or make man work (in the fashion of industrialism or militarism) for an end that is not his: it carefully fostered independence, and even idiosyncrasy, and only used discipline and tutelage as means to an end. Hence the cleavage in the attitude to the *slave* and the *labourer*, on whom earlier economic society had depended. The result of the Crusades was to give a new impetus to slavery—such a recrudescence indeed, that the horrors of the ancient world were equalled and probably surpassed by the african slave-trade. In the following period the student can point out how the revival of classical studies led to an apotheosis of *tyranny*, not (as many people to-day idly suppose) to a vindication of *freedom*. The irresponsible State was on the

one hand unfettered by transcendental (or even moral) ideas; on the other, the subjects were but a flock of disintegrated atoms, ranging from the frankly servile class to the automaton working for wages. The failure of the humanitarian sentiment in the french enlightenment, the restoration of the absolute State and the servile proletariat, show how irresistible was the stream making against liberty.

Status of Labourer Raised: Captives and Slaves.—*Power as a trust not a patrimony* was a medieval commonplace:[1] its correlative doctrine was the *worth of the individual*. Economic causes and Christian sentiment had combined to raise the labourer's status. From St. Paul's day the Church had not declaimed against slavery or sought to interfere with it: it never asserted that man had an inherent right to be free.[2] But it followed up the roman juristic attempt to modify the servile lot: and, with a very different motive from the stoic impulse, urged the common brotherhood of men. The slave was protected from cruel treatment and the State stepped into the once reserved circle of home-life, under the absolute patriarch. Christian legislators or codifiers followed good pagan examples (*Cod. Theod.* ix 55. i § 5: *Cod. Just.* vii 15 § i). Freedom was an ideal which must be kept in view. With her shrewd theory of *supererogation* the Church made a special virtue, not a universal obligation, of enfranchisement: it was not wrong to keep slaves, to set them free was commendable. For captives of muslim masters beyond the seas there was the deepest pity. Christians who for profit sold their brothers in the faith to pagan masters, roused bitter indignation and loathing. The order of the Redemptionists (and of the Holy Trinity and St. Victor) was founded to aid in the release of such captives. In cent. xiii the followers of Dominic and Francis took an active part in this good work of ransom; Innocent III even recommended the pious duty to the sultan Almanzur, with whom he was then on friendly terms. The attitude to the slavery of pagans brought to serve in Christian lands was of course wholly different.[3] It

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[1] Oresme, bishop of Lisieux, in his treatise *de mutatione monetarum* is angry with John of France for his debasement of the coinage: the money of the realm belonged to the community at large; the king had no right to treat it as his own, to alter its form and value at his sole will and pleasure. If he did so for gain he was worse than a usurer; he was not *bargaining* but extorting from men who had never made a bargain at all. This is but one instance of such language; but it has special weight and meaning as coming from a class and a country only too anxious to remove the fetters from arbitrary power.

[2] Cf. the high praise bestowed on medieval society by Hilaire Belloc, *Servile State* § iii, 41–54.

[3] Columbus sent home 500 prisoners from the Caribs (1494) to be sold as slaves at Seville: Isabella, after a royal order had sanctioned this, felt uneasy and had a letter written to Bishop Fonseca to suspend the edict and to inquire into the causes for which they had been captured and the legality of the sale. The divines disagreed and Isabella sent the slaves back to their homes.

might even be held a pious work or act of mercy to bring the heathen within the reach of instruction.[1]

Improvement in Condition of Lowest Class: Deterioration later.—But in Europe throughout this period actual slavery decreased and the labourer's status improved. In roman times estates were worked by serfs, tied to their holdings quite as much on their own as on their masters' account; and these holdings were allotted to them much as plots were given to slaves by the primitive Germans, who had no use for an elaborate system of domestic service. The medieval villein enjoyed a recognized legal status, and he acquired in time both right of proprietorship and fixed tenure. When *money* took the place of *kind* for payment of dues and in commuting personal service or corvée he was the gainer; the *ascriptus glebæ* sold with the estate becomes the copyhold tenant safe from disturbance, so long as he pays his annual penny or half-penny and his fine or 'fee' on 'institution to his benefice'. His time was now his own; he enjoyed economic and personal freedom. There was little demand for hired labour; and no occasion to import it into Europe. A large peasant-body cultivated small holdings (in which was arising a system of double ownership). In the reclaiming of new ground or intensive tilling of present areas there was little inducement for capital to show enterprise. There was therefore a very large free settled population, not a band of shifting hirelings and wage-earners (as we have to-day). There was no room for slaves from Africa; it was the quite different character of plantations in the New World that introduced them there. Here Christian sentiment failed to make its protest and the example reacted upon the Old World: there, after a brief triumph of the worker after the Black Death, the position of the rural labouring class grew steadily worse until days well within present memory.[2]

Peculiar Position of Villein: How far the King's Subject?—We may here briefly notice the position of the mediating class of *villeins* because of the light it throws on the policy of the centralizing kingship. The villein 'is assumed to be free by birth but holds (servile) land of which he cannot freely dispose' (Vinogradoff). In saxon times in England the estate of the lord and the property of the peasant are clearly marked off; but in the advance of Feudalism after Domesday, we see the kingship (as

[1] Columbus actually advocated it on this ground. The Spaniards in general disliked the trade but regarded it as a necessary evil; that nation has always had a loftier and more genuine sense of human dignity than the italian.

[2] 'In cent. xiv' says Cunningham ii 166 'the labourer had won such 'freedom that he was able to bargain for higher wages and to insist on 'getting them.' But this was in the infant days of capitalism, which soon put an end to this vaunted independence except in the case of the really skilled craftsman, who can choose his trade at first and move from place to place to sell it at the best price. At first no doubt 'labour tended 'to follow capital because it was attracted, not because it was forced' (*ibid.*) How long did this enviable state of affairs last?

later in France) surrendering its power as between peasants and lords, while increasing it in other relations. The king's assize protected the free tenants (*liberi tenentes*) but did not protect villeins,[1] and the royal courts refused to entertain their suits against the lord. Henry of Bratton believes that intolerable cruelty may be cognized, but it is evidently proper for the Crown to take action only in extreme cases. Meantime on the rediscovery of roman law its teaching on slavery was applied to the villein. The relation to the lord was now regarded as *personal*, instead of *predial*; one born of villein stock belonged to his master and was bound to undertake whatever work was imposed. His independent rights as owner of individual property were denied as against the lord: *quicquid servo acquiritur dominis acquiritur*. On the other hand villeins were still citizens; paying taxes, serving on inquests and in the militia (in times of crisis): except against their master they were free persons and could sue and be sued. Only tenants in 'ancient (royal) demesne' occupied a more favourable position; they could even appear as plaintiffs against the lord in his own manorial court. This clearly shows that the king in granting out 'ancient demesne' did not wish his former tenant to suffer by change of ownership, but that in saxon times the status of the villein was much better than in later times. Elsewhere, as *personal* dependents on the lord (so the law was now interpreted) native villeins could be sold; so Glastonbury Abbey sells Philip Harding for 20 shillings. It was in the next period (after *1300* A.D.) that a social system based on natural economy and feudal disruption is seen to give way. Instead of the tradition and custom of champion farming and the fetters of communistic procedure, private enterprise sought new outlets and found fresh avenues of freedom and adventure. The age of *cash-nexus* and commercial contract was at hand. The kingship repented of surrendering so large a proportion of its subjects to the tender mercies of a local magnate and resumed its staterights over all and sundry: judges went on circuit, the exchequer claimed its dues without respect of persons or their technical status, the police interfered and manorial franchises gave way as effective wheels in the social machine. *Economic* and *political* causes worked together and each side reacted on the other. Government grew strong and kingship absolute, only because society was richer, more enterprising and more coherent as a whole. Social

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[1] Not till cent. xv in the legal crisis did the Courts abolish that *denial* of protection to villeins which formed the basis of villeinage. Hence the recognition of copyhold tenure. The interference of chancellors in cent. xv, cognizing the relations of peasants and lords, prepared the way for a great change; 'under copyhold tenure' held at the will of the lord and by the 'custom of the manor'—the first part is titular and the second all-important. This formal enfranchisement of persons and holdings is of course not denied in the above remarks on the increase of practical servitude in later times: but the result seems to be that a merely formal independence has been purchased by a real tightening of bonds and by a loss of personal interest in the land.

intercourse and trading venture increased because government was more competent and better able to protect them.

Foreign Pressure an Impulse to Development: the Norsemen.—The chief factors which introduced life and stir into the romano-germanic society were the muslim and the norse Vikings, and (in a less degree) the creation of slavonic and magyar kingdoms on the eastern frontier. Charles foresaw the danish menace to his political structure (*Mon. Sangall.* ii 14). Yet this dangerous element, when once absorbed, was the chief instrument for spreading his culture. Apart from the Norman it is difficult to see whence seafaring enterprise could have arisen. He was not a mere wanton raider; but an unscrupulous merchant who pillaged to resell. Already the Baltic (cent. ix, x, xi) was a scene of busy trading activities, long before the Hanse League. He could adapt himself not merely to shipboard life and vagrant trading but to colonizing and husbandry; he had more aptitude for urban life than his cousin the Teuton. Dublin, Cork, Waterford, owe their origin to a *norse* settlement; and the five towns of the Danelagh are cases in point. The Vikings traded (along the Elbe and Oder) with Byzantium and the Euxine, and their pathway and trade-routes are strewn with muslim coins. They reached Archangel and Iceland, Greenland and perhaps America. They changed their savage creed with surprising readiness and ceased to be a menace to Christian faith and society: instead they became their bulwark and assiduous promoters. The vigorous life of the Norsemen settled in the south and west, but lost its spirit in its ancient home where commerce passed into german hands, who in turn yielded to England and Russia in the control of the Baltic.

Their Aptitude for War, Commerce, Law.—'No people were ever more 'eager to borrow from other nations, to take into their service and friend-'ship men of skill and learning from any quarter' (Freeman). They did not invent, but they adopted and improved. When the new tongue, the new creed, the new social rule had taken root among them they were better fitted than the creditors, from whom they had borrowed, to act as pioneers; 'armed missionaries . . . with all the zeal of recent converts they set 'forth upon their new errand . . . in the spirit of their heathen fore-'fathers.' The Crusades (as a military enterprise) may be said to start in the sicilian *razzias* of Tancred and his house. Fond of war, they were also fond of law. 'If the Norman was a born soldier he was also a born lawyer' (Freeman). William's claim to the english crown was a triumph of technical art and special pleading: 'in the worst days of anarchy . . . the robber-baron could commonly give elaborate reasons for every act of wrong.' A 'strict observer of forms in all matters', the Norman was careful of religious formality, supported the papacy, and aided the reforming party of Clugny.

The Saracens.—Such was the new element from the north which stirred up a civilization, recent indeed but already decadent, and gave it (first through fear, and then by policy) a new cohesiveness and a common aim. The Saracens who formed the complement to the Vikings in the south had something of their nature; neither in Bagdad nor in Cordova did they originate; their science and art, even their architecture and (as we know)

their philosophy, are a loan. But they handed on and preserved, developed and improved. They brought together men of all creeds and aptitudes, and they learned by comparing them. These two factors, norse and muslim, pressed upon teutonic Europe with its disintegrating social fabric and (in quite different ways) each gave it an impulse towards unity. It would be impossible to over-estimate the effect of the norman conquest of England or of Sicily ; or of the religious fervour which on the outskirts of Europe seemed ever on the watch for its Christian prey. Against the Normans a weak society on the *defensive* felt bound to unite ; the Crusades were an act of *aggression*. The Normans were led by robber-captains ; Islam was represented by an efficient and highly organized State. In the north by the conversion of the Baltic Lands the Gospel expanded (as with the conversion of the Magyars) ; the muslim did not succumb to Christian influence even where he still remained in the country he had lost.

High Level of Arab Culture.—Arab culture in this age was on a much higher level than in Christendom. A refined and artificial court collected men of real attainment and became a centre of enlightenment : in no art did the caliph need Christian instructors. In another section we have traced arabian influence on thought and feeling in the south of Europe : here we may mention the names of Averroes and Frederic II, and the whole anti-clerical movement of Provence. The Saracens fused several elements which had but little in common ; they blended hellenistic philosophy with a simple and devout Theism and accepted light and guidance from every quarter. Yet, unlike the Normans, this assimilative, tolerant and centralizing power was itself without vitality. A purely theistic creed does not consecrate life ; it either brings its routine into contempt or tries by mysticism to lift it wholly into the divine. Government as a theocracy was therefore unlimited and absolute even beyond the prerogative of a roman *princeps*. The concept of democratic immortality was of a sensuous type and held no real lesson for the present work-a-day world ; in the fatalism bred of God's omnipotence there was little room for the play of individual enterprise, or for the value of human work and personality. The Christian faith alone (it would seem) could ennoble common things, could bring noble motives and principles to bear on earthly concerns, could thereby remodel the life of citizens, commerce and country.

Analogy of the Punic Wars : Economic Issues Prominent.—In this new shock of semite and aryan, another chapter in the duel of east and west was opened and closed. It had many analogies with the struggle of Rome and Carthage : the conflict was, in both cases, largely coloured by *economic* issues. In many ways the Christian and muslim trader could work together : both agreed (an agreement notoriously broken by the Barbary Corsairs) that piracy on the high seas must be suppressed. The muslim gave sites for factories and allowed the merchants to fortify these strongholds. The rulers of Morocco were treating with France and the great italian republics at the most intense moments of the Crusades. The (norse) spirit of adventure awoke in the north ; religion, war, and trading instincts united. The effect on commerce and on thought was incalculable. First Genoa and then Venice (to its eternal shame) threw themselves

heartily into the struggle. The impulse given to trading centres like Pisa and Florence was imparted more or less rapidly to other cities : Augsburg and Nuremberg came to the fore ; Flanders prepares for her long and brilliant commercial history. It is in cent. xiv (just after our period closes) that we can see the full effect of the Crusades in the universal and organized intercourse between all parts of western Christendom and the countries of the east. But this cosmopolitan unity and harmony is on the surface only ; the old ideal of a kingdom of God upon earth has disappeared for ever. There is no more a single ruler or a common aim ; nationalism, particularism and egoism emerge into overt hostilities.

B. SOCIAL UNITS

(i) The Village

The Communal or Kindred Village : Land a Trust, not Personal Property.—Since this age witnesses the transition from *village* to *city*, from feudal *manor* as social unit to *commune* and *gild*, it will be well to consider further some of their several features. A typical teutonic instance of the *village* is given in the Ditmarschen portion of South Jutland where the autonomy of a peasant republic lasted till the Reformation (cent. xvi). It was then organized, as it had been in cent. x, as a group of kindred folk, of blood-relatives and cousins (real or artificial) who joined them ; each kindred is based on agnatic ties. *Households* are grouped into *brotherhoods*, these again into *clans* (roman *gentes*). The organization was never *monarchic* ; it was based, like nearly all *natural* government, on the rights of adult fighting-men who partook in the tribal affairs of war and peace, and set at the head of the whole federation a co-opted and responsible council of elders. In matters agrarian again, we are on a soil entirely free and independent ; there is no trace whatever of lordship or vassalage or any constraint from without to unify holdings : only *economic* causes prevented the endless subdivision (in *gavelkind*) of the family plot.[1] In Norway, a free peasantry, quite immune from any seigneurial or coercive influence, removes its superfluous heirs from the allod (*odalgaard*) by a money payment and hinders alienation into strange hands by giving the right of pre-emption to the kindred. There are many places to be found in England which by this sure witness prove the holding of a common family : here are not the estates of some great lord settling *coloni* or serfs on his domain, but genuine tribal settlements—the natural primitive republic based on clanship, the only true *democracy* that history can show. This sense of the *perpetuity of the family* is a very primitive and enduring

[1] I am treating here only the western development, but (since man is the same all the world over) the agrarian evolution in the same centuries in the east-roman empire may profitably be compared. For a brief notice see my *Constit. Hist. Rom. Emp.* Longmans 1910 (ii 144–149) where the agrarian reforms of Romanus I in cent. x show very clearly the existence of the *communal* type of village and the dangers to which such a miniature republic was exposed.

motive of social union. We find it fully developed in India even before the aryan invasion and surviving there to the present hour: Baden Powell[1] reminds us how strange to hindu sentiment is the notion of alienating any part of the sacred common holding to a foreigner. The individual, even if he be proprietor and not a mere member of a business joint-stock company, cannot estrange his portion, for he is only a trustee, who must pass on as he received. In the west we can trace during our period the varying influences which sought to banish this superstition. In old english law *folkland* cannot be sold away; it must pass under the conditions of customary law: as in India, it could not be disposed of outside the kindred group or without their consent.

The System Modified by Church, Roman Law and the New Manorial Lordship.—But the church fostered the growth of individualism and absolute ownership by insisting that a man may grant away his estate for the benefit of his soul. Kings give exemptions to this folk-right and create estates held by *book*, following the rules of *individualized* roman law. Private persons wished to break through custom to provide for daughters and to bequeath land by will, like any other form of property. By the end of the saxon period, transfer and sale outright are everywhere seen, while the Conquest placed at the head of every community of kinsmen (real or fictitious) a foreign lord, as guarantor, judge and protector. In place then of the tribal folkland (in which all members shared), without a monarchic superior but enslaved to custom and common tradition, we have now an estate burdened with service to a superior (Vinogradoff). At the same time the holding remains undivided by *gavelkind* as long as possible (the kentish custom is a singular exception and anticipates the equal sharing of modern french law). Before the military lordship demanded that the enjoyer of a holding under the manor should bear arms and follow his master, the need of *economic* efficiency had disposed of sons' equal rights and created something very like primogeniture; borough-english is only a variant of the same principle. We see then in the foregoing that *kinship*, as we might expect, guides the early *economic* or naturally defensive efforts of man: land is at first mainly owned in the strict sense by tribes and kindreds, individual members only enjoying rights of usufruct and possession according to custom, not any free power of alienation or bequest. As in the classical world, after the admittance of plebeians, neighbours take the place of kinsmen. In either case the tendency is to preserve undivided a normal holding (*bols* or *hides*), kept together by rules of united or single succession, just as manorial custom kept them integral for purposes of the new militarism.

The Seigneurial Manor, Artificial and Ubiquitous.—The Manor is non-natural and artificial: some analogue to its theory and structure is found all over the world at certain stages of social life. It represents the break-down of a primitive democracy; in which there is no authority but that of custom and the collective wisdom of the elders who represent it. In the normal village there is no monarch; the headman is only an executive

[1] *Indian Vill. Comm.* Longmans 1896: (cf. ch. v § 3, vi § 3.)

officer and a delegate without intrinsic powers of his own. The manor marks the beginning of an *aristocratic* period. Tribal notions and arrangements had proved inadequate for upholding the social fabric. The world was full of ' kin-shattered ' men who had ' broken caste ' and were without ties ; and into a peaceful society had come a fighting class of another race. But that this *foreign* element is by no means essential to the manor is clear from the roman empire. This polity began with two principles : the *autonomy of towns* : the *sharp distinction of slave and citizen.* Both features were modified in course of time. The centre, not from set purpose but unhappily by a natural law, interfered more and more and reduced all the pleasing varieties (e.g. of a german or indian empire) to a dull ' byzantine ' uniformity. Meantime slavery, (difficult to recruit when the epoch of wars was closed), and the *economic* system which exploited it, gave way to a blend of freedom and serfage. Nemesis overtakes the central power ; it has no longer any agents in whom it can trust ; it is the tool and dupe of its own bureaucracy. For the real business of government it comes to rely on private help, upon a *natural* not a *hierarchic* nobility.

Its Origins, in the Decadence of the Roman Empire.—In cent. iv and v, it appealed to the great landowners and made them responsible for their tenants' conduct, thus giving them the right of justice, coercion, and punishment. The great domain is now held to be exempt from the jurisdiction of the neighbouring city, and amenable solely to its owner in taxes and police. Here then are great estates subject to the political lordship of the owner, and to no other official short of the emperor himself. Even in smaller estates the owner is *representative* of the whole ; and for the military levy as for bringing the guilty to justice, he alone is now held responsible. The imperial power, fatigued by the pressure of its duties, prefers to confront a single person, who shall represent in its eyes his clients and dependents. This is a wholly new departure from the ideals of the early empire, of the stoics, or of the roman jurists. It by no means follows that it is a signal blow at freedom. It may open the way to petty tyranny but it also lays the basis of self-government. The equalization of all men before a single and central law is of course the slavery of all ; and servitude to an official bureaucracy is less tolerable than obedience to a local family.

Descent of Yeoman and Rise of Slave to Form a Single Type.—Meantime the slave becomes rather a villein, after the teutonic pattern as depicted in Tacitus' *Germania.* He receives plot and tenement and (to some extent) security of holding, but of course is burdened with dues and services of various kinds. While he improves his lot and rises upwards in the scale, the small yeoman-farmer sinks towards the same level, and in the end the joint class of tenants can hardly be distinguished. Though both are free in person, they fall to a like *economic* position, holding plots by custom or ' precariously ', ' ascribed to a glebe ' which was once their own. ' Ominous symptoms of growing political disruption ' says Vinogradoff, ' and of an ' aristocratic transformation of society were everywhere visible at the ' close of the empire.' But this aristocracy was home-made and largely one of wealth, sometimes even distinct from the one nobility recognized,

reckoned by place in the civil service. What prevented the advent of the full manorial type was the continuance of commerce. With the Teutons this trading intercourse between towns and *villæ* fell to pieces; and the newcomers reinforced the manorial features by their own analogous usages. The owner of house and enclosure was master there, and if in a sense responsible he was also all-powerful.

Village under Overlord becomes Social Unit.—Again the fighting men were the only true citizens and held aloof from the despised arts of peace. The german freeman was already used to allotting land and tenement to his slaves in return for payment in kind. On the soil of the empire after 500 A.D. the mechanism of government broke down: the labourer on his plot could no longer be effectively supervised and had to be left in something like autonomy. Even among the 'kin-shattered' men who largely composed these free-booting armies, *tribal* organization still deferred the coming triumph of the seigneurial *manor* under a lord. But under the Carlings (*c. 725–900* A.D.) the estate becomes more and more a *political* unit; once again the centre had to compromise with the feudal or aristocratic forces to secure any government or order at all. The *seniores* have to pick out their men for the war levy and lead them in the host: the exempt abbey (itself a religious manor) and the noble owner judged their own folk as well as the neighbours who had 'commended' themselves in vassalage. The Pepinid Mayors had amusingly threatened with condign penalties the *count* (their own official) who dared to put foot inside the privileged domains.[1] The struggle against norse and magyar inroads gave the finishing touch to this isolation of small local centres. Each group, flying to a common spot for protection, found its little world in the shadow of a tutelary castle, limited to a narrow horizon of purely village politics.

Effect of Crusades and Communes on the Manor.—The *aristocratic* constitution of society was complete, but such a society was already pregnant with the seeds of its own ruin. Every step removing this separatist concentration into terrified knots, every fresh facility for commerce or intercourse, every advance of kingship to recover more effective government for the centre, lessened the influence of the manorial system. The Crusades brought back, not only a decimated nobility to heavily mortgaged land, but new notions and standards and ideals. Meantime the *Commune* had already replaced the Manor as the typical social unit.[2]

(ii) Evolution of the Town and Borough

Section I. The Roman Type: German Free-Towns

Roman Municipia.—It seems certain that the roman terms *municipes*, *municipium* convey the idea rather of *duties* than *rights*—the performance

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[1] Cf. the works of Fustel de Coulanges on early french institutions.

[2] I may refer to three articles of mine in the *Economic Review* Jan. Apr. July, 1910 on (1) The Landlord, (2) Indian Land Tenure and the Manor, (3) Land Tenure and Political Development (Celtic Period).

of services toward Rome as the metropolis by citizens settled in distant parts. This is of course a novelty in the ancient world ; for the greek daughter-state broke off all but sentimental ties with the mother. Of towns within the borders of Italy, some as *Fundi* had local autonomy limited in the matter of jurisdiction ; others as *Anagnia* were ruled directly from Rome : both find analogies in the french towns of our period. All ' boroughs ' had certain common features : the citizens paid the same dues and served in the legions as if they were roman *residents* with full civic rights, but they could not vote or hold office in the capital : the urban prætor seems to have sent out a deputy for jurisdiction. These ' rights ' are then clearly burdens not privileges. But after the Second Punic War it became a coveted honour to receive *municipal* rank. In *200–100* B.C. the right of voting and of holding office (*jus suffragii . . . honorum*) was given to many towns. Their citizens, though technically enrolled in the roman tribes, can seldom have had leisure to exercise these rights : but one who benefited by this concession was no less a person than C. Marius, under whom first the old constitution definitely broke down before the new militarism. Indeed the Revolution had begun with the support given by the italian towns to Tiberius Gracchus (*133* B.C.) some five and twenty years earlier. After the legislation of *90* and *89* all distinction of rank and privilege was abolished. Sulla did much good work in organizing these ' boroughs ' on a uniform plan, and he sent forth the earliest *municipes*, in citizen colonies beyond the italian frontier. Julius Cæsar ' enfranchised ' all Hither Gaul, and its towns became *municipia*. Under the empire further advance to uniformity was made. The ancient towns of the east were incorporated in the system ; while in the west, cities were for the most part roman creations, often marking the site of the legions' permanent camp.

As Autonomous Centres of Roman Culture.—By the reign of Trajan towns of this semi-corporate type are as numerous in west as in east, and everywhere form a network of roman influence and act as centres of roman culture. Their government is in the hands of magistrates, senate and general assembly, as in most medieval counterparts. It is (owing to the fundamental conception of the City-State) independent of the roman government, except in serious cases of jurisdiction reserved for the urban prætor. As in earlier time, the borough is bound to perform certain duties, levy men and horses for the army, maintain the imperial post, receive soldiers and entertain roman officials. Citizens might be *born* to that dignity, or *enfranchised*, or *naturalized* ; a subordinate class of *incolæ* had partial rights only, based on domicile carrying with it a limited power of voting. But both classes shared in all civic burdens. While the powers of the assembly (*comitia*) were never expressly curtailed, the Senate or Town Council intervened more and more and the chief citizens became more and more reluctant to hold office : *popular* election became, as in Rome at an earlier date, a farce and a fiction. Rome, for her part, encouraged an *aristocratic* faction and gave special honours to natives of a province, as being *senators* of one of its towns. Three pairs of colleagues were elected yearly : *duoviri* (for jurisdiction), *ædiles* (in charge of high-

ways, buildings, police, games and food-supply)—this quartet sometimes called *IVviri*—lastly, *quæstores* (for finance). Once in five years Censors, as in Rome before Sulla, took the place of the *duoviri*, and were entitled *quinquennales*. These municipal officers had no light task; from the public funds they fed the poorest citizens and brought in corn to be paid for at moderate and uniform rate by the rest. In cent. i at least, municipal schools were common; doctors were sometimes maintained at the public expense. The water supply was also in public hands. To meet these heavy charges large benefactions were forthcoming (at least until *200* A.D.) from wealthy citizens; resort was had later to direct *taxation* for municipal purposes. The town-council possessed funds, mines and quarries as well as landed estates, which dispensed with or lightened[1] the heavy rating. In the case of catastrophe there was always the safe asylum of the emperor's purse; Tiberius was generous to the asian towns stricken by an earthquake. The town was the *religious* centre of the district owing to the spontaneous growth of the imperial cult; the priests (*augustales*) held a dignified position as such in provincial society, and seem to have been chosen amongst the industrial classes. This development of a free and respected industrial and trading class was a feature of the empire, which might be called a triumph of the 'knights' or *equites* and a reaction of the provinces against feudalism. If the Gospel and monkish labour corrected the notion that manual tasks were degrading, the empire prepared the way for the change of feeling from classical prejudice against commerce and handicrafts (*βαναύσοι τεχναί*). Very early are to be seen traces of a free and thriving class of producers and craftsmen, proud of their calling and their small corporate life; even when liberals like Trajan looked with suspicion upon such gilds, forerunners of the medieval association.

The 'Concordia Ordinum.'—One feature in which roman social life set an inimitable example to later times lay in the *concordia ordinum* which without doubt existed. All classes lived together in contentment and peace; the rich performing without complaint or intimidation the 'liturgies' which in other democratic States have to be made compulsory.[2] Civic feeling or local patriotism was a genuine sentiment at least down to the age of Commodus (*180–192* A.D.): the letters of Pliny and the ruins and inscriptions of public edifices all over the roman world can testify to this. But the government of cent. iii seemed to extinguish genuine autonomy and local feeling by bringing the towns (as in a modern centralized state) more directly under the governor of the province; hence the distaste shown for office and the well-known 'prison-house' of the urban *curia*. Popular control ceased, owing to the natural sloth of a contented, nay, surfeited people, before the end of Trajan's reign; the Senate, who succeeded to the dignity and costs of office, were at first well pleased to have it so. But the new fiscal system of an impoverished empire, now on the defensive against the barbarian raiders, ruined this Curial Order and with it disappeared the welfare of the boroughs.

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[1] As in some favoured english boroughs, as Beccles to-day.

[2] One phase of the 'war against wealth' in which popular and despotic rule are so much alike.

Growth of Teutonic Municipalism.—During cent. x the bishop had been entrusted with justice and government within the old roman towns of the Rhine.[1] The Advocate (*vogt*) served as his acting deputy : for real duties and titular dignity seldom went together. The town had its own law, separate from that of the country, and shared in some of the *burgh* privileges, i.e. was accounted as a royal fortress enjoying the special ' peace ' of the king's palace. But new german towns in the interior were being built on the land of some lay or clerical patron, with market square and streets leading thither from the chief gates. They were established chiefly as trade-centres. Already round castle or abbey or cathedral-close there had been fairs ; but the new towns were markets under permanent charter and the settlers who received a special welcome sprang from the class of merchants and craftsmen. The older towns followed suit. Immigrants were of varying status, some being serfs who fled from their masters—cause of later legislation and much discontent in seigneurial circles. A *democratic* air was held to pervade the sacred urban area ; *Stadtluft macht frei*. The towns were no more favoured than the villages in having rights over such common interests, as lord or public courts did not condescend to cognize : this autonomy in detail was indeed the rule everywhere. By *1050* the claim was made by the trading towns to settle mercantile disputes according to a law of their own ; to the great indignation of the clerical mind. The Town-Council was the origin of this self-government, and increased its powers by use, making byelaws, fining for breach, punishing brawlers, and raising funds by excise. In the older towns the bishop made constant protest against this independence, and during cent. xiii[2] he was able to obtain imperial decrees suppressing the *Rat* or Council altogether, or else the right to nominate its members. The bishops also resented the enterprise and autonomy of the craft-gilds, in this case to little effect.

The Free Imperial Cities.—The cities took a deep interest and share in imperial politics. The *vogt* received the ban from the king directly, though he was the nominee of an episcopal patron. When the king held a diet in any see-town, all powers lapsed or reverted to him and his officers. The citizens preferred this regal and intermittent authority ; in *1073* Worms rose on behalf of Henry IV against its Bishop, Cologne in *1074*. Towns founded on imperial ground or on ducal Hohenstaufen demesne claimed to stand immediately beneath the sovereign. In *1256* a league of 100 cities (a chain extending along the Rhine but stretching from Bremen to Zurich) resolved to recognize no king unless elected unanimously. In the south, imperial cities were federated for their own interest and jointly attacked

[1] In England the last trace of this clerical government was suppressed a few years ago, when a corporation of the modern type succeeded the rule of High Steward and High Bailiff directly appointed by the Dean of Westminster. The story of palatinate rights at Durham (and Ely) is quite another matter.

[2] A reactionary period for german lands owing to seigneurial particularism and the collapse of the Monarchy.

the nobles and princes. Unable to compete in the new warfare of feudalism they lost their power of intervening with effect; some were seized as 'unredeemed pledges', others became members of the swiss league; but a large number survived till *1803*, when their number was reduced to four, and this again to three after the fatal mistake of Frankfort in *1866*. Their former powers (prior to cent. xv) were due to the better government prevailing within the walls. But when the princely territories were more fully organized the towns could no longer claim exception or form alliances with each other of the Hanseatic type. Long superior to the princes' estates in the method of ruling, they fell behind in an age which raised the *tyrannis* (or control of a single efficient owner) to the highest pitch of perfection. The *mediate* towns were now brought into closer subjection by ducal houses, such as Austria and Brandenburg. Some lost ground in the rivalries of commerce; and, to whatever cause we may trace the decline, the classical, 'democratic', urban community ceased to have political influence or material importance.

Corporate Government in Germany.—The control of the city lay with the *town-council*, though in time the *craft-gilds* claimed a share in the business or profit of ruling. At first any inhabitant, holding a certain amount of land, was a full citizen (the clergy and the lord's *comitatus* being alone excepted as not liable to pay urban rates). This schedule did not include the artizans who, united in their trade-union, rebelled against the monopoly of a co-opted council. Against this rich oligarchy they alleged the usual charges of corrupt management and withholding of justice from inferior classes. In cent. xiv and xv (that is, the age directly following our period) the old classical precedents were strictly followed; each party attacking its rival with slaughter and gaining a brief supremacy. Where the *democracy* succeeded, an overbearing policy abroad and a narrow protective system at home can be noted. The Suabian League came by its disasters in cent. xiv because its *democratic* towns took hasty measures in war (like Athens in the expedition to Sicily or the appointment of Cleon) and refused to keep faith in treaties when honesty was found inconvenient. Vexatious restrictions harassed and warned off foreign traders. Again, as in the strict and narrow basis of periclean citizenship at Athens, membership of craft-gilds became increasingly difficult. Like the venetian nobles in *1296*, these plebeian artizans practically closed the rolls of their benefit-societies, limiting admittance to sons, sons-in-law and widows' husbands. This *democracy* then, so far from extending to others the equal rights they had won for themselves only created in its turn a voiceless *proletariat* class of assistants who might never rise to gild-membership. Hence economic ruin followed when the town was exploited for the sole benefit of a new oligarchy. From the year *1500* many centres of once important trade sank into obscurity and lost in numbers owing to this ignorant *protective* policy.[1] But where the elder oligarchy held its own (as in Nuremberg and the northern parts) protection was modified and a more enlightened policy pursued. Still, heavy debts were incurred for public buildings and walls

[1] Inseparable from any popular system of government.

which could not serve their purpose in the new methods of warfare: in many towns, beginning from our own period (cent. xiii) annuities, pensions and sinecures had been lavishly sold—like court-offices under Justinian or juridical dignities in France—until they could no longer be paid by the impoverished exchequer of the borough.

SECTION II. MUNICIPAL LIFE IN MEDIEVAL ITALY.

Lombard Struggles Against Imperial Control.—Turning to Italy we notice two chief features; the towns were still *more independent* than the german, both in claim and fact, and recognized no living superior when the right of the emperor, always reluctantly admitted, had been shaken off (*c. 1200–1250*). Again the result of independence and autonomy was almost without exception a *tyrannis*: of which Zurich alone affords an instance in the north. In Lombardy the nobles (as a dangerous and inferior class) were compelled to live within the city walls, the citizens thus making protectors of possible enemies or at least disarming and keeping them under watch. The reverse was the case in Germany where the prince or knight had his castle and interests quite remote from the cities. Hence with this greater fusion of classes and ideals, municipal life in the south became more complex; nobles (great and small, or *capitani* and *valvassori*) living side by side with the commons (*popolo*). When the emperor withdrew from the scene, his deputy the bishop disappeared also. The struggle of the Lombard Cities for their rights is historic. Even under the lombard kings they had maintained in some measure their trade, their defences and their autonomy. King Aistulf distinguishes three classes of merchants, the first *majores et potentes*, the byzantine δυνατοί, keeping themselves equipped with horse and corslet, shield and lance. From Lombardy came the merchants, who at first employed (as we saw) as fiscal agents by the Papacy, gave rules and a name to later financiers. Henry V (for Cremona in *1114* for Mantua in *1116*) recognized some degree of self-government, and even sanctioned the revolt of the merchant class against a corrupt clergy. Nearly half a century later Frederick I found these new franchises grown into an intolerable abuse, with civil wars raging between rival cities. The Roncaglian Jurists (*1158*) decided in favour of the emperor, of central government and of peace: only rights of autonomy ratified by imperial charter were admitted and the emperor's claim to supreme jurisdiction was confirmed. Hated Milan was indeed destroyed in *1162* when it had led a general rising in protest against the german sovereign. But after Legnano in *1176* the imperial claims vanished into those of a merely titular and complimentary suzerain. Here and under Frederic II the Holy See stood for municipal franchise: and the cities in cent. xiii saw in an imperial or wibelline victory the loss of their liberties.

Form of Government in Italian Boroughs.—The precise form of government or its phases in an italian city is a matter of technical history: we may here briefly state that the three orders sent deputies to a common council, called *consules* though numbering as many as twelve. In practice however a much smaller body held the reins of power,—acting on the advice of the *credenza*, analogous to the roman senate, consulted according

to custom by all roman magistrates during their brief term of office. Underneath this small executive, and in effect the true sovereign (however rarely assembled), was the popular assembly (*parlamentum* or *concio*). It would be hard to name a single system that did not recognize these three orders of primary and ultimate government. In spite of the formal safeguards of liberty, factions and family influence often destroyed it: there were papal and wibelline partizans in every town and, like their classical forerunners, they were quite content to win their case at the cost of their city. Two expedients were attempted to avoid perpetual feud; the well-known institution of a *foreign* magistrate with ample powers (*podesta*) who would have no bias as being an outsider, and the recognition of a *native* prince from some leading family (at Milan the *Visconti*, at Mantua the *Gonzaga*, at Verona the *Scala*, at Padua the *Carrara*).

Tuscany: Florence and the Medici.—*Tuscany* under its marquis was a centralized government of a type which for long excluded the cities from any prominent political *rôle*. But Pisa and Genoa throughout cent. xi waged war against the Saracens: the former provided ships to the Hohenstaufen to fight in Sicily; both (in alliance with Venice) aided the kings of Jerusalem to reduce the coast towns of Syria. *Communes* under *consuls* were formed in Tuscany as elsewhere, but kept their freedom longer against the insidious attempts of the *podesta* to erect a tyranny: even the Medici bowed to republican usage till they assumed the ducal title in *1531*. In Florence towards the end of our period (*1250*) the *people* rose against the *nobles* and chose a *capitano* or tribune aided by 12 *anziani* as his Council. Somewhat later the craft-gilds attained supremacy and placed power (*1282*) in the Signory's hands, a body composed of their own *priori*. Nobles, if members of a craft, were also admitted, a privilege withdrawn in *1293* when the nobility were deprived of all power and the lower gilds accorded a much fuller share. Just after our period (cent. xiv) 'twelve good men' were chosen from the city-wards, each set holding office for 2 months only.[1] Meantime, as in ancient Rome, the magisterial system was made of set purpose cumbrous and competitive; 3 officers were called in from abroad to hold office for 6 months, *podesta*, *capitano* and the 'executor of justice'. The result was weakness without security. After the lowest orders had risen (in the wool-combers' revolt of *1378*) and been repressed, the wise and veiled monarchical guidance of Albizzi and Medici restored wealth and order with much needed peace.

Peculiar Development of the Venetian Commonwealth.—The development of Venice proceeded on other lines. The refugee communities from the mainland elected from very early days their own tribunes, but they

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[1] At the present day, the supreme power at San Marino resides in the General Assembly (*Arringo*) which is convoked twice yearly. The executive is lodged in 2 *Capitani Reggenti* selected twice a year from the sixty life-members of the Grand Council, in which the 3 orders—nobles, landowners, citizens—each appoint a third to represent them. A small committee assists the regents who remain in office too short a time (6 months) to secure any real initiative (Ricci *La Repubblica di S. M.* Bergamo 1903).

maintained a steadfast loyalty toward the eastern emperors. In commerce they treated, almost as equals, with the lombard kings. In the great tumult during the exile of Justinian II (*700*), they elected a *dux* of their own, having executive powers and the right to convene the people and appoint his officers. About the time of Charles' new monarchy (*c. 804*) the Rialto was chosen as the seat of the central government. Dukes, like roman emperors, attempted to convert an *elective* and popular into a *hereditary* office. Dominicus, Doge in *1022*, made it penal for the supreme ruler to appoint his successor or even secure his choice during his own lifetime, which had been the unvarying expedient of the emperors in founding a dynasty. The public meeting *en masse* was replaced by a Great Council of some 450 members in *1172*, after mob-violence and the murder of Duke Vitalis. The new body appointed most state-officers or their smaller boards of electors. An executive council of six was chosen from the six city-wards. The doge, henceforth named by a small electoral board of nobles, invited certain notable persons to help him before any measure was submitted to the Great Council (now the most *democratic* body). In very rare cases appeal was made to the *concio* or *parlamentum*, in which each citizen exercised political rights in person and not by deputy. This tendency to restrict all popular rights (a contrast to italian development elsewhere) culminated in the act of *1296* which closed the Great Council to all but a limited number of noble families. The executive was supervised (as in Sparta of old) by an 'Ephorate'; the well-known Council of Ten (dating from *1310*), henceforth in effect the chief power in the State. But this limiting of the popular voice was the work of an active and trading nobility, not of feudal lords. Here the ruling class was thrifty and business-like and knew how to make timely concessions: this rich and hardworking governing body kept both titular *prince* and *people* in proper submission. Commercial interest was of course the keynote of policy, and the republic of traders decayed when it no longer held a vigorous monopoly. With Venice may be coupled the equally byzantine cities Naples, Gaeta and Amalfi; whose independent civil life ended with incorporation into the norman kingdom. Rome has strictly speaking no civic history, save perhaps the records of Arnold's and Rienzi's splendid futilities; for it had no merchant class, no trade and no manufactures. There was no middle rank of society and, except the clergy, there were no 'citizens': only nobles and a mob, clients willingly dependent upon the great houses of foreign birth.

SECTION III. THE FRENCH COMMUNES

Communes in Southern France.—Very similar to the neighbouring italian towns is the history and character of civic franchises in southern France. In these 'consular' towns, as in Lombardy, 12 consuls shared the government, elected for one year only and re-eligible after a due interval. The Municipal Council (*commune* or *magnum* or even *secretum concilium*) and a general Popular Assembly (*parlamentum* or *concio*)[1] were the other organs;

[1] But sometimes also called like the smaller body *commune concilium*.

the latter never embracing the entire free populace. Here, as in Italy, the native nobility did not retire to the castles but took a share in urban life; bishops and clergy also bore a part and their influence was not, as elsewhere, resented or in the end overthrown. But here again feud and dissension led to the appointment of a *podestat* like the greek *tyrant* or *æsymnete*.

In the North.—In the north of France however the condition was very different: even the creation of the civic *communes* was an act of violence and revolution directed against the bishops and the feudal nobles and clergy. These (unlike their brethren in the south) felt little sympathy for civic aspirations and were held to be the chief hindrance to mercantile development. The two superior classes were excluded from all membership or the active duties of citizens: those who dwelt in the walls had to take oath not to conspire against the *commune*. The *jurati* (our modern *jurats* in the Cinque Ports) were held together by a solemn undertaking to fight for urban liberties, though the title was sometimes restricted to the councillors (also called 'peers' or *échevins*). The number of actual governors varies curiously between 12 and 100; they could judge as well as administer. Retired officers (as in the roman senate) formed a reserve body which was consulted in a crisis. The president of this 'senate' was the mayor or provost (*maire, prévôt*).

Owing to Class-Bitterness Privileges Surrendered to Crown.—From the end of cent. xiii the craft-gilds forced their way upwards into the ruling body and their representatives were admitted there. But the people applied to the king for further rights and political freedom was soon at an end. This summoning of State-aid and interference stands in marked contrast to the conduct of german towns—where at least all classes were at one in desiring autonomy, and the aggrieved party did not think it honourable to call in support from without. Hence from their different racial character arises a quite different development on the two sides of the Rhine. Class-hatred [1] for the french people ended perforce in a state of despotism which gave the barren gift of equality, ensured order and respect for law, but destroyed self-government. German towns respected the local rights even of neighbours and rivals and did not unite to form a nation. So jealous was the french citizen-mind that towns never formed

[1] In the recent outburst of class-hatred in England (largely artificial though it was, and fostered by professional statesmen) we see glad welcome given by the 'people' to a great extension of State-authority: but the end of such appeals cannot be in doubt; *cum domino pax ista venit*. In our own country the nemesis has been rapid: the nobles and clergy have been vilified and discredited but the result is the 'Servile State', the definite recognition of an *inferior* body of citizens who must be coerced and scheduled for their good. The war, appealing at first to the volunteer principle, has created something of a reaction; but this must be only an interlude, and the organized efficiency (which the future will demand) must bring still further curtailment of local initiative and individual freedom.

leagues and confederacies, as across the Rhine and in Italy; and even to-day the epithet *bourgeois* has a peculiar and invidious meaning which is quite unknown elsewhere.

Seigneurial Boroughs by Charter.—But by far the larger number of french towns belonged to another class: the *villes franches* possessing a lord's charter which agreed to limit and define the services due to him. Their privileges therefore varied like the 'custom of the manor'; some were governed by an *elective* council which had rights of jurisdiction, others by councils *without* such rights and merely administering police duties, others ruled directly by the lord's officer.[1] To these *seigneurial* boroughs belonged some of the chief towns of France. Paris indeed was governed by a provost, but the Seine merchants had certain powers of autonomy and had another provost of their own. From *1296* (when Venice had first closed her Book of Nobles), the provost and *échevins* named 24 councillors. The craft-gilds had senior officers named by the provost (or by some great noble): between *1292–1300* nearly 450 craft-names appear, Boileau (writing in *1268*) names 101 bodies of traders and artizans. These divided the duties of the night-watch and thus had a certain military discipline and organization. When they rebelled, as under Stephen Marcel (one of the lesser provosts named above) and once again in *1382*, the city was only placed in the interests of order and trade more strictly under control of the royal officers.

The Towns of Flanders.—The flemish towns, Bruges, Ghent and Ypres rose under the shadow of the count's strongholds; when a new house succeeded (*1128*) their influence was felt, and the burghers soon held the counts in the toils of indebtedness. They made alliance with weavers and artizans against their master and employers. The three towns, though torn by faction, won a leading place in the politics of Flanders; hence friendly relations with England whose wool was required for their staple industry. In Spain, the land of a permanent crusade, the town did not win power as market or mistress of commerce but as a stronghold against the infidel. It was to stout defenders of New Castile, the outpost against the muslim, that spanish kings granted *fueros*, not to successful trading corporations. Barcelona, whose history and affinities are not spanish but french, stands on a different level: in *1068* Berenger the count gave it a spanish law based on custom and usage, while from *1300* its commercial code was recognized throughout the whole of southern Europe.

SECTION IV. GROWTH OF THE BOROUGH SYSTEM IN ENGLAND.

The Saxon *burh* (both *tribal* and *kingly*).—Whatever continuity may perhaps be established on the continent between roman *municipia* and

[1] E.g. in England the civil office of *portreeve* usually marks a *feudal* or *manorial* nominee: at Okehampton the two titles *mayor* and *reeve* existed side by side and sometimes were held by different people; in the neighbouring (feudal) borough of Hatherleigh the *portreeve* is always named at the lord's Court Leet and is still recognized as having civic powers (of a very limited kind no doubt): in Wales a certain family of Marchers still retains the right to nominate a mayor for a small municipal borough.

later borough-towns, none can be detected in England. No doubt a roman camp (as at Canterbury and Rochester) was often occupied by a tribal *burg*, in this case for the men of east and west Kent, but there was no connexion beyond one of site. The *burg* or *burh* was the king's home and the stronghold or asylum of the tribe: higher penalties were imposed for breaches of the peace within its precincts. It was encircled by an earthen rampart, repair of which was enforced both by royal edict and current anglo-saxon law. The boundaries were perambulated in yearly solemnity; the peace of the borough, as a sacred place, must be always unbroken. Chiefly built for *national* (or rather '*tribal*') defence, they are found in sites otherwise unprotected. They drew commerce to themselves: for every reason traders sought to gain a footing; the borough was court and palace, centre of government and of church life. It had its mint and its royal bankers; these exchangers used the true standard of weights and measures. Transactions concluded in these *ports* enjoyed certain privileges: a *portreeve* watched the merchants, saw that the king had his dues and tolls, his fair-rents and customs, his share of fines for breaches of the peace. In cent. x under Edgar, *moot* or court is required to meet 3 times a year, that pleas might be heard on issues concerning life, liberty and land, that men might show their pledges and sureties answerable for their good conduct (cf. *view of frank-pledge*). Over this court the *portreeve* presided, supported by a group of assistants (*witan*, cf. french *prud'hommes*), in the Danelag by 12 '*lawmen*', in other towns by aldermen or senior burgesses holding police powers and some military duties. Division into wards, each with its own system of police and watch, can be traced to an early time; a record of London describes it fully in *930–940*. Owing to the licence to 'commend' one's person to some great owner, the boroughs became honeycombed with *sokes*, areas of seigneurial jurisdiction, which interfered sadly with the *portreeve's* authority, and so with the king's.

Norman Changes.—The Normans appear to have restricted municipal competence to the narrowest possible area and forced the outlying district under the control of the lord's castle, placed outside the borough limits. The king in saxon times granted leave to a village or demesne to hold its own distinct hundred court: his tenants or the greater lords followed his example and at Domesday such cases of incorporation were not uncommon. Every castle drew to itself by its own needs a group of privileged craftsmen and artizans encouraged to settle near it: the lord's charters confer the following rights: fixed rental, release from villein-dues, castle-jurisdiction and forced food-levy by the castellan: in addition they gave freedom from tallage at will, the right to sell and devise property, separate borough jurisdiction (with or without the right to choose their own officers). The lord or his reeve remained in close touch with all the citizens in this norman type of borough; whereas there was a great variety of relations between saxon lords and their burgesses. Rural charters often expressly relieved the town from some feudal incidents. As in France, the king's right tended to take precedence of the mesne-lord's: the position of the latter was weakened and, in the direct relation of crown and borough, the rights which the lord forfeited were shared between the two parties.

Patronage of the Crown.—From the borough the king accepted a composition for dues : the borough took care to pay punctually and to keep the payment at the same figure. Sometimes money was raised within the town to buy a charter from the king, allowing the citizens to treat directly with the crown-officers instead of mediately through sheriffs. Thus Lincoln in *1130* bought the right to hold their burg *in capite* ; the next year London acquired its own sheriffs ; and in the same century many towns paid their dues to the Crown (*firma burgi*) by their own officers. At the beginning of cent. xiii fresh concessions were made ; the burgesses were allowed to elect their own officers more freely and the royal power to dismiss was then expressly limited.

Under Richard and John (*c. 1200* A.D.) the french title *mayor* was adopted for London and Winchester. The king, in allowing the boroughs to collect and forward their own dues, handed over to them a valuable source of future revenue and the fixed and unvariable sum paid to the crown left over to these ' farmers ' an increasing income. Under Henry II trade received a new impulse. The officers of the borough who treated with the exchequer, were rich and leading citizens who found it easy to find securities.

Long Exclusion of the Commonalty from Privilege.—Only in cent. xiii do we hear of the *vulgus*, or commonalty ; who, in continental towns of the south especially, as *parlamentum* or *concio*, were recognized as the ultimate source of power. These took action through the gilds and craft-corporations and made effective protest when taxation was increased. Under Henry II the royal justices assessed the taxes, but if the borough offered a gift the re-partition was left in its hands, in the former case the richer citizens, in the latter the poorer felt the burden. This pressure led to demands by the commons to supervise borough expenditure. By the end of our period London had its Court of Common Council to represent the commonalty and the voice of the city-wards. A tendency may be observed to model borough-government on national lines ; the new court formed a counterpart to the people and commons of England ; the aldermen represented the lords ; while the title ' sovereign ' was sometimes given to the Mayor, a title found latest in the unreformed corporations of Ireland. Admittance to borough-privileges (or right to trade and appear in the court) was only given to duly qualified and proper persons : by inheriting, purchase or gift, sometimes by marriage and in London, after *1275*, by apprenticeship. The newcomers shared in all the municipal burdens. Personal service was sometimes dispensed with and hence there grew up the abuse, so common in later times, of non-resident freemen who entirely controlled the borough from outside. The Commons in many towns asserted their claim to vote in electing magistrates but, through turbulence, this right was gradually curtailed. As in Germany all classes were afraid of State interference and the annulling of their charters for riot or other misconduct. But in cent. xiii London was more than once subjected to heavy fines and placed under the control of the Tower. The later development of municipal institutions shows an irresistible tendency to *oligarchy*, which reached its height in the close corporations of cent. xviii.

C. FORCES AND NEEDS THAT PRODUCED THE MODERN SECULAR STATE: OR, THE TRIUMPH AND DEFEAT OF NOMINALISM

Section I. New Powers Succeed to the Heritage of the Incompetent Rulers: Royalty and Economics

The Sworn Companies in Islam and in the West.—Both the *Military* Orders and the *Mendicant* Friars are signs of the breakdown of feudal compromise: perhaps the chief impulse in both may be traced to the sworn brotherhoods and secret societies of Islam. It was the caliphs who brought into the world a real autocracy. When their hands grew feeble, when daring and unauthorized captains seized the power which they let slip, provinces became independent and satraps princes in their own right; or again, non-territorial companies like the Assassins formed everywhere an *imperium in imperio*. Despotism and its correlative, implicit obedience, were now found together as the double nexus of society: 'man born free' was everywhere busily forging and eagerly submitting to chains of his own making. For no man was born a member of a secret order; he was free to join as a volunteer, but having once become a member he was bound to obey. Society both in east and west began to frame itself upon the model of a pirate-band,—at least all its efficient organisms copy this exemplar. In the Crusades effective arms lay not with feudal levies or pious zealots but with special expert bodies under strict rules and discipline. Power lay with Hospitallers of Rhodes, Templars, Teutonic Knights; a little later with the Catalans and other companies of *condottieri*. The *fyrd* had given way to the feudal militia, and this in turn had collapsed while a definitely royal army was still in the making. It was in default of any real central power that these (to us) anomalous powers and jurisdictions grew up. When burgher society awoke to the menace of these unauthorized companies,[1] law and commerce and finance worked together to set up a representative centre. The result is the modern State—an autocracy never really personal (except in the rarest cases) but controlled and guided by the strongest influences in the kingdom. That these were economic and utilitarian will largely explain the new character which the State takes on after the fall of Empire and Papacy together, towards the close of our period.

Decadence of the Central Powers.—Over this development it is clear that *economic* causes exerted the most serious influence, and it is these which first demand inquiry. The unique medieval world had a different fate from that of the Roman Empire, its prototype: there the limbs fell into atrophy, here they waxed so vigorous that they threw off tutelage. The one fell to pieces after a long failure and decay in its economic resources; the other was becoming each year more wealthy and enterprising. The crusading era was an age of advancing prosperity, not to be interrupted by the civil feuds of italian trade-centres, the Black Death, or the Hundred Years' War with France. The vitality of the members (as in the towns of

[1] Of which that of the Jesuits is really the last survival.

Germany and Flanders) was in strange contrast with the numbness and feebleness of the central power. In this respect it was in truth 'a period of transition'. Both pope and emperor had ceased to be decisive factors and the ideal of united Christendom no longer made appeal: yet national states with strong government and well husbanded resources had not yet arisen. The discredit, first of the Captivity (or exile at Avignon *1309-1378*) and next of the long schism which followed it, fell not merely on the Head of the Church, but on an entire social system.

Church Fails to Meet its Official Obligations.—Throughout these centuries there was scarcely a moment when the Church and its rulers duly fulfilled the functions which Christendom was content to entrust to them. When the popes lost their old prestige and were sinking, first into parasites of the french king, next into petty and grasping italian princes, men began to question the finality of the whole fabric. The Church had demanded the right to control every department of human life; no sphere of human life lay outside its cognizance. Hence churchmen had been granted the management of civil affairs; not only because they were learned and adroit, but because they were trusted as honest men and could not found feudal dynasties.[1] Besides semi-religious matters (like marriage and testament) there came into clerical hands a large mass of fiscal, judicial and (above all) diplomatic business. The pious complained with good reason that the clergy were mere servers of tables distracted from their proper spiritual duties. The rise of the Mendicant Order early in cent. xiii had been a protest against secularism among churchmen. The Albigenses held the same views, proceeding, however, from a dualistic contempt for the evil world and a doomed society. In the next century Occam and others used this prejudice to control the papal claims. But even the reformers had fallen from popular favour; the friars were held to be slothful beggars who lived on alms instead of working; religious houses were not always (as they were normally in England) good landlords; the papal merchants could not be called habitually honest. With this discontent abroad it is easy to see that the whole papal claim to supervise the world was challenged at every point. These opinions, long forming, even during the zenith of the papal monarchy, were unexpectedly reinforced by a great natural catastrophe.

The Black Death and a New Social Order.—The Black Death was perhaps the chief factor in the disintegration of society. Half of the population disappeared; the features of town and rural districts were wholly altered and their landmarks obliterated. The monasteries never recovered their old position as economic examples and centres of genuine piety; the supply of clergy for the parishes became inadequate; heathenism, never quite extinct, again raised its head; and (as in Boccaccio's tales) an epicurean secularism became the fashionable tone. Even the serious and faithful doubted the wisdom of diverting wealth to religious purposes which had had their day and no longer fulfilled a want. Princes and kings were clamorous that the endowments should serve more useful ends; the legacies

[1] Cf. preface to *Dial. Scacc.*

of pious benefactors were in some cases set aside (as in similar movements of our own time); and men showed the greatest reluctance to pay the constant fees demanded by the papal officials. The Catholic Church (like the feudal militia) saw itself superseded in many of its most important functions; the 'king's peace', whereby the law could be summarily enforced against brawling and private quarrels, was a better safeguard than the sentiment of the *treuga Dei*. There arose an expert body of civilian administrators; and rulers dispensed with the services of clerical agents and chancellors, not without a feeling of relief. The religious houses, once pioneers in agriculture, were no longer a model to secular landlords; and as patrons of commerce had been entirely left behind by the towns. 'The Church', says Cunningham with justice (*West. Civil.* ii 145), 'had 'ceased to be a leader in the arts of practical life.'

The Intervention of the Secular State: New Utilitarian Spirit.—After the Black Death (*1348–1350*) the old institutions could not cope with the new situation. Many of the most urgent social duties which piety had once imposed were now neglected; when this neglect was repaired in cent. xvi the work was done under the eyes and by the authority of the new civilian State. In France the long dynastic wars had interrupted trade and broken down communication. In England many of the bridges, once erected by private persons as a meritorious Christian act, had vanished; the repair of roads had been a piece of pious philanthropy, like building a *caravanserai* in muslim countries. When the resources or the public spirit of the land-holding abbeys declined, the obvious public need shifted the burden on to other shoulders: under Philip and Mary (*1555*) a Statute provides for the appointment of road-surveyors. Again, with regard to pauperism, the old religious relief of the poor could no longer suffice to cope with the new and terrible conditions left behind by the Black Death. The convents met but imperfectly the duty of providing for the famine-stricken vagrants. They seem to have stood aside from the new organizations of charity, which in place of a Christian duty became a matter of civic or municipal expedience. We need not enlarge on the effect of the changed system on motive and sanction. An important sphere was withdrawn from a moral or emotional atmosphere and transferred to one purely secular and utilitarian. The poor were relieved, not because they were Christian brethren of the well-to-do, but because idle and unproductive vagrants are a menace to society. So in our own time costly education of the labouring class is justified, not as their right—for upon rights no one is to-day agreed—but because an ignorant proletariat is a revolutionary danger.[1]

New Conception of National Monarchy: Feudalism Decays: Rise of Bourgeois.—Two distinct forms of secular power were ready to take up the new responsibilities for which neither the spirit nor the institutions of the church sufficed; the *city* and the *kingdom*, republic and monarchy.

[1] Many apologists have cooled in their efforts since it has been proved in Russia that the most dangerous element of all is not a rough peasantry but an unbelieving middle-class, trained at the universities in secular science.

Both types were capable of organizing government action in spheres hitherto relegated to the church or to private piety. The advance of *royal* (that is *central*) authority was due to several causes; the towns or communes had been glad to assist in wrecking feudal particularism. During cent. xv the noble families, in spite of outward show, were becoming less important, in *politics* than the sovereign, in *economics* than the new plebeian wealthy. In Italy, Flanders and some german towns the *municipium* was strong enough to keep its freedom. In England and France the result of the long wars had been to decimate the nobles and to give the king (or his advisers) a more effective control, in town and country alike. It was therefore possible to regard a large continuous territory as a unit (like *household* in early, or *city* in later, medieval times). One object was kept steadily in view by the rulers and all resources were used (in this new competitive age) to strengthen the kingdom as an integral whole. The towns expanded their ideas in this period, took in wider districts and fields of enterprise, and allowed account of landed interests as well as of private mercantile gain: yet medieval urban life was scarcely an advance on the ancient classical type, and gave little novelty or impulse to economic progress. The aim of each several city was particularist and exclusive: like savage tribes they did not know how to combine and much labour and wealth was wasted in avoidable friction and needless rivalry. Germany and Italy were most conspicuous in local activity and keen zeal in trading. They outran the other countries of West Europe in commerce and energy (cent. xv); yet for this, like the Greeks before them, they sacrificed their independent political life.

Impulse towards Strong Organic National Unity.—It would seem that the question of moment for each country was how it could best attain a *national* unity. The more backward lands answered better the economic demand; the very greatness and freedom of rival centres in Germany and Italy made any step towards consolidation impossible. *National* unity arose from different causes in which sometimes pure economic factors played a secondary part, though they were never wholly absent. England, industrially far behind other parts of the continent in cent. xv, became *one*, partly because it was an island and largely because administrative monarchy had begun its work here early and with confidence. In Spain, a common religious foe pressed the survivors into a unity; so in the dutch provinces and the cantons of Switzerland. In France too, foreign pressure rallied patriots round the king as the centre of unity and the symbol and guarantor of freedom. Meantime, as Roman Law was more carefully studied, the advantage of a uniform autocracy became a commonplace both with lawyers and merchants. It was seen that a strong civil power had once charged itself (with the fullest consent of the governed) with the many duties now surrendered to the church or to pure 'knight-errantry'. The genius of the latin race led them towards this bureaucratic cæsarism under which for a time it remained acquiescent and grateful, content to expand its manifold resources.

Roman Law had revived in cent. xii and had justified the imperial claims. It was from the first a destructive agent in its attitude to the

spiritual powers : it could not conceive of a genuine *dyarchy* in which both parties respect the limits of the sacred and profane departments. As in philosophic theory, the practical mind pressed towards an absolute and final authority, each side no doubt hoping to influence it to their own profit. A new lettered class of laymen arose, primed with the doctrines of a *secular* absolutism (as it seemed to them) which was destined to supersede the canonists. The Church had early demanded a respect for property and the new law helped to define its titles and enforce its covenants. The rejection of usury by the Church (never upheld in practice) was now withdrawn ; and the prohibition was ingeniously explained away (but see on the *contractus trinus*, Ashley, *Introd. Econ. Hist.* I. ii 440). This not only removed prejudice against trading enterprise, but also restored the self-respect of the merchant community, now recognized as following an honourable and dignified calling.

The Monarch's Supporters : Sovereign as People's Delegate.—The Roman Law also aided economic progress by the support it gave to the new monarchy. The curious legal fiction, by which the roman people consciously surrendered all its rights into the hands of a single arbiter, became an accepted maxim. Therefore the prince's ruling was to have the force of law ; and the doctrines of modern absolutism were imbibed and expounded.

Kings are the natural (and perhaps the only) creators of nations ; and no better instance can be given than France. The revival after the fatal Hundred Years' War was due to Charles VII and Louis XI. The inert body, or congeries, came slowly to conscious life as an organism ; this life (with the approval of all) had its centre in the kingly brain. Monarch and advisers made economic uniformity by degrees out of hopeless tangle. The nation submitted to a permanent tax (*taille*) and with this regular income gave secure dignity to the crown and saved itself from mercenaries by providing for a standing army of natives. Charles VII owed much to Jacques Cœur who, enjoying this new peaceful order, revived the woollen industry at Bourges, traded with the east from Montpellier and settled his factories on the coast of Syria and Egypt. Money economy was now triumphant and the sovereigns who *wanted*, and the merchants or bankers who *possessed*, capital entered into a long and friendly alliance—e.g. Charles V and the Fuggers, Edward IV and the Hansards. Internal safety was improved ; the perhaps equal mischiefs of brigandage and feudal tolls were abolished.

Monarchic Integration. First Realized in France : Economic Basis.—The advisers of Louis XI were not nobles but *bourgeois*. He might claim, and exert, the right of interfering with the great industrial societies by naming his own members ; he might from his central position set aside local privilege and interest at Paris or at Rouen for the sake of general welfare : but in spite of his high-handedness he did not forfeit confidence or esteem. Thus he began the *nationalizing* process whereby not only the neglected duties of the church but the enterprises of private persons were taken over by royalty. To this policy was due the amazing recovery of France between the departure of the last english soldier and the brilliant

'summer tourney' of Charles VIII in Italy. The french kingdom became a centralized economic whole. Interrupted once more by the religious struggles of cent. xvi, the task was taken up anew by Henry IV, by Sully and by Colbert: and resulted in the crowned socialism of the *Ancien Régime*.[1] For its supplies in France and elsewhere the Crown (that is the nation) was consciously dependent on the goodwill and confidence of merchant and capitalist. Financiers were consulted on the royal policy: there was even a time when both in France and England[2] the *bourgeois* class was believed to have the sole and indefeasible right to control affairs, and reforms giving this class the franchise were believed (even by far-seeing statesmen) to be final. If money was required for the people's safety and the king's glory, it was not to be obtained except by methods ensuring its steady flow and untrammelled circulation (Lamond's edit. of *Discourse of Commonweal*): commercial interests were also royal interests. Food supply and the development of husbandry was a national concern. The old civic particularism had given way before a wider conception of the problem 'Who is my neighbour?' To this end Roman Law and the new monarchy, capital and the trading influence had all coöperated.

Religious Rupture and the New Secular Absolutism.—It must not be forgotten that just after the close of this period (*1300–1500*) another factor enters to assist in creating the new competitive nationalities,—the *religious* rupture. Steadily at work during these years a discontent which was largely economic came to a head in the next age and led to the dismemberment of Christendom. Nothing contributed so much to the exaltation of the civil power—just at that time under genuinely personal rulers, and not yet collapsed into an anonymous State-autocracy. The modern nation is really a novel social form. It is founded not on kinship as of old but on contiguity, in an artificial area, and on a common allegiance (often to a foreign dynasty). In cent. xvi (and xvii) attempt was made to give the arbitrary amalgam a certain coherence and solidarity by insisting also on a common belief. With the full sanction of the Reformers in the religious movement,[3] the princes were empowered to enforce their own religious creeds and practice on the subjects within their scattered or

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[1] The comparison will be called inaccurate because 'the resources were 'centralized by the Bourbons for dynastic ambition, for pensioning a now 'superfluous aristocracy, for the whims of the king's mistresses and 'favourites: whereas modern autocracy aims only at the good of the 'worker'. Time will show (if mankind is unhappy enough to give the scheme a trial) whether an unlimited centralized power can safely be entrusted to any body of men. Under an economic bureaucracy there might well be as little personal freedom or chance of expressing opinion as under the thoroughly frightened despotism of Naples under the Bourbons or Russia. Let those who are sceptical read Wells' *The Sleeper Awakes*.

[2] In France 1830–48, in our own country between the dates of the first two Reform Bills: 1832 and 1867.

[3] A movement, it need scarcely be said to-day, in truth reactionary.

contiguous estates; and without their support (not wholly disinterested) the Reformation and the rupture of Christendom could not possibly have been achieved. In the last years of our period another influence began to work both on nations and rulers—colonial imperialism: it unified the nation at home, at least placed it under the management of a single board of directors, that it might compete with rivals abroad.

Section II. Political Theory (*1300*): Dante and Marsilius

Law of Nature and Equality of Man Supplant Medieval Franchises.—One chief and embracing question in our period was the doctrine of human *Equality according to Nature's Law*—which upset all the fabrics and objectives around and left the field open to the modern notions of *force* and *utility*. It will be seen that hitherto all political views had rested on some *positive recognition of rights*, whether personal or corporate. The turmoil of the Middle Ages was not a reign of pure licence and selfishness; it was an honest attempt to adjust these conflicting rights and effect a working compromise. This end was almost everywhere pursued with sincerity. Until the italian tyrant, no king or ruler ever believed that he held power for selfish uses; and in his most savage and unenlightened act could appeal to the greater good of the commonwealth which he could only secure by crushing its foes. To say that in the feudal period kingship was the acknowledged *vindex et assertor libertatis* is to utter a commonplace which has been tardily accepted even by the prejudiced idealists of our own times. The ruler had duties then, as he had rights, like everyone else. Every other class (each with its own laws, usages and code of honour) was in like position. To harmonize and to conciliate was the ruler's task. In every case there was some claim insoluble and impenetrable which was believed to rest on the real nature of things. The possession of a *personal* law, not to be set aside or overridden, largely helped, if not the theory, at least the practice of liberty. Rights inhered in a class or person and were not an artificial endowment or gift from outside. Finally (though the doctrinal mind in the Middle Age tended towards a realism which despised the particular) the last unshaken and root principle, to which in the end all other laws had to bow, was the *inalienable right of the immortal soul*.

Loss in Personal Liberty and Local Autonomy.—Now it cannot be denied that during the Enlightenment (from about *1300* to the Revolution *1800*) these very substantial and positive assets were bartered away for shadowy privileges of theory or for arbitrary gifts from strangers. Man (like Ishtar in her descent into the underworld) is seen to divest himself one by one of the rights he enjoyed as member of such a community or sworn retainer of such a prince. He loses pride in local characteristics and ceases to be a Gascon or Andalusian that he may become a Frenchman or a Spaniard. Until recently it has been supposed that this exchange told in favour of *freedom*; the horizon and the chances of life were infinitely extended and the petty parochialist was on the way to become a citizen of the world, a member of the commonwealth of mankind. It is now suspected that this wider franchise has been purchased at much too high a price. It is said that the Church by fixing man's attention on the hereafter

taught him to neglect the tangible benefits and beauties of the present life. But what shall we say of reformers who belittle or ridicule the class, the habits, the ignorance, the rights of the majority in whom the sole ultimate control of government is vested ; who thus encourage discontent with their forefathers' interests and abodes : who teach them to abandon some measure of local autonomy in exchange for a worthless vote in an unwieldy centralized State ? At present however it is solely on the *negative* character of the new conception of man that we insist. Instead of a concrete and highly ' qualified ' personality, a colourless entity was set up as the ideal man. At first this figure was invested with every sort of splendid attribute by the eternal Law of Nature. The whole later history of social politics (the only politics deserving the name) is a long record of disillusionment. The earlier outlook might have been narrow ; the interests of clansman, peasant or burgess may have been paltry and trivial, and the rights enjoyed by persons under a feudalism highly precarious. But it is hard to see that the surrender of these has been compensated adequately. Here once again to proclaim a universal equality and, for that purpose, to divest each class and person of special rights is to prepare, not the reign of equal units, but the tyranny of new, anonymous and self-seeking forces.

Contrast of Ideals (Dante and Marsilius).—The two chief political treatises at the close of our period are Dante's *de Monarchiâ* (*1310–1313*) and the *Defensor Pacis* of Marsilius and John of Jandun (*1324*). The interval of thought between the two writings is astounding. Dante replaces a divine and autocratic papacy by a divine and autocratic imperialism ; under whose arbitrage each state and class and unit is to find its true sphere and proper work. He accepts the curious blend of religious thought and classical tradition when he believes that the roman people are God's chosen vessel for appointing the world-ruler : but he hastily compromises with existing custom by accepting the vii electors as the true channels of the divine choice. He would not have taken Charles IV to Rome to be crowned by the roman populace, nor regarded the revived republic of Rienzi as an improvement. As he is the highest exponent of medieval thought and theology at its best, so is he the clearest expounder of the spiritual monarchy and a united Christendom. Marsilius and Jandun are still medieval ; there is not yet to be observed the frank and unscrupulous particularism of later theory and practice. But the spiritual and moral element is much in the background. The *Defensor Pacis* wishes to restore peace and order to mankind. Law on which peace depends, is the will of the whole people or at least—an ominous reservation—of the majority (*pars valentior*) ; they should therefore elect their own ruler to carry out the laws and ensure peace, but should give him but a small army or police-force lest he be tempted to subvert the very laws he is chosen to defend : Dante, it will be remembered, did not condescend to ask if the moral umpire needed an armed body at all ! If he breaks the law he can be held to account like any other violator : for his office rests on tacit or explicit contract : if he is guilty of serious crime against the common weal, he *may be put to death*. The cause of the distress of Europe is the Papacy, a fictitious power which only rules by a series of adroit usurpations. In reforming the

church Marsilius goes far beyond Dante and, in effect, makes it a subordinate department of the State and not one independent body. No clergyman can exert coercive power or impose penalties or enforce submission to God's law: heretics should be punished by the civil tribunals of the State as bad citizens. The clergy should be forcibly restored to a holy and apostolic poverty; tithes should be suppressed and the excessive estates of churchmen resumed by the secular power. The State is to appoint to the chief benefices; and the emperor is to summon the General Council which was to enjoy supreme power in sacred matters. The pope, whose ancient dignity is not denied, is to have honour and titular precedence, but must concern himself with his spiritual duties alone. Like the emperor he is to be elected by the people, or by *the princes who represent them*, or again by the General Council: by these agencies he can be suspended or deprived.

Fictitious Democracy: Real Despotism.—If the theory of this work is pure democracy, the actual effect would be pure cæsarism; for it is a vindication of a strong central power like that of Frederic II without rival or counterpoise, either in nobles or churchmen. From the side of church-reform it is more daring than any proposal of Wiclif: for the hierarchy was to be set down, the clergy to be despoiled of any secular duties or privileges, and the Christian republic (or rather its chosen autocrat) was to reduce the pope to an honorary chairman without a vote. This is oddly imperialist and really recalls the pagan theory of the emperor's sovereignty as set forth by the lawyers, before his powers were limited by the church.

Section III. Civilian Absolutism: The Cæsaro-papism of Frederic II

Sicilian King as Pioneer of the New Central Autocracy: Begins as a Welf.—Frederic II had passed his early years amid the anarchy of sicilian feudalism, but his abilities were good and his education was not neglected. The atmosphere of peril and lawlessness produced in him the same character that we find in ancient greek tyrants and their counterparts in medieval Italy. He is at the outset a papalist or welf of set policy: in *1213* he surrenders all lands claimed by the roman see since his father's death and his own right to interfere in the choice of bishops. He affirmed the papal supremacy over his island-kingdom, allowed the power of appeal to Rome and promised to lend secular aid to root out heresy.[1] After the victory of Bouvines in *1214* and his own crowning as king in the next year, he wrote to Innocent III that his son would be made king of Sicily and be placed under the papal suzerainty. There does not seem any reason to doubt that Frederic lied in stating that Henry's election as german king in *1220* was a step taken without his knowledge or consent; indeed, his manifold concessions to electors and princes at the time seem to show

[1] We have seen elsewhere that the earliest 'freethinking' monarch did much to promote the rigorous treatment of suspected heretics under torture (p. 742).

his eagerness to secure it. Crowned at Rome (in November of the same year) he renewed his promise to go on a crusade (made at Aix in *1215*), set the clergy free from taxes and lay jurisdiction, agreed that the imperial ban should follow the anathema of the Church and again repeated his detestation of heretics. But his pious designs were interrupted by the needs of his southern government; he spent five years in pacifying Sicily, where the feudal barons hindered orderly and uniform government and the wealthy towns gave trouble.

His Saracens and Crusade Estrange the Pope: Sicily Centralized.—He gathered round him a bodyguard of *condottieri* from his saracen captives, men without a country, whom he bound to himself by purely personal ties: they were settled on the mainland at Nocera. This step perhaps first aroused against him the papal suspicion which he never was afterwards able to allay. In *1225* he assumed the title King of Jerusalem and in *1227* in spite of Gregory IX's prohibition proceeded to fulfil his vow. Gregory denounced him and Frederic replied in a letter addressed to the princes of Europe which won him no little sympathy even in Rome. He crowned himself king in the Holy City in *1229*; and on his safe return came to terms with the pope by agreeing to allow free election to the sicilian clergy and to respect his rival's domains—in which matter the pope himself had not set a good example during the king's absence in Palestine. In *1231* he was once more engaged in crushing the disorderly elements in his own kingdom: the Laws of Melfi put an end to baronial ascendancy, lost estates were won back to the crown, royal officials were appointed, fortresses and castles were destroyed, self-government was granted to the towns and their deputies invited to sit in Diets. The Church was placed under the king's jurisdiction and further gifts or bequests to it were no longer allowed. That is to say, Frederic II set up the first successful instance of the modern centralized and secular State.

Opposite Policy in the Empire: Deliberate Abolition of Effective Kingship.—In Germany his policy was exactly the reverse. He willingly exchanged a tangible heritage in the rich and luxurious South for the visionary dreams of world-empire—such as Dante urged on his successor nearly a century later—or a precarious position as *primus inter pares*. Virtually he recognized the german princes as autonomous: in them was vested all jurisdiction and no imperial mints or tolls were to be set up on their estates. The privileges of the cities he fiercely attacked in the interests of the higher nobility: their justice was confined within their walls, they were forbidden to give shelter to the lord's men, their trade-gilds were abolished and the consent of the bishop was required for all appointments to civic office. He also attacked the franchises of the lombard cities, already assailed in *1226–27* at the Diet of Cremona; he was glad to accept the pope's mediation after failure to enforce his demands. Just 10 years later he was again embroiled (*1237*) and this time the cities refused to accept the kindly offices of Gregory IX, the terms offered by Frederic being held insulting. He seems to have deliberately torn to pieces, in his conflict with the papacy, the last relics of imperial power in the north. His enactments *in favorem principum* (*1220, 1231*) put an end to the central

power in Germany and helped in a disintegration[1] of the realm which passed into a proverb. When the Mongols threatened Germany (*1241*) there was no central force to defend the State as under Henry I three centuries earlier; Frederic was content to issue futile directions for a campaign which he could not control or command. But the danger passed and next year he visited the kingdom merely to squander the last remnant of substantial prerogative in lavish grants of doles and privileges.

His Struggle with Rome and Failure.—Frederic's war with the Holy See lasted from *1239* to his death in *1250*; a bitter and truceless quarrel which ruined both combatants and estranged thoughtful and loyal men not only from the competing heads, but from the very ideal of Christendom. Frederic was charged with impiety, heresy and blasphemy: the pope urged the german princes to renounce fealty (as in the days of Henry IV) and despatched travelling friars to preach rebellion through the country. Innocent IV at the Council of Lyons (although an old wibelline before his election) pronounced sentence of excommunication and deposition on the ground of heresy, perfidy, oath-breaking and hostility to the Church. The king-emperor retorted by attacking the wealth, the pride, the bad faith of the clergy; and threatened to confiscate their estates in his italian dominions. Innocent was even more steadfast in his hatred than the foregoing pontiffs and stirred up sedition in Apulia, while Parma, a wibelline stronghold, was seized by his welf partizans (*1248*): the imperial treasures and insignia fell into their hands and the crown was bestowed in derision upon a hunchback. Peter de Vineis, his loyal and capable minister, now fell under his moody suspicion: having been charged with treason and deprived of sight, he took his own life by dashing his head against his dungeon wall. Enzio, the king's favourite son, was made captive, and all offers of ransom were refused by the Bolognese. Frederic died at Fiorentino in Dec. *1250*, perhaps of a broken heart, having witnessed the failure of all his plans. Yet, in spite of this disappointment, his career and policy became a model for the italian tyrants—of whom Eccelino da Romano, his friend and imitator, was amongst the first and Cæsar Borgia perhaps the last.

An Oriental Caliph, not a Medieval King: His Versatile Culture.—Versatile and unscrupulous, Frederic recalls rather a muslim caliph than a Christian sovereign. The contrast with his grandfather, the great Barbarossa, is most striking: an entirely new ideal of Christian monarchy and worldly ambition had replaced the older and nobler teutonic standards. It is one of the ironies of history that the younger Frederic became, after the fashion of Nero or the invisible Imams of the Fatimites, the expected Messiah of any and every party with a grievance.[2] His court and culture were imperially 'catholic': Jews and Muslim were made welcome and

[1] Of which today there are vestiges even under the iron hegemony of Prussia.

[2] The Germans long believed him to be still alive and about to return: it seems certain that it was only in later times that this legend was transferred to Frederic I who is said to wait in a cavern with his beard grown through the table, until the hour strikes for the Empire's Golden Age.

great impetus was given to learning.[1] He knew six tongues, founded the University of Naples in *1224*, and was a patron of the famous Medical School at Salerno. He kept a menagerie and studied natural history and architecture. He wrote on falconry [2] and proved himself a close and accurate observer. At his court italian poetry was born; de Vineis [3] is said to have written the first sonnet and Frederic's own lyrics are still extant. His wives were kept in seclusion in muslim fashion and eunuch-chamberlains were employed to guard the harem at Lucera.

His Peculiar Religion: The Divine Imamate.—His religious views are wholly obscure or appear to us rather a medley of conflicting theories often changed and discarded. Political motives, rather than any clear conviction, made him persecute heretics and encourage mahommedans. The irreverent jests with which his enemies charged him do not prove more than a vague and scoffing indifference: he cannot be charged, any more than the byzantine Constantine V (*741–775*) with definite unbelief. At the same time it cannot be doubted that he gave much occasion for scandal by his open friendship with infidels and by his attacks on the papacy, which were yet in a large measure defensive or retaliatory. It is certain that he was acquainted with the eastern doctrine of the Divine Imamate and may at times have believed himself the prophet of God, a vehicle of the divine spirit, or even an actual incarnation of the Deity.[4] Frederic was certainly not always consistent in his opinions nor had he any precise religious creed, except fear and dislike of an aggressive papacy. But we cannot doubt that he excited the anger of the pious by claiming, like a caliph, to unite *spiritual* and *imperial* power: whether he himself believed in his full competence in these respects is perhaps doubtful.

His Cæsaro-papism: State Without a Rival.—In politics he set (as we saw) a model for the new centralized State, in which the whole resources of a clearly marked kingdom were to be turned to the glory of the sovereign and owner. He really brought about the end of anarchy in Sicily and gave the distressed country an era of contentment and prosperity. He was an able legislator: he strove to enhance his dignity and pomp after the manner of the caliphs or the roman and byzantine emperors—in which latter imitation he followed Otto III.

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[1] Under his advice our Michael Scot translated treatises of Aristotle and of Averroes. Leonard of Pisa introduced algebra and arabic numerals.

[2] *De arte venandi cum avibus*, lat. Augsburg 1596, germ. Berlin just 300 years later.

[3] 1190–1249, one of the earliest in the line of royal ministers and chancellors, not chosen within the circle of ecclesiastics: welf tradition accused him of abetting Frederic in his blasphemy and heresy and of writing the famous work (which nevertheless has never been produced) *De Tribus Impositoribus*: the fear of this destructive treatise was no doubt quite genuine among simple Christians.

[4] Huillard Bréholles (*Hist. Diplom. F. II* Paris *1852–1861* and *Vie et Correspondance de Pierre de la Vigne*, Paris 1865) is the principal exponent of this very plausible theory.

Embodiment of All Heresy : Founder of Modern Despotism.—It is not surprising that he seemed to the papacy the apotheosis of secular wickedness in high places, the very embodiment of all and sundry the heresies which distressed and alarmed that age of perplexity and transition. That he was accepted almost as prophet and martyr by the Fraticelli makes the hostile attitude of the Holy See natural and to some extent justifies it. Justinian has been called an ' empurpled nihilist ' and it is certain that to average catholics on the papal side Frederic represented the overthrow of every principle they held dear. He seemed to threaten the ruin not of the church and its chief pastor only but of Christian society itself. He turned resolutely away from idealism and achieved his ends in east or west by intrigue and money rather than by force of character or military strength. He marks the passage from a moral and spiritual Christendom, ruled by two consuls without earthly might and in God's name, to the utilitarian particularism and competition of modern States. He did much to promote a vague notion of human equality [1] which overturned the carefully graded hierarchy of feudalism and led straight to regal autocracy, to the absolute claims of the collective group and its spokesman over the freedom of the unit. It is not without reason that we call this appendix ' the triumph and the defeat of Nominalism ' ; for the particulars, reacting against a tutelage they had outgrown, became a mass of unrelated atoms. These, themselves incoherent and centrifugal, were united and consolidated only by the strong hand from outside, to become the pliant instruments of the central will.

Section IV. Democratic Absolutism aimed against Papal Claims

After Austin, Church not State the Ethical Community.—The feud between the secular and sacred powers only waxed acute and irremediable in the very last years of our period. It was only in cent. xiii that the two claimants could not be reconciled or exist side by side. Up to that time political theory (much modified by Scripture and the witness of the Fathers) had accepted both rulers while giving the complimentary primacy to St. Peter's vice-gerent. But in the post-austinian medieval mind there lurked a profound distrust of an earthly or civil ruler. The visible State was no longer, as in the classical ideal, a school for moral excellence, an arena for the development of the highest character, it was ' added because ' of offences ' and its rise marked the fall of a once perfect mankind. In the west after Gregory the Great (+ *604*) the Church arose to overshadow its claims upon human loyalty and confidence. The (coercive) State was the result of Adam's sin and but for the Fall would not have been called into being (Aust. *De. Civ. Dei* xix 15). The Church was now the only ethical community : the State, assuming a purely legal and judicial guise, was but a necessary evil, a preventive of greater ills, sometimes an executioner and agent of divine wrath. Some remnant of aristotelian text and

[1] Like Islam itself.

memories kept alive the notion of Law, to which the personal will was subservient, as a transient unit to the eternal Idea. Scripture too taught men to distinguish *tyrant* from *king*, *Saul* from *David*. Hincmar of Reims upholds limited monarchy. The Wars of Investiture and the novel claims of the hildebrandine papacy brought on a shower of 'welf' and 'wibelline' pamphlets (after *1076*) on the source and sanction of political power, *de lite imperatorum et pontificum*. Gregory VII (*Epist.* viii 21) led off the conflict with a daring statement: that kingship is the invention of those who, ignorant of God and instigated by the devil, have presumed to tyrannize over their fellow-creatures.

Distrust of Civil Sovereignty: Law Above the King.—John of Salisbury (*Polycraticus*) believed that *tyrannicide*, even attended by perfidy, *might* on occasion be justified. At the close of cent. xii, even before the full knowledge of classical texts and politics, it was agreed that *monarchy should be limited by law* and that the subject had a right to resist injustice: just as in the purely feudal aspect, a vassal might secede from a lord who could no longer protect him. Bratton (*c. 1200–1268*) in his *De Legibus* says: 'the king has for his superior God and the Law; if he does wrong 'the baronage and the assembly of the kingdom (*universitas regni*) have 'the duty and power of correcting and amending him.' The argument was clear: kingship was ordained for the common good; law was a rule of action to regulate this good; and to its pursuit in accordance with law the kingly power is restricted.

About *1264* a nameless friar of the franciscan order wrote in rhyming latin, a treatise on politics and a eulogy of Simon de Montfort. He sees the root of English distress in Henry III's roman axiom that the 'prince's 'will has the force of law'. Quite in the formula of Herodotus (*νόμος βασιλεὺς ἁπάντων*) he insists that the real king is not the changing and mutable person but the eternal law; *rex* is not *lex* but *lex* is and ought to be *rex*. Roger Bacon had been teaching at Oxford just after the death of Frederic II (*1250–1257*) that science and nature were regular and majestic. The study of law also belonged to this cent. xiii—a code not depending on royal pleasure or on a mere congeries of custom and usage but a logical unity. To this our author assents: *Dicitur vulgariter ut rex vult lex vadit: Veritas vult aliter, nam lex stat, rex cadit/ . . . . Ista lex sic loquitur, per me regnant reges/ per me jus obtenditur his qui condunt leges/. Istam legem stabilem nullus rex mutabit/ sed se variabilem per istam firmabit/ . . . Et rex nihil proprium præferat communi/ quia salus omnium sibi cessit uni/ Non enim præponitur sibimet victurus/ sed ut hic qui subditur populus securus/.*[1] He denies that his caprice is binding on subjects (*quod imperaret/ suomet arbitrio singulos ligaret*. Rebellion is lawful but in extreme cases only; normally the executive magistrate should be limited by a parliament which makes known the 'people's will.' *'Igitur communitas regni consulatur/ ut quid universitas sentiat sciatur.'* The pope (like the Jesuits in later times) was by no means averse from this doctrine. Manegold

[1] Understand *vivat*.

wrote that: 'The people exalts one man to govern and rule men justly. 'If he break the compact (*pactum*) under which he is chosen, his people 'are set free from their allegiance, since he first failed to keep faith.'

Constitutionalism in Aquinas: Papacy Superior to All Rulers.—St. Thomas of Aquin, true to his harmonizing aim, tries to combine the austinian theory of Church and State with Aristotle: '*Law* is *reason*, for it 'is the function of *reason* to order things to an end . . . this *end* is *happi-* '*ness*: so law contains rules for the *common happiness* (of all): so to make 'laws belongs either to the whole community or to some one man who 'carries the person of the whole community: . . . *unde optima ordinatio* '*principum est in aliquâ civitate vel regno in quo* unus præficitur *secundum* '*virtutem* qui omnibus præsit, *et sub ipso sunt aliqui principantes sec. virt.*: '*et tamen talis principatus ad omnes pertinet, tum quia* ex omnibus eligi 'possunt, *tum quia etiam* ab omnibus eliguntur.' Here Thomas looks forward to a modern democratic bureaucracy in which men are compensated for loss of autonomy and official interference by the thought that in some measure they elect their rulers and supply them according to merit, out of their own body. He maintains that all have some share in sovereignty (*omnes aliquam partem habent in principatu*). 'The Commonalty both 'institutes and limits the prince' (*de Reg. Princ.*) 'if he uses his power as a 'tyrant he may be destroyed by the commons who have set him up or 'they may limit his prerogative.' Like Manegold, he believes in a contract (*pactum*) which conditions the ruler's power and is forfeit if he abuses it.[1] St. Thomas is an unqualified papalist: *papa utriusque potestatis apicem tenet* (*Comm.* in *Sentent.* Dist. xlv 67). Only the papal power is ordained directly by God; the princes of the earth receive their mandate from the pope and so from God mediately. It was against this view that Dante wrote: both powers were 'ordained of God'. In the *Summa* Aquinas argues that sedition is lawful against a bad government.

The First Theorist of the New Monarchy.—Ægidius Colonna (*1247–1316*)[2] wrote a treatise under the sane title *de Regimine Principum*, addressed to Philip IV of France: he was general of the Austin Friars, and won the title *Doctor Fundatissimus*. He also treads closely in the footprints of the classical philosophers, distinguishing king and tyrant as the ruler has before him a fatherly or a selfish aim and adding (as Aristotle ought to have done) one step more to the hierarchic grades; family, village, city, *kingdom*. He justifies this more comprehensive polity on grounds of expediency; it is a confederacy of districts and cities under a single prince,[3] who is of

[1] We may note here, as a result of blending Aristotle and the Church, the principle so prominent in Dante half a century later: man has two ends in time and eternity, and he is a member of a commonwealth both *civil* and *spiritual*: the one leads up to and prepares for the other; but the value of the latter through revealed religion is incommensurate with the former.

[2] In imitation of Ægidius but in the venetian dialect of italian the Minorite Fra Paolino wrote his *de Regimine Rectoris*.

[3] Thus he may well be a foreigner or an invited guardian from elsewhere,

service in making war against a common foe and in averting dangers menacing the lesser units, household, village, and town. Ægidius (it will be noted) is purely modern; he speaks no longer of the emperor; from the imperial and world-wide state he turns to France, the typical instance (before the Hundred Years' War) of successful integrating absolutism.[1]

Attempt to Found Imperial Claims on Democracy.—The future lay with such modest ideals, local and national, and not with a world-sovereignty. When Emperor Louis IV came to Rome to be crowned he found himself welcomed by franciscan malcontents eager for clerical poverty and papal disendowment, by jurists like Marsilius and Jandun who applied to the imperial case arguments already used with success in the recent conflict of Boniface and Philip the Fair. Marsilius in his *Defensor Pacis* (*1324*) raises the lay-state from its humble condition. He suggests the policy of receiving the crown not from an exile and a puppet of France at Avignon but from the roman people. Louis recognized a principle which Barbarossa had repelled with scorn—the citizens of medieval Rome were now asserted to be the true source and channel of authority. The *Defensor* aimed to restore peace to Christendom by settling the points at issue on the *origin* and *nature* of political power. He believes in the rule of the *stronger*; the *valentior pars*, as a body, are to make the law. The feeble executive, with but a very small armed force at its disposal, is named by the people; the magistrate is responsible to them and may be deposed or even put to death for default or abuse of power. The sole cause of the present distress is papal usurpation and encroachment into the civil realm. The church must retain no sort of coercive jurisdiction; heresy must be punished no doubt, but by a civil tribunal, as a crime against society. The excessive wealth of the clergy must be secularized and in future the State must nominate to all benefices. The pope's dignity is to be one of honorary precedence, without power to give wealthy office, interpret Holy Writ, or define dogma. All this was only realized after the Revolution of *1789* and then only for a brief space; but two Frenchmen had already set forth the outlines of this daring policy. It is *democratic* in theory but of course in practice *imperialist*; and the church is not made parallel

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like the ruricids in Russia, or the customary *podesta* in a jealous italian city.

[1] That Cæsar is the residuary legatee of democracy (in the sense of a free people) is seen not only in the roman absolutist adage but also in modern practice: with us the old notion that the land belonged primarily to the *people* gives way before the new theory that it belongs to the king,—this not merely by right of force and conquest, but as a legal convenience and a guarantee of peaceful enjoyment and certain title to the king's vassals. 'The king', said Professor E. Robertson, 'may be said to have 'become the universal successor of the people . . . where ancient common 'right has come to be a right of the Crown or the right held of the Crown 'by a vassal.' Hence to-day the absolute and unqualified claims made by some in favour of state-power over all private property.

and independent, but a subject and satellite to the civil State. The utopia of a roman commonwealth was realized.

Marsilius : Attempt to Revive Notion of State as Ethical Community.—But although this theory of *popular* sovereignty could in effect lead only to an imperial absolutism, it is not surprising that Louis IV saw in those bold collaborators Jandun and Marsilius, heretics quite as dangerous as the Albigenses : the doctrine that Cæsar was formally accountable to his people and might be arraigned and executed was unwelcome, though it is the single condition on which the roman autocracy was built. Soon received into favour, Marsilius followed Louis into Italy, where he preached against the absentee ' frankish ' pope and witnessed his ideal realized. The king was crowned emperor by the people's delegates (*1328*) ; the pope was deposed by this now fully authentic power, and, after a shadowy popular vote, Nicholas V was raised to the papacy by imperial decree. Marsilius was made imperial vicar and persecuted the non-juring clergy. He was also made archbishop of Milan and Jandun his colleague obtained as a reward the see of Ferrara.[1] Marsilius, who with Ægidius follows Aristotle in tracing politics up from the family or household, desires to *rehabilitate* the State, as the home of ethical life, in the ancient spirit of classical times. He seems also to follow him in dividing the six functions (three productive, three protective) : *husbandry*, *crafts*, and *banking* for the physical life ; the duties of *judge*, *soldier* and *priest*, for both natural and spiritual life. The priesthood is just another department of the State, set up and controlled by the people. His purpose, to demolish grounds for *clerical* interference in politics, was one which could not have occurred to Aristotle in whose time there was no such counterpoise to *secular* absolutism,—or rather the *divine king* Alexander united in his own person, the factors now contrasted and at feud.

Law Made by All Citizens to be Sovereign.—The Laws are for him ' universal judgments ' defining what is just and expedient in a State, enforced by means of temporal sanctions, properly made by all citizens or a majority (*universitas civium aut ejus valentior pars*)[2]. The *general*

[1] Marsilius (who died shortly after 1342), wrote also an oddly named treatise *De Translatione Imperii* which, closely following the lines of a work by Landulf Colonna, maintains the exclusive jurisdiction of emperor (or civil power) in matters of marriage : in spite of its wide and familiar title it is only a short *opuscule ad hoc* to justify the imperial right to annul a marriage. In Oxford there reposes (to the shame of medieval students) a *Defensor Minor* as yet in MS. dealing with indulgences, penances, crusades, pilgrimages, vows, relations of pope and council, marriage and divorce. Here he is even more clearly forced by his *democratic* axioms to push to extremes of *autocracy* the prerogative of the Emperor. It is needless to repeat here that this was the result of all abstract political theories aiming at liberty or popular control—to thrust all power upon a single ruler who became in effect irresponsible.

[2] Which is very much like the κρείττονος ξύμφερον of Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic.

advantage will best (he argues with Aristotle) be seen by the *generality* of the citizens: the people will readily obey laws made by themselves and will be quick to resent statutes passed by a foreign authority: *quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur.* Marsilius seems to forget or absorb all other functions of a ruler in the *judicial*, i.e. the application to special cases of laws already agreed upon and presumably ancient and unalterable. Of course this was not the chief problem before the Middle Ages at all: it was an unimportant side or aspect of the real issue. Marsilius, in making *Law* (with Fortescue and Hooker) the ultimate authority, seems to uphold *popular sovereignty* in a very modern sense. But with Dante these writers are the last to press seriously the universal claims of a secular roman emperor.

D. THE PAPACY AND THE MODERN STATE

(A Study in Central and Secular Government)

Ideal of Non-coercive Unitary State: both in Welf and Wibelline.—Hildebrand's ideal for a european polity was theocracy, in a single church-state. The Wibellines, such as Dante, merely put the emperor as secular head (but still consecrated and divinely appointed) in the place of the pope. In the general conception the two factions scarcely differed at all. The final power was both worldly and spiritual, and though the parts or members, countries and towns, enjoyed freedom in local usage and law, the supreme moral power had at all times a right to intervene, with a decision or arbitrage that must not be challenged. This authority no one attempted to invest with force: it was believed, even amid the tumult and wrongdoing of the Middle Age, that all Christians would cheerfully obey a central power which exercised only a *moral*, never a *coercive*, jurisdiction. Only very late appears the claim of particular cities and provinces to be quite independent, to recognize no referee in a quarrel, to trust entirely to force and success in establishing itself as a paramount influence among its neighbours. A pope who was an exile, an emperor (somewhat later) who might be a bankrupt (and even at times under arrest), exercising a wide appellate jurisdiction, stood as continual reminders of the *spiritual* basis of society. God's vice-gerent (whether pope or emperor) was justice incarnate, whose verdict (needing no bailiffs or executive force behind it) would be accepted by all men as if it were the divine sentence itself. But while the two rival factions strove, other powers slowly grew into maturity, based on very different ideals of the world and of man. The period of the Crusades (*c. 1100–1272*) was interrupted by the Hundred Years' War between the rival leaders (*1155–1254*).

Rupture under the Hohenstaufens.—There had been imperious emperors and a closer copying of byzantine autocracy before this time; but it was Frederic I who first strove to bring in a new and less spiritual conception of empire, its rights and duties, the absolutism, in effect secular, which Diocletian had set up. He fought 22 years with Popes Hadrian and Alexander; he struggled with the League of Freedom in Lombardy; he modelled his prerogative on the pagan law of Rome—in order to restore

in the west a byzantine centralism which teutonic feudalism had overthrown. He destroyed Milan (*1162*) after he had claimed at Roncaglia (*1158*) unbounded rights as emperor over clergy and laymen alike. He appealed to the roman code (known and studied in north Italy since *1100*) instead of acknowledging Canon Law. This code popes did not create and could not modify. It was the Hohenstaufens who first in the empire (*1150–1200*), and failing this in a provincial kingdom (Sicily *1200–1250*), drew the outlines of the modern State whose head is 'over all causes, as well 'ecclesiastical as temporal, throughout his dominions supreme'. This revival of the strictest imperial claims struck a blow at local urban autonomy and at papal rights; Frederic could not tolerate self-governing cities, or a pope who refused to be his subject. Alexander III after giving support to the successful revolt of Lombardy, Rome and Venice, received homage from the emperor in *1177* at St. Mark's, a scene scarcely less memorable than the wintry incident of Canossa, just a century before (*1076*). Henceforth there was a truceless warfare for supremacy; and if the pope won in the extinction of the detested dynasty, success only brought his complete ruin at the moment of his most splendid triumph: (to Boniface VIII soon after the great Jubilee *1300*.) In spite of the humiliation of the secular power in the fall of Frederic II and his family, the papal victory was really a defeat. A transition from sacerdotal tutelage and spiritual unity had been long preparing. The Conqueror and Henry II in England, the rival combatants for the sicilian prize, the franconian kaisers, had all fought for the freedom of the civil power without knowing it. Roman Law opened the eyes of the Hohenstaufens, who set before themselves a definite imperial aim in which they failed.

France, not the Teutonic Empire, Reaped the Profit.—It was french logic that carried into effect the vague imperial claims, to receive the obedience of all residents as subjects direct, to abolish all mediating groups and jurisdictions, and to hold this almost absolute crown without papal sanction—or even in defiance of it. Philip [1] then, succeeded where others had only found ruin; and for the first time the pretensions of sovereignty and the modern State were clearly and frankly formulated (*1303*). The reign of force had begun—not brutal, capricious and apt to relapse into strange terror and penitence; but the steady, regular and unscrupulous force of a man who has but one end in view, to be master in his own house.[2] France, a continual asylum in the past for exiled popes now became their prison-house (*1309–1377*). A papacy localized and fettered, no longer 'the pilgrim of eternity', lost its powers and prestige and became the organ and instrument of its gaoler. The *nationalist* character of a french

[1] Philip of France or his ministers? The king's personality is very obscure and fugitive and, as in many so-called autocratic reigns, he may well have been but the mouthpiece of a strong *nationalist* and *gallican* faction.

[2] Philip, like Henry VIII, marks his independent secular reign by confiscating the Templars' estate, another instance of regal war against mediating groups and corporations, against clerical immunities of every kind.

papacy was recognized; it was no longer ecumenical. Nations and the claims of their local churches begin to be heard after *1300*.[1]

Protests Against Enslaved Papacy.—Hence the pope lost his character of impartial umpire; and a prelude or rehearsal of the Reformation is seen when (*c. 1320–1350*) german, english and italian thought united to condemn his claims in favour of a purely civil power. A striking concourse of many different minds—Marsilius the republican at Paris, William of Occam a franciscan friar, and Michael the general of that Order, followed by the Fraticelli [2], the Crown lawyers of France, and the blunt german supporters of Louis the Bavarian—all combine, from radically different standpoints, to set up a powerful secular Emperor and reduce the Pope to a mendicant friar.[3] Michael of Cesena and Occam were in open revolt against papal claims; the latter set the Bible over the church, and maintained that the pope was neither infallible as a *spiritual* ruler, nor by rights a *secular* ruler at all. The revolt was the uprising of the *secular* and (in the end) the *democratic* consciousness. Many might wish in theory to see a strong emperor whose will stood for law according to the new conceptions of authority—just as Hobbes or Machiavelli are quite content to obey a single strong ruler without having any special prejudice in favour of monarchy.

Program of Anti-Clerical Absolutism.—But Marsilius in his *Defensor* puts forth, without disguise and with plain indebtedness to roman tradition, the modern whig doctrine,—that all power comes from the people, and that the prince is but a limited magistrate. It is the whole community that makes the laws and alone can legislate and coerce; the church must be content to persuade. Clergy are subject as other men to the civil courts and must be allowed no special immunities. The right to excommunicate (as in old city-states) rests with the body of citizens taken together, not with any single priest. The magistrate, appointed by the people, names and removes bishops: of heresy he must take no cognizance unless it threatens public order. Here is the prototype of all later secular absolutism—of Henry VIII and Elizabeth, of Erastus and Grotius, of Hobbes, Rousseau and Napoleon. The claims of a spiritual power had been abso-

[1] Dante is a wibelline because he is a patriot and resents a gallican pope; in different ways Petrarch and Rienzi protest against the evils of a popedom, as much chained to civil dictation as in the feudalized period of Theophylact and the Counts of Tusculum (882–964). The *moral* commonwealth passed away from human memory, when these idealists were dead, and in its place arose the *coercive* State of modern times.

[2] A catholic recrudescence of the agelong resistance to a secularized and greedy church, which appeared in the Paulicians and their western followers, Cathars and Albigenses.

[3] The hero of the franciscan extremists was Celestinus V, whom Boniface VIII the last 'pope-emperor' had frightened into abdication; their scriptures were the writings (some being apocryphal) of Abbot Joachim (+ 1202); and their chief tenets, the 'Eternal' and spiritual 'Gospel', the ending of Antichrist and the carnal church of Babylon, and belief in a new outpouring of the Holy Ghost. See pages 777 to 784.

lutely denied, but, so far from being abolished, were merely transferred intact to the new ruler—whether *prince* acting for people or *people* acting for themselves. In a moment the whole *spiritual* basis of authority vanished: in its place we have *utility*, or *common consent*, or the *will* of an unlimited sovereign—chosen by the people for this very purpose, to reduce all to a dead level of uniformity and rule, like his real model the greek tyrant, with stern impartiality.

Rienzi, the Black Death, the Golden Bull: Return from Avignon.—The Conciliar Period (which shows Marsilius' views in active operation) was hurried on, first by avignonese finance, next by the scandal of the Great Schism.[1] It must not be forgotten that the papacy (though now 'gallican') was still looked upon as the central treasury of Christendom and the war-chest against Islam. No believer felt as yet any right to refuse to contribute. It was still so far international and democratic, standing at the pinnacle of a hierarchy where the loftiest places were freely open to merit and ability. But it had now pushed this internationalism to extremes: absentee foreigners held, often in plurality, the best benefices of the northern and eastern kingdoms. The middle of cent. xiv was marked by the appearance of Rienzi and by the Black Death (*1347*, *1348*). The failure of the one, the colossal ravages of the other, did much to lower the moral temperature and administer a death-blow to idealism.[2] Rienzi was first and foremost an italian *nationalist* of the federal type; a Latin League, with an elected Latin Emperor, was his original scheme. So far had he progressed from Dante's *universal* and holy monarchy; the nearer and more concrete had replaced the older and wider visions. At the same moment the *Golden Bull* (*1355*) showed that Germany repented of her long imperialism; Charles IV seems implicitly to recognize the impassable frontier of the Alps and to resign the costly intervention in matters italian. While France and England were fighting to the death in the disastrous Hundred Years' War, the pope renounced his gallicanism and after a tentative visit (*1368*) to Rome, returned there finally to reside in *1377*. No general feeling that the papal estate was sacrosanct could have preserved it in that unscrupulous age of Hawkwood, the Visconti, the Free Companies.[3] It was necessary that the pope should visibly 'take

[1] John XXII was largely to blame for the oppressive system which already formed an economic grievance (to such countries as England and Germany) and was the real cause of the 'Reformation' after 1500.

[2] The contrast of the two governments of Rienzi is most remarkable; always vain and theatrical, he is yet in his first period a high-minded tribune, but in the latter, merely a variant or eccentric instance of the italian tyrant: his death was an early instance of the 'justifiable homicide' of an elected ruler, who according to the new doctrines (destined to bear such terrible fruit) had forfeited by abuse of power, not merely the rights of a *monarch* but even the rights of a *man*.

[3] It is notable that Florence (just as in Machiavelli's time) protested against the pope's return, so long demanded by Italians: 'it would destroy 'all hopes of italian freedom.'

seisin ' of his realm and capital. But with his return the character of the papacy once more undergoes change : the pope whose *spiritual* freedom has been seen to depend on *territorial* independence throughout the sojourn at Avignon, tends now to become an italian princeling of the usual pattern, anxious to establish a real authority instead of the old shadowy *dominium*, and secretly conspiring in a celibate church to found a dynasty.

Protests of Nationalism : Belief in Parliament.—The Great Schism (*1378*) was in part a protest of nationalities against a power which had long been a slave or a partizan. As France had entertained its own private pontiff for nearly 70 years, might not each principal division of Europe have its own separate head ? The ecumenical empire was in fact gone, why should not a supernatural papacy follow it ? But there prevailed, in this Conciliar Age, a *democratic* rather than a *monarchic* tendency. The Church was to have parliament as its chief organ ; General Councils were to rule rather than one man. It was clear that under such a system the laity would predominate. In the divided allegiance the divisions of peoples ran on *political* rather than on *religious* lines. In the early years of cent. xv, Europe had become tired of the papal conflict. In *1406*, the popes of Rome and Avignon agreed to resign but neither would take the irrevocable step before his rival. Just a quarter of a century before, Langenstein, a german at Paris, had written *Consilium Pacis* (*1381*) an impersonal title which points a real contrast to Occam's treatise. He showed that only a Convocation or Assembly could decide between rival claims in the papal *dyarchy* or appease the schism which had ruined the old exclusive and imperious *monarchy*. The cardinals in *1408* withdrew their allegiance from both popes and themselves summoned the Council of Pisa (*1409*).

Overt Denial of Monarchy : Victory of Constitutionalism.—This aristocratic convention was unique and revolutionary. It was not merely an act of rebellion against a pope, but a real denial of this monarchical principle altogether, a blow at centralized authority. Cardinals appeared with full powers to judge, accuse and condemn their popes : laymen joined with them in a final verdict depriving and deposing both claimants. Gerson reinforced the general thesis, put forward by Marsilius many years back, by maintaining that, while a pope was in any case subject to a General Council, the church could do without a pope altogether. This was distinctly a second rehearsal of the reformation. After the brief reign of Alexander V the Council made Baltazar Cossa pope as John XXIII. But the election was not a happy one for the party of reform, and in *1411* Emperor Sigismund decided to call a second Council at Constance. In this great assembly (*1414–15*), of pomp and numbers unparalleled, the voting was taken by nations, not by members present (in which case the roman bishops would have turned the scale). John XXIII escaped and Cardinal Zabarella carried Gerson's principle, that the Council was superior to the Pope. John was formally deposed *1415*. Gregory XII resigned ; Benedict XIII (Pedro di Luna) was quietly ignored till *1417*. The ' parliamentary ' movement issuing from Paris under Gerson and Alliacus had won its case : the papacy was now a constitutional monarchy : councils summoned every five years were to be the real governors of the church.

New Social Peril from Heresy : Hus and Jerome Condemned.—Such a liberal system could now turn with assurance against heretics and antinomians—both in England and Bohemia. It was one thing to fetter the arbitrary powers of a pope, another to allow the inroads of Wiclif and Hus, whose principles were represented as subverting the social order itself. The social aspect of heresy or of schism must never be forgotten in dealing with medieval persecution : the people were as timorous and suspicious of secret or unusual cults as the heathens of Rome and the provinces in the first three centuries. With the wild charges levelled impartially against early Christians, gnostics, cathars, albigenses, templars, we have nothing to do here. But it is fair to remind ourselves of the grounds of the panic and cruelty which (as in the case of later witchcraft) disgraced a civilized society. So long as the primitive notion of Church-State survives, such action will be not merely natural but justified.[1] Where this strong conviction waxes feebler, it is not hard to associate new doctrine with new social usage ; and the people are by nature staunch conservatives and, if they demand the most violent changes, do so in the name of the reform of recent abuses and a return to the ' good old days '. Lollards (it was thought) had menaced the whole social fabric under Richard II. They were implicated in all the agrarian tumults and disorder of the reign. They had formally denounced (*1395*) in a petition the doctrine of the mass, clerical celibacy, monkish vows, confession and prayers for the dead. Persecution came into fashion with the new century and the insecure dynasty of Henry IV purchased church support by allowing it. The College of Prague had caught the infection from refugees : all dogma, discipline and authority were threatened : Hus was condemned to death in *1415*, Jerome the next year.[2]

Parliament and the People having Won their Case Vanish : Demand for Absolutism.—Martin V, a Colonna and an italian prince as well as a pontiff, passed south into the charmed circle of the Renaissance, into an atmosphere where the rude blasts of teutonic grievance could not

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[1] I cannot do better than quote Dr. Margoliouth : ' The better the ' order of the community, the less chance has a prophet. The execution ' of Socrates took place after a legal trial, in the most highly civilized and ' most tolerant State of antiquity. The charge was that Socrates did not ' worship the city's gods and shook other people's belief in them . . . ' Some citizens of Bagdad a few months ago (1914) clamoured for the ' execution of a man who preached the equalization of the sexes in defiance ' of the Coran. People suppose that the favour of the gods is necessary ' for the well-being of their communities : if the gods are offended, their ' vengeance falls, not upon the individual offender, but upon the community, ' taking the form of plague, famine or defeat in war. Hence it is with the ' view of self-preservation that the community defends the honour of its ' gods.'

[2] Dr. Barry, the learned and impartial historian of the papacy says : ' According to the judicial procedure which then prevailed, their trial was fair and their sentence merited.'

penetrate. The Reformation was not understood as a serious movement by the Romans until nearly a third of Europe was in schism, until the Sack of Rome (*1527*) sobered society and its rulers by a sudden and terrible shock. But the most curious feature of the ' parliamentary ' epoch, which the Councils had ushered in, was the disappearance of Parliament. No sooner had the rights of Christendom in council over the pope been established, than they were repudiated or forgotten or spurned with impunity. We find a striking analogy nearer our own age : after ' freedom ' was restored in the ' Glorious Revolution ' of *1689*, it was out of fashion for a century, and at no time in english history (it may safely be said) did the people at large exact so little influence or control over their governors as in cent. xviii. The victory of titular independence seemed in both cases a last expiring effort rather than the first step in a serious movement towards any real autonomy. Freedom of this or that group was both the pride and the disadvantage of the Middle Ages. Everywhere the central power was checked, not merely by its own financial weakness, but by every species of contract, franchise, charter, immunity, Diets, Estates. The period saw the culmination of constitutional counterpoises. Representation (of classes and interests rather than of heads) was the rule not the exception. But cent. xv which began with the conciliar triumph of ' parliament ' witnessed also the extinction of this form of government. In France, armagnac feuds and the national demand for a strong ruler produced the typical ' italian ' tyrant, Louis XI. The Lancastrian Parliament, which recovered its rights over a feeble and usurping house, lost all power or credit during the dynastic feuds under Henry VI and Edward IV : a ' tyrant's ' policy of confiscation enabled both York and Tudor sovereigns to avoid meeting their Commons with unwelcome demands for money. Parliament became a mere instrument of despotism. The most highly civilized towns of Italy were in the hands of ' tyrants '—Rimini, Bologna, Milan, Ferrara, Perugia, Florence (with some reserve).

Everywhere Democratic Claims Abandoned : Papacy an Italian Princedom.—Side by side with the culture and art of the Renaissance, there rose up a system of government which Machiavelli only codified but did not invent. He only drew a picture from life and passed it on a handbook of the ruler's art. The absolute defeat of constitutionalism is the feature of the century, at the very time when public knowledge, opinion, and interest in passing events were much increased in nearly every country. The notable triumph of secular government, untrammelled by moral or clerical restraint,[1] resulted in part from fear of the church and of feudalism: both systems were irksome checks upon the chief factor in social evolution, wealth and commerce. Principles of democracy seem everywhere abandoned, not least rapidly in the popedom itself. The church as an international system had been open to the very humblest class and until cent. xv the poorest monk had a chance of becoming head of Christendom. But we see now the continuous influence of certain papal families, exerted without any general scandal. Yet the Conciliar Age dragged out an un-

[1] Of which nothing but strength and success were demanded.

honoured existence. The Council of Basel sat for eighteen years (*1431-1449*), a democratic assembly, unwelcome survival in an age of a new and refined aristocracy.[1] Pius II (Æneas Sylvius) called it in contempt an assembly of cooks and stable-boys; both in its claims, its length of tenure its anachronism, and its futility, it resembled our own Long Parliament just two centuries later.[2] The Conciliar Movement died at the last sitting of Basel (*1449*); Constantinople[3] fell to the Turks four years later. At the same time (*1452*) the few traditions of roman 'freedom' were extinguished in the execution of Porcaro the last municipal republican, and with Cardinal Nicolas of Brixen expired the last hopes of internal reform, the last moderate protest from the teutonic spirit north of the Alps. The papacy assumes more and more the features of an italian 'tyranny' disguised by greek refinement. Yet freedom owes a real debt to the popes, who saved Rome from falling to France or Spain and permitted a liberty of thought and expression (as well as of morals) from which rationalism has since derived its chief weapons.[4] The great spiritual ideals, papacy and empire, are now to be seen as mere appendages to personal interests and without ecumenical significance. Charles V used for dynastic ends

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[1] It is clear that, in this and later times, *papal nepotism* was justified by popular opinion as providing at least some stability through trustworthy ministers—in an age when no one could believe another man's word. Nepotism not only enabled a pope to survive secret plots or poison, but gave respite from the baronial lawlessness of the earlier Middle Age which the Romans never forgot.

[2] We may here make clear one point of importance: that parliament and the puritans, so far from establishing principles current to-day, defended a cause already lost. Central government was perhaps unhappily entrusted to Charles I, to Laud and Strafford: but the puritans (like a feudal party of old) fought for a weak executive, and again wished to restore a clerical tyranny. Cromwell avenged Charles I as a king, though he executed him as a man and a rival. Parliament never afterwards regained either the confidence of the people or its own independence: and when reform in 1832 released it from subservience to a few noble families (amongst whom the central government and sovereignty were put in commission), the Ministers of the Crown soon began to look past a popular house to the people themselves. Nor is it difficult to-day to see that this people prefers a dictator to a council or a cabinet.

[3] The entrance of the Turks was in large measure due to *religious* feuds: the power and prestige of the byzantine monarchy had been shattered by the latin buccaneers in 1204; two and a half centuries later the Turks seized the headquarters of the Greek Church, which catholic Europe would not help in spite of some passionate appeals from the Renaissance popes, among whom Pius II calls for honourable mention.

[4] Dr. Barry does not utter a perverse paradox when he says: 'Rome for nearly 300 years remained the one free spot in southern Europe, as Holland became the free meeting-place of the protestant north.'

the still remaining prestige of the empire; but he was only following the example set by the popes after Pius II.

New Ideals in Charles VIII., Savonarola, Cæsar Borgia.—The close of the century is notable for two political experiments, the willing submission of Italy to a foreign king (a dominion which however crumbled at his first defeat *1495*) and a striking attempt at practical theocracy. The Florentines gave a ready welcome to Charles VIII of France, and Savonarola was among the deputies who invited him to enter; italian cities always preferred a supreme administrator who had nothing to do with the place and recognized no party ties.[1] A free people received as their patron a foreign king, just as the papacy rose to power by investing a frankish foreigner with the patriciate (*800*). The 'summer-king's' reign passed in a night, and Florence made trial of a theocracy under a friar preaching a stern morality in a wanton and sceptical age,—a forerunner of Calvin, Knox and the scottish presbyters: he too fell a victim like Rienzi (*1498*) and the pope Alexander VI had won a double victory over national unity (achieved it is true by a foreign dominion) and the cause of reform. This strange pontiff gave the next four years of his life to the revival of Theophylact's old feudal policy (*c. 900*): Cæsar Borgia's conquest of Romagna was to found a family to which the popedom might be attached.[2] For a moment it seemed even possible that Cæsar might unite Italy under a single king; the title or antecedents of a papal bastard made no difference in an unprejudiced age which paid homage only to beauty, cleverness, and success. The deaths of father and son put an end to a scheme which in part depended on the backing of papal prestige. Julius II also desired to see the french or franks turn their backs on Italy and held that Italy's hope lay in a strong secular papacy.[3] But on his death once again a frankish policy prevailed and the concordat was signed with Francis I (*1516*).

Luther and the New Hierocracy: Subjectivity only Begets Authority in a Fresh Form.—The recent papal recovery as a secular power reinforcing spiritual claims, without doubt helped to hurry Luther into rebellion: the objects attacked were italian supremacy and financial pressure.[4]

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[1] It is hardly needful to point out the *foreign* origin of most historic dynasties, which are rarely 'prophets in their own country'; also the *patronal* basis of most royal claimants, who appear as a welcome relief from internal feud and oscillating factions: hence *cum domino pax ista venit* and, again and again, the 'people love to have it so'.

[2] Who can wonder if somewhere about this time Maximilian dreamt of annexing the *papacy* to the *empire*?

[3] That italian unity was not then achieved has been by some charged to the discredit of Venice; which steadily and stealthily opposed his policy, to her own hurt and the further disunion of Italy.

[4] Like Nestorius, Luther was only slowly and reluctantly impelled to the extreme position: he had conciliar warranty for holding that by *itself* a papal decree was not security enough; in 1517 he did not deny that Indulgences might be good in themselves; in 1520 he burnt Leo's Bull in

The final breach (*1520*) opened the way for new theories of church and of government. In place of a priesthood conferring (or withholding) sacramental *grace*, *faith* in the Saviour became the chief Christian dogma and origin of salvation. Ordinances and outward forms became superfluous, as long ago in the Paulicians' eyes: and though the motive was personal *mystical* and (in theory) democratic, yet the reformed system when applied to a large and ignorant mass involved the supremacy of preachers who, like Savonarola or Knox, 'dictated laws from the pulpit'. At last the mystical subjectivity, which hitherto the church had known so well how to control and utilize in legitimate channels, united with a purely secular movement 'of the purse', and in a large part of Europe won the day. Catholic 'realism' was wholly set aside when the old donatist tenet was revived that the individual believers, added together one by one, made the church, and not the church the individual believers. If the Christian makes the church, the church does not make the Christian; it is a later result or merely a convenient collective name, which must never deceive us into giving vitality to a mere abstraction. This was Nominalism *in excelsis*, long heralded by the new induction of individualism, which in worlds of *thought* and *nature* alike had been introduced in cent. xiii and xiv.[1] Individual or atomic *freedom*, without necessary corporate union, cannot fail to produce *Authority* in another and intenser form.

Catastrophe of the Secularized Papacy: Henry VIII and the New Democratic Absolutism.—The last scene in the Drama of the Renaissance Papacy shows the pope Clement VII (Medici) allied once more with France against Charles V, a parody of the old captivity at Avignon. When his ally was captured by the emperor it is said that the pope absolved him from the oath to keep the treaty (which restored the king's freedom), and

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public; five years later he declared against the conventual and cœnobite system; and by that time he had (no doubt with some unwillingness) allowed his eager followers to deny certain aspects and efficacies of the Mass.

[1] All the genuine and basic tenets of the Reformation may be found in the *Ship of Fools* by Sebastian Brant, chancellor of Strasburg (Basel, 1494). Though he satirizes the clergy he is earnest in tone and exhorts man never to forget eternity and salvation: he does not refer to the church as granting pardon or imparting grace; reference to confession is scanty: virgins and saints are not named as intercessors; there is no emphasis on the need of sacraments. The lesson is plainly taught that man *deals with God directly* without mediation of priest or ordinance: to Him alone he is responsible, 'to his own master he standeth or falleth'. Classical history supplies instances of the good and noble life, of wisdom consisting in obedience (to natural law) and upright conduct: instead of apostles and saints, we are asked to look at the examples of Hercules and Penelope, Pythagoras and Socrates, Plato and Virgil. A *german* scholar of the Renaissance thus leads the way in formulating some of the chief tenets of the new faith: but, no doubt, not the most important of all, salvation by *faith*, rather than by *works* or (pagan or pelagian) virtue.

renewed the alliance. Clement also tried to bribe Charles' general, Pescara, to desert. Fighting partly like the Borgia for family ends, partly also in the interest of italian freedom, Clement exasperated Charles and led events onward to the irretrievable catastrophe of the Sack of Rome. In the humiliation of the pope, in sacrilegious outrages in Rome, Lutherans were invited to join by the emperor's captains ; and they did so wth hearty good will. Both in *1526* and *1527* the capital of Christendom was assaulted, taken by storm and plundered. A medici pope and a catholic emperor gave Rome over to lutheran pillage. The spirit of the Holy See, not merely of the pope, was broken. He consented to crown his enemy in *1530*, and promised to call a Council. Charles made gracious concessions to the Lutherans at Nuremberg (*1532*) ; and on Clement's death, in *1534*, nearly half Christendom was in rebellion against the papal system. Just six months before his death (that is, on March 24), the pope confirmed the Rota Tribunal's decree that Henry VIII's marriage with Katharine was valid and indissoluble. The answer came in the denial of papal supremacy, the final rupture of England with Rome, and the elevation of a secular king to be the ruler of a national church. Cranmer as Primate had given leave for the divorce in May, *1533* ; and it was now openly claimed that the king had final jurisdiction in spiritual matters. Convocation and Parliament hastened to heap new titles and prerogatives on the King, and in England the ideal of Machiavelli had been realized.

Reformers Aggrandise the New Tyranny : Cruel Penalties for Treason and Heresy.—This wholesale transfer, not entirely under compulsion, of power to the state-sovereign—not by a timid mob but by men of prudence and intellect—is the salient feature of cent. xvi. Everywhere submission to authority was preached, not merely by rulers but by able spokesmen from the subject class. It was therefore clear that religious freedom and tolerance was not the aim for which Reformers strove, but religious supremacy for a new and better system (it was hoped) of dogma and discipline. Whatever promises to other dissenters may be made (or broken), every formal confession or decree of the reformed churches makes for absolute control of religion by the State. In England a king (of the italian type) is supreme head of the church : Luther is asking fresh powers for the territorial prince ; Calvin will write his *Institutes* and dedicate a notable work of learning and logic to a french catholic despot ; Ignatius composes for the new militant Order of Jesuits his *Spiritual Exercises* ; the Council of Trent will soon close up by formal and vigorous definition every avenue still left open to private judgment ; the protestant churches will retaliate by Prayer-books often recast by civil authority, by Augsburg Confessions, or Thirty-nine Articles, or Westminster Catechisms. Everywhere the old polity of tradition gives way before a feverish desire for paper constitutions, and for a strong executive—two things clearly irreconcilable. The fervour of a faith, no doubt often vague and uncertain of aim, has surrendered to fixity and formula. The Jesuits form a new order on the lines of a strict military obedience to an autocrat ; the model was no longer a secluded order of monks or even a brotherhood of preaching friars but the ' free company ' of *condottieri* under an absolute captain. Every sect (except

the socinian) accepted the duty of persecution: to be of a different faith from the ruler's was to be a traitor amenable to laws of treason, growing daily more and more cruel. Catholics sincerely maintain the need of defending the social order against the infection of anarchy, the moral law (inseparable to them from conformity and right belief) against antinomian licence. Protestants of all phases of thought demanded that the civil magistrates should abolish false doctrine and the 'idolatry of the Mass'.[1]

Passive Obedience—(not a Legacy from Medieval Catholicism).—All early Reformers inculcated *passive obedience* to rulers; and everywhere, by a natural process, these civil rulers were being invested with spiritual, or at least with clerical, powers. Some proposed to submit the prince to the ruling of the state-clergy and most refused him any competence in defining dogma; but in the end the church-establishment was in a real degree a subsidiary department of the new absolute State; not, as in the Middle Age, its superior, or at least its counterpoise. Thus by a curious irony the movement toward a purely spiritual and invisible church of personal belief and assurance degraded religion into a province of the State: the essential element was outward conformity and obedience to a visible and no less autocratic official body. But Luther discarded the idea of a coercive Establishment, and the new hierarchic claims are best seen in Calvin's writings.

Anti-Monarchic Reaction: Revival of Republic and Parliamentarism.—Reform was a movement of the middle class, of the industrial townsfolk; it was utilized by kings and nobles for their own ends; but it distrusted these allies. Underneath professions of obedience and appeals to Holy Writ, it tended to undermine government and to claim a democratic equality of urban burgesses who might elect their ministers but were then to be governed by them. It is idle to deny that in the end reform on these lines became *anti-monarchic*. Stuarts both in Scotland and England might be pardoned for holding firmly to a belief in this anarchic tendency. The Huguenots with their exempt citadels and strongholds, were a menace to any notion of a united and centralized France; the Beggars in the Netherlands, the Presbytery in Scotland, Calvin's imitation of Savonarola in Geneva—may be cited in support. Neither Calvin nor his fellow-townsman Rousseau in later times would allow much scope to a regal executive; both believed in lodging absolute power in an assembly representing (or claiming to represent) the entire community.

Council of Trent Reverts to the Monarchical Principle.—The Council of Trent (sitting for 6 years in the period *1545–1564*) learnt much from the systems and policies of its enemies: *fas est et ab hoste doceri*. It organized

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[1] Even Melancthon joins Luther, Calvin and Knox, recording his vote for civil interference against popery '*non enim plectitur fides sed* hæresis', and what was heresy is determined by the State; he held that stubborn Anabaptists should be put to death. Beza thinks the death penalty should be exacted from all who denied the Trinity. Calvin acted on this principle in the notable case of Servetus (1553) and himself wrote a *Defence of the Orthodox Faith showing that heretics ought to be punished by the sword.*

anew the services of defence or aggression, and (once more) submitted the church wholly to a papal autocracy like an army under a general: there was no more talk of conciliar government. But this does not in the least imply an arbitrary or purely personal power, to be lodged in the pope: quite the reverse. It is indeed the first aim of a formal Absolutism to safeguard itself against such an exercise or misuse of authority. The church had seen enough of a genuine personal autocracy, in the italian princelings or ambitious spaniards who somehow became possessed of the tiara and used it for selfish or dynastic aims. The real power was to reside (as in democratic cabinets to-day) in a small central committee, receiving news by the new 'secret service' of the Jesuit Order. Neither France nor Spain for all their professed devotion to the Holy See, regarded this development with favour. Although the pope was in theory absolute, a State could no longer treat with him personally as an autocrat, nor had he any longer a personal policy or (with rare exceptions) a will of his own. The great catholic powers were as anxious as the protestant that there should be no real revival of Theocracy.[1]

Civil State ceases to Recognize Religion or Morality.—In all this confusion of sentiment, policies and ideals, amid the belated survivals of medieval conceptions in most unsuspected quarters, passed away the period of the Wars of Religion. Westphalia (*1648*) put an end finally to many of the old pretexts and decent disguises. Hobbes at the same moment taught that, though the modern State must be absolute at the centre and religion a subordinate province, the State had in truth nothing to do with belief or personal religion at all. To-day we wonder if it has been able to retain any connexion with morality.

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[1] Just as it is strange to find Voltaire writing in earnest defence of the Jesuits, so we wonder at the threat of Paul IV (a Caraffa from Naples 1555–1559) to depose Philip II of Spain and deprive him of both his crowns! Philip, like his father, did not scruple to send troops under the duke of Alva against Rome.

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